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A bstract
Recently the use of formal methods in describing and analysing the behaviour of (computer) sys­
tems has become more common. This has resulted in the proliferation of a wide variety of different 
specification formalisms, together with analytical techniques and methodologies for specification 
development. The particular specification formalism adopted for this study is LOTOS, an ISO 
standard formal description technique. Although there are many works dealing with how to write 
LOTOS specifications and how to develop a LOTOS specification from the initial abstract re­
quirements specification to concrete implementation, relatively few works are concerned with the 
problems of expressing and proving the correctness of LOTOS specifications, i.e. verification. The 
main objective of this thesis is to address this shortfall by investigating the meaning of verificar 
tion as it relates to concurrent systems in general, and in particular to those systems described 
using LOTOS. Further goals are to automate the verification process using equational reasoning 
and term rewriting, and also to attempt to make the results of this work, both theoretical and 
practical, as accessible to LOTOS practitioners as possible.
After introducing the LOTOS language and related formalisms, the thesis continues with a 
survey of approaches to verification of concurrent systems with a view to identifying those ap­
proaches suitable for use in verification of properties of systems specified using LOTOS. Both 
general methodology and specific implementation techniques are considered. As a result of this 
survey, two useful approaches are identified. Both are based on the technique of expressing the 
correctness of a LOTOS specification by comparison with another, typically more abstract, spec­
ification. The second approach, covered later in the thesis, uses logic for the more abstract 
specification. The main part of the thesis is concerned with the first approach, in which both 
specifications are described in LOTOS, and the comparison is expressed by a behavioural equiv­
alence or preorder relation. This approach is further explored by means of proofs based on the 
paradigm of equational reasoning, implemented by term rewriting.
Initially, only Basic LOTOS (i.e. the process algebra) is considered. A complete (i.e. confluent 
and terminating) rule set for weak bisimulation congruence over a subset of Basic LOTOS is 
developed using RRL (Rewrite Rule Laboratory). Although fully automatic, this proof technique 
is found to be insufficient for anything other than finite toy examples. In order to give more 
power, the rule set is supplemented by an incomplete set of rules expressing the expansion law. 
The incompleteness of the rule set necessitates the use of a strategy in applying the rules, as 
indiscriminate application of the rules may lead to non-termination of the rewriting. A case study 
illustrates the use of these rules, and also the effect of different interpretations of the verification 
requirement on the outcome of the proof.
This proof technique, as a result of the deficiencies of the tool on which it is based, has two
major failings: an inability to handle recursion, and no opportunity for user control in the proof. 
Moving to a different tool, PAM (Process Algebra Manipulator), allows correction of these faults, 
but at the cost of automation. The new implementation acts merely as computerised pencil and 
paper, although tactics can be defined which allow some degree of automation. Equations may be 
applied in either direction, therefore completion is no longer as important. (Note that the tactic 
language could be used to describe a a complete set of rules which would give an automatic proof 
technique, therefore some effort towards completion is still desirable. However, since LOTOS 
weak bisimulation congruence is undecidable, there can never be a complete rule set for deciding 
equivalence of terms from the full LOTOS language.) The composition of the rule set is re­
considered, with a view to using alternative axiomatisations of weak bisimulation congruence: two 
main axiomatisations are described and their relative merits compared. The axiomatisation of 
other LOTOS relations is also considered. In particular, we consider the pitfalls of axiomatising 
the cred  preorder relation.
In order to demonstrate the use of the PAM proof system developed, the case study, modified 
to use recursion, is re-examined. Four other examples taken from the literature, one substantial, 
the others fairly small, are also investigated to further demonstrate the applicability of the PAM 
proof system to a variety of examples.
The above approach considers Basic LOTOS only; to be more generally applicable the verifi­
cation of properties of full LOTOS specifications (i.e. including abstract data types) must also be 
studied. Methods for proving the equivalence of full LOTOS specifications are examined, includ­
ing a modification of the technique used successfully above. The application of this technique is 
illustrated via proofs of the equivalence of three variants of the well-known stack example. The 
proofs are carried out by hand as neither of the implementation tools used above are able to handle 
data types. The approaches of other authors to verification of full LOTOS specifications are also 
described and illustrated by examples in order to propose an approach to verification comprising 
several complementary techniques.
Finally, the verification of LOTOS specifications where the abstract requirements axe expressed 
using temporal/modal logic is briefly considered. Specific reference is made to the existing linear 
temporal logic used in conjunction with LOTOS and also to the use of HML (Hennessy-Milner 
Logic) in conjunction with CCS. The possibility of using HML with Basic LOTOS is discussed 
at length, with examples drawn from earlier in the thesis. Also considered is the possibility of 
extending the logic for use with full LOTOS. Both of these proposals require further investigation.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
1.1 B ackground
The last few years have seen an increasing interest in the use of formal methods in the design 
and analysis of computer systems. By formal methods, we mean the application of mathematical 
concepts to the modelling of a real world problem. Most commonly this means the use of a formal 
specification language, i.e. one which has a formal mathematical semantics, to describe the system. 
The use of formal methods allows us to build a (simplified) mathematical model of a real world 
phenomenon which can then be analysed using mathematical techniques. The results gained can 
then be used to deduce results about the properties of the real world system. Of course, the 
applicability of these results to the real world system is highly dependent on the accuracy of our 
mathematical model.
Use of formal methods can aid practitioners in two main ways. Firstly, by virtue of their math­
ematical basis, formal specifications allow clear, precise and unambiguous descriptions of a system; 
moreover, descriptions can be written without reference to implementation issues. Secondly, the 
existence of formal semantics for the specification language makes rigorous mathematical anal­
ysis, i.e. verification, of the specification possible. Such analysis can improve confidence in the 
correctness of the design and/or implementation. It may also lead to a better/deeper understand­
ing of the system, especially in cases where the analysis detects some (non-trivial) error in the 
specification.
A variety of different specification formalisms are in current use in many different areas of ap­
plication, e.g. VDM, Z, denotational semantics, petri nets, finite state automata, process algebras, 
. . . .  Although the choice seems endless, it may be narrowed down by the requirements of the area 
of application. We are interested in the verification (and therefore the specification) of concurrent 
systems. For this application area, a popular means of specification is process algebra. Promi­
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nent examples of process algebras include ACP [BK84], CCS [Mil80, Mil89b], CIRCAL [Mil85], 
CSP [Hoa85], SCCS (Synchronous CCS) [Mil89b], and MEIJE [AB84]. They are prominent be­
cause of popularity, i.e. used in many applications and studies, both academic and industrial, or 
theoretical significance, e.g. it has been shown in [dS85] that SCCS and MEIJE are universal pro­
cess algebras, in the sense that all other process algebras can be described in terms of SCCS or 
MEIJE.
It should be realised that universality is not necessarily a desirable feature of a language. 
While a universal process algebra is able to describe every sort of system, it may be that these 
descriptions are clumsy. More importantly, because it is so general, the theory for verification 
may be less rich than if we used a language which has a smaller scope and is perhaps specifically 
designed for our purpose. For this reason neither of the universal process algebras mentioned 
above are considered further here. The matter of why variety is important in process algebras is 
further discussed in [BBH+91].
Another consideration not mentioned above is standardisation. Although the formalisms above 
are of academic significance, they have not been widely adopted for industrial use. For interna­
tionally standardised specification formalisms we must look to ISO (the International Standards 
Organisation).
One of the tasks undertaken by ISO is the development of open systems which will provide 
a uniform framework for communication throughout the world. This means that the protocols 
controlling communication must behave in exactly the same way whenever and wherever they are 
executed, regardless of local variables such as implementation language, machine architecture and 
physical location.
The focal point of the standardisation process is the seven layer Reference Model [IS074] 
which describes the interaction between systems in an abstract, implementation independent way. 
Obviously, given the aims of ISO, the first essential is to have a specification which cannot be 
interpreted in any way other than that intended by the specifier, implying the use of a formal 
specification language. With this in mind, ISO have introduced three internationally standard 
formal description techniques (fdts) to support the Reference Model: Estelle [ISO90], SDL [CCI88] 
and LOTOS [IS088]. These are to be used to give formal specifications of the services and protocols 
which make up the Reference Model. [Vis90] gives a historical overview of the development of 
these languages and related standards, and [Tur93] gives an introduction to, and comparison of, 
the languages.
Support for the formal description techniques is provided in the form of European research and 
development projects. In the past these projects have resulted in development methodologies and 
analytical tools for the fdts. Initially the projects were joint ventures, encompassing all three fdts, 
for example, the SEDOS project [vEVD89]. More recently, as interest in the different languages has
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grown, the projects have been specific to particular fdts, e.g. LOTOSPHERE [vSPV92]. Following 
this lead, we also concentrate on just one of the fdts, LOTOS, for the following reasons.
The LOTOS language has two parts: process algebra, which can be used to specify the control 
aspect of a system, and abstract data type, which can be used to specify the data manipulated 
by the system. The process algebra part was developed from the formalisms CCS and CSP; this 
allows us to link our study to both academic and industrial concerns. The theory behind CCS 
and CSP is now well developed, and there is a wide literature on many aspects of analysis of CCS 
and CSP specifications. Due to the close relationship between these formalisms and LOTOS it 
may be possible to transfer results obtained for these formalisms to the LOTOS setting. Our main 
reason for choosing to study LOTOS rather than CCS or CSP is its status as an international 
standard. We cannot investigate all aspects of the definition and application of LOTOS in one 
thesis, therefore we concentrate on verification of properties of LOTOS specifications.
The fdts of ISO were all designed with specification in mind; therefore the expressivity of the 
language was given more importance than the simplicity of the semantics. While specification in 
itself is a valuable undertaking, providing clear descriptions and perhaps a better understanding 
of the system, ideally, from our point of view, more emphasis should be put on methods for 
checking the correctness of a specification. The more expressive a language is, the more complex 
the semantics, and the harder it becomes to verify correctness of specifications in that language. 
Verification really needs to be considered right from the first stages of specification, rather than 
tackled after specification is completed; this point is made in [HJOP89]. This conflict between 
the expressive power of the language and the simplicity of its semantics is particularly relevant 
to LOTOS, which is encumbered by a verbose syntax, making analyses longer and more tedious, 
and also obscuring the simplicity of the underlying system.
Several forms of analysis can be considered for LOTOS, including debugging, simulation, test­
ing and verification. While projects such as LOTOSPHERE have been successful in providing a 
structured development methodology together with some tool support, other aspects of the devel­
opment process have been largely ignored. In particular, although much effort has been expended 
on, for example, testing techniques, relatively little has been directed towards the problems of 
verification, particularly verification of properties of full LOTOS specifications. A desire to rectify 
this imbalance is the main aim of this thesis; more specific aims and objectives are detailed in the 
next section. We are interested in verification because it provides rigorous mathematical analysis 
of a system. While verification cannot provide 100% certainty that a system is correct, it can 
greatly increase our confidence in the general correctness of the system, and the correctness with 
respect to particular properties (assuming the properties are expressed accurately). Verification 
can give more confidence in the system than a testing method can.
Another aspect of verification is automation. Even for small systems, analysis can be tedious
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and error prone, therefore it is vital to have some sort of machine assistance. Although full 
automation of any analyses is preferable, in practice we may have to settle for partial automation.
A wide variety of methods for automation exist for different aspects of verification. We consider 
a general method of proof and automation, the paradigm of equational reasoning implemented by 
term rewriting, and consider how two forms of analysis may be carried out by equational reasoning 
and automated by term rewriting. Process algebras are all associated with sets of laws or axioms 
corresponding to different notions of equivalence, making equational reasoning a natural proof 
technique to use.
The next section details our aims and objectives in the study of verification of properties of 
LOTOS specifications.
1.2 A im s and O b jectives
The aims of this thesis are:
• to investigate the verification of concurrent systems described using the formal description 
technique LOTOS,
• to apply this knowledge by developing proof methods for verifying the correctness of LOTOS 
specifications. These methods should make use of existing proof tools rather than necessi­
tating the implementation of new software. The proof technique used will be equational 
reasoning, automated by term rewriting.
• to make the results (both theoretical and practical) of this investigation accessible to LOTOS 
practitioners.
These aims will be achieved by the following objectives:
• to build knowledge of LOTOS, the LOTOS related process algebras CCS and CSP, and their 
associated approaches to verification,
• to use this knowledge in defining what verification means for concurrent systems in general, 
and more specifically for both Basic LOTOS and full LOTOS,
• from the above study, to identify an approach to verification which can be automated using 
equational reasoning and term rewriting,
• to develop a proof system (based on existing tools) implementing that approach to verifica­
tion,
• to demonstrate the usefulness of the proof system through examples.
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We believe these aims and objectives have been largely achieved in the thesis. Although we do 
not claim to have completely investigated verification for LOTOS (we have only briefly covered 
some aspects of verification, such as the use of temporal/modal logics in specifying the requirements 
of the system1), we have thoroughly explored one aspect of verification, namely that of proving two 
specifications (both described using LOTOS) are related by a behavioural equivalence or preorder. 
This has been achieved through theoretical and practical investigations, the practical work being 
carried out using equational reasoning and term rewriting tools. The proof technique we develop 
in the thesis is illustrated through several examples, some small, others medium sized.
The following section gives a more detailed account of the work carried out.
1.3 O verview
The thesis is organised around the main topic of verification; particular questions addressed are: 
what is meant by verification, what kind of verification can be carried out on LOTOS specifications, 
how can the proofs of verification can be automated, and what do those results tell us about the 
system under examination?
Chapter 2 contains an informal discussion of what is meant by verification. The view taken 
here is that verification is the formal, mathematical expression and proof of the correctness of a 
concrete description of a system with respect to some set of (formal) requirements. Of course, 
the requirements also constitute a description of the system, at a more abstract level. As the 
two descriptions need not be expressed using the same formalism, two main cases are considered; 
the bulk of the thesis is concerned with the case in which both descriptions are expressed using 
LOTOS. An alternative case in which the concrete description is expressed in LOTOS and the 
requirements are expressed using a temporal or modal logic is considered in chapter 11.
What does verification mean in relation to systems specified using LOTOS? In order to consider 
this question a good working knowledge of the semantics of LOTOS and the ways in which LOTOS 
specifications can be compared is required. It is also helpful to have the same knowledge for CCS 
and CSP, since LOTOS was developed from these formalisms. Since both CCS and CSP have a 
rich literature, it may be possible to adapt proof techniques from either of these formalisms for 
use with LOTOS. The three formalisms, LOTOS, CCS and CSP, are presented in some detail 
in chapter 3, including a summary of their main differences (and similarities). At this point 
we consider only Basic LOTOS, which aids the comparison with CCS and CSP. Full LOTOS is 
considered in chapter 10.
The survey of the three process algebras is followed by the first detailed section on verification,
1The investigation of temporal logic in conjunction with LOTOS is the basis of a SERC funded project, “Tem­
poral Aspects of Verification of LOTOS Specifications”, which will run over the next two years.
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chapter 4. The technique of comparing two descriptions of a system where both are written using 
the same specification language is one which is commonly used in the process algebra literature. 
Many proof techniques and tools based on this approach are currently in use, and a wide variety 
of equivalence relations and/or preorders have been developed to express ways of comparing spec­
ifications. A side issue considered briefly here is the selection of the most appropriate relation for 
a given problem.
The available proof techniques and tools are surveyed, compared and considered for use in 
conjunction with LOTOS. Although there are some fast algorithms for deciding equivalence of 
processes (based on graph partition algorithms), in general these do not give any intuition in the 
case where the two specifications are not equivalent (they only answer yes or no). Such algorithms 
also rely on a special internal representation of the process specifications for their calculations. 
In this work our preference is for a proof technique in which no special intermediate forms are 
required, and which may give some insight into the workings of the system under consideration, 
especially in the case in which the two specifications are not equivalent. Equational reasoning 
is such a proof technique and is adopted for use in the practical work. Equational reasoning 
is automated by term rewriting. The basic theory of term rewriting, including Knuth-Bendix 
completion, is presented in chapter 5. We also discuss the discovery of an inconsistency, which we 
found by rewriting techniques, in the laws of weak bisimulation congruence of [IS088].
Chapters 6 to 9 detail the various components of the practical work. The initial aim of the 
practical work is to form a complete (i.e. confluent and terminating) set of rewrite rules (giving a 
decision procedure) for LOTOS weak bisimulation congruence using the tool RRL (Rewrite Rule 
Laboratory). This is described in chapter 6. A complete rule set for a subset of the language is 
developed. No complete set for the full language can exist because weak bisimulation congruence 
is known to be undecidable. Several small examples of proofs by rewriting demonstrate the use 
of the rewrite rule set and also the need for rules expressing the full power of the expansion law 
(which allows parallelism to be expressed in terms of sequencing and choice). A set of rules to 
achieve this is developed. As the new set of rules is not complete, a strategy in applying the rules 
must be adopted, otherwise the rewriting may not terminate.
To illustrate the use of this verification technique, a case study is introduced in chapter 7. 
The case study has two purposes: firstly, to obtain a successful proof, using the rewrite rules 
developed with RRL, of the requirement that the specification of the system is satisfied by the 
implementation, and secondly, to discover the effect of different interpretations of this requirement 
on the outcome of the proof. It is interesting to note that under the initial, intuitive interpretation 
of the verification requirement the implementation cannot be proved to satisfy the specification. 
In the end the specification has to be altered (in a modular way, using the constraint oriented 
specification style) in order to complete the proof. As a result of this study a number of defi­
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ciencies in the original verification technique are identified; the most important is the inability to 
handle recursive processes, but also significant is the inflexibility of the RRL system and lack of 
opportunity for user intervention.
Chapter 8 introduces our second approach to using term rewriting proof techniques for ver­
ification of Basic LOTOS specifications. A different tool, PAM (Process Algebra Manipulator), 
which can perform proofs on specifications incorporating recursive processes, is adopted. This new 
power is balanced by the fact that PAM cannot perform proofs automatically; the user must guide 
every step. However, a number of tactics describing patterns of rule application may be defined, 
allowing some limited form of automation.
An important decision in setting up PAM is how to express the LOTOS laws, and indeed 
whether all laws are necessary for most examples. The relative merits of different solutions to 
this question are considered. This leads on to implementation of equivalences other than weak 
bisimulation congruence. Also discussed is the problem of axiomatising a preorder relation.
In chapter 9 the case study example is repeated (this time with recursive processes). In order 
to further show the utility of the system, a number of other examples are also presented. These 
are a simple radiation machine, the reader/writer problem, a nondeterministic candy machine and 
the scheduler. Of these, the most significant, and largest, is the radiation machine study. Proofs 
are presented of the safety (or not) of several variants of the machine; the most interesting are 
the proofs of safety. These could not be completed using PAM, as reasoning external to our proof 
system had to be employed. All of the examples are taken from the papers of other authors.
Until this point only one half of the LOTOS language has been considered; namely the pro­
cess algebra part, Basic LOTOS. However, full LOTOS also incorporates an abstract data type 
language, ACT ONE. In chapter 10 the proof technique used so far is reviewed and the question 
of how the inclusion of data types might alter the verification process is considered. The modified 
proof technique is illustrated by means of an example. Three descriptions of the stack, each with 
varying emphasis on the process algebra, are compared using weak bisimulation congruence; the 
proofs are carried out by hand. Hand proofs are normally tedious and error prone: these are no 
exception. This “feature” is only exaggerated by including data types. The technique seems of 
limited value without automation (which is not possible due to the limitations of current tools) so 
approaches by other authors to the problem of verification of full LOTOS are also surveyed. The 
two main approaches we consider both work on the principle of removing the abstract data types 
from the specification to obtain a Basic LOTOS specification, and evaluating correctness using 
the better understood Basic LOTOS proof techniques. The first approach provides a method for 
encoding the data values of a full LOTOS specification in a Basic LOTOS one, and may be varied 
to preserve some, all, or none of the data type information. The other approach is really a method 
for deriving a process algebra specification from an abstract data type specification, preserving
7
all data type information in the derivation. We illustrate both approaches by our own examples: 
one using the Stack example and a hand proof, the other using the radiation machine study of 
section 9.2 and the PAM implementation to automate the Basic LOTOS proof. In the absence 
of one really useful and generally applicable proof technique for verification of properties of full 
LOTOS specifications, it seems that a composite approach may be the best solution.
In the initial discussion of verification in chapter 2, two main approaches to verification were 
identified. Although the main approach of proving equivalence between LOTOS specifications 
was demonstrated in chapter 9 to be fairly successful for Basic LOTOS specifications, chapter 10 
showed that it is not as suitable for full LOTOS specifications. The second approach to verification 
mentioned in chapter 2 considers the situation in which one description (usually the more abstract 
specification) is written using some form of logic. This allows the desirable properties of the system 
to be described in a more abstract, less constructive manner. The current state of verification 
with respect to this approach is surveyed in chapter 11. Although a linear temporal logic has been 
developed for use in conjunction with LOTOS, it is not satisfactory as the equivalence induced by 
the logic is the rather weak trace equivalence, meaning that deadlock properties are not preserved. 
We conjecture that a variant of HML (the logic commonly used with CCS) might be adapted 
for use with Basic LOTOS; we present the logic, outline the proof technique and give some re­
specification, in logic, of earlier examples. A natural progression is to consider what sort of logic 
would be required for use with full LOTOS; we discuss this topic, illustrating the discussion by 
examples, but the possibility is not pursued. This work will be the subject of a future investigation, 
as mentioned earlier.
Finally, chapter 12 concludes our study with a discussion of what has been achieved, how far 
our work has gone towards meeting the original objectives, open problems and further work.
Four appendices are attached: appendix A consists of a survey of existing tools for verification 
of specifications written using process algebras and tools for LOTOS (proof tools and otherwise), 
appendix B presents the LOTOS syntax and semantics, and appendices C and D give the input 
files used in RRL and PAM respectively.
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C hapter 2
Verification Requirem ents I
In this chapter the meaning of the term verification is discussed, initially in the general setting 
of concurrent systems. As there are many different uses of the term in the literature, we try to 
identify what exactly we mean by verification: what it is, what it is not, and at what point in the 
development of a system verification techniques may be applied. We feel it is important to clarify 
from the outset what we understand verification to mean so that it is clear to the reader what we 
are trying to achieve in the wider aims of the thesis. The discussion of the meaning of verification 
can of course be applied to verification of properties of systems described using LOTOS, and, 
where appropriate, specific examples from the LOTOS literature are used to illustrate certain 
forms of system analysis.
2.1 W h at D o  W e M ean B y  “V erification” ?
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several different approaches to the analysis of spec­
ifications, some formal, some informal. For example, we may carry out syntactic analysis of the 
specification to ensure expressions are well formed and well typed. This sort of analysis can be 
easily carried out by machine. Indeed, machines can perform such tasks with greater accuracy 
than humans, because by hand they become tedious and errors are then easily missed.
Another form of analysis involves the use of a simulator to try to detect invalid sequences 
of events by “executing” the specification. A similar function may be carried out by performing 
a test process describing the sequence of events in parallel with the specification, synchronising 
on all events. If the test process reaches a special “test passed” event, then we know that the 
specification can perform that sequence of events. Using these simulation methods we can check 
for good or bad behaviours in a system, and correct any errors found. These forms of analysis 
involve only syntactic manipulation of the system, and have been automated for LOTOS, e.g.
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various components of the LITE toolkit [LITE]. Appendix A.4 provides a brief survey of such 
tools.
Unfortunately, due to the non-exhaustive nature of simulations and tests, all errors in a speci­
fication may not be discovered by such methods and tools. While the presence of errors in all but 
the simplest of specifications is unavoidable, there are some further analyses which may further 
reduce the number of errors left undetected. This brings us to verification.
In the literature there seems to be a great confusion over exactly what is meant by verifi­
cation: everyone has their own, slightly different, interpretation. In particular, verification is 
often confused with validation. Our understanding of these terms, supported by various sources 
[CR90, vG90, Bri88b], is as follows:
verification Formal, rigorous proofs of properties of the system by manipulations of axioms and 
known truths.
validation  A convincing demonstration of conjectures. Proof by experiment.
For example, verification may involve formal proofs of the equivalence of two specifications, or 
that a particular property holds of a given system. Validation, on the other hand, tends to be less 
formal, and includes, for example, the application of tests to an implementation, or simulation 
of a specification, until a “sufficient” number of test have been passed, or “enough” behaviour 
has been observed in the simulation. Of course “sufficient” and “enough” are highly subjective 
evaluations. Since both analyses are typically non-exhaustive, we use validation techniques to 
increase our confidence in the correctness of the system, but we can never be sure that we haven’t 
missed some important test. Therefore, although validation is useful, especially in the early stages 
of design/specification/implementation, because it is usually less time consuming than verification, 
we are more interested in verification because of its wholly formal basis.
An alternative definition of validation, found in, for example, [HJOP89], includes verification 
as a subclass of validation, i.e. the definition of validation is similar to that above, but validation 
activities consist of testing, simulation and verification. This definition is compatible with our 
own because verification retains the same meaning.
2.2 S ystem  D evelopm ent and V erification
Having settled on a definition of verification, the next question to be considered is “at which point 
in the development of a system can/should verification techniques be applied?” . To try to answer 
this question, we consider the flow of system development as put forward in figure 2.1.
We assume the Requirements are the informal requirements of the customer, written infor­
mally in a natural language, the S p ec ifica tio n  is given formally, written in any of a variety
11
Im plem entation
R equirem ents
S p e c i f i c a t io n
Figure 2.1: The Flow of System Development
of specification languages, and the Implementation is the final code of the system, written in a 
programming language.
What sort of verification can be carried out in each area?
2.2.1 R equirem ents
Since the Requirements are assumed to be informal and written in a natural language such as 
English, they are therefore ambiguous and possibly even inconsistent, so there is little to say 
about them in relation to formal proofs, i.e. we cannot rigorously and formally compare a formal 
specification with informal requirements. However, we can use formal requirements, which are 
then a form of specification, in such a proof. These formal requirements do not appear out of 
thin air; they must have their beginnings in informal thoughts about the system. We discuss this 
formalisation process below.
When the informal requirements are expressed, we expect that the user has in mind some 
aspects of the final implementation, therefore the informal requirements could be said to relate 
to a class of implementations. We then go through a process of trying to express the informal 
requirements in formal terms, thereby reducing the set of acceptable implementations by remov­
ing the ambiguity inherent in an informal description. Typically, the informal requirements may
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be interpreted in several different ways; therefore the formal requirements use the information in 
the informal requirements under one of those interpretations. One of the problems of verification 
lies in trying to interpret our informal notions of the correctness of a system. We look at this 
problem with respect to a particular example, the Login Case Study, in section 7.3. The partic­
ular informal requirement considered there is: “the implementation (of the system) satisfies the 
specification (of the system)” . Other common informal requirements include “completeness” and 
“freedom from deadlock” , which may also be transformed into formal statements; see the section 
on S p e c if ic a tio n  below.
The derivation of formal requirements from the informal ones, i.e. requirements capture, is 
being studied by others, but this field lies somewhat beyond the scope of the current document.
2.2.2 Specification
The most appealing area of system development, in terms of possibilities for verification, is that 
of S p e c ifica tio n . Given the possibility of iterations in the specification process it is useful to 
assume the existence of a sequence of specifications:
So — y  S\ — y  S2 — y  • • • — y  Sn
The arrow indicates a temporal ordering of the specifications (i.e So is the first specification 
and Sn the last) but no other relationship is assumed, i.e. 5,+i not necessarily derived from S',-. 
We expect that So will be the most abstract specification, detailing what the system must do 
without saying anything about how these actions are to be performed, while Sn will be much more 
concrete, possibly providing implementation information. So will probably be the first attempt 
at formalising the informal requirements, as described above, while Sn is the specification from 
which we might attempt to derive program code (depending on available techniques).
Given such specifications, the sorts of verification which can be carried out can be split into 
two groups:
• formally comparing two specifications, and
• proving properties of an individual specification.
We examine each of these case in more detail below.
Form al C om parison o f Tw o Specifications
We also refer to this approach to verification as satisfaction because usually we want to prove that 
one specification satisfies another. A different formalism may be used for each description, for 
example a logic for the “specification” , i.e. the more abstract description, earlier in the sequence of
13
specifications, and a process algebra for the “implementation” , i.e. the more concrete description, 
coming later in the sequence of specifications. In this case we need a proof technique relating the 
semantics of the logic to the semantics of the process algebra. This approach to verification is 
discussed in chapter 11. Note that the term “implementation” is used here in a different sense to its 
use earlier, in figure 2.1, where it denoted system code. The language used for the implementation 
here will be a formal specification language, and not a programming language, but we expect that 
the style of specification will be more concrete than that used for the other specification.
Alternatively, we might use the same language for both descriptions, but at different levels of 
abstraction, again allowing one to be viewed as the “implementation” of the other. Given two 
process algebra descriptions, there are many relations based on the observable behaviour of a 
system which can be used to express their equivalence, or perhaps that one is a refinement of the 
other. This approach to verification is discussed in detail in chapter 4.
P roving P rop erties o f  Individual Specifications
Although it is more likely that we will wish to express the correctness of a LOTOS specification 
with reference to some other specification, occasionally we want to prove particular properties hold 
of an individual specification. We note that this provides a link with the informal requirements 
as typically these properties will be expressed informally.
An example of a property we may desire a specification to have is internal consistency. For 
example, a change may have been made to the specification and we wish to ensure that this change 
does not conflict with, or contradict, the existing parts of the specification.
Another property we may desire of an individual specification is completeness, i.e. the speci­
fication describes all the things we want it to describe. This can be hard to express because we 
are asking if the specification matches an informal intuition about the system; however, we can at 
least put forward some guidelines to help.
Above we mention that logic may be used to specify a system. Although this will not be fully 
discussed until section 11, the properties which can be described by the logic may be partitioned 
into two classes: safety properties and liveness properties. This classification can help express 
the completeness of a specification because we may have some informal criteria such as “the 
specification should satisfy safety and liveness properties” . Then, if the specification says nothing 
about liveness, this is probably an omission, since it should say something about liveness.
For example, the trivial process which does nothing satisfies the liveness property of termi­
nation, but obviously does no useful work. Similarly, the divergent process satisfies all safety 
properties of the form “when the process terminates, P  holds” because it never terminates. Only 
the liveness property of termination forces the specification to describe useful work.
Completeness of a specification can also be partially checked by testing, e.g. to check that the
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specification satisfies the requirement that all classes of data are correctly dealt with, test cases 
must include examples from each data class. Conformance testing (see the following section on 
implementation) can perform this function for all classes of data expected by the specification, 
but not for unexpected ones.
In [RS91], the completeness of a specification of a finite state machine (which is a subclass of 
the machines which may be described using LOTOS) is investigated by describing the machine as 
a set of rules and relating the completeness of the rule set, a property well understood in term 
rewriting theory, to the completeness of the machine. This work is described in more detail in 
chapter 5.
We ignore other properties which may be desired to hold of a specification, such as robustness 
and performance, as they cannot be expressed in the chosen formalism and therefore cannot be 
verified. For example, the language must be able to express time and/or space to rate performance 
since this is usually measured in terms of these attributes. Also ignored is fairness, e.g. given a 
repeated choice between two actions a and b, we cannot guarantee that a will ever be performed. 
This is a limitation of process algebra.
Obviously the choice of formalism affects the properties we can prove hold of a specification. It 
can also affect the verification process: if logic is used to describe the system, a proof technique such 
as model checking should be applied, whereas if process algebra is used to describe the system 
a different proof technique would be applicable. This leads on to consideration of other issues 
which may affect the verification process, such as the style in which the specification is written. 
Varying the level of abstraction is an obvious stylistic choice which has already been mentioned. In 
LOTOS another obvious choice is between writing an abstract data type specification and writing 
a process algebra specification; the problems of verifying full LOTOS specifications are discussed 
in chapter 10.
We now consider what sort of verification can be carried out in the implementation stage of 
system development.
2.2.3 Im plem entation
Unlike specification, there is little to say about the Implementation, as this will be a bottom 
level implementation in a language such as C, Pascal, Ada, FORTRAN etc. Note that most of 
these languages do not support concurrency. This is because with OSI we expect that much of the 
concurrency comes from executing the protocol on different machines, i.e. distributed computing, 
rather than from having several processes running on one machine.
The transition from specification to implementation has been more widely researched than that 
from requirements to specification. Below we describe two particular areas of research which are 
of some interest because, although they cannot be considered as verification, they are based on a
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formal approach.
A number of tools have been developed which “translate” a specification language into program 
code, assuming that the specification is suitably concrete. The method may also require that the 
specification is annotated by comments indicating how something should be implemented (to give 
the compiler some help). An example of this, drawn from the LOTOS literature, is described in 
[vEKvS90]. This approach uses the relationship between the resource oriented and state oriented 
specification styles, see section 3.5.2, to translate LOTOS into C code.
Also of interest is conformance testing, i.e. checking that a given implementation conforms to 
its specification by applying particular tests. This allows the user to confirm that the product 
behaves as expected, i.e. as originally stated in the informal requirements. Note that conformance 
testing does not test for robustness, i.e. correct behaviour of the system in the presence of in­
correct/unexpected inputs. This is because such tests would be impossible to derive from the 
specification and, while the set of conformance tests is finite, the set of robustness tests can be 
infinite.
In [BSS87] the notions of what constitutes a correct implementation, and how conformance 
tests can be used to prove that an implementation is correct, are discussed. The formalisation of 
these notions is based on the testing equivalences and preorders of section 3.5.3. A later work, 
[Bri88a], considers the question of canonical testers. A canonical tester is a test case, or a set 
of tests, such that if I  conforms to S  then I  will pass the test, and if I  does not conform to 
S  then it will not pass the test (this last part requires repeated execution of the test since a 
nonconforming implementation may pass the test on some occasions, but not on every occasion). 
In [Bri88a], canonical testers are shown to always exist, and a method for deriving such testers 
from the (Basic LOTOS) specification is given. This result is only possible because of the exclusion 
of robustness tests. This and other methods, also for specifications in Basic LOTOS, have been 
implemented as tools [Wez90, Ald89].
There are situations in which conformance testing, a form of validation, is more appropriate 
than a verification technique. Firstly, in an industrial setting, the source code of an implementation 
may not be available (to check it against the specification), therefore testing is the only way to 
determine if an implementation meets its specification. Secondly, although verification may have 
been carried out at an earlier stage in the system development, errors may have crept into the final 
code when transforming the formal language into a programming language. Thirdly, the system 
may be too complex, or too large, to make exhaustive analysis practical.
The reason that techniques such as conformance testing do not make verification redundant 
(even though it is typically harder to analyse a specification formally than it is to apply tests to 
a finished implementation) is that any errors are discovered relatively late in the development of 
the system, by which stage correcting the error may be very expensive. Obviously, given that we
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can examine the specification of the system, it would be better if verification techniques could be 
applied early in the design process, catching errors before they have serious consequences. Ideally, 
a combination of verification and validation techniques should be used in system development.
2.3  Sum m ary
In this chapter we have given a general definition of verification as the formal proof of correctness 
of a system, and have identified two broad approaches to verification of the correctness of LOTOS 
specifications. In the remainder of this thesis we concentrate on the former approach, i.e. expressing 
the correctness of a LOTOS specification by comparing it with another specification (either in 
LOTOS or in a modal or temporal logic). The second approach to verification, of proving properties 
of an individual specification, is rejected as it relies on some degree of informality in specifying 
the requirements.
Since this type of analysis may only be carried out on formal specifications of the system, 
the formalism to be used, i.e. LOTOS, must be introduced before verification techniques can be 
discussed formally and in more detail. This is the purpose of the next chapter.
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C hapter 3
Concurrency and Process Algebra: 
A Survey
3.1 In trod u ction
Here we introduce Basic LOTOS by way of a general discussion of the features of process algebra 
and presentation of the related process algebras, CCS [Mil89b] and CSP [Hoa85]. This helps 
to give a context for LOTOS within the wider spectrum of process algebras. The reason for 
presenting CCS and CSP is that in order to verify a system, we need to have a firm grasp of what 
the meaning of the system is, i.e. its semantics. Presenting CCS and CSP in detail achieves two 
goals; the first is that their semantics are clear and simple, and therefore provide a much better 
introduction to the concepts of process algebra than LOTOS, which is made more complex by 
considerations of OSI protocols. The second reason is that a rich literature on verification in CCS 
and CSP exists, and, bearing in mind the close connection between these languages and LOTOS, 
it may be possible to adapt verification techniques developed for use with CCS or CSP for use 
with LOTOS instead. This latter goal in particular should be borne in mind when reading this 
chapter.
The reader who is familiar with process algebra can safely ignore much of this chapter. We 
recommend reading sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.4 which deal with proof techniques for CSP and CCS 
respectively, and also section 3.5 which introduces LOTOS and its associated proof techniques.
3.2  P ro cess  A lgeb ra
In this section a particular kind of concurrency formalism is introduced, process algebra. Process 
algebras are based on the concept of observable behaviour, where the behaviour being observed is
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typically a sequence of events. Events are usually atomic and without duration, i.e. we abstract 
away from duration, therefore it is impossible to distinguish the start (or end) of an action. There 
may of course be intervals between occurrences of actions, so processes are not without duration.
The systems being observed display patterns of behaviour which are normally called processes. 
This term can be used to refer to the systems themselves, associating an object with its behaviour. 
The observer is usually taken to be some entity with a means of recording events who has the 
power to perform experiments on processes, either by controlling the environment in which they 
operate or by interacting with them.
For example, consider a vending machine1 which can take money and dispense bars of chocolate. 
This can be viewed as a process which orders the events inlOp and outchoc in some way, where 
inlOp denotes the event of putting ten pence into the machine, and outchoc denotes the event of 
a chocolate bar appearing in the dispensing tray. Of course, other events may also occur in the 
life of the vending machine (e.g. refill with chocolate, empty cash box), but we have the ability to 
ignore events which we do not find interesting, or which are not relevant to our point of view.
The three process algebras to be discussed here all use the same (or similar) notions of events, 
processes, operators and environments, although these basic concepts may have different repre­
sentations in each formalism. We begin by looking at some of the basic ideas common to all of 
the languages considered.
3.2.1 . Basic Concepts and Operators of Process Algebra
In a process algebra, each process is defined inductively (or algebraically), with one or more special 
processes forming the base case, and a variety of operators providing the means to construct new 
processes. The following list of basic ideas is therefore in two parts; first the base elements of 
process algebra, followed by the constructors.
E vents (Also called actions). These are the basis of the observable behaviour of our systems. 
Events may be specified as required for a particular task e.g. inlOp, outchoc for a vending 
machine, send.m, receivejm for a communications protocol, and so on. They can be simple 
or complex, depending on the level of abstraction in the specification, e.g. the event buychoc 
could model the whole vending machine operation described above.
In addition to user defined events, some formalisms have special events built into the lan­
guage. The most common special event is one which denotes internal, or unobservable, 
action. Internal actions can be used in specifications for a number of reasons; often they are 
used to explicitly introduce nondeterminism (see below), but they may also result from the 
application of other operators such as hiding (see below).
1 We acknowledge a debt to Tony Hoare, who was the first to use vending machines to illustrate process algebra.
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To continue with the vending machine example, an internal action may denote the coin 
dropping down inside the machine, or a gate opening to release the chocolate, neither of which 
are of particular significance to the customer of the machine and are therefore unobservable.
Other common special events include successful termination (although in some languages 
this is a process rather than an event, see below) and clock tick (used in languages with 
time, see section 3.2.2).
P rocesses As with events, processes can be user defined by associating a name with a particular 
behaviour, or they can be special processes, built into the language. Examples of special 
processes are: the broken process (also known as deadlock) which can do nothing, the process 
which can terminate successfully and then do nothing, or the process which can always do 
everything.
Another important feature of execution is divergence, i.e. a process never terminates but 
continues doing useless work for ever. Useless work is characterised by endless repetitions 
of the internal event. Although we usually do not want such processes in our specifications, 
divergence should appear in our concurrency theory so it may be identified and avoided. 
Some formalisms give this process a special name, others do not.
Another special process is the environment. The environment of a process can determine 
which events the process may perform, and can be viewed as another process interacting 
with the process of interest. Typically the process chosen to represent the environment is 
one which will allow all actions, and not hinder the progress of any other process.
In addition to the base case elements above, all process algebras include some operators, or 
constructors, which create new processes from the building blocks of events and special processes. 
The common operators are given below.
E ven t P refix ing  This is the most basic way to construct a new process. The operator for this 
takes two arguments, an event, x and a process, P. The new process can be described by “do 
event x, then behave like process P”. This operator allows the construction of sequential 
processes, i.e. events occur one after the other.
Choice This describes the point in a behaviour where we want to say “behave either like A  or like 
B ” . A  and B are called the branches of the choice. There are two different sorts of choice:
d e te rm in is tic  choice The current environment determines which branch of the choice is 
to be taken, depending on the initial events of A  and B. Note, the initial events of A 
and B  must be distinct. When the initial events are both allowed by the environment 
weak determinism results. This means the environment observes the choice made, but 
cannot influence it.
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If only deterministic choices are made in a process, then, given the same environment 
and the same sequence of events, the process will always end up in the same state.
An example of deterministic choice may be found in the vending machine which sells 
chocolate and toffee. After inserting lOp, the customer, who forms part of the envi­
ronment of the machine, presses one button to choose chocolate and another to choose 
toffee. The machine then delivers chocolate or toffee as appropriate. The machine is 
willing to allow either button to be pressed, and the choice to deliver chocolate or toffee 
is only taken after the button is pressed.
n onde te rm in is tic  choice The choice between A  and B  is random. Given the same en­
vironment, the same choice may or may not be made again. Continuing the vending 
machine example, assume that instead of having buttons to allow choice between choco­
late and toffee, the machine decides which to supply, based on some internal decision 
making procedure, which is sometimes modelled by the internal action (this makes the 
two branches initially look the same and the choice is made nondeterministically). To 
the customer, the machine has made an internal choice as to what sort of sweet to 
supply, chocolate or toffee; the customer does not participate in the decision making. 
When implementing nondeterministic choice, it may be further classified as angelic, 
demonic or erratic. The difference between these two types of nondeterminism is best 
demonstrated by example.
In a choice between A  and B  let A be a process which takes a coin, gives a chocolate 
then stops (deadlocks), and B  be a process which takes a coin, gives out a chocolate 
and returns to its initial state. Angelic choice will never pick A, always B  (because A  
deadlocks, but B  does not).
This sort of choice is also known as external choice, meaning that the only actions which 
may proceed are those allowed by the environment. In the implementation of angelic 
choice both branches are followed until some event causes one branch to deadlock. This 
forces execution to commit to the other branch of the choice (although it may deadlock 
at a later stage)2. This form of choice is in some sense stronger than deterministic 
choice (in the case in which both actions are possible), as it has the ability to look 
beyond the first action when making its choice.
Demonic choice operates in much the same way, except that the bad branch is chosen, 
i.e. the one which deadlocks. Demonic nondeterminism is also known as internal choice 
since it depends only on the process — the environment has no influence.
2 In an environment where neither branch leads to  deadlock we must rely on som e other im plem entation of 
nondeterminism, e.g. tossing a coin!
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Obviously, both forms of choice lead to inefficient implementation as extra computations 
must be carried around when there are unresolved choices. A more efficient alternative 
is erratic choice.
In the implementation of erratic choice the decision of which branch to follow is made 
straight away, with no reference to the events in each branch, initial or otherwise. The 
choice is random, and each branch is equally likely to be chosen. In the example above, 
there is a 50% chance that the deadlocking branch A  will be chosen.
Some notations have separate operators for deterministic and nondeterministic choice, while 
others have only one which can behave in either way, depending on the circumstances. 
Typically, such general choice operators behave deterministically when the initial events of 
the choice are distinct, and nondeterministically when the initial events of the choice are the 
same, or one is the internal event.
P aralle lism  One of the most important features of concurrent systems is that processes may be 
observed interacting. In order to achieve this, the processes must be executed at the same 
time, i.e. in parallel. There are two sorts of parallelism: true parallelism, (events may occur 
simultaneously) and interleaving parallelism (only one event occurs at any point in time, 
but the order in which the events occur is unknown). Although true parallelism is the more 
powerful of the two approaches (since any the result of any computation obtained under 
interleaving semantics may also be obtained under true parallelism semantics), interleaving 
is a more commonly used semantics for process algebra. This is because interleaving is 
simpler, or more easily understood, than true parallelism and has nicer algebraic properties 
(such as being able to express parallelism in terms of event prefixing and choice), while 
retaining some level of nondeterminism in the ordering of events. Some languages may have 
operators which specify interleaving, taking precedence over the true parallel semantics if 
necessary.
To illustrate the difference between true parallelism and interleaving parallelism, consider 
the following example. Take two processes A  and B. Let A  be the statement y := y -j- 1 , and 
B  be the statement y := y — 1. The initial conditions are y = 1. If A and B  are performed in 
parallel there are two possible results depending on the kind of parallel semantics employed. 
With interleaving semantics, the result will be y = 1, since A  before B  gives y = 1, and 
B  before A  also gives y — 1. On the other hand, true parallel semantics will yield a set of 
results y — {0,1,2}. This is because, in addition to the execution scenarios given above for 
interleaving semantics, it is possible that A  and B  begin execution at exactly the same time. 
Each process may read the value of y at the same time (y = 1), but the result depends on 
which statement overwrites the value of y last. Obviously true parallelism is more powerful
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than interleaving semantics, since the result set obtained by interleaving semantics is a subset 
of the the result set obtained by true parallelism. True parallelism may also give a more 
realistic model of the world than interleaving semantics. However, formalisms are often a 
simplification of real world situations, as the full complexity of the situation may be too 
great to allow analysis.
Another variation of parallelism to consider here is whether the actions of the language 
occur synchronously or asynchronously, i.e. actions of parallel processes are performed in 
lockstep, or actions of parallel processes are allowed to start and stop at different times. 
Synchronous calculi are interesting because they are more powerful than their asynchronous 
counterparts (asynchrony can be expressed by introducing a wait operator to the synchronous 
calculus), but they are less used because the idea of every process executing according to 
some global clock does not intuitively relate to our notion of distributed systems, where 
each part proceeds at its own speed. This problem, the conflict of power and popularity, 
was mentioned in section 1 .1  when we discussed which formalism to adopt for our study.
Now we can express two processes executing at the same time, we also need to consider 
different forms of interaction, or communication.
C om m unication  Communication is a simple phenomenon which, like parallelism, comes in sev­
eral varieties. Given two processes A  and B  which wish to communicate, the most obvious 
form of communication is message passing.
Message passing provides a means to exchange information between processes; rather like 
input/output. Events which perform message passing are usually called channels. Message 
passing can be synchronous or asynchronous. These two forms of communication can be 
illustrated by simple, everyday, examples. Synchronous communication is like a telephone 
conversation (both parties engage in the communication at the same time), while asyn­
chronous communication is more like writing a letter (each party is active at different times, 
but not necessarily so). Note that synchronous message passing does not necessarily entail 
a synchronous calculus, similarly for asynchronous message passing.
The difference between these two forms of communication may be understood by considering 
the type of communication medium being modelled in each case. Synchronous message 
passing models communication over a wire, i.e. without a buffer, while asynchronous message 
passing models communication over a buffer. In synchronous message passing, if one process 
is ready to send a message it has to wait until the other process is ready to receive that 
message. Asynchronous communication allows the sending process to deposit its message in 
a buffer and continue working; the receiving process may come and get the message when it 
is ready. Obviously the reverse is not true; the receiving process cannot pick up a message
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before it is available.
A special case of synchronous message passing occurs when the messages are empty. For 
examples, if both processes can perform event x, say, we require that they perform x at the 
same time, with the occurrences of x being somehow merged. Hence the observer sees just 
one occurrence of x, but it was performed by both A  and B. This sort of communication 
serves only to synchronise the progress of the processes involved, i.e. if process A  is first to 
reach the point where it should execute x, it is forced to wait until B  is also ready to execute 
x before it may proceed. Communication of this type is referred to as synchronisation.
Some process algebras restrict communication to be between two processes only; however, 
communication can be generalised to multi process interaction. When more than two pro­
cesses are involved, message passing is known as broadcasting, or multi-way synchronisation 
(for empty messages).
H id in g /R es tric tio n  3 Hiding takes place implicitly when the observer decides which events are 
im portant/to be observed (all others are hidden), but the concurrency formalism may also 
provide a mechanism for explicitly hiding certain events from the observer. Hiding of events 
is typically achieved by transforming the events to be hidden into occurrences of the internal 
event, which is unobservable. Hidden events may proceed instantaneously.
An alternative to hiding, restriction specifies a list of events which may not occur, rather 
than a list of events which occur but cannot be observed. Restriction is often used to force 
processes to communicate with each other by refusing to allow communication with any 
other processes in the environment.
R ecursion  This allows us to describe repetitive behaviour patterns that may continue indefinitely.
Above we have described some of the most common process algebra operators. There is 
one more fundamental concept which has yet to be discussed; this is the area of Observations, 
Semantics and Equivalence Relations.
The concept of observable behaviour is fundamental to process algebras. As described above, 
the semantics of a system is given by the actions it takes, and patterns of those actions. It is 
also important to realise that the semantics of a system may change depending on our notion of 
what can be observed. This may allow us to identify more processes (to distinguish fewer), or to 
identify fewer processes (to distinguish more processes). This is appropriate because the modelling 
of different systems may call for different notions of what is important and needs to be observed, 
and what can be safely ignored.
3This is a rather sim plistic view of how hiding and restriction work. For more details see section 3.3.1 and 
section 3.4.1 respectively.
24
Another way of altering which processes are identified is to define equivalence relations over 
the structure of the processes. This is just another method of saying which aspects of process 
behaviour are observable. Usually, each process algebra has a particular equivalence relation with 
which it is most often associated, although it may also be associated to a lesser extent with other 
equivalences. The topic of equivalence relations will be discussed in more detail in sections 3.3, 3.4 
and 3.5 where reference can be more easily made to specific relations and process algebras. We 
also discuss the relationships between different equivalence relations in section 3.6.2.
Those features of concurrency which are common to many process algebras have been given 
in this section, but each process algebra will have its own interpretation of the operators, and 
probably some special features not discussed above. There is a large body of work on extending 
the capabilities of process algebras to make them capable of specifying real world phenomena 
more accurately. Of course, this also has an effect on verification in terms of being able to express 
different properties, e.g. a timed language can express properties relating to performance and 
efficiency. We may also have to develop new verification techniques to allow us to determine 
whether or not our system possesses these properties. The next section briefly discusses the sort 
of extensions which have been proposed in the literature.
3.2.2 Extensions to Process Algebra
Extensions to process algebras fall into two broad classes: those which are merely notational, 
and are intended to simplify the specification of complex systems by giving the specifier more 
operators, and those which are more fundamental, requiring an extension of the underlying model. 
An example of the first type of extension (although it is not generally viewed as an extension) 
is the parallel operator in an interleaving semantics. Although we presented this operator as a 
basic constructor of process algebras, it is actually redundant, as any expression using parallelism 
can be rewritten using action sequencing and choice. It should be noted however that the huge 
specifications resulting from the removal of parallelism would be almost impossible to read and 
understand mainly because of their size and lack of structure. Other examples of the notational 
type of extension may be found as part of the language descriptions in sections 3.3.1 and 3.5.1.
These forms of extension only affect verification if we use a proof technique which relies on 
the syntactic form of the process. More often we will use some form of pre-processing which 
reduces the process expression to its simplest form, using only basic operators, and apply the 
proof technique to that expression. A far greater impact may be made on the verification process 
by the introduction of the second type of extension which can alter the underlying model of the 
language.
The second type of extension lies somewhat outside the scope of this survey, but it is important 
to know of the existence of such developments and of the form they may take. To this end, some
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possible extensions to process algebra are given below. We present only those extensions which 
have been applied to LOTOS, giving LOTOS specific references in each case. Other extensions, 
such as priority weighting for choice, which do not have LOTOS applications have been ignored.
T im e The formalisms considered later in this chapter order the occurrence of events but do not 
include an explicit notion of time. However, the specification of real-time systems requires 
a more complex model of time.
There are several different approaches to the introduction of time: some languages introduce 
a special operator which signifies the passing of time, others introduce a global clock. A 
third method of adding time to a language is to make actions more complex by adding a 
time parameter to the actions, e.g. action a takes 0.2 seconds. An example of a language 
which uses time explicitly in this way is Timed LOTOS [QAF90, QFA89, RvB91] which adds 
date stamps to its actions.
D a ta  C onstruc ts  Most existing process algebras deal only with simple data types. Obviously to 
describe more complex concurrent systems more complex data types may be required. The 
ability to describe such data types has been added to some languages by the introduction 
of an abstract data type sublanguage to describe the actions. For example, full LOTOS is 
obtained by adding the ACT ONE data type language to the process algebra Basic LOTOS.
M obility  A different approach to the introduction of data types to a process algebra is to extend 
the sort of messages which can be passed between processes to include channel names. This 
allows dynamic reconfiguration of processes, giving the ability to model complex data types 
and higher order process algebra. This approach is basic to the 7r-calculus [MPW92]. This 
extension has been modelled in LOTOS in [F091].
P ro b ab ility  The branches of a choice can be weighted by adding probability to the language. 
For example, in a choice between a and b, we can say action a is more likely to occur than 
action b. For LOTOS, this extension has been described in [RvB91] and [MFV89].
Further examples of extensions and approaches to extensions both generally, and more specifi­
cally for LOTOS, can be found in the proceedings of conferences such as CONCUR, e.g. [CONCUR], 
PSTV, e.g. [PSTV] and FORTE, e.g. [FORTE],
The additions of such extensions can have important repercussions in the semantics and proof 
theory of a language, and this in turn affects verification. Typically proofs become more com­
plicated; we shall see examples of this in chapter 10 where proofs in full LOTOS, i.e. with data 
types, are considered. Initially, to avoid such complications, we concentrate on the simpler Basic 
LOTOS, i.e. with no extensions other than the notational kind.
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3.2.3 Properties of Specification Languages
In section 3.2.1 the features specific to concurrency formalisms were considered; such languages 
should also have the features we desire of any specification language.
In [Bri8 8 b] some basic criteria are presented which a good formalism should satisfy. A for­
mal description technique (fdt) should be clear and consistent, have appropriate mechanisms for 
providing the specification with structure, be able to specify all aspects of the system under 
consideration (at a sufficiently high level of abstraction) and should encourage the specifier to 
write unambiguous specifications (of course, the language’s own semantics should also be without 
ambiguities). These basic criteria can make a specification easier to reason about.
A concurrency specification language may also have special needs as regards verification. We 
may want to analyse any of the following properties: freedom from deadlock/livelock, fairness, 
correct allocation/deallocation of resources, mutual exclusion, equivalence between processes etc. 
Our modelling of the concurrent system should facilitate specification and verification of these 
properties. It is possible that such properties may be better checked by some formal system which 
can be used in conjunction with our process algebra, rather than by using a more complex version 
of the process algebra.
We move on now to present the three process algebras CCS, CSP and LOTOS in more detail. 
Although LOTOS was developed from CCS and CSP there are many differences in approach 
between the formalisms. LOTOS was developed for industrial use, whereas CCS was developed 
for research purposes. CSP has a foot in both camps as it was intended to be a usable language 
for large scale development (the programming language occam™ is based on CSP) but is also 
commonly used for research.
A further contrast between the languages chosen is evident in the approach to their definitions. 
We can split process algebras into two groups: those which are based on a particular model and 
are presented with laws which are true in that model (e.g. CSP and LOTOS), and those which 
are calculi of rules and axioms and can be presented independently of any mathematical model 
(e.g. CCS).
The languages chosen are discussed individually in the following three sections. In each section 
we present the basic ideas behind the design of the language, the operators which express that 
language’s particular flavour of concurrency, the form of semantics most commonly associated with 
each formalism (but not the full language semantics), and some of the proof techniques which may 
be used in that semantic framework. Specific implementations of techniques and tools for particular 
languages are not discussed here; automated proof techniques are considered in chapter 4 , and a 
survey of verification tools, mainly those for CCS, and of LOTOS tools in general, may be found 
in appendix A.
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We begin by presenting the process algebra CSP. Alphabetically, CCS should be considered 
first; however, CSP has a simpler mathematical model.
3.3 C SP
The most important design decision behind CSP [BHR84, Hoa85] was to have a single, simple 
model in which as many processes as possible were identified. This decision arose from the following 
aims: the language must
• be able to describe a wide range of applications,
• admit efficient implementation,
• give programmer support in all stages of development, i.e. specification, design, implemen­
tation, verification and validation.
These aims result in a large number of operators, each corresponding to one concept in con­
currency theory, giving the programmer flexibility. The designers also adopted the principle of 
indiscernibles: only observably different processes are distinguished, all others are identified. This 
model yields a rich set of algebraic laws, allowing flexible transformation and optimisation of CSP 
processes.
3.3.1 Operators of CSP
A core set of CSP operators are given in figure 3.1, in which a and b denote events, c a channel (a 
communication event), P  and Q processes, and A  and C sets of events. We use x to range over 
events, P(x) for the set of processes parameterised by x, v and w to range over some data set 
e.g. integer, X  to range over processes and F (X )  to denote a guarded expression containing the 
process variable X .
Features of CSP concurrency to note are:
a lp h ab e t An important part of CSP is the alphabet of a process. The alphabet of a process is 
the set of events in which the process may engage. This may be explicit (as a subscript to 
the name of the process, or defined separately), or implicit (can be deduced from the process 
description).
env ironm en ta l choice This form of choice is intended to be deterministic, so we require a b 
in the expression (a —>• P) | (6  —> Q).
genera l choice This is a combination of environmental choice and nondeterministic choice. If 
the initial actions of P  and Q are distinct then it behaves like |, otherwise it behaves like fl.
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description notation
deadlock STOP
divergence CHAOS
action prefixing a —»■ P
deterministic choice based on actions (binary) (a —■► P) 1 {b Q)
(and over sets of actions) (x : A  —y P(x))
general choice over processes p \ \  Q
demonic nondeterministic choice over processes P  n  Q
parallelism P \ \ a Q
interleaving J’ lll Q
communication event (input) c?w
communication event (output) c!42
hiding of events P \ C
recursion HX : A. F (X )
Figure 3.1: CSP Operators
para lle lism  The parallel operator may have its synchronisation set explicitly specified, as in 
P  || A Q, meaning that only events in the specified set, A, may interact. Otherwise, the 
synchronisation set of the parallel operator is taken to be the intersection of the alphabets 
of the processes, i.e. all possible events interact.
In a CSP parallel expression two or more occurrences of the same event synchronise i.e. 
multi-way synchronisation. Synchronisation is compulsory in that if an event belongs to the 
specified synchronisation set then it may not proceed independently.
in terleav ing  Interleaving is parallelism where the synchronisation set is empty, i.e. no synchro­
nisation/message passing at all.
com m unication  For example, occurrences of c?w and c!42 synchronise, assigning the value 42 to 
w. Message passing is treated slightly differently from synchronisation. Convention dictates 
that while synchronisation in general is multi-way, channels may be used for two process 
communication only, although this is not enforced by the semantics.
h id ing  The expression P \ C  means the process P  with all occurrences of events in C hidden,
i.e. the events may still occur, and in fact they occur automatically and instantaneously, 
but they may not be observed by the environment. The alphabet of P \  C is therefore the 
alphabet of P  minus events in C.
recursion  In the definition of a recursive process F (X ) must be a guarded expression, otherwise 
the recursion degenerates to divergence. A guarded expression is one in which the occurrence 
of the process variable is prefixed by at least one action. This action must not be hidden.
In view of the aims of the designer (in particular, that CSP should be applicable to large scale
systems), there are a number of additional operators in CSP which are more apt for specifying real
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protocols and applications. These include yj (the successful termination event), sequential com­
position of processes, interrupts, pipes and various features borrowed from imperative languages 
such as assignments, conditionals and loops.
3.3.2 Sem antics of CSP
As mentioned in the introductory section, most formalisms have several different semantics. The 
following section gives the strongest and most commonly used of the CSP semantics, Failures- 
Divergences semantics. Two other semantics are frequently used in connection with CSP: Trace 
semantics and Failures semantics. These are also detailed below.
Standard Sem antics
In CSP, a process is uniquely represented by its alphabet, its failure set and its divergence set. This 
representation of a process is known as Failures-Divergences semantics. The alphabet has already 
been mentioned. The definition of the failure set is a little complicated; first the terms trace and 
refusal must be defined.
A trace is a sequential record of the observable behaviour of a process. It may be viewed as a 
string and shares many of the standard string operations such as concatenation. In this section 
the following notation is used:
• () denotes the empty trace.
• (a) denotes the trace containing one occurrence of the event a.
• (a,b, c) denotes the trace a then b then c.
• A* denotes the set of all possible traces using events in A. We use cr to range over A*.
Each process may have many possible traces as a result of choices in execution.
To define a refusal, let X  be the set of events offered by the environment of a process, P. If 
P  can deadlock on its first step when placed in this environment, then the set X  is known as 
a refusal of P. We combine traces with refusals to obtain the failure set of a process, P, which 
contains all pairs (a ,X ), where cr is a trace and A is a refusal, such that P  may deadlock after 
trace cr in the environment offering events X .
The divergence set of a process is a set of traces such that, after performing any one of these 
traces, the process will behave chaotically, i.e. it is impossible to determine which events will occur.
The semantics of any CSP process is given by these three sets. As an example consider the 
two special processes:
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STOP,, ^  (^ ,{ (> }xP (^ ),{} ) 
CHAOS,, =' (A ,(A 'x W {A )) ,A ‘)
(3.1)
(3.2)
where IP (A) denotes the powerset of A.
The first component of the triple in equation (3.1) says that the alphabet of STOP,* is A, some 
arbitrary set of events. Note the use of a subscript A  to make the alphabet explicit in the name 
of the process; if unspecified the alphabet is assumed to be all events. The first component of 
equation (3.2) is similar. The second component of equation (3.1) says that STOP^ can refuse to 
do any subset of A  after it has performed the empty trace, i.e. it can refuse to do everything before 
it does anything, while the second component of equation (3.2) says that CHAOS^ can refuse to 
do any subset of A  after any trace, i.e. at any time it can refuse to do any event. The remaining 
component of equation (3.1) says that STOP>t has an empty divergence set, meaning STOP^ 
never diverges, while the last component of equation (3.2) says that CHAOS^ may diverge after 
every possible trace.
We give a further example of the Failures-Divergences semantics of a process below.
E xam ple Consider a vending machine, VM, which either takes 5p, gives a chocolate and stops, 
or takes lOp, gives a toffee and stops. This machine can be represented by a process in the following 
way:
VM d= (in5p — ¥ outchoc — ¥ STOPa vM  I  ^ outtoffee — ¥ STOPa y^f)
d cjA = {in5p, inlOp, outchoc, outtoffee}
VM d= (A, {((), P({outchoc, outtoffee})), {(in5p),F(A - {outchoc})),
((inlOp), IP ( A  - {outtoffee})), ((in5p,outchoc), I P ( A ) ) ,
((inlOp,outtoffee), P(A))}, {})
The alphabet, A, contains the four events of interest, in5p, inlOp, outchoc and outtoffee. The 
process may deadlock if, after doing trace (), it is only offered outchoc and/or outtoffee. Once the 
machine has accepted a five pence, i.e. (in5p), it can only perform an outchoc event, refusing all 
others, similarly for inlOp. Finally, after the process has performed {in5p, outchoc), it becomes 
incapable of any further action (similarly with (inlOp, outtoffee)). VM never diverges.
A ltern ative  Sem antics for CSP
The semantics given in the previous section is not the only possible semantics for CSP. We now 
describe two other weaker CSP semantics: Trace semantics and Failures semantics.
In trace semantics a process is represented by its trace set. For example, let p be a process, 
then traces (p) is defined to be the set of all possible traces of p. Two processes are equivalent if
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their trace sets are the same. This equivalence on processes is similar to the language equivalence 
used for finite state automata. It is the weakest possible semantics for CSP and generally an 
unsatisfactory one as it does not preserve deadlock properties, i.e. two processes may be equivalent 
under trace semantics even if one deadlocks and the other does not. Trace semantics is popular 
because it is simple, and easily described and understood. For verification purposes a stronger 
equivalence is generally required.
The next step up from trace semantics is Failures semantics. In this semantics a process 
is represented by its alphabet and its failure set (as described above). Two processes are then 
equivalent if their failure sets are the same. This semantics ^ cannot detect divergence.
3.3.3 P roof Techniques for CSP
Proofs in CSP can be carried out using two methods: manipulation of the specification by using 
the algebraic laws, or proving certain properties hold of the semantics of a particular process. This 
has been compared with the way in which proofs in boolean algebra may be performed [BBH+91].
As mentioned earlier, because of the simple model of CSP and the proliferation of operators, 
the algebraic theory is fairly rich. The algebraic laws can transform process algebra statements 
so that they are more efficient, or so that they may be more easily verified. We will not present 
all the laws here: a full treatment is given in [Hoa85]. Instead we mention a few of the main 
laws. For example, || , n  and [] are all associative and commutative, n  and [] are also idem- 
potent. STOP is a zero for || , but an identity for [] , while RUN is an identity for || (RUN is 
the process which may do anything/everything, but never blocks an action, unlike CHAOS). We 
also have (1 and Q distribute over each other, and —>■ distributes over n. Note that this law 
a —t ( P r \ Q )  = (a —y P) n  (a -> Q) is one of the main distinctions between CSP and CCS (it 
does not hold in CCS).
The alternative proof technique is to define desirable properties in terms of traces (and failures 
and divergences if necessary) and use a relation sa t which relates process algebra expressions to 
the CSP semantics. We write P  sa t S, where P  is a process and S  is a specification of properties, 
meaning P  satisfies S, i.e. all possible observable behaviours of P  are consistent with by S. 
More formally, Vtr. (tr € traces(P) => S ). These specifications allow us to write more abstract 
descriptions of systems, specifying what should be achieved, rather than how to do it.
For example, in a vending machine, we may want to specify that pairs of inlOp and outchoc 
events always match up, i.e. the machine never takes money without giving a chocolate, and it 
never gives chocolates without taking money. This can be done by stating that the number of 
inlOp events in a trace must be equal to or one more than the number of outchoc events.
We move on now to consideration of CCS.
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3.4 CCS
The aim behind the design of CCS [Mil80, Mil89b] was to provide a means of investigating different 
models of concurrency. Each model uses the same set of operators, but a different notion of 
equivalence between processes. Unlike CSP, the operator set of CCS is very compact, with each 
operator combining elements of different concurrency concepts. For example, deterministic choice 
and nondeterministic choice are denoted by the same operator. Despite the small size of the 
operator set, CCS has a high level of articulacy and generality, i.e. many different kinds of system 
may be described, at many different levels of abstraction.
3.4.1 Operators of CCS
The operators of CCS are given in figure 3.2, in which P  and Q denote processes, a an event and 
L a set of event names. X  ranges over processes.
description notation
internal action
inactive process (deadlock)
action prefixing
choice
parallelism
restriction
recursion
T
0
a.P
P + Q
P \Q
P \L
Figure 3.2: Operators of CCS
Because of the difference in approaches between CSP and CCS, there are some important 
differences between the operators:
• r , the special internal action, signifies the occurrence of an internal event without giving 
details as to what that event is. It can be used explicitly by the specifier, but it also results 
from communication between processes (see below).
• There are two sorts of actions, the simple actions and their overbarred complements. Com­
munication occurs between an action and its complement. When such a communication 
occurs the resulting action is r, i.e. given a and a, the result of their communication is r  and 
both a and a are hidden. It is convenient to view these complement pairs as input/output 
pairs.
• Communication and value-passing can occur between only two processes, unlike CSP which 
allows broadcasting.
• CCS has only one parallel operator. There is no synchronisation set associated with this 
operator, so it is possible for all events to synchronise, but synchronisation/communication
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is not compulsory and need not take place. The restriction operator, see below, may be used 
to force communication between certain processes by denying communication with other 
processes.
• CCS has only one choice operator, which is deterministic but can be forced to be nondeter­
ministic by prefixing each branch by the same event, or by prefixing just one branch by the 
special event r.
• Restriction prevents other processes in the environment communicating with P  through ac­
tions in L. Actions in L may occur within P  (assuming P  is a complex process composed 
of other processes in parallel) if they can synchronise with their complements (since syn­
chronisation results in a r  action, which cannot be restricted). Unlike CSP hidden actions, 
restricted actions may only proceed by communication and may not proceed independently.
Extensions of the basic calculus introduce operators which make descriptions of real systems 
more convenient, but these operators introduce no extra power. They are not described here since 
they are similar to the extra operators introduced for CSP and will not be used in the following 
discussion of the equivalence relations defined over CCS.
The following sections introduce the semantics of CCS processes and discuss some of the 
equivalence relations which have been defined in the CCS literature.
3.4.2 Semantics of CCS (Informal)
The operators of CCS are defined in terms of labelled transition systems. Each process is seen as 
a set of states, with arcs between states representing actions which move the process from one 
state to another. The unobservable action, r, moves a process silently from state to state. Loops 
from a state to itself are possible. A set of inference rules give an operational definition of CCS 
processes in terms of labelled transition systems.
Exam ple Consider again the vending machine VM  presented in section 3.3.2. The labelled 
transition system for VM can be rolled out into the form of a tree, which looks like this:
inlOp
outchoc outtoffee
Labelled transition systems are often represented as trees, or process graphs, since pictures are 
usually understood more quickly and easily than a mathematical equation. The switch from one 
domain to the other is normally made without comment.
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Now consider the notion of equivalence between processes/labelled transition systems. As 
with CSP, there are several different equivalences for CCS. The choice of equivalence is important 
in system verification (where we might want to prove equivalence between two processes) since 
processes can be equivalent in one model, but not equivalent in another. For more details of how 
the equivalences relate to each other, see section 3.6.2.
Of the many equivalences which can be defined for CCS, only four will be detailed here.
D escrip tion  o f  CCS Equivalences
To motivate the different equivalences, we first include some examples of processes, taken from 
[Mil89b], which we would not like to be identified.
a. (b +  c)
b
a.b +  a.c
The reason for distinguishing these processes is that, after performing an a event, the left hand 
process may deadlock when offered 6 , i.e. the right hand branch has been taken, whereas the right 
hand process will never deadlock if offered b after performing a. Note that these processes are 
equivalent under all three of the CSP semantics. This example demonstrates the invalidity of the 
distributive law of . over +  in CCS.
We also want to distinguish the following processes:
b
a.b +  a
The left hand process may do an a and then fail when offered b. Again, this is because the 
right hand branch has been taken. The process on the right will always do a then b then stop.
This may lead us to the conclusion that we only want to identify processes which have exactly 
the same branching structure, i.e. tree equivalence, but this is too strong. As a further example, 
here are two processes which we generally wish to equate:
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a.b -f a.(b +  b) a.b
These processes cannot be distinguished by their behaviour: they both perform a then b and 
then stop. The criteria we use in identifying processes is that they should be equated if they 
exhibit the same behaviour under all tests. These tests are constructed with respect to three 
conditions:
1. The choice of transition at any moment is determined by the environment (nondeterministic 
choice is used in the case of ambiguity, e.g. same first event in each branch);
2. The environment has only finitely many states — at least as far as choice-resolution is 
concerned;
3. We can control the environment.
Essentially, these criteria mean that to test a process, a copy of the process is executed. When 
a branch point is reached, duplicate copies of the state reached are made, one for each possible 
branch, and execution continues. This means that for any process we know all the behaviour of 
that process, and have a record of the places in the process where (significant) choices are made. 
This last point is most important: often it is the differences between the choice points which 
distinguish processes. See, for instance, the first example of this section.
Two equivalences are obtained using this view of the testing:
• If r  is viewed in the same way as all the other actions, the equivalence obtained is Strong 
Equivalence, also known as Strong Bisimulation Equivalence. This is the strongest equiva­
lence used in conjunction with CCS.
• If r  is given its special status as the unobservable action, it cannot be used to distinguish 
between processes. The equivalence obtained is Observation Equivalence, also commonly 
referred to as Weak Bisimulation Equivalence, or just bisimulation equivalence in the litera­
ture.
Although these equivalences are nice to use because of their simple definitions, they have been 
criticised for their artificiality, i.e. in reality we may not be able to control the environment, expect 
it to have a finite number of states, or be able to calculate all the states. This leads us to a third 
equivalence known as Testing equivalence in which two processes are equivalent if they “pass” the
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same tests (where pass can have different interpretations). On the other hand, criticism is also 
made of observation equivalence for making distinctions which are not truly observable. Branching 
Bisimulation Equivalence was developed to correct these deficiencies.
The formal definitions for these equivalences are given in the next section.
3.4.3 Sem antics of CCS (Formal)
Before defining the equivalences of CCS, we first need to make some auxiliary definitions. All 
definitions, including those of particular equivalence and congruence relations given elsewhere in 
this section, are taken from [Mil89b] unless otherwise specified.
D efinitions
• The domain of labels is called C. This consists of names A  and co-names A . We use a, b, c, 
. . . ,  a, b, c, . . .  to range over £  and t , t i , . . .  to range over C*.
• The domain of actions is called Act. This is defined to be C U {r}. We use a , /?, 7 , . . .  to 
range over Act, and a to range over A c t . The empty string is denoted e.
• The domain of CCS processes, called V , is the set of ground process expressions. We use P  
and Q to range over V.
• A labelled transition system is a 4-tuple (5, Act, {-^4C S  x 5}, so)j which consists of a set 
S  of states, a set Act of transition labels, a transition relation — I, one for each a  £ Act, 
and a starting state so £ S. The transition relation determines how we get from one state to 
another, and is defined by the inference rules which give an operational semantics of CCS. 
The name of a CCS process is identified with the starting state of its labelled transition 
system by an abuse of notation.
• P  -^4 Q means that process P  performs the event a and then behaves like process Q. 
This can be extended to strings, so P Q, where cr =  (a,b,c), is an abbreviation for 
P P' P" Q, for some intermediate states P' and P ".
• P  ==> Q means that P  performs some string of events r 'a r J for some i, j  > 0 before behaving 
like Q. Again, this relation can be extended to strings as above.
• We write cr to denote the string a with all occurrences of r  removed.
• P ==b- Q means the same as P Q for all a  ^  r . For a = r  the behaviour is slightly 
different: P Q means P Q where <r =  for j  > 1, while P  ==»■ Q denotes P Q 
where a =  r J for j  > 0 , i.e. it is possible that cr = e.
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In simple terms what these definitions mean is that, for all events in C, the three kinds of 
arrow behave in exactly the same way; their behaviour differs only for r  actions. For a £ Act*, 
the arrows describe the labels in a exactly, and their behaviour on the r  actions is as follows: 
describes exactly the r  actions in cr, ===>- at least the r  actions in cr, and ==$■ says nothing 
about t actions. The definition of these different types of arrows allows us to define the different 
bisimulations and equivalences in a similar manner.
Strong E quivalence
Strong equivalence is described in terms of a property of relations over processes, called strong 
bisimulation. The notion of bisimulation was first introduced by Park in [Par81].
D efin ition  1 (S trong Equivalence) A relation, R C .V  x V ,  is a strong bisimulation if  
(P, Q) £ R implies, Va £ Act
1. if 3P' : P P' then 3Q1 : Q Q '  with (P ', Q') £ R, and
2. if  3Q' : Q ~ ^  Q' then 3P ' : P P' and (P ',Q ') £ R.
Two processes P  and Q are strongly equivalent, written P ~  Q, if  there exists a strong bisimu­
lation R such that (P,Q) £ R. The relation ~  is defined to be the largest strong bisimulation, i.e. 
the union of all strong bisimulations.
A certain amount of confusion arises from the common use of strong bisimulation to describe 
the equivalence as well as the relational property. We will try to avoid such confusion.
There are a number of alternative characterisations of strong equivalence, corresponding to the 
alternative characterisations of observation equivalence given below, with the exception of HML. 
The details for strong bisimulation equivalence are not given here as they are similar to those 
given for observation equivalence.
O bservation Equivalence
As with strong equivalence, observation equivalence is also defined in terms of a property of 
relations over processes. This property is called weak bisimulation, also referred to as bisimulation. 
This is similar to strong bisimulation, as the name suggests, only differing in its treatment of the 
unobservable r  action.
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D efinition  2 (O bservation  Equivalence/W eak B isim ulation  Equivalence) A relation,
R C.V  x V, is a (weak) bisimulation if (P , Q) £ R  implies, Vo £ Act
1. if  3P' : P P' then 3Q' : Q Q' with (P ', Q') £ R, and
2. if 3Q' : Q - ^  Q' then 3P' : P P' with (P ',Q ') £ R.
Two processes, P and Q, are observation equivalent, written P ta Q, if(P ,Q )  £ R for some 
(weak) bisimulation R. The equivalence, is the union of all weak bisimulations, and hence the 
largest weak bisimulation.
The essence of this equivalence is that r  actions may be ignored in determining the equivalence 
of two processes; only visible actions are taken into consideration.
Again, confusion arises because of the identification of the name of the property with the 
name of the equivalence. In this case the problem is more severe than with strong bisimulation 
and strong equivalence as the two names resemble each other less, and often give the impression 
that there are two equivalences, one called weak bisimulation, and the other called observation 
equivalence.
There are a number of algebraic laws associated with observation equivalence. For finite agents 
(i.e. terminating processes) these laws form a complete axiomatisation [HM85]; this result was 
extended to finite state agents in [Mil89a]. Note that these axiomatisations are not finite; given 
the operators of CCS, a complete, finite axiomatisation of observation equivalence is not possible 
[Mol90]. Observation equivalence is undecidable in general.
A lte rn a tiv e  C haracte risa tions of O bservation Equivalence
There are a number of alternative methods of defining bisimulation. We give them here as they 
may be useful in developing proof techniques later.
Refining th e  U niversal R ela tion  The above definition of observation equivalence starts from 
the empty relation and adds pairs of processes to the relation to give a bisimulation. The following 
definition works the other way, i.e. starting with the universal relation at the leaves of the labelled 
transition system, and gradually refining the relation as we head towards the root.
This method of defining observation equivalence is the original observation equivalence, and 
was given in [Mil80], before the bisimulation method was developed.
D efinition  3 (O bservation  Equivalence) The new relation is defined in terms of a series of 
relations, with the first in the series being the universal relation, each of the others being defined 
in terms of the previous relation.
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P  « 0 Q holds for all P and Q;
P *k+i Q iff- V<7 <E C*
(i) if 3P' -.pJU P' then 3Q ': Q Q' and P ' « fc Q ';
(ii) if 3Q' : Q =^> Q' then 3P ': P P 1 and P' » fc Q';
P  »  Q iff Vfc > 0. P n k Q
i.e. «  =  p |  
k
In fact, the relation obtained here is only identical to that obtained by definition 2 on the 
domain of image-finite processes. A process is image-finite if for each a the set {p' | p p'} 
is finite. This means that the practice of using the terms weak bisimulation equivalence and 
observation equivalence interchangeably is in fact incorrect.
H ennessy-M ilner Logic A third characterisation of observation equivalence can be obtained 
by using Hennessy-Milner logic (HML), first introduced in [HM85]. This logic is presented fully in 
chapter 11, so we will not give the details here. The power of the logic comes from the ability to 
nest the modal operators to arbitrary levels. There is a direct relation between the depth of this 
nesting and the stratification of the relations in the previous characterisation; the proof of this can 
be found in [Mil89b]. A direct result of this relationship is the property that HML also precisely 
characterises observation equivalence, so that if two processes are not equivalent with respect to 
observation equivalence then an HML formula can be found which distinguishes them.
In [Mil89b] a satisfaction relation between processes and HML is defined which uses the tran­
sition relation to define what it means for a formula to be true of a process. This provides us with 
a mechanism for expressing properties of programs (such as deadlock) in logic and proving the 
CCS specification of that program satisfies those properties. Again, this is studied in more depth 
in chapter 1 1 .
U sing Tests The last method of characterising observation equivalence to be considered is as 
a Testing equivalence. Since testing equivalence will not be introduced until later in this section, 
we give only a very brief outline of the way in which this equivalence may be altered to give 
observation equivalence.
As mentioned in the informal introduction, observational equivalence is based on a notion of 
testing; however, in general, these tests rely on some very strong assumptions about the control we 
have over the environment. In the usual definition of Testing equivalence, test are constructed in 
a similar way to processes, and do not have the discriminatory power of observation equivalence. 
In [Abr87] the extra power required is gained by extending the operator set used in constructing 
tests to include the existential quantifiers, V and 3. These correspond to the informal notion that 
in observation equivalence we can control and examine the environment and that we can perform
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tests in all possible configurations of the environment (implying that there are only finitely many 
configurations). This extension to testing equivalence gives observation equivalence.
We move on now to consider observation congruence.
O bservation  C ongruence
Unfortunately, observation equivalence is not preserved by summation in CCS. For example, while 
it is true that r.b «  b holds (since the r  action is unobservable), it is not true that a +  r .6 «  a +  6
holds because, on the left hand side, we can find ourselves in a position in which it is no longer
possible to perform a (and only b is possible), i.e. the r  branch has been taken. This is due to 
the pre-emptive power of the r  action, which essentially converts a deterministic choice into a 
nondeterministic one.
This is a major failing in the equivalence. Imagine a system in which you wished to replace 
some subsystem by a new, perhaps more efficient subsystem, without changing the functionality 
of the system as a whole. Even if the old and the new subsystems were shown to be observation 
equivalent, we could not guarantee that the system with the new part would behave in the same 
way as the old system, as shown in the small example above. What is needed is a congruence 
relation which guarantees that two systems which are identified behave in the same way in all 
contexts. Observation congruence is defined to be the largest congruence relation contained in 
observation equivalence.
D efin ition  4 (O bservation  C ongruence) P and Q are observation congruent, P  — Q, if 
Vo; E Act
1. if  3P ' : P P' then 3Q’ : Q Q' with P 1 «  Q', and
2. if  3Q' : Q - ^  Q' then 3 P ' : P P ' and P' «  Q'.
Note that the only difference between this definition and the definition of observation equiv­
alence is that ==*>• appears instead of = >  for the first transition from the root. This means that 
rather than throwing away all information about r  actions when comparing systems, some r  ac­
tions, those which occur at the root, are retained. In particular, if Q starts with a r  action, then 
that action must be matched by one or more r  actions in P. Observation equivalence, on the 
other hand, allows that such an action is matched by zero or more r  actions.
To return to the small example from the beginning of this section, we show that the problem 
no longer arises because although r.b «  b, it is not true that r.b  =  b. The congruence does not 
hold because the first clause of the definition is not true, i.e. the left hand side can perform a 
t  action to become b, but the only way the right hand side can match this is by performing no 
action at all, and this is not allowed by observation congruence.
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A complete axiomatisation for observation congruence over processes without recursion is given 
in [HM85],
Two problems arise when using observation equivalence or congruence in proofs. On one hand, 
it makes distinctions which are not truly observable: as mentioned above, to describe observation 
equivalence in terms of tests requires that we make tests very strong. This makes observation 
equivalence too strong for many applications. On the other hand, observation equivalence does not 
truly preserve the branching structure of a process, i.e. although it does preserve some information 
about the branch points of processes, it does not preserve the branching potential of all states. 
This can be more easily seen in an example:
a.(c +  r.b)
b
a.b +  a.(c +  r.b)
In the process on the left, the decision to do b might have been made when the a is performed,
i.e. the left branch is taken. In the right hand process, after a, we can still do b or c. These processes 
are equivalent under observation equivalence. Below, we consider equivalences which solve these 
problems by preserving different amounts of information about the branching structure of the 
process.
B ranching B isim ulation  Equivalence
In order to supply a branching equivalence which incorporates the notion of the unobservable 
action without making unnecessary identifications, branching bisimulation was developed [vG90]. 
Although originally defined in the setting of ACP, the definition can be easily translated into CCS 
(and LOTOS). Essentially the definition is the same as observation equivalence, differing in that, 
as well as comparing the states at the start and finish of r  sequences, it also compares states along 
r  sequences.
D efin ition  5 (B ranch ing B isim ulation  E quivalence) A symmetric relation, R  C P  x V , is
a branching bisimulation if  (P , Q) £ R implies, Va £ Act
1. if 3P' : P  -^4 P' then either a = r  and {P' , Q) £ R, or
3 a path : Q => Qi -^4 Q2 => Q' with (P, Qi) £ R , (P ', Q2) £ R, (P ', Q') £ R, and
2. if  3Q' : Q - ^ 4  Q' then either a — r  and (P, Q') £ R, or
3 a path : P  = *  Px ^ 4  P2 =► P ' with (Q, Pi) £ R, (Q't P2) £ R, (Q'} P ') £ R.
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Two processes, P  and Q, are branching bisimulation equivalent, written P i±Q , if  (P,Q) G R  
for some branching bisimulation R.
Branching bisimulation equivalence has some pleasing properties, including that it is a con­
gruence relation, that it is decidable for a certain class of processes [Hiit91] (see section 4.2.2 for 
more information) that it has a complete axiomatisation, and a complete term rewriting system 
corresponding to those axioms [AB90].
Testing Equivalence
As mentioned in section 3.4.2, the strong and weak bisimulation equivalences are generally inad­
equate in real world applications because they rely on fairly strong assumptions about the degree 
of control over the environment and tests on processes (e.g. the ability to make multiple copies 
of the environment and the process under test is assumed). Testing equivalence [DH84, Hen8 8 ] is 
based on the notion of experiments on processes. Two processes are testing equivalent if they pass 
the same tests. To define this equivalence we need a set of observers, a way of observing, and a 
criteria for judging the results of the observations.
Given a set of states, S ta tes, a computation can be defined as a non-empty (possibly infinite) 
sequence of states. Com p denotes the set of computations and is ranged over by c.
Let O, V  (ranged over by o,p respectively) be a set of observers and a set of processes. For 
every o and p there is a non-empty set of computations Com p(o,p), which denotes the effect of 
the observer o performing tests on the process p. The outcome of a test is then c G Com p(o,p). 
We define a subset of S ta tes  to be the Success states, denoted by {T}. Unsuccessful states 
are denoted by {-L}. A computation is successful if it contains a successful state, unsuccessful 
otherwise. We denote the result set of a test by lZ(o,p). The tests may be repeated a number 
of times, which may yield the additional result, {T, _L}, i.e. sometimes the process will pass the 
test, sometimes it will fail.
Testing equivalence is defined in terms of three relations which reflect different views of how 
to order these results as domains.
1. The Hoare Domain, see figure 3.3, reflects the view that the possibility of failure is not a 
disaster, and therefore equates {T} with {T, X}, i.e. some experiments may fail, but at 
least one experiment was successful. Given a process p, p m ay satisfy  o if T E 1Z(o,p).
The relation on processes derived from this domain is written Cmay, where p Cmay q if 
Vo £ O, p m ay satisfy  o implies q m ay satisfy o.
2. The Smyth Domain, see figure 3.3, is the opposite of the Hoare domain, in that the possibility 
of failure is viewed as catastrophic, and {T, X} is equated with {X}. Given a process p, 
p m ust satisfy  o if {T} = 7Z(o,p).
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{T}
{T} = {T, X} {T} {T, X}
{-L} {-L} =  {T, X} {X}
The Hoare Domain The Smyth Domain The Egli-Milner Domain
Figure 3.3: Testing Domains
The relation on processes derived from this domain is written where p Qmust 9 if
Vo £ O, p m ust satisfy  o implies q m ust satisfy o.
3. The Egli-Milner Domain, see figure 3.3, reflects a more balanced view of the possibility of
failure, equating it with neither {T} nor {-L}.
The relation on processes obtained from this domain is written Q te s t ,  and p Q te a t  9 iff 
P Q m a y  9 and p Cmus£ q.
Each of these relations is a preorder, i.e. a reflexive and transitive relation.
D efinition  6  (T esting  Equivalence) Testing equivalence is defined in a natural way by the fol­
lowing:
p and q are testing equivalent if p Q t e s t  9 and q Q t e s t P -
Informally, p and q are testing equivalent if there are no tests which one passes but the other 
does not. As with strong and observational equivalence a complete axiomatisation exists for testing 
equivalence over finite processes [DH84],
The power of testing equivalence varies, depending on three factors: the power of the observers, 
the criteria for determining success or failure of a test, and the method of tabulating the results 
of a test. Varying these factors gives a range of different testing equivalences. The observers most 
commonly used are constructed in the same way, and using the same operators, as processes, with 
the addition of an action u; which denotes success. A test is successful if the u> action is observed. 
The resulting equivalence is the one most commonly used, and is the equivalence we mean when 
we refer to “testing equivalence” .
Tests can be made stronger, as mentioned previously, by allowing existential quantifiers, as 
in [Abr87], as part of the language. This alters the way in which the information from the tests 
is collated. Another possible extension is to change the treatment of divergence; specifically, if a 
process enables the observer to perform an u> action but subsequently diverges, should a success 
or failure be observed?
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C h aracterisations o f T esting Equivalence
We now consider other means of characterising testing equivalence. The full definitions may be 
found in [De 87].
L abelled  T ransition  System s The previous discussion of testing equivalence was in a general 
setting. To be applicable for CCS (or LOTOS), the notions of observers and successful states 
must be defined in terms of labelled transition systems. An observer (or experimenter) is just a 
process with the additional action u>, denoting success. A state is a (process, observer) pair. The 
state is successful if the observer can perform an cj action. Given these definitions, computations 
are sequences of states, and the preorders m ay and m u st are defined in terms of success states 
within computations.
P rocesses are sets of LTS’s as defined in section 3.4.3.
O bservers (or experimenters) will be P rocesses with the additional action u>, which reports 
success.
S ta tes  will be pairs (p, e) where p is a state of a process and e is a state of an experimenter. A 
successful state is one whose right component can perform an u  action.
C om p u tation s Given two transition systems, T  and E, with initial states t and e, a computation 
from (t , e) is a finite or infinite sequence of pairs of states (tn,en) where:
1 . (to,e0) is (t,e).
2 . (a) (tn, en) (^n+ij^n+i) if tn  ^ r^»+i a-nd en — en-\-\, or en en+i and
i n  — ^n + l )
(b) (tn j ^n) (tn+ 1  > Cn+1) if tn  ^^n+1 and en >• €n+\
3. if the sequence is finite with {tk,ek) as final element then no more transitions in Act 
are possible from (t*,e*).
The relations m ay satisfy  and m ust satisfy  can now be redefined in terms of the above defini­
tions.
1. T  m ay satisfy  E  if 3<x e  Act*.(to,e0) — >■ (tn ,en) and 3en+i.en e„+i.
2. T  m ust satisfy  E  if for every computation (to,eo) {t\,e i) ^ 2 ,^ 2 ) — > . . .  there
exists n > 0  such that en en+i ■
The preorders and the equivalence are defined as before, but using the above definitions of m ay  
satisfy  and m ust satisfy.
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A ction  Sequences The problem with the above characterisations of testing is that, although 
they are very easy to understand, they are not so useful in proofs of equivalence. Proving non­
equivalence is straightforward: only one observer which differentiates the processes must be found, 
whereas a rigorous analysis of all possible tests is necessary to prove equivalence.
An alternative method of characterising this equivalence uses sequences of actions to define the 
three orderings. This is the method used in the LOTOS standard to define the testing preorders. 
As the definitions are given in section 3.5.3 we do not repeat them here.
Failures In [De 87] the important result that testing equivalence has the same discriminatory 
power as the equivalence induced by failures semantics in CSP is given. This means that testing 
equivalence can also be defined in terms of traces and failures. The definition turns out to be just 
the contrapositive of the definition in terms of action sequences given in section 3.5.3, i.e. rather 
than concentrating on the actions a process can perform we concentrate on the actions it cannot 
perform.
3.4.4 Proof Techniques for CCS
The kinds of proofs which can be constructed for CCS processes vary depending on the particular 
semantics/equivalence relation adopted.
• The operational semantics may be used to “simulate” a behaviour. This allows us to trace 
through the execution of a process, highlighting situations in which deadlock may occur and 
so on.
• Two terms to be proved equivalent may be manipulated by applying the algebraic laws 
associated with the particular equivalence/congruence/preorder used. This is always sound, 
and in some cases, e.g. for branching bisimulation, may also be complete.
• The alternative methods of characterising the equivalences can be used instead of referring 
to the labelled transition system or the axioms. For example, using strong equivalence or 
observation equivalence we may proceed by trying to find a (strong or weak) bisimulation 
R  which includes the pair of terms to be proved equivalent. For observation equivalence 
we may also try to prove that two processes are not equivalent by finding an HML formula 
which holds for one but not the other. To prove that two terms are not equivalent under 
testing equivalence a test must be found which distinguishes them. Alternatively, a case 
analysis over tests must be carried out to show that there is no test which distinguishes the 
terms.
• A combination of the above methods can be used as appropriate for the given problem, 
e.g. first use the algebraic laws to simplify the processes, making the other proof techniques
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simpler to apply.
Another important technique used in proofs in CCS is unique fixed point induction. This allows 
us deduce that two recursively defined processes are equivalent if they satisfy the same general 
equation. This is due to a result about the uniqueness of solutions to equations. Again this 
definition is taken from [Mil89b].
D efin ition  7 (U nique S olu tion  of E quations) Consider solutions of the expression X  = E, 
where X  and E denote vectors of variables and process expressions respectively.
Let the expressions E  be guarded and sequential expressions, i.e. all expressions have visible 
initial events and use only the operators . and -f, with free variables in X . Let P = E { P / X }  and 
Q = E{Q/ X} .  We may deduce P = Q.
In the above, = stands for observation congruence, but similar results have been obtained for 
other equivalences/other formalisms.
Having introduced CCS and CSP, we can now consider the formal description technique 
LOTOS.
3.5 LO TOS
LOTOS [IS088] is based on the concept of specifying a system in terms of observable behaviour, 
i.e. events, and was designed by ISO (International Standards Organisation) with the specification 
of communications protocols in mind. This has had a great bearing on the design decisions taken 
when developing the language; in particular, LOTOS is very expressive, with a large operator set, 
including mechanisms for structuring large specifications.
As in CCS and CSP, LOTOS has no explicit representation of time; however, constraints may 
be placed on the order of events. The communication and change of information within a system 
is expressed by the structure of those events.
LOTOS consists of two parts: the process algebra Basic LOTOS and the abstract data type 
specification language ACT ONE. In this section, and for the following six chapters, only the 
process part of the language, Basic LOTOS, is considered; the data type part is discussed in 
chapter 10. The complete syntax and semantics of full LOTOS is given in appendix B.
3.5.1 Operators of Basic LOTOS
The operators of Basic LOTOS are given in figure 3.4, in which a is an event, P, Q and ex are 
processes, G is a set of gate names, and S  is a relabelling function.
Some LOTOS operators have exactly the same behaviour as their CCS counterparts:
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description notation
internal action i
inaction (deadlock) s to p
successful termination ex it
action prefixing a; P
choice p  D Q
parallelism (general) P |[G ] | Q
parallelism (interleaving) ^111 Q
parallelism (full synchronisation) m  Q
enable P >  Q
disable P[> Q
hide h id e  G in  P
renaming P[S\
recursion p ro c  ex := a; ex e n d p ro c
Figure 3.4: Operators of Basic LOTOS
• t  becomes i.
• 0 becomes stop .
• a.P becomes a; P.
• P + Q becomes P  (] Q.
The remaining operators are either ones which owe more to CSP than CCS, or ones specially 
introduced to make the specification of communications protocols easier.
• In addition to the CCS unsuccessful termination, i.e. deadlock (stop), LOTOS also has 
successful termination, denoted ex it. A new event, 8, denoting successful termination is 
added, along with the transition rule ex it stop .
• In CSP the special communication events are called channels; in LOTOS they are called 
gates.
• The parallelism operator is altered to allow explicit specification of the set of gate names, 
G, on which the processes must synchronise (this follows the model of CSP parallelism).
• LOTOS has broadcast communication.
• Interleaving is parallelism with an empty set of gate names, i.e. no synchronisation. Full syn­
chronisation is parallelism with the set of gate names equal to the language of the processes 
being combined, i.e. everything synchronises.
• Enable, denoted by , means the sequential composition of processes4.
4 In the concurrency literature enable has a different meaning. If an action is enabled, then it is ready to be 
performed. This difference is irritating, but enable is the name used in the LOTOS standard for this operator.
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• Disable, denoted [> , allows Q to interrupt the execution of P  and take control.
• LOTOS h ide  is like CSP hide, rather than CCS restriction, i.e. hidden events are turned
into occurrences of the internal action, and may proceed without constraint.
• The post-fix renaming operator applies a relabelling function to the gate names. The only
constraint on the behaviour of the function is that it must map the internal action to itself.
An important area of LOTOS-related research, which is not a feature of CCS or CSP research, 
is the investigation of the ability to write specifications in different styles. Some of the most 
common styles are described below.
3.5.2 LOTOS Specification Styles
In [VSvSB91] two basic characterisations of the descriptive style of a specification are given: exten- 
sional, an abstract style which describes what the system does, and intensional, a more concrete 
style which describes how the system operates, typically also giving internal structuring of the 
system. For Basic LOTOS, two more styles within each of these classes can be identified. For 
extensional descriptions these are monolithic and constraint-oriented, while for intensional spec­
ification styles we have state-oriented and resource-oriented. In the monolithic style, observable 
interactions are presented as a collection of alternative sequences in branching time. A character­
istic of this style is the absence of parallelism, only choice and ordering are used. In constraint- 
oriented specification, different aspects of the system are separated and described as individual 
processes. These processes are recombined using parallelism to give the whole specification. This 
style of specification is popular because in general it is easier to understand the behaviour of small 
components than large ones. However, this can lead to a false understanding of the system, as 
the interactions of the components can be very complex and easily misunderstood. The user must 
rely on tools to check that the combined behaviour is as intended. Examples of this style may be 
found in [Naj87, Tur92], and also here, in section 7.4.3.
In the state-oriented specification style, interactions manipulate a global state variable. No 
structuring other than choice is used which is similar to the monolithic style. Finally, we have the 
resource-oriented specification style, which is similar to the constraint oriented style, except that 
here each component can be identified with an underlying implementation feature rather than 
with an abstract feature of the system. Tools exist which can transform a specification written in 
one style into another style [vE89, LITE].
The constraint-oriented and resource-oriented styles also satisfy more general specification 
style concerns such as orthogonality (functional independence of parts), generality (parametric 
specifications), and open-endedness (flexible, easily extended specifications). This makes them
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more suitable for early, abstract specifications, while the other styles are nearer to the level of the 
implementation of the system, particularly the state oriented style.
In most specifications, a mixture of styles will be used, starting with constraint-oriented, which 
is more easily understood by a user, and moving to state-oriented or resource-oriented, which may 
be closer to implementation. An interesting question, from our point of view, is how the verification 
process might be affected by the style in which a process is written. Obviously, since there are 
transformations from one style to another, the specification style should not alter the validity of 
a property; however, it may be easier in a particular style to show that property holds of the 
specification.
3.5.3 Sem antics of Basic LOTOS
Basic LOTOS is based on the same model as CCS: the semantics of processes are given by labelled 
transition systems. The inference rules defining the semantics of LOTOS, taken from [IS088], are 
given in appendix B. Everything that was said about equivalences in CCS can also be applied to 
Basic LOTOS, and we do not repeat the definitions here. Some laws, also taken from [IS088], for 
weak bisimulation congruence and equivalence, testing equivalence, testing congruence, red and 
cred are given in appendix B. In the LOTOS laws the operator C is often used. This operator 
takes a process and returns the language of that process, i.e. the set of events in which it may 
participate.
In the rest of the thesis the following notations are used. We have tried to maintain com­
patibility with both the LOTOS standard and the definitions and notation used in the previous 
section.
• The domain of gates is denoted by Q (this is similar to the domain of labels in CCS, but there 
is no notion of a co-label in LOTOS as communication is multi-way). The new termination 
action is treated in the same way as the other gate labels, S E Q, but, as in CCS, internal 
actions are treated differently, i £ Q. We use g , g i , . . . to range over Q and t , t i , . . .  to range 
over Q*. Subsets of Q may be denoted by A, G or L (depending on the context).
• The domain of actions is denoted Act as before. Act = Q U {i}. We use a ,/?, . . .  to range 
over Act.
• The definitions of — > and =>• are as before, modulo renaming of variables and substitution 
of i for t .
• We denote LOTOS weak bisimulation congruence by =wbc and weak bisimulation equivalence 
by ^ wbe• The notation for the other relations is defined in a similar manner.
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In addition to defining weak bisimulation equivalence and congruence for LOTOS, the LOTOS 
standard also defines the preorder red and its congruent counterpart cred. These are essen­
tially the testing preorders of section 3.4.3, as described in [DH84, De 87, Hen8 8 ], although the 
LOTOS convention is to write the arguments in the opposite order, i.e. impl cred spec, rather 
than spec C impl.
We give the LOTOS standard’s presentation of testing in terms of action sequences below. To 
define the red and cred relations some more auxiliary definitions are required. Remember the 
slightly different naming conventions of variables in LOTOS as opposed to those used in CCS. For 
example, traces, denoted by t, may also contain S.
• P  after t =  { ? ' | F  P'}.
• Let L C Q, then
(P m ust L) iff. P  =>- P' implies 3 P " . P ' ==U- P" for some I E L
P  m ust L is equivalent to saying that if P  performs any visible actions then it must perform 
an action from L , assuming L ^  0. The expression P ==> P' guarantees freedom from 
divergence, i.e. any sequence of internal actions is finite. There are two special cases of note: 
stop  m ust L and P  m ust 0, both of which give false, regardless of L and P.
Note that this relation really has more of the flavour of m ay than m ust, since it expresses 
the possibility that an action may be performed rather than the certainty that that action will 
be performed. The m ust flavour comes from the following definition extending the relation 
to sets of states.
• The m ust predicate can be defined over sets of states in the obvious way. Let Q C V , then 
Q m ust L iff. V Q E Q. Q m ust L.
An interesting special case here is 0 m ust L which is always true, even when L =  0. In the
definition of red below this case occurs when the trace t is not a valid trace of the process,
therefore P  after t is empty.
• Let C\ ] be a LOTOS context, then C[P] denotes the process P  in the context C[ ].
The red and cred relations may now be defined.
D efin ition  8 (T h e red relation) P  red Q iff.
W E G* VL C Q. (Q after t ) m ust L =>• (P after t) m ust L
D efin ition  9 (T h e cred relation) For LOTOS behaviour expressions P and Q,
P  cred Q iff. for all LOTOS contexts C[ ], C[P] red C[Q],
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Both of these refinement relations are preorders (i.e. reflexive and transitive relations). Divergence 
is ignored, unless it comes before a successful state.
An alternative definition of red  is given by [Bri8 8 a] and [Lan92].
D efin ition  10 (T he red  re la tio n  2)
P  red  Q if
v t e g * , V L  e g
if 3P'. P =U P ’ A Va € L -.(3 P P '  P") then
3Q'. Q Q' A Va G A. - (3 Q". Q' =*> Q")
Informally, this definition describes red  in terms of events which it cannot perform, i.e. re­
fusals, rather than in terms of events which it may perform. These two forms of definition are 
in fact equivalent, since this is just the contrapositive of the previous definition of red . This 
also underlines that tests and failures are just different ways of expressing the same equivalence 
relation.
Similar/related preorders to red  and cred  have been defined elsewhere in the literature. For 
example, red , ex t and im p in [BSS87] and red  and conf in [Bri8 8 a]. Note that the same name 
need not denote the same relation; however, the differences are minor.
The definition of red  in [BSS87] is like definition 10 above except that the trace set of the 
implementation must be contained within the trace set of the specification. The ex t preorder, 
on the other hand, insists that the trace set of the specification process be contained within that 
of the implementation process. Moreover, although the rest of the definition is the same as the 
alternative red  given above, the traces are taken from the language of the specification, rather 
than from Act*. This difference makes sense as the intention of [BSS87] is to develop a method 
of deriving tests from the specification. Using tests from Act amounts to testing the system for 
robustness, i.e. correctness in the presence of incorrect/unexpected inputs, whereas restricting the 
tests to traces of the specification means that only defined inputs are tests; all others are ignored. 
The equivalences induced by red  and ex t are the same. The third preorder of [BSS87], im p, 
is defined by im p =  red  ext, i.e. a composition of the two previous preorders. It behaves like 
the red  of definition 1 0  except that it insists that the specification and the implementation have 
the same traces. These three relations evolve into red  and conf in [Bri8 8 a], where re d  is as in 
definition 1 0  and conf is similar to ex t except that no constraints are placed on the trace sets of 
the processes.
The definitions of [BSS87] were early attempts to express the notion of implementation which 
were later refined in [Bri8 8 a], therefore we choose to use the later definitions in the following. 
We do not use conf as it is not a preorder (it is not transitive) and therefore does not yield an 
equivalence, unlike red . Since most of our work will be based on equivalence relations red  is
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therefore a more desirable relation to use.
Complete axiomatisations for LOTOS equivalences and preorders do not exist, as far as the 
author is aware, or rather, they have not been documented. Certainly finite Basic LOTOS can be 
transformed into finite CCS, see [BIN92], and complete axiomatisations exist for finite CCS, and 
therefore for finite Basic LOTOS.
3.5.4 P roof Techniques for LOTOS
The proof techniques for LOTOS are borrowed directly from the proof techniques for CCS. With a 
little manipulation, CSP-like proofs can also be obtained, this is described in [GL91] and [GL091]. 
A problem of the approach is that the fixpoint induction principle cannot be applied to LOTOS 
with failures semantics as the solutions to equations are not unique; this is because the ordering 
over sets of failures is non-monotonic with respect to the corresponding processes in the presence 
of i.
In addition to the usual CSP and CCS proof techniques, property testing is a commonly used 
proof technique for LOTOS. The technique consists of describing the property in the style of a test 
process and executing that test in parallel with the system to be tested. The test process includes 
a special action which indicates that the test has been passed and the two processes synchronise 
on all other events. If the system can perform the same actions as the test process then the test 
is passed; if not, the test fails. This technique is based on testing equivalence, but typically only 
one test (one property) is considered, rather than all tests. This proof technique used in [Tho93], 
which is also described in chapter 9.
The power of the tests can be increased by extending the language of tests. One possible 
extension is to add an action which can detect deadlock; this form of testing is described in 
[Lan90].
We have now presented the three process algebras CSP, CCS and LOTOS. Before moving on 
to consider verification of properties of LOTOS specifications in more detail, we summarise the 
differences and similarities of the three formalisms. We also compare the relative strengths of the 
different equivalence and congruence relations defined for all three process algebras.
3.6  C om parison  o f  P ro cess  A lgebras
3.6.1 Com paring the Formalisms as Specification Languages
The process algebras CSP, CCS and LOTOS are all very similar in their basic concepts. Each 
formalism is described in terms of a set of operators over the same basic domain: processes and 
actions. They differ in their philosophy and area of application however. When CCS was defined
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the intention was to have a minimal set of operators which would allow the semantics of the 
language to be more easily explored. Although good for small examples, CCS is more difficult 
to use in larger scale examples because it lacks the operators necessary to structure a larger 
specification. However, some of these operators can be constructed from the basic operators if 
necessary. On the other hand, both CSP and LOTOS were designed to be used as specification 
languages. LOTOS in particular was designed for large communications systems, and therefore 
has lots of operators which make it easy to build a large specification out of smaller parts.
Having a large operator set can cause problems, simply because the proliferation of operators 
may cause confusion, thus making the specification process more difficult in some circumstances. 
Also, as mentioned in the introduction, the more expressive a specification language is, the more 
complicated verification becomes (either through the language being based on a more complex 
mathematical model, or simply through the confusion of having lots of operators).
The three formalisms, although based on a common semantic model (CSP can also be defined 
in terms of labelled transition systems), have slight differences in the way in which that model 
is interpreted. For example, communication in CSP and LOTOS is based on multi-way synchro­
nisation, whereas CCS restricts communication to two parties. The differences in the approach 
to communication are also reflected in the approach to hiding and restriction. While CSP and 
LOTOS turn hidden actions into internal actions (which may then proceed instantaneously), CCS 
uses restriction to prevent a process from communicating with its environment, usually forcing it 
to communicate with some other process.
Another difference is the use of distinguished actions. CSP has one distinguished action, 
yj’, which signifies successful termination. Although the hiding operator in CSP, as in LOTOS, 
produces internal, invisible, actions, CSP has no special notation for this. CSP invisible actions 
really are invisible! CCS, on the other hand, relies quite heavily on the internal action for the result 
of a communication, and for modelling nondeterminism in the system (whereas CSP has a special 
operator for nondeterministic choice). LOTOS, as might be expected, reflects both formalisms in 
that it has a distinguished internal action; however, its treatment of i is a combination of the CCS 
use of r , and the CSP creation of internal events by hiding.
With regards to syntax and semantics of operators, it can be seen that CSP and LOTOS are 
quite similar and useful as practical specification languages, while CCS is more suited to small 
theoretical investigations. When considering proof systems, LOTOS is aligned with CCS rather 
than CSP. The operators of all three formalisms are associated with a set of algebraic laws which 
allow transformation of process expressions. In addition to this, CSP also has an associated 
abstract specification language, which can be used to express the requirements of a system, and 
a satisfaction relation, which tells us when a CSP process meets those requirements. CCS is also 
closely related with a more abstract specification language, the logic HML, which can be used in
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a similar way. LOTOS however, has no such language. What LOTOS does have, which the other 
two lack, is extensive tool support; this is a result of being designed for use in industry rather than 
academia. Of course there are tools associated with CSP and CCS, but there are not so many, 
and they are mostly proof tools, whereas LOTOS tools offer support in various other forms of 
analysis. Details of tool support for CCS and LOTOS are given in appendix A. Where CSP and 
CCS gain is that there is an extensive associated literature, while LOTOS, being relatively new, 
has only a small literature.
Finally, we may also consider implementations of processes: CSP is closely related to the lan­
guage occam™, CCS is incorporated in the language LCS [BS94], and tools exist which translate 
LOTOS into C [LITE],
Further comparison of CCS and CSP may be found in [vG8 6 ]; the evaluation of LOTOS with 
respect to other concurrency formalisms, including CSP and CCS, may be found in [Fid93].
Although proof systems are mentioned above, they are not discussed in detail. All methods 
of proof, i.e. traces, failures, tests and bisimulations, are relatively easy to understand, and to 
a great extent preference for one or the other depends on the subjective choice of the specifier. 
However, the behavioural equivalences associated with each proof technique can be compared more 
objectively.
3.6.2 Com paring the Different Equivalences
Several different equivalences have been defined in sections 3.3.2, 3.4.3 and 3.5.3. In [vG90] a 
general framework, based on transition systems, is presented which allows these equivalences to 
be compared in terms of distinguishing power. The use of a common model also enables us to see 
that an equivalence defined for use with CSP may just as easily applied to LOTOS or CCS, or 
vice versa.
A similar study of some of the commonly used equivalences is detailed in [De 87], but without 
the cohesive underlying framework. However, this work does consider equivalences which involve 
the r  action, while the study of [vG90] considers only finitely branching5, concrete, sequential 
processes. This means that the processes under consideration can have no internal actions, they 
must be compliant (they may not block actions — only the environment may block actions), and 
actions may not occur simultaneously. In other words: no infinite summation (choice), no silent 
actions, no nondeterminism (although nondeterminism occurs when a choice is given which has 
the same first action in each side) and no true parallelism are permitted.
Note: we do not consider the red  and cred preorders in this framework since it does not make 
sense to compare preorder relations with equivalence and congruence relations.
5 Finitely branching processes may be recursive, but at each stage, only finitely many choices are allowed.
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Below we give the informal description of the comparative framework of [vG90], the ordering 
of the relations presented here in that framework, and some examples illustrating the differences 
between those relations.
O bserv ing  P rocesses
The semantics of a process is determined by its observable behaviour. An observer may observe all 
actions of a process, and may terminate the observation at any time. An observation is a sequence 
of actions over A, in other words, a trace. Three parameters of observable behaviour are used. 
The first concerns time:
1. L inear T im e The observer may observe the process many times and under all circumstances, 
giving a set of traces.
2. B ranch ing  T im e At any time in the execution the observer may split the process into 
several copies of itself, each taking a different execution path. This results in a tree of 
observations.
The second parameter is concerned with the sort of events which may be observed:
1. O nly A ctions
2. Also Id leness Traces are defined over AU{<J}, where S denotes idleness, i.e. periods during 
which the process performs no actions.
3. M enus At each idle period, a menu of possible actions is recorded.
Finally, the effect of the environment on the process is considered.
1. S ta tic  E nv ironm ent The environment will allow any action to proceed.
2. In te rm e d ia te  E nv ironm en t The environment may block actions. Once blocked, an action 
cannot be re-enabled.
3. D ynam ic E nv ironm en t The environment is free to block and unblock actions at any time 
in the execution of the process.
This results in a total of 18 semantics or equivalence relations, but many of these coincide in the 
particular range of processes chosen. We also limit this discussion to those relations presented in 
this chapter, with the inclusion of complete trace equivalence which is just the language equivalence 
of finite state automata.
The semantics can be ordered by the partial order “makes at least as many identifications 
as” , written S  ■< T , if S  makes as many (possibly more) identifications as T. This means that
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S  is a coarser equivalence than T , i.e. let iden(c>) be the set of identifications made by S, then 
iden(»S) D iden(T). See figure 3.5 for a diagram showing the positions of the seven defined seman­
tics in relation to each other. In this diagram S  <— T  represents S  -< T ■ The diagram is part of 
a complete lattice on this ordering over all variants of observing processes, called the linear time 
— branching time spectrum. See [vG90, De 87] for details of the rest of this lattice, and also for 
proofs that the relations are indeed ordered as shown in figure 3.5.
strong bisimulation equivalence
branching bisimulation equivalence
observation congruence
observation equivalence
failures congruence = testing congruence
completed trace equivalence
trace equivalence 
Figure 3.5: The Distinguishing Power of Common Equivalences
D ete rm in is tic  Processes
An interesting result discussed in [vG90] is that if the processes are deterministic, the whole 
structure of figure 3.5 collapses, i.e. all equivalences coincide.
D efin ition  11 A process is deterministic if  P  Q Sz P R  => Q = R.
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If the processes are deterministic, the equivalences are also decidable (since strong bisimulation 
equivalence is decidable for the class of normed BPA processes [GH91, Hiit91]).
E xam ples
Below we give some examples which demonstrate the differences between equivalences in the above 
ordering. The examples are expressed in CCS syntax and are taken from [vG90].
6
a.b + a
— te
cte
a.b
Completed trace equivalence is more discriminating than trace equivalence as traces (left-hand- 
process) = traces(right-hand-process) =  {e, a, ab}, but complete-traces(left-hand-process) = {a,a&}, 
while complete-traces(right-hand-process) =  {ab}.
b
— cte
#/«
a . (6  +  c)a.b +  a.c
Failures equivalence/testing equivalence is more discriminating than complete trace equiva­
lence as complete-traces (left-hand-process) =  complete-traces(right-hand-process)= {ab,ac}, while 
(a, {6 }) E failures (left-hand-process) but not failures (right-hand-process).
a.b.c + a.b.d
— f e  
^ s b e
a.(b.c +  b.d)
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Strong bisimulation equivalence is more discriminating than failures equivalence, as in the left 
hand process we can perform a and then find ourselves unable to perform be, while the right hand 
process will always be able to perform be after a.
— wbe
sbe
a.b a.r.b
Any processes which are equivalent under weak bisimulation congruence by removing an inter­
nal action will never be equivalent under strong bisimulation equivalence. Similarly for branching 
bisimulation equivalence.
For an example of processes which are distinguished under branching bisimulation equivalence, 
but identified under weak bisimulation congruence, see section 3.4.3.
Discriminatory power is one of the most important ways in which we can compare these 
relations. In section 4.2.2 we discuss some other possible means of comparison.
3 .7  Sum m ary
In this section we have laid the foundations for the discussions of verification to come. The 
semantics of CSP and CCS have been introduced, and the many interpretations of those semantics 
have been put forward. Since LOTOS inherits much of its semantics from these two languages, in 
most cases the same interpretations may also be applied to LOTOS semantics, possibly with some 
small alterations. In addition, the various proof techniques associated with each formalism have 
been described. These proof techniques may be useful in giving us different ways of approaching 
the problem of verifying the correctness of a system. Finally, we have summarised the differences 
and the similarities of the three formalisms, particularly concentrating on the different semantic 
equivalences which may be defined for each.
In the next chapter, one particular aspect of verification is singled out for further study, namely 
the approach of proving two specifications, both described using process algebra, in particular Basic 
LOTOS, are related in some way, i.e. by a preorder, equivalence or congruence relation.
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C hapter 4
Verification Requirem ents II: 
Satisfaction
In this chapter we examine in detail the proof method of evaluating the correctness of an im­
plementation with respect to a specification by showing that the implementation satisfies the 
specification, i.e. some relation, an equivalence, congruence or preorder, holds between the two 
descriptions. We shall call this the satisfaction approach to verification. We assume the specifica­
tion and implementation are given, and are both expressed in Basic LOTOS. The most important 
question to be answered is “what sort of relation should be used to model satisfaction?” .
We begin by considering the types of relation available to us in LOTOS, equivalences, con­
gruences and preorders, and some criteria in deciding which kind of relation to use. We then 
consider more specifically the various equivalence relations which can be used with LOTOS and 
put forward some criteria for choosing between them. We also briefly consider the question of 
using these relations to help derive the implementation from the specification.
Having considered the theoretical background of the satisfaction approach to verification, we 
move on to consider proof techniques and tools currently in use for either CCS or LOTOS which 
are based on this approach. The reason for considering CCS techniques and tools is the lack of 
verification tools available for LOTOS; we may be able to adapt these techniques and/or tools for 
use with LOTOS. From this survey of tools and techniques, we identify the technique of equational 
reasoning as appropriate for our use.
4.1 P rov in g  th e  Im p lem en tation  satisfies th e  S pecification
Many case studies in the literature include examples of proving the equivalence of two behaviours, 
one which represents a “specification” of the system, the other the “implementation” ; see below
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for references to a selection of such case studies. The specification here is an abstraction of the 
implementation. This may mean that it is described in a more abstract, less implementation 
dependent way; the LOTOS specification styles mentioned in section 3.5.2 illustrate some of the 
different levels of abstraction possible within one language. Alternatively, abstraction may mean 
that the specification is partial, i.e. it describes only certain aspects of the behaviour of the system, 
whereas the implementation may capture the full behaviour of the system. In this case an equiva­
lence relation is an inappropriate means of comparing the specification with the implementation; a 
preorder relation should be used instead. Having said that, most of the examples in the literature 
use equivalence relations, therefore we will concentrate on the former interpretation of abstraction.
Examples of the satisfaction approach to verification are particularly common in OSI commu­
nications examples, due to the structure of the OSI Reference Model [IS074]. Each layer of the 
Reference Model is specified in two ways: a description of the service provider in terms of the 
services available to the layer above, and a description of those services as protocols, i.e. interfaces 
between the user, which is the service provider, and the service providers of the layer below.
This approach to verification is applied by many case studies in the literature. Some use tools 
to aid in the proof, others carry out the verification by hand (this is only feasible for relatively 
small examples). Those which use tools to automatically construct an equivalence relation include: 
train/car level crossing [Bai91], communications protocols [Par8 8 , BA91, CN91], sliding window 
protocol [MV91b], ISO Reference Model layer [Naj87], communications protocol [Ern91], protocol 
for overtaking cars [EFJ90], and hand-over procedure in a mobile phone network [F091].
Other case studies rely on equational reasoning: curious queues [vG90], sliding window protocol 
[Gro87], and hand-over from one base station to another in a mobile phone network [0P91]. Most 
of these are done by hand. A particularly rich source of equational reasoning examples is [Bae90] 
which deals with applications of the process algebra ACP (which is defined only by sets of axioms, 
making equational reasoning an obvious paradigm to adopt) to specific examples. Also good for 
many examples of equational reasoning and constructing bisimulations by hand is [Mil89b].
The papers on automatic tools referenced in section 4.4 and in appendix A contain examples of 
automated proofs; common examples include Milner’s scheduler and the alternating bit protocol. 
Another example is the verification of protocols governing the logging-on interactions between a 
user and a computer system [Kir93], also described in chapter 7.
Given that we wish to show the implementation satisfies the specification, we have first to decide 
which sort of relation, i.e. equivalence, congruence, or preorder, is appropriate for a particular 
example. In particular, if an equivalence relation is used, which of the many relations defined in 
the last chapter should be used. This decision depends on which parts of the observable behaviour 
are important and are to be used in evaluating the equivalence. The answers to these questions 
are considered below.
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4 .2  W h at Sort o f  R ela tion  Should B e U sed?
4.2.1 Equivalence, Congruence or Preorder?
For LOTOS, we have a choice of three kinds of relation with which we may compare processes: 
equivalence, congruence or preorder relations. In most verification proofs, we will want to ensure 
that the substitutivity property is preserved, i.e. that two equivalent processes will have the same 
behaviour in all contexts, therefore if a congruence relation is available, we should always choose 
it in preference to the corresponding equivalence relation. This applies to weak bisimulation 
congruence and testing congruence; strong equivalence, branching bisimulation equivalence and 
trace equivalence are all also congruence relations. This criteria also applies to preorder relations.
We still have to decide between using an equivalence/congruence relation and a praorder rela­
tion.
If the specification and implementation are developed independently, then choosing between 
congruence and preorder is largely a matter of trial and error. However, if we assume that the 
implementation is somehow derived from the specification and that we have inforrmtion about 
that derivation process, then we can use that information in our decision. This is m t a strong 
assumption, as in general we expect that the specification will at least be used as a reference when 
defining the implementation. Note that we do not assume that the implementation is formally 
derived from the specification, as this would make the verification trivial, see section 4.3 .
As in section 2.2.2 we assume a sequence of specifications, So —> Si —>■ S2 Sn . This
time we also assume we know a little more about the relationship between each specification and 
the next.
Given two descriptions in the sequence, Si and Sj, where i < j , we view S,- as the specification 
of the system and Sj as the implementation. Four interpretations of implementation an identified 
in [BSS87]; we consider three of these interpretations below. The fourth interpretation of the term 
implementation is as the final code of the system. Since we stated in chapter 2 that we are not 
interested in program code, this particular interpretation is ignored here.
We consider three sorts of steps which may be taken from the specification to reach the imple­
mentation.
R ed u c tio n  Resolving choices which were left open in the specification, i.e. removtig nonde­
terminism. This means the implementation may have fewer possible behaviour; than the 
specification, but certainly not behaviours which the specification does not have.
E x tension  Adding new information about what to do/how to do something (different observable 
behaviour). Extension supports incremental specification, moving from a partial specification 
to a total one [IYK90]. This implies that the implementation will have behaviours which
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the specification does not have.
R efinem ent Providing more detail about a particular component, or method of structuring, e.g. 
changing a method (for efficiency for example) (same observable behaviour).
Examining these steps can tell us something about the sort of relation we need to capture the 
difference between descriptions. For example, if Si+i is obtained from Si by refinement, preserving 
the observable behaviour, then some sort of equivalence relation is appropriate. On the other hand, 
if 1 was obtained by reduction then a preorder relation might be more appropriate since the 
behaviour of S;+i will be contained within the behaviour of Si. In the same way, extension steps 
also indicate the use of a preorder relation; in this case the behaviour of Si will be contained 
within the behaviour of Si+i. The preorder relation models the case where we want the behaviour 
of one specification to approximate the behaviour of the other.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the step the specifier takes between Si and Si+ 1  will be larger, 
and probably a combination of many of all three types of design decision, making the choice 
between equivalence and preorder less clear cut.
Since we are dealing with LOTOS, there is only one preorder relation to consider, i.e. cred  (the 
congruent counterpart of red). If, however, the interpretation of implementation indicates an 
equivalence or congruence relation, we still have to choose between several different equivalence 
and congruence relations commonly used for LOTOS and presented in detail in the last chapter.
Possible criteria for making this choice are detailed next.
4.2.2 Choosing between Different Equivalence/C ongruence Relations
The most commonly used equivalence for LOTOS is weak bisimulation congruence (observation 
congruence), which is unfortunate since it seems to be too strong for most applications. (It is 
well known that the differences between distinct processes under observation equivalence are not 
truly observable [Abr87].) Also used are testing equivalence and, less commonly, failures and trace 
equivalence [GL91, GL091]. However, any other equivalence which can be defined over labelled 
transition systems can also be used for LOTOS, e.g. branching bisimulation equivalence.
Given that such a number of equivalences exist, how can a user wishing to compare two 
specifications choose which relation is the most appropriate for a particular example? Of course 
the satisfaction relation must capture the property we wish to express, but it can be difficult to 
determine exactly what that is. A number of possible criteria for making this chdce are given 
below. Our intention here is not to thoroughly explore the question of choosing an equivalence 
relation; we merely suggest some possible criteria, illustrating them via some selected examples. 
The exploration of the full implications of these criteria is considered as further work.
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S tre n g th  In the portion of the linear time — branching time spectrum presented in figure 3.5, 
section 3 .6 .2 , the relations are compared in terms of the number of identifications they make. 
We can use the relative strength of relations in terms of identifications to make our choice. 
For example, a strong equivalence will probably hold if a very short step has been taken 
between specification and implementation. On the other hand, a weaker relation is more 
likely to hold than a strong relation if the implementation is very far removed from the 
specification.
At the very least, when considering proving satisfaction, the user should start with a strong 
equivalence relation, moving to a weaker relation if the proof fails, if that relation still 
captures the property to be proved.
P ro p e rtie s  P rese rv ed  As mentioned in section 3.4.3, logic may be used to describe properties 
of the system. Some equivalences respect certain properties while others do not. For exam­
ple, trace equivalence does not preserve deadlock properties, and is therefore unsuitable for 
verification purposes (since we normally do not want to equate a process which deadlocks 
with one which does not). Similar relationships may exist between other equivalences and 
properties. The relationships between the equivalences induced by various logics and the 
standard process algebra equivalences is investigated in [BR83].
C ongruence This was discussed above. Normally we expect that a congruence relation is more 
desirable in a verification setting than an equivalence relation.
R efinem ent o f A ctions Normally actions are assumed to be atomic, but a useful development 
procedure is to use an action to model a more complex process, substituting that process for 
the action at a later stage in the development of the specification. Unfortunately, equivalence 
may not be preserved by this procedure. An equivalence which does allow refinement of 
actions is branching bisimulation equivalence [vG90].
A xiom ati sa t ions In order to carry out axiomatic proofs, it is helpful if the axiomatisation is 
sound and complete, and, for automation purposes, finite. Given the usual operators of 
process algebras, it is shown in [Mol90] that no such axiomatisation can exist; the expan­
sion theorem required to express interleaving semantics is actually an axiom schema which 
expands to give an infinite axiomatisation. A finite axiomatisation can only be obtained 
by altering the operator set. For example, the addition of the left merge operator to the 
language can give a finite axiomatisation. Alternatively, we may restrict ourselves to a subset 
of the language. For example, in [BIN92] a complete axiomatisation for finite Basic LOTOS 
has been derived by translating Basic LOTOS into CCS (and a complete axiomatisation 
exists for observation equivalence over finite state agents [Mil89a]).
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R ew rite  R ules Some axiomatisations can be turned into a finite confluent and terminating sets 
of rewrite rules, while others cannot. Experiments have been carried out in [DIN89] to inves­
tigate this for various equivalences, yielding the following results. Those equivalences which 
do have a corresponding complete rewrite rule set include branching bisimulation equiva­
lence, also discussed in [AB90], and trace equivalence; while those that do not admit a finite 
confluent and terminating rule set include observation equivalence and testing congruence. A 
complete rule set may be derived for these latter equivalences in one of two ways: removal of 
“troublesome” operators, e.g. observational congruence without the parallel operator yields a 
complete set of rewrite rules, [DIN89], or by application of special term rewriting techniques 
which allow infinite rule sets to be generalised, giving finite rule sets. This is also discussed 
in section 6.4.3.
A lte rn a tiv e  C h arac te risa tio n s  For hand proofs in particular, some methods of proof may be 
more appealing than others. For example, for weak bisimulation congruence, a proof may be 
completed by using the axioms, or by exhibiting a bisimulation, or by using logical properties. 
As another example, while proving testing equivalence does not hold can be relatively easily 
done by demonstrating that one test exists which differentiates the two processes, it is harder 
to be sure that all tests have been considered in a proof that the equivalence does hold. In this 
case we might resort to the alternative characterisation of failure trees (as testing equivalence 
and failures equivalence are identical). Unlike the other criteria, which are quantifiable in 
some way, this criterion depends mainly on the subjective opinion of the specifier.
D ecidab ility  Given two arbitrary processes, is it always possible to compute whether or not they 
are equivalent? Obviously if the underlying equivalence is undecidable, then we cannot fully 
automate the proof. Taking the classification of process algebra equivalences as put forward 
by [vG90] (the linear time -  branching time spectrum), it has been shown in [GH91, Hiit91] 
that of these, only strong bisimulation equivalence and branching bisimulation equivalence 
are decidable in general. All other equivalences in this spectrum are undecidable. (This 
result was shown for a special class of processes, equivalent to the context free languages, 
called normed BPA (Basic Process Algebra).)
Restrictions may be imposed on the language which ensure decidability, e.g. if the processes 
are deterministic then completed trace equivalence is decidable. Since all equivalences are the 
same over deterministic processes, [vG90], all equivalences are decidable over deterministic 
processes.
Another alternative is that we can relinquish fully automated methods of proof, moving to 
partial automation (where some measure of user guidance will be required).
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C o m p u ta tio n  How feasible is it to compute the equivalence? Although most of the above equiv­
alences are undecidable in general, algorithms have been developed which allow automation 
of proofs of equivalence for a subset of processes [KS90]. We might consider the efficiency of 
these algorithms with respect to each other.
Until these criteria are fully investigated we must rely on the method of trial and error in 
selecting a relation.
4 .3  R efin em en t and T ransform ation
Above we have considered the situation in which we are given two descriptions and are required to 
prove them related; however, we may also briefly consider the question of refining or transforming 
a specification to give an implementation, preserving some relation in the refinement. Again the 
choice of relation is important, since some relations will preserve properties which others do not.
Obviously, if equivalence relations and preorders can be used to determine whether or not one 
specification satisfies another, the axioms of an equivalence (or a preorder) can be used to derive 
5,+i from Si. It is also possible that the correctness of any transformations which are developed 
can be expressed in terms of the equivalences above. For example, as part of the LOTOSPHERE 
project a catalogue of correctness preserving transformations [Bol92] was developed for LOTOS. 
Several of these transformations preserve weak bisimulation congruence. One of the transfor­
mations is discussed in section 10.3.1; we note that special variants of the usual bisimulation 
equivalences were developed to express correctness of this transformation.
Another example of specification transformation in given in section 10.3.3, in which weak 
bisimulation congruence is preserved in transforming an abstract data type specification into a 
process algebra specification. We may also consider transformations within process algebra, e.g. 
from one specification style to another.
Related to the above question is how putting a specification in a different context may change 
the behaviour of the system as a whole. For example, if the specification replaces another con­
gruent specification, then there is no change to the observable behaviour. On the other hand, the 
constraint oriented style of specification is based on the ability to alter a specification by compos­
ing it in parallel with a new subsystem. This composition preserves the safety properties of the 
specification but not the liveness properties [Bri89].
The whole question of refinement and transformation is really a side issue of the main consider­
ation of proving an implementation satisfies a specification, as we assume that the implementation 
is given, rather than being derived by us from the specification.
We now return to the main question, and consider proof techniques for proving the equiva­
lence/ordering of two process algebra specification, and tools which implement those techniques.
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4 .4  P r o o f  Techniques and P r o o f  T ools
An important factor in the acceptability of a specification formalism is the quality and type of 
methods and automated tools with which it is associated. The previous sections have dealt with 
the theoretical foundation of the verification method of proving two specifications are related. We 
now consider automated techniques applying this method, and mention specific tools which can 
perform the comparison automatically (or semi-automatically). The features of these tools are 
discussed in more detail in appendix A.
There are several approaches to automating the proof of implementation satisfies specification, 
and many different tools. Here we consider proof tools in general because of the lack of specific 
LOTOS tools for this approach to verification. Below, these are grouped into those which use 
semantic reasoning, i.e. the approach relies on a deeper understanding of the semantics of the 
formalism, particularly the details of the equivalence relation, or syntactic reasoning, i.e. the 
approach relies on being able to manipulate the process expressions, without the machine having 
any knowledge of the underlying semantics. We might also call this the formal approach.
We consider several approaches in detail.
4.4.1 Sem antic Reasoning
P a r ti t io n  A lgorithm s To construct an equivalence, the processes are converted into finite state 
automata and partition algorithms, such as those given in [PT87, KS83] are used to construct a 
bisimulation. Equivalences such as testing equivalence can be alternatively expressed in terms of 
bisimulations by varying the information on the nodes of the graph, see e.g. [CH90]. Systems using 
this approach to equivalence checking include the Concurrency Workbench [CPS89] and AUTO 
[MV89], also used as part of the LITE toolkit [LITE].
These systems are limited by the fact that the partition algorithms can only be applied to 
finite state graphs, therefore not all processes which are equivalent can be proved equivalent using 
these tools. We note however, that this must be true of any method for equivalence checking, as 
most of the relations we deal with are undecidable. Constraints on the syntactic structure of a 
process which ensure finiteness have been developed in [BS87, MV91a]. The partition method also 
suffers from the state explosion problem, i.e. if the size of the graph gets too big, which happens 
easily when parallel statements include several components, the algorithm may become too slow 
to make its use practical.
A further drawback of the original partition method is that it can only give a yes/no answer,
i.e. if two processes are not equivalent it cannot supply any reason as to why this is the case (such 
reasons can be useful in gaining understanding of the specification). One way of expressing the 
difference between two processes is by finding a modal logic formula which one may satisfy but the
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other cannot; such a formula is guaranteed to exist [HM85]. [Cle91] refines the algorithm of [KS90], 
allowing the construction of a distinguishing formula in the case of inequivalence. This applies 
only to the algorithm for observation equivalence; similar refinements for other equivalences may 
be discovered in the future.
B ack track ing  M eth o d  This method, described in [Lar8 6 ] and automated in TAV [GLZ89], is 
different from the partition algorithm above in that it tries to find a minimal bisimulation rather 
than a maximal one. The method involves backtracking and is slower than the partition algorithm. 
Its main advantage is that reasons for inequivalence are generated automatically (but this can now 
be accomplished by partition methods also).
M ilne’s M eth o d  This method, described in [MM92] also relies on the representation of the 
processes by finite state machines, but instead of partitioning to find an equivalence, the equiv­
alence is demonstrated more directly, by composing the processes in parallel and comparing the 
resultant transition system with that of one of the original processes using tree equivalence. This 
allows the construction of a distinguishing trace in the case of inequivalence.
This method computes strong bisimulation for deterministic finite state machines (although 
note that the spectrum of equivalences collapses when nondeterminism is eliminated, so this is the 
same as trace equivalence) and testing equivalence for nondeterministic finite state machines (by 
transforming the graph into a deterministic Acceptance tree).
This method is not reliable as the equivalence computed is not exactly the same as testing 
equivalence.
In summary, of the semantic reasoning approaches to equivalence checking, the most promising 
seems to be the graph partition method of proof, since it subsumes the backtracking method, and 
since Milne’s method is not sound. However, the graph partition technique has some features 
which we find undesirable, such as the need for a special representation of processes, and the 
lack of intuition into the system being investigated given by this approach, due to the lack of 
meaningful information supplied during the proof.
We now consider approaches to equivalence checking which fall under the syntactic reasoning 
approach.
4.4.2 Syntactic Reasoning
Sym bolic M an ipu la tion  Using the technique of equational reasoning, the axioms of the equiv­
alence under consideration can be used to manipulate process expressions. Informally, the goal is 
to prove equivalence by transforming one expression until it has the same syntactic form as the 
other. The advantages of this approach are that the state explosion problem is avoided, since one
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equation may encompass several states, but also we can use lazy expansion, expanding only one 
part of an expression at a time as we choose, rather than indiscriminately expanding everything. 
Other advantages are that even infinite labelled transition systems are easily dealt with, and that 
the intermediate stages in the proof are easily understood, which is not true of intermediate par­
titions. The main disadvantage of this approach is that the proof procedure may not be fully 
automatic; some user intervention may be required to determine which axiom should be applied 
next and the direction in which it should be applied. This problem is partially overcome by term 
rewriting systems, a method of automating equational reasoning, in which the axioms are turned 
into rewrite rules by orienting them, i.e. giving them a direction. Even with this improvement, 
full automation is only possible if the rule set forms a decision procedure for the relation modelled 
by the axioms. The rule set only forms a decision procedure under certain conditions (of course, 
the decidability of the original relation is important!). Tools which are based on term rewriting 
systems are therefore usually proof assistants, rather than automatic theorem provers.
In this category, there are tools which are general equational reasoning tools which have had 
special rule sets or tactics built into them to deal with a particular formalism and equivalence, 
e.g. [CN92] which is based on the LP theorem prover. In addition, [Lin92] is a process algebra 
specific rewrite tool, i.e. it has been tailored to enable easy manipulation of process algebras, but 
does not adopt a particular process algebra.
Other systems may start with the rewriting paradigm and build a tool which implements just 
the equivalences of one particular formalism, e.g. [IN90, DIN89] for CCS. This particular tool also 
performs proofs in LOTOS by using additional rules to translate finite Basic LOTOS into CCS 
[DIN91].
Logical System s The semantics of a process algebra may be expressed in terms of logical for­
mulae, allowing equivalence between processes to be reduced to a logical statement, and therefore 
allowing the use of a general logic based theorem prover to perform equivalence checking. Exam­
ples of such systems include: [Fle87], which uses the Boyer-Moore theorem prover, [Boo89] which 
uses LCF, and [CR90, CIN91, Nes92] which are based on HOL.
Note that [Nes92] does not fit comfortably into our categories as the work is based on formalis­
ing the semantics of CCS in HOL. Nevertheless, this is certainly a formal approach, rather than a 
graph based one. Once the transition relations are described, and the equivalence relations, proof 
tactics and operators of the language are defined on top of them, the user has no need to refer to 
the transitions again.
V erification via D ecom position There has been particular interest in compositional meth­
ods, both of specification and verification, particularly since this should make analysis of large
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systems easier. Compositional methods of verification include partial methods [LT91] and modal 
specifications [Lar90a]. Both of these methods rely on somehow modifying the transition system 
(by adding unspecified events to give a partial specification or by adding new sorts of transition 
relation). Modal specifications use two transition relations, must and may, and give a rich theory 
of refinement. Note that if only must transitions are used (which is likely in later refinements) 
then the system is equivalent to a labelled transition system with the usual sort of transitions.
Alternatively, the method of [GM92] allows the truth of equivalence of two specifications to 
be deduced from the truth of the equivalence of corresponding parts of the specifications using a 
special operator to project the parts for verification out of the main process. The original transition 
system remains unchanged. This method is more a symbolic preprocessing, allowing equivalence 
to be calculated using the partition algorithms above more efficiently. Only a limited number of 
systems, those in which communication between the components is minimal, are suitable for this 
transformation.
To summarise the syntactic approach to reasoning about the equivalence of processes, equa­
tional reasoning and logically based systems seem the most promising techniques; verification by 
decomposition is only applicable in a few cases. We now consider the tools and techniques with 
specific reference to LOTOS.
4.4.3 LOTOS Considerations
Amongst the tools mentioned above, only two are LOTOS specific, [LITE] and [DIN91].
Graph partition methods, as used in [LITE], have the advantage of speed, but as a special 
representation is used, the proof steps, assuming we can look at intermediate steps in the proof 
process in the first place, are not informative. In particular, if a proof fails, we may not gain any 
information as to why it failed.
On the other hand, syntactic reasoning, as used in [DIN91] avoids the need for a special repre­
sentation for processes, and the proof steps, being applications of the axioms of the equivalence, 
are simple and easy to follow. The normal forms produced in a proof of inequivalence may help 
identify the reason for the inequivalence as the normal forms are generally more* compact and 
clearer to understand than the original process terms. The main drawback of this approach is the 
lack of automation and high reliance on the skills of the user, who must frequently guide the proof. 
This may also be seen as a benefit, as such close interaction may lend additional understanding 
of the system under examination. We do not adopt the tool of [DIN91] as it deals only with finite 
Basic LOTOS, and it is our intention to perform proofs over as much of the language as possible. 
This proof system is claimed to be modular and easily extensible; this is only true if the developer 
is familiar with Prolog programming. We intend to develop a system in which the user only needs 
to know about the laws of the LOTOS relation being used, even in the case that new laws or even
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relations have to be added.
4.5  Sum m ary
In this chapter we have described an approach to verification which allows us to prove that the 
implementation of a system satisfies the specification of that system, where we assume that both 
descriptions are written using Basic LOTOS. What it means for one description to satisfy another 
can be conveniently modelled by one of the LOTOS equivalence, congruence or preorder relations. 
Since many different relations can be used, the choice of the most appropriate relation for a 
particular problem is an important decision in this approach to verification. We have presented a 
number of criteria which may help in this choice.
The satisfaction method of verification may be automated in a variety of ways; we surveyed 
current techniques and tools in order to identify a suitable tool for our work. Equational reasoning 
as a proof technique provides a simple proof system for the user to understand, and may also lend 
extra understanding of the system under investigation, by examination of intermediate stages in 
the proof. However, the only equational reasoning based tool for LOTOS is applicable to only 
a subset of Basic LOTOS, and may prove difficult to extend (the user must have knowledge of 
Prolog as well as of LOTOS).
In view of the deficiencies of this system we decided to develop our own proof system for 
proving equivalence or ordering of two Basic LOTOS specifications, using equational reasoning as 
the underlying proof paradigm.
Chapters 6  and 8  detail our attempts to develop an equational reasoning tool to perform proofs 
of equivalence over LOTOS processes. Equational reasoning is implemented by term rewriting; we 
base our approach on existing term rewriting tools in order to avoid unnecessary implementation 
work. To prepare for the description of the development of our tool, we first introduce the basic 
concepts of equational reasoning and term rewriting which will be used in the following chapters.
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C hapter 5
Equational Reasoning, Term  
Rewriting and LOTOS
In the previous chapter an approach to verification of LOTOS specifications was discussed which 
requires a proof of the equivalence of two specifications (or that one specification is related via a 
preorder to the other). We considered various implementation techniques, eventually identifying 
equational reasoning implemented by term rewriting as our favoured method of automation. The 
terms “equational reasoning” and “term rewriting” have only been described in a very informal 
way up till now; it is the purpose of this chapter to give formal definitions of these terms. In 
addition, we will describe how we plan to use term rewriting in the proofs of equivalence of 
LOTOS specifications and any special term rewriting techniques that may be required for these 
proofs.
5.1 In trod u ction
Equational reasoning provides a means of reasoning about equational specifications, i.e. specifi­
cations that are given by a signature (a set of function names and arities) and a set of equations 
specifying the properties of the functions of the signature. LOTOS processes and the laws relating 
to the LOTOS equivalences can be viewed as such a specification.
A LOTOS expression is built from variable names, and the function symbols of LOTOS. An 
expression of the language is also called a term. In equational reasoning two expressions (terms) 
are proved equivalent by applying axioms to one or both until they are syntactically identical. In 
a typical proof the same axiom may be used several times, applied in either direction, sometimes 
making the expression smaller, sometimes bigger. Of course, we cannot always transform one 
term into the other; in this case either the terms are not equivalent, or our axioms or laws do not
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fully describe the equivalence relation of the mathematical model, i.e. they are not complete with 
respect to the model. In the latter case we may have to define a new axiom, derive a new law, or 
use a different proof technique altogether to complete the proof of equivalence.
A problem which arises when automating equational reasoning is that a great deal of skill 
is required when deciding which axiom to apply (for several may be applicable), and in which 
direction that axiom should be applied (left to right, or right to left). In order to combat this 
problem, instead of using axioms, we use rules which are obtained by orienting the axioms, i.e. 
by giving the axioms a fixed direction of application, so we decide once only the direction of 
application for each rule. The rules obtained in this way may then only be applied in that 
direction. A system of such rules is called a term rewriting system. Assuming that the underlying 
equivalence is decidable, a term rewriting system may give us a decision procedure for the equality 
of terms. This is not always the case: even if the equivalence is decidable, we also require that 
the term rewriting system satisfies certain properties.
In the following sections we give some standard definitions of basic term rewriting concepts 
which will be required for chapters 6  and 8 . Further introductory material to term rewriting theory 
in general may be found in [H082] and discussion of specific topics may be found in a special issue 
of the Computer Journal [Com91] devoted to term rewriting.
5.2  Term  R ew ritin g  S ystem s
We begin by giving a formal definition of terms and signatures. A signature is a pair (5, T )  where 
S  is a set of sorts and T  is a set of functions. Each function consists of a name and arity describing 
the sorts of the function arguments and result. For example /  : s i , . . . , s n —»■ t,  where /  is the 
function name, s i , . . .  , sn,t G S  and n > 0, denotes the function /  which takes arguments from 
each of the s,- and returns a result in t. If n =  0 then the function takes no arguments and is 
known as a constant.
Given such a signature, a term, w, is then constructed from the functions of that signature 
and variables over the sorts, w = f ( u i , . . .  , un) where /  G T  and i q , . . . ,  un are also terms (of the 
correct sort with respect to the arity of / ) .  Subterms of w are w itself and all the subterms of the 
U{, 1 < i < n.
To explain the use of term rewriting systems we use a small, familiar, example of a rule set
describing addition in the integers. The rule set is defined as follows:
x +  0 —» x R1
0 +  x x R2
—x -f x —► 0 R3
{x +  y) +  2  -► x +  (y +  z) R4
where x,y,  z denote variables.
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These rewrite rules are obtained from the corresponding axioms of the system by exchanging 
the =  symbol for a —>■ symbol, and by giving the rule a direction of application. Notice that all of 
the rules in the system given above, with the exception of the associative rule, have smaller terms 
on the right hand side of the —Y than on the left hand side. The associative rule is ordered so that 
the brackets group to the right.
Although the direction can be given manually by specifying for each rule whether it should 
be applied left to right, or right to left, normally an ordering  is used to describe the direction 
of the rules in a consistent manner. In general we use standard pre-defined orderings such as 
Knuth-Bendix Ordering (KBO) and Recursive Path Ordering (RPO), or variants of these. We 
do not give details of these orderings here; the reader need only know of their existence. Further 
information on orderings may be found in [Der82]. The ordering provides a method of evaluating 
the complexity of a term, and usually the rules are oriented so that the left hand side of the rule 
is more complex than the right hand side.
Assuming we have constructed a set of rewrite rules as above, how are they used? The basic 
step is a reduction  or rewrite. Given a rule, I — Y r,  and a term, t =  f ( u \ , . .  n > 0, we
compare I and t. We may apply a substitution a to I which exchanges the variables in I for other 
terms and/or variable names so that <xl — w,  where w  is a subterm of t .  This process is known as 
matching. The rewriting continues by replacing w  in t by <rr.
Iteration of this process is called reducing or rewriting. We write t \  — Y* t n for the sequence 
t 1 — y . . .  — y tn , where n > 0. Termination  means that there are no infinite reductions, i.e. 
rewrite sequences of the form t \  —Y t2 Y <3 —Y . . .. If the ordering used to orient the rewrite 
rules is well-founded  then termination of the reduction process is guaranteed, i.e. well-foundedness 
guarantees there are no infinite decreasing sequences of terms in the ordering, so eventually we 
must reach a term to which no rule applies.
The process of reducing a term until no more rules can be applied is called normalisation, and 
the final term obtained is called the normal form.  Usually the rule set contains more than one 
rule, so the rewrite step compares the left hand side of each of the rules to t in turn, looking for 
a match. Also, more than one rewrite rule may be applicable to a given term, therefore rewriting 
is nondeterministic.
For example, given the rule set above, consider the term a + 0. Using the rule R1 and substi­
tuting a for x, we can rewrite a +  0 to get a, i.e. a + 0 — Y a. Since none of the rules has a left 
hand side which matches a, this is a normal form.
A rewrite proof  consists of rewriting two terms until their normal forms are obtained, i.e. no 
more rules can be applied. If the two terms obtained at the end of the process are syntactically 
equivalent, then the original terms are equivalent in the semantics. This process is illustrated in 
figure 5.1. The terms s and t  are equivalent since they both rewrite to the normal form u. If we
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assume that the rule set forms a decision procedure for the equivalence, then the normal forms are 
unique, therefore if the normal forms resulting from the rewriting process are different the original 
terms are not equivalent in the model.
s t
u
Figure 5.1: A Successful Rewrite Proof
Unfortunately, the procedure is not always as easy and straightforward as described in fig­
ure 5.1. Even assuming the original equivalence is decidable, a set of rewrite rules derived by 
orienting the equations of the equivalence only yields a decision procedure for the equivalence if 
the rule set satisfies certain properties. If the rule set does not satisfy these properties, then the 
normal forms are not unique, and we cannot deduce from the failure of a rewrite proof that the 
original equation does not hold, i.e. we have a semi-decision procedure. The reason for this loss 
of power is that when using the equations we can apply them in either direction, whereas we 
restrict rules so that they may be applied in one direction only. In forcing the equations to be
unidirectional rewrite rules we have lost the power of the original equational system.
In the next section, we discuss this problem, and a partial solution, further.
5.3 K n u th -B en d ix  C om p letion
If a rewrite rule set derived from a set of equations is to give a decision procedure for the equivalence 
relation expressed by those equations, it must satisfy two properties: the rule set must be confluent 
and terminating (termination was defined above, confluence is defined below). If these properties 
hold we say that the rule set is complete or canonical. These properties ensure that every term 
has a unique normal form and equations which can be proved to hold in the equational system 
can also be proved to hold by the rewrite rules. Conversely, equations which cannot be proved to 
hold by the rewrite rules do not hold in the equational system.
A term rewriting system is confluent if, and only if, V<i,<2 ,U t —** U A t —>* £2 => . <i —>■*
t' A <2 —>■* t ' . This is also known as the diamond lemma for obvious reasons:
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tFigure 5.2: Confluence
Confluence means that if there are two ways to rewrite a term, it doesn’t matter which one is 
chosen as eventually both will rewrite to the same term. Local confluence is like confluence except 
that we replace t —y* 11 and t — <2 in the above by t —y t\  and t —>• £2 , he. <1 and t% can be 
obtained by exactly one reduction from t .
The properties of confluence and termination are undecidable in themselves. However, New­
man’s theorem [New42] shows that a terminating term rewriting system is confluent if, and only 
if, it is locally confluent.
A procedure exists, due to Knuth and Bendix [KB70], which checks a rule set for local conflu­
ence, and if the set is not locally confluent, adds rules to try to make it locally confluent. Used in 
conjunction with a termination ordering, the procedure may produce a complete rule set, hence 
the procedure is known as completion, or Knuth-Bendix Completion.
The completion procedure is based on the examination of critical pairs. A critical pair is a 
pair of terms generated by applying two different rewrite rules (or two different applications of 
the same rewrite rule) to a term (the critical expression). For example, assume a rewrite system 
which allows the term t to be reduced as in figure 5.3.
t
t l  t2
Figure 5.3: A Critical Pair
The critical pair is (<1 ,^2)- Assuming t\  and <2 cannot be further reduced, the rule set is not 
confluent. To correct this we must add a new rule to the rule set, <1 — y <2 - The main theorem 
of [KB70] says that a terminating term rewriting system is locally confluent if, and only if, every 
critical pair is trivial. An example of a trivial critical pair is (t,t), i.e. the terms are the same, or 
have the same normal form.
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Critical pairs are generated from rewrite rules automatically by superposition. This means 
unifying subterms. Unification is the process of matching where substitutions may be applied to 
both terms, i.e. we look for a i and cr2 such that (T\l\ = 0 2 2^ - Rules may also be superposed onto 
themselves.
Knuth-Bendix completion works by generating all critical pairs and adding non-trivial pairs as 
rules until no more non-trivial critical pairs are generated. In this way, if Knuth-Bendix completion 
is successful, a non-confluent system may be turned into a confluent one. Of course, the completion 
procedure is not always successful.
Three things can happen as a result of running the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure:
1. The algorithm may halt, leaving a confluent and terminating set of rewrite rules, giving a 
decision procedure for the original equivalence.
2. The algorithm may halt because a critical pair has been generated that it cannot orient.
3. The algorithm may diverge, i.e. superposition of the rules generates an infinite number of 
new non-trivial critical pairs and therefore new rules.
The second case may be solved by adopting a different termination ordering. There are several 
methods of attempting to solve the third case, i.e. divergence of Knuth-Bendix completion; this 
topic is discussed further in section 6.4.3.
Even if we have a set of rules which is not complete, we can still use this set of rules for rewrite 
proofs, but we will not be able to prove that an equation does not hold. In order to prove an 
inequation, we must use some other proof technique. Note that we can use rewriting to produce 
normal forms of the terms of the inequation, possibly simplifying the application of the other proof 
technique, i.e. rewriting with a non-complete set of rules is sound.
A further introduction to the ideas of Knuth-Bendix completion may be found in [Dic91].
5 .4  E x ten sio n s to  Term  R ew ritin g
There are three extensions to the basic paradigm of term rewriting which are of interest to us: 
order-sorted rewriting, rewriting modulo a set of equations, and conditional rewriting.
Typically, term rewriting systems have one sort, the universal sort, and all terms belong to 
that sort. In order-sorted rewriting we can define subsorts, giving a sort structure. Using this 
structure we may declare function arities more accurately, which may help clarify the specification. 
Additionally, rewriting may be restricted to allow terms to be rewritten only to the same sort or 
to a subsort.
The next extension is concerned with specific equations; those, such as the commutativity 
axiom, which cannot be oriented in the conventional rewriting framework. To get around this
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problem rewriting modulo a set of equations was introduced. The special equations are held 
separately from the rest of the rewrite rules. Since the special equations most often express 
associativity and commutativity this is also known as a-c rewriting.
Finally, we may wish to define rules which only hold in certain situations, i.e. they have side 
conditions. Again, a special modification of term rewriting allows us to deal with conditional rules.
5.5 A p p lica tion  to  LO TO S
As the LOTOS equivalences are given by a set of laws, equational reasoning is an obvious choice 
of proof technique. Although most of the LOTOS equivalences are not decidable, as discussed in 
section 4.2.2, and therefore no corresponding complete rule set can exist, we may be able to find 
a complete rule set for a subset of the language. Finding this rule set will require the application 
of the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure. Since some LOTOS operators are associative and/or 
commutative, we should try to use a term rewriting system which implements rewriting modulo a-c 
equations. The RRL (Rewrite Rule Laboratory) term rewriting system [KZ87] has these features. 
RRL also has a limited form of order-sorted rewriting in that operators may be given sorts, and 
subsorts may be defined, but variables have the universal sort. Order-sorted rewriting is required 
by some methods of solving divergence in Knuth-Bendix completion. RRL also has conditional 
rewriting. Other rewriting tools are available, see [HKK91] for a survey; however, none have all 
the features we require.
5.5.1 Using Term R ew riting Techniques in O ther Ways
An interesting application of term rewriting to concurrency protocols described as finite state 
machines (fsms) appears in [RS91] where the properties of a fsm are shown to have a direct 
correspondence with the properties of the term rewriting system implementing that fsm.
First the system to be investigated is described as a set of rules giving the transition relation 
for the fsm. We can then check that rule set for properties such as completeness, confluence 
and termination using a standard term rewriting tool and use this information to deduce the 
corresponding properties of the fsm. For example, if the rule set is complete, then the protocol 
described by the fsm is complete, i.e. all possible input scenarios are described, and it makes 
progress. If the rule set is terminating then the protocol is bounded and so on. The Knuth-Bendix 
completion procedure can be used to check that the rule set has the desired properties, and may 
also be used to supply the extra rules required by a deficient rule set to ensure that the rule set 
has these properties. This work was carried out using the RRL system [KZ87].
Also, specific properties such as “input x leads to state s, or to output y” may be expressed as 
equations (over states of the finite state machine) and shown to be consistent with the original rule
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set, i.e. they are valid with respect to the original equational theory. The equation may contain 
variables, in which case either it holds for all possible instantiations of the variables, or RRL can 
be used to supply the particular values for which the equation holds.
This method has limitations in that Knuth-Bendix completion is not guaranteed to terminate, 
and the method of description restricts the applicability to finite state machines only, therefore we 
would have to translate finite LOTOS expressions into a finite state machine to use this technique. 
Furthermore, the finite state machine gives a fairly low-level description of a system, and we would 
prefer to express our properties/equations etc. to RRL using normal LOTOS syntax. It is also 
difficult to see how higher-level language constructs such as parallelism could be accommodated 
in this framework. These limitations deter us from adopting this approach to verification of 
concurrent systems.
5.5.2 Soundness of the Laws of [ISO88]
One of the common applications of term rewriting is to prove the consistency of a specification: for 
boolean terms, if a rule set is not consistent the completion procedure will (eventually) generate 
the rule true — > false. During our attempts to find a canonical rule set corresponding to the laws 
of weak bisimulation congruence for LOTOS, which are described in the next chapter, we also 
managed to find an inconsistency in the laws of [IS088], i.e. the laws are not sound. Fortunately, 
this inconsistency can be corrected. In this section we discuss how completion uncovers this 
inconsistency and our correction of the laws.
Before we began our experiment we were aware of a possible inconsistency in the LOTOS laws 
for weak bisimulation congruence as given in [IS088]. Knowing of this problem helped greatly; 
as we shall see, inconsistencies in term rewriting systems containing sorts other than booleans are 
less obvious than the true — y false example above.
The inconsistency can be detected as follows. We give the following rules, derived from d4, 
c3b and d2a of the LOTOS standard,
B  stop  — > B  HI stop
ex it HI stop  — y stop  
ex it B  — y i; B
to RRL and invoke the completion procedure. The following rule is derived:
i; stop  — y stop
It is not immediately obvious that this rule is not valid; however, an example will demonstrate that 
although valid under weak bisimulation equivalence, this rule is not valid under weak bisimulation
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congruence as the two processes do not have the same behaviour in all contexts. It is necessary 
only to consider the behaviour of the processes when part of a choice expression, i.e. we must show 
B  [] s top  j=wbe B  [] i; stop, for some B .  Consider the corresponding equation with B  — i; exit, 
i.e.
(i; exit) \\ s top  =wbe (i;exit) [] (i;stop)
By the reduction derived above, i; s top  — > stop, this equation can be shown to hold in RRL; 
however, by considering the behaviour of each side of the equation, it is clearly false. While the left 
hand side will always terminate successfully, the right hand side may either terminate successfully 
or deadlock, since [] is forced to be nondeterministic in the presence of i actions.
The law in the standard will be sound if a side condition is added:
B  stop  = w bc B  HI s top  where B  ^  ex it
We use this form of the law in the remainder of this thesis.
5.6  Sum m ary
This chapter introduced the basic concepts of equational reasoning and term rewriting. We also 
discussed how these proof techniques will be used for LOTOS proofs, how they contributed to 
finding an unsound law in the standard [IS088] and described a previous use of term rewriting 
techniques for verification of concurrent systems [RS91].
The next section describes how we used a particular rewrite tool to develop a complete set of 
rules for use with LOTOS, and how these rules can be used in rewrite proofs.
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C hapter 6
Using RRL to Im plem ent LOTOS 
Weak Bisim ulation Congruence 
Laws
6.1 In trod u ction
This chapter describes the use of Knuth-Bendix completion to try to find a canonical rule set 
corresponding to the laws of LOTOS weak bisimulation congruence. We take the laws of weak 
bisimulation congruence as given in the LOTOS standard [IS088] as our starting point. Since 
weak bisimulation congruence is undecidable, there will be no complete rule set corresponding to 
the equivalence of the model; however, we are able to find a rule set corresponding to a subset of 
the laws of weak bisimulation congruence which is complete. The term rewriting system used for 
this work is RRL (Rewrite Rule Laboratory) [KZ87]. The use of the rule set is illustrated by some 
small, simple, rewriting proofs. From these examples, it is clear that the rule set suffers certain 
deficiencies; we attempt to correct these by adding new rules but in doing so lose completeness. 
Finally, we discuss the problem of using a rule set which is not complete in rewrite proofs, and also 
consider some laws we would like to add to the rule set, but which cause the completion procedure 
to diverge.
6.2  Im p lem en tin g  LO TO S Laws as R u les in R R L
Our first experiment with the LOTOS equivalences is to attempt to obtain a complete set of rules 
for weak bisimulation congruence, starting with the laws as given in the LOTOS standard [IS088].
81
In the following sections we use two numbering schemes for the rules. In most cases, we refer to a 
rule by the number of the corresponding law in the standard, this will be of the form an, where 
a is an alphabetic character from {a . . .  m} and n is a number, e.g. d l. Sometimes the code will 
have an additional letter, for subdivisions of a law, e.g. d2a. We also use the number assigned to 
the rule by RRL for rules generated by the completion procedure which do not appear in [IS088].
This work is also reported in [Kir91] and [KN91]. Here we give a slightly modified version of 
those results, allowing a more coherent presentation.
6.2.1 Basic Rule Set for Weak Bisim ulation Congruence
The first decision to be taken is to choose which laws from the LOTOS standard are to be adopted 
as rules. In RRL, all data structures to be used have to be defined by the user; the only built-in 
data type is Boolean. In this first experiment, no auxiliary data types such as lists or sets are used, 
therefore operators relying on these types, such as h ide  and relabelling, are largely ignored; the 
only exceptions to this are equations requiring base cases of the types, i.e. the empty list or set, 
or which do not require investigation of the values, i.e. the value of the list or set is not important 
to the equation. We also do not yet deal with recursive processes: recursion cannot be easily 
expressed in the rewriting framework, and this problem is discussed in more detail in chapter 8 .
The set of rewrite rules is formed by adding rules derived from the laws in the LOTOS stan­
dard one at a time, discarding laws that “misbehaved” , i.e. cause divergence of the completion 
procedure. We also have other factors, such as operator precedence to consider, see below. Other 
methods, resulting in different rule sets, could be used; for example we could include only laws 
relating to a particular set of operators. Since our goal is completion we choose to add just those 
rules which do not interfere with achieving this goal. Although this results in a rather haphazard 
rule set it is at least a complete rule set. The “bad” rules, those which cause divergence, are 
discussed further in section 6.4.3.
The laws eventually chosen and run through the completion algorithm are as follows, using the 
numbering scheme of the LOTOS standard (also used in appendix B): b l, b3, b4, c3a (particular 
case where ex it takes no parameter), c3b, d l, d2a, d3, e2, e3, e4, e5, k l, k2, m l, m2 and m3. We 
refer to this rule set as core. The rules corresponding to these laws are given in figure 6.1, with 
the exception of law b l. The RRL system keeps a special set of operators which are declared to be 
commutative and commutative-associative and therefore has no need of the actual laws expressing 
commutativity or associativity. Note that associativity on its own cannot be expressed using the 
special declaration.
We have edited the input files to give a more familiar, LOTOS, look in the presentation. The 
actual input files may be found in appendix C, together with details of the relationship between 
the two representations (LOTOS and RRL).
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[b3] P [] s to p  — > P
[b4] P □  P — > P
[c3a] e x it  | [A] | e x it  — > e x it
[c3b] e x it  ||| s to p  — y s to p
[d l]  s to p  »  P — y s to p
[d2a] e x it  »  P — y i; P
[d3] P »  (Q »  R) — >• (P »  Q) »  R
[e2] P [> s to p  — y P
[e4] s to p  [> P — y P
Ce3] (P C> q) □  Q — ► P [> q
[e5] e x it  [> P — y e x it  [] P
[k l]  s to p [S ] — y s to p
[k2] e x it  [S] — y e x it
[ml] u; i; P — y u; P
[m2] P [] (i; P) — > i; P
[m3] (u; (P [] (i; Q ))) [] (u; Q) —■> u; (P [] ( i;  Q))
Figure 6.1: core set of rules
The following information is also given to RRL: function arities as given in appendix C, dec­
laration of [] as commutative, »  associates left to right, allowing orientation of rule d3, and 
function precedences: »  > ; and [> > []. These precedences ensure that rule d2a and e5 respec­
tively are oriented left to right. We note here that it is possible to use different precedences, and 
that other precedences give different results, for example, an infinite sequence of rules is produced 
if all precedences are reversed and »  associates right to left. The precedences above are chosen 
because these particular directions make sense for rules d2a and e5 if we assume that we are try­
ing to push occurrences of the choice and sequencing operators out, and therefore occurrences of 
operators such as disable in. We should eventually be able to remove the higher level operators. 
The precedences chosen also give the smallest canonical rule set.
6.2.2 Result of the Com pletion Procedure
The completion procedure, when given the above information, terminates, producing the following 
extra rules:
[17] Q [] (q [] ex it) — y Q [] ex it [e 5 ,e 3 ]
[18] (i; Q) »  R — ► i; (Q »  R) [d2a ,d3]
[19] u; Q [] u; (P [> (i; q ))  — y u; (P [> (i; q ) )  [e3,m 3]
The numbers on the right indicate the rules from core which generate the critical pair giving the 
new rule.
We use the name newcore to denote the set of rules comprising the core set plus the rules 
generated by the completion algorithm. The rule set newcore is complete, i.e. confluent and 
terminating.
The next section illustrates the use of the rule set newcore in rewrite proofs.
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6 .3  E q u ation al P roofs —  T h e Buffer E xam ple
Consider the example given in figure 6.2. The aim of this example is to prove that the behaviour 
of a two-way buffer is the same as the behaviour of two one-way buffers in parallel. Unfortunately 
the example is a little forced as recursion is not part of our restricted LOTOS; this means that 
the buffers in figure 6 .2  only handle one or two data elements, depending on which buffer is being 
considered, and then stop.
in i ;  ( in2; ( ou tl;  out2; exit
[] out2; ou tl;  ex it)
□  ou tl;  in2; out2; ex it)
[] in2; ( in i ;  ( ou t l;  out2; exit
[] out2; ou tl;  ex it)
[] out2; in i ;  ou tl;  ex it)
Figure 6.2: Buffer example
The right hand process in this example is far easier to read than the one on the left. This 
demonstrates that simply defined processes in parallel are frequently easier to understand than 
large process written without parallelism (a principle of the constraint-oriented style of specifica­
tion).
The newcore rules generated above by Knuth-Bendix completion are not enough to prove the 
buffer example; laws relating some of the higher level constructs (such as parallelism) to the more 
basic constructs are also required. Such laws are known as the expansion laws and describe how 
any LOTOS process can be rewritten to a form using just ; and []. The particular expansion law 
required here is law n l of the LOTOS standard, also given in figure 6.3.
B \ [A} \ C ==wbc 0 {&,■; (Bi | [A] | C) | name (&,- g A, i £ I }
D D t e  (B  I [A] I Cj)  | name (cj £ A, j  £ J}
[] □ {a; (Bi | [A] | Cj) \ a =  bi = cj, name (a) £ A ,i  £ I , j  £ J}
where B  =  {6,;5j | i £ 1} and C = {cj]Cj \ j  £ J}
Figure 6.3: The Expansion Law for Parallelism, law (nl) of [IS088]
This law cannot be entered straight into RRL because of its complexity, i.e. use of choice over
an indexed set of processes, so some simple instantiations of this law are generated by hand and
added to the set newcore in RRL. These new rules, call them little-exp, are oriented left to right. 
The rule set formed by newcore and little-exp is no longer canonical; the completion procedure 
diverges.
a l;  PI HI a2; P2 == a l;  (PI ||| a2; P2)
[] a 2 ; (a l;  PI ||| P2)
= w b c  ( in i ;  o u tl;  ex it)  
HI (in2 ; out2; ex it)
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a; P HI e x it  == a; (P ||| e x it )
e x it  HI a; P == a; (e x it  ||| P)
Although no longer complete, the rule set can be used to prove the equation in figure 6.2 holds.
6 .4  A d d in g  O ther R u les
In the Buffer example, extra rules had to be added to turn an expression involving parallelism into 
one involving only sequencing and choice in order to complete the proof of equivalence. In that 
particular case only three rules had to be added. Looking ahead, since the rules in little-exp do not 
express the full generality of the expansion law, other (larger) examples will certainly require more 
such rules. If using the rules newcore plus little-exp as a proof system, adding rules on an ad-hoc 
basis is undesirable, therefore what is required is a set of rules which will be generally applicable, 
i.e. able to translate any expression involving parallelism into its sequential equivalent, rather 
then an ever-increasing number of specific instantiations of the expansion law. Section 6.4.1 below 
details our development of a set of rules which implement the full expansion law for parallelism 
and hide and discusses the problems created by this rule set.
The expansion laws are not the only LOTOS weak bisimulation congruence laws omitted from 
newcore. As mentioned in section 6.2.1, we also rejected laws which caused divergence of the 
Knuth-Bendix completion procedure. Although such divergence generates an infinite set of rules, 
in some cases it may be possible to generalise this set, i.e. if a pattern may be detected in the 
form of the rules, it may be possible to find a (finite) re-expression of those rules.
Section 6.4.3 details some of the rules which, together with core, cause divergence of the 
completion procedure. We also present portions of the corresponding infinite rule sets generated 
and our attempts to find patterns in those rule sets. Only in one case does this allow us to add 
rules eliminating the cause of divergence; however, the other examples have been used by our 
colleagues on the SERC project “Verification Techniques for LOTOS” in order to illustrate the 
application of special term rewriting techniques which attempt to generalise infinite sequences of 
rewrite rules [TW93, Wat92]. Finally we discuss the possibility of adding rules which describe the 
behaviour of the relabelling operator more fully than those in core.
6.4.1 D eveloping The Expansion Rules 
T h e  E x p a n sio n  Law for P a ra lle lism
In this section we give an overview of the definition of rules expressing the generality of the 
expansion laws, in particular the expansion law for parallelism. The full RRL input files for these 
rules may be found in appendix C.
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First consider the general form of this expansion law as given in figure 6.3. Two sorts of events 
are considered: events which may proceed independently, and events which must synchronise. In 
the expansion law the events which may proceed independently are dealt with by the first and 
second branches of the law; these are all initial events of B  which are not in A, and all initial 
events of C which are not in A, respectively. The events which must synchronise are dealt with 
by the third branch of the law; these are events which are initial events of both B  and C  and are 
also in A.
The division of the law by type of events is also reflected in the RRL implementation; the 
function expanda deals with events which may occur independently, and the function expandb 
deals with events which must synchronise. These functions are declared as follows:
expanda : procset, procset, gatelist —> procset
expandb : procset, procset, gatelist —> procset
where procset is a set of processes.
The rules defining these functions follow the style of functional programming, i.e. each rule is 
defined by pattern matching over its arguments. To cut down the number of patterns which must 
be considered we assume that, as in figure 6.3, the process arguments B  and C  are formed by a 
generalised choice, denoted gch, over a set of processes and moreover, that the only operators used 
are stop, exit, ; and event constants. Since all LOTOS processes can be expressed in this way 
this does not restrict the scope of the rules.
The general rule for the expansion law is
par (pp(gch(x),gch(y)), v) == gch(expanda(x,y,v) ++ expanda(y,x,v) -H- expandb(x,y,v))
where -H- is similar to the set union operator. The three branches in the right hand side of the 
rule correspond to the three branches of the expansion law as given in figure 6.3. In addition to 
this rule, we must also define rules which correspond to special patterns in the input; namely B  
and/or C equal to stop , exit, or simple processes b; B  and c; C. These are similar to the laws in 
little-exp.
The individual expand functions operate as follows:
expanda  This function takes both process arguments, B  and C, and also the list A. The result 
of the function is a set of processes whose initial elements may proceed independently.
The function examines each component of the first set of processes recursively and, depending 
on whether or not the initial action may proceed independently, either adds a new component 
to the result set or proceeds to the next component. For each process examined there are 
two possible outcomes; either the process is stop , ex it or &,•; Bi, where &,• E A, in which case 
no action may proceed independently so no process is added to the result set, or the process 
is b{-, B i,where bi £ A, and the process 6*; (J9,| [A] |C) is added to the result set.
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This function implements the first and second branches of the law in figure 6.3 by switching 
the first and second arguments accordingly.
expandb  This function again takes both process arguments and the list A. The result of applying 
expandb is a set of processes which proceed by synchronising with each other.
The task is to compare pairs of processes from B  and C  to determine whether any initial 
actions from these processes may synchronise, expandb strips one process at a time from B  
and gives it to the auxiliary function expandc together with the whole set of processes C  
and the gate list A. expandc compares the process with each component of the process set 
C  in turn, producing the set of processes which may proceed by synchronisation, expandb 
combines the results from repeated applications of expandc.
expandc is declared
expandc : process, procset, gatelist —> procset
For each iteration, assuming we have the first argument 6,-; B i, and Cj; Cj from the set, ex­
pandc compares &,• and Cj. If they are the same and also in A  then the process &,•; (Bi \ [A] \ Cj) 
is added to the result set, otherwise nothing is added and we go on to the next member of 
the set. If either process is stop  then again nothing is added and we go on. Finally, if both 
processes are ex it with the same exit list then ex it is added to the result set of processes.
The rules introduced to “implement” the expansion law are essentially a functional program 
and therefore are deterministic; at any point, only one rule is applicable. The correctness of these 
functions is not formally proven, since initially we plan to test the correctness of the rule set in use, 
i.e. validation to increase our confidence in the rules, with formal verification of their correctness 
coming later. As shall be seen in the next chapter, deficiencies in RRL lead us to adopt a different 
tool for our proofs. This new tool has the expansion law built in therefore our expand rule set 
becomes redundant, and a formal correctness proof becomes a rather pointless exercise.
To implement these functions we also have to introduce rules for the standard functions on 
sets and lists (as generalised choice requires sets, and the parallel operator is expressed using a 
list of gates; lists are also required for the h ide expansion law). We do not present the functions 
or details of the rules which implement them here; see appendix C for the full rule set and some 
explanation of their operation.
The expansion law for hide is also added. Apart from requiring the definition of lists, the 
implementation of this law is unremarkable; it is not as complex as the law for parallelism, and 
requires no auxiliary operators or functions.
We note that the rule sets now obtained, expand and hide respectively, are not complete; this 
is a result of the constructive way in which the functions are defined. This means that it is always
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possible to make more superpositions, and hence more rules.
An example of the use of the rule sets formed by newcore, expand and hide in proofs by rewriting 
may be found in the Login case study detailed in chapter 7.
6.4.2 Strategy in Applying the Expansion Rules
When using RRL with the rules newcore, expand and hide for proofs, we discover that the rules are 
best split into two groups: one with expand and one with newcore plus hide. It is also important to 
use these two sets in the correct way, otherwise the normalisation process diverges: this is a result 
of not having a complete set of rules. We rely on the system applying all the newcore and hide rules 
before trying to apply the expand rules, and vice versa: all the expansion rules must be applied 
before trying to apply the newcore plus hide rules. This is because, although the expansion laws 
will eventually produce the correct expansion of a given term, there are a number of intermediate 
stages in the expansion which do not correspond to well-formed LOTOS processes. Ultimately, 
the need to have more control over the application of rules becomes more important as we move 
further away from a complete rule set. RRL cannot provide the facilities to do this.
6.4.3 Laws causing Infinite Sequences of R ew rite Rules
Other laws we might wish to have in our rule set for weak bisimulation congruence include: f8  
(hide distributes over ), b2 (associativity of [] ) and el (associativity of [> ). These laws 
cannot be included because they cause divergence of the completion procedure, i.e. they generate 
an infinite sequence of rewrite rules.
Some special term rewriting techniques [TJ89, Lan89, TW93] exist which allow (some cases 
of) infinite rewrite rule sets to be generalised by a finite rule set. These techniques require either 
an extension of the underlying term rewriting theory or the addition of extra operators or sort 
structure to the definition of the rule set. In all techniques, the first step of the technique is to 
identify a pattern in the infinite sequence of rules. From this pattern it may be possible to express 
a general rule, or set of rules, which subsumes the infinite sequence, i.e. to make a generalisation. 
Of course, the trick is to ensure that this generalisation is exact, i.e. it only produces rules which 
belong to the infinite sequence, and does not introduce new rules. An exact generalisation may 
not exist.
Below, we consider the infinite rule sets given by the completion procedure on core plus each 
of the rules mentioned above in turn. In each case we give some representatives of the infinite 
rule set and try to detect a pattern in these rules. In most cases we give fairly informal over­
generalisations, i.e. the rules fit the pattern, but the pattern also generates other rules which are 
not in the infinite sequence. Fuller details of the rule sets and of our attempts to generalise them
may be found in [KN90]. These investigations were made in the hope that a simple solution to 
the problem of divergence could be found, as is the case for the first example below. In the other 
(unsuccessful) cases, there appears to be no simple solution, and we do not pursue the problem 
here. These infinite rule sets provide example material for the special techniques for solving (some 
cases of) divergence of Knuth-Bendix completion developed by our colleagues on the SERC project 
“Verification Techniques for LOTOS” , see [TW93, Wat92].
D istr ib u tiv ity  o f  h ide over
This law, f8 , is just a representative of a family of similar laws involving h id e or relab el and the 
other operators.
h id e  v in  (PI »  P2) == (h id e  v in  PI) »  (h id e  v in  P2)
This law is added to the set core, given left to right orientation by declaring the precedence 
h id e  >  » .  The infinite sequence generated by Knuth-Bendix completion includes the following 
rules, where the first 16 are just the rules of core:
[f8 ]  h id e  A in  (P »  Q) — > (h id e  A in  P) »  (h id e  A in  Q)
[19] (h id e  A in  s to p )  »  (h id e  A in  Q) — > h id e  A in  s to p  [ d l ,  f8 ]
[20] (h id e  A in  e x it )  »  ( (h id e  A in  e x it )  »  h id e  A in  P)
— > (h id e  A in  e x it )  »  (h id e  A in  P) [m l, 18]
[24] (h id e  Al in  (h id e  A in  s to p ) )  »  (h id e  Al in  (h id e  A in  Q))
— y h id e  Al in  (h id e  A in  s to p )  [1 9 , f8 ]
[35] (h id e  A in  s to p ) »  ( (h id e  A in  Q) »  R)
— y  (h id e  A in  s to p )  »  R [1 9 , d3]
It can be seen that some terms in these rules take the form Pn, where
Pn =  h ide A n in  Pn - 1  
Pq = h ide A  in  stop
or Qn , defined similarly to Pn, but with exit instead of s top  in Qq. We also note that these terms 
occur on the left hand side of a operator. Intuitively, it seems that hiding gate names in stop  
or ex it should have no effect, but there are no rules in [IS088] which allow, for example, Pn to 
be rewritten to stop. What we do have is the following law:
h ide  A  in  P = P where A  fl C(P) =  0
This law, f4, which allows applications of h ide to be removed if the actions to be hidden are not 
in the process P  anyway, was passed over originally because it requires conditional rules. Using 
the facts £(stop) =  0 and £(exit) =  0, we generate two instantiations of this law by hand to give 
the rules:
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[f4 a ] h id e  A in  s to p  — > s to p  
[f4b ] h id e  A in  e x it  — > e x it
In addition, we know from rules d l and d2a that occurrences of s to p  or e x it  on the left hand 
side of can be eliminated.
Given rules f8 , f4a and f4b the completion procedure terminates producing a canonical set of 
rules comprising the rules originally generated to give newcore, and one more rule:
h id e  A in  i; P — > i; h id e  A in  P [d2a, f8 ]
This is in fact one of the laws of weak bisimulation congruence in the standard, number (f5a). We
note that this rule set is not canonical if rule f8  is oriented right to left, i.e. if »  > h id e .
This example shows that some infinite sequences may be easily eliminated.
A sso c ia t iv ity  for []
In core, [] is declared to be a commutative operator. If [] is declared to be associative as well 
as commutative the completion procedure diverges. Below is an initial portion of the infinite 
sequence generated when completion is attempted of core with [] associative and commutative. 
The first 16 rules are the same as those in figure 6.1.
[18] R [] (P [> (R1 □  R )) — y (P [> (Rl [] R))
[19] R [] i; (Rl [] R) — >• i; (Rl [] R)
[20] R [] (P [> (PI [> R)) — > (P [> (PI [> R))
[21] R [] (P [> (R l [] (P2 [> R)>) — )• P [> (R l [] (P2 [> R))
[22] R [] (i; (R l [] i; R)) — > i; (Rl [] i;  R)
[23] R [] (i; (P [> R)) — > (i;  (P [> R))
[24] R [] (P [> i;  R) — ► (P [> i; R)
The rules in the infinite sequence generated by the addition of associativity of [] follow the 
basic pattern:
R [] P — > ? (*)
Of course, a rule like (*) is undesirable as it makes choice totally unfair (it will always choose 
the second argument). Also it is not an exact generalisation (i.e. not every instantiation is a rule) 
and so adding it would imply unsound equivalences.
There seems to be a more complex relationship between R  and P  which deserves further 
investigation. For example, R  is a subterm of P, and P  is built from applications of [>, i, and []. 
Such a study lies outside the scope of this thesis.
In [Wat92] a method of generalising infinite sequences of rewrite rules by recurrence terms is 
investigated. Recurrence terms extend the underlying term rewriting theory by allowing terms
[ e 3 , b4] 
[m2, b4] 
[ e 3 , e3] 
[e 3 , e3] 
[m2, m2] 
[m2, e3] 
[m2. e3]
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to be constructed using operators not in the signature; meta-operators in some sense. The basic 
extension allows a term schema to be defined, thus one recurrence term represents a sequence 
of the usual kind of term. The rule set generated above is used as an example to illustrate the 
application of the method, and an exact generalisation is produced. Since the solution relies on 
an extended form of term rewriting we cannot use it here (because RRL does not support that 
extension). The previous infinite sequence of rules is also used as an example in [Wat92], but we 
were able to find a different solution which does not require any special term rewriting techniques.
A ssociativ ity  for [>
When rule e l (associativity for [>) is added to the core set, with the operator [> declared to 
associate from right to left, the completion procedure diverges. The first 16 rules are as in figure 6.1; 
examples of the remainder are as follows.
Cel] P [> (Q [> R) — > (P [> Q) [> R
[18] q [] (Q [] ex it)  — y (Q [] ex it)
[19] (Q [] ex it)  [> R — > exit [] (Q [> R))
[20] P [> (R [] ex it)  — y (P [> ex it) [> R)
[21] (q [> r) [] ( (p [> q) [> r))  — ► (p [> q) [> r
[22] (P [> ex it)  [> ex it — y P [> exit
[23] (P [> ex it)  [> (i; ex it) — y P [> i; ex it
[24] ( (P [> ex it)  [> PI) [> ex it — y (P [> PI) [> exit
[25] (R [] ex it)  [] (CP [> ex it) [> R) — y (P [> ex it) [> R
[26] ex it [] (R [] ex it)  — y R [] exit
[27] ex it [] (i; ex it [> R) — y i; exit [> R
[28] ex it [] ( (P [> ex it)  [> R) — y (P [> ex it)  [> R
This time generalisation is more difficult as there seem to be several infinite sequences of rules, 
each with a different pattern. Since no simple pattern is obvious, we try altering the composition 
of the rule set slightly by omitting law e5, which can be seen to be contributing to the critical 
pairs above, from core. Completion then gives the following rule set:
[b3] P [] s to p  — y P
[b4] P [] P — y P
[c3a] e x it  I [v] I e x it  — y e x it
[c3b] e x it  I [] I s to p  — y s to p
[dl] s to p  »  P — y s to p
[d2a] e x it  »  P — y i; P
[d3] P »  (q »  R) — y (P »  q) »  R
[e2] P [> s to p  — y P
[e4] s to p  [> P — y P
[e3] q [] (p [> q) — ► p [> q
[kl] s to p fv ]  — y s to p
[k2] e x it [v ]  — y e x it
[ml] u; i; P — y u; P
[m2] P [] i; P — y i;  P
1—
1 
ffi cn e3]
[e5 , e l ]
[e5 , e l ]
[ e l , e3]
[b4, to 0  1
__
__
__
i
[m2, 20]
[e 3 , 20]
[20 , e3]
[b4, 19]
[m2, 19]
i—
i
(D 03 19]
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[m3] u; q [] u; (P [] i; Q) — > u; (P □  i ;  Q)
[e l]  P [> (Q [> R) — ► (P [> q) [> R
[17] (q [> R) [] ((P [> q) [> R) — >• (p [> q) [> R
[18] (i; q) »  R — >• i; (q »  R)
[19] P »  ( i ; R) — >• (P »  ex it) »  R
[20] (P »  stop ) »  R — y P »  stop
[21] ( (P »  ex it)  »  ex it) »  PI — y  (P »  ex it)  »  PI
[22] ( (q  [> q i )  [> R) [] ( ( ( p [> q) [> q i )  [> R)
— ► ( ( CP [> q) [> q i )  [> R)
[23] (u; q) [] u; (P [> (i; q ) )  — ► u; (P [> (i; q ) )
[24] ( ( ( q  [> q i )  [> q2) [> R) [] ( ( C(P [> q) [> q i )  [> q2) [> R)
— > (CCCP [> q) [> q i )  [> q2) [> R)
[25] ( ( ( ( q  [> q i )  [> q2) [> q3) [> r )
[] (CCCCP [> q) [> q i )  [> q2 ) [> q3) [> r)
— > (CCCCP [> q) [> q i )  [> q2 ) [> q3) [> r )
[26] (CCCCq [> q i )  [> q2 ) [> q3) [> q4) [> r)
[] ( ( ( ( (C P  [> q) [> q i )  [> q2 ) [> q3) [> q4) [> R)
— > ( ( ( ( ( ( P  [> q) [> q i )  [> q2 ) [> q3) [> q4) [> r)
This time the infinite sequence appears to have only one pattern.
arg [] (P [> arg) — y P [> arg
ignoring brackets in (P [> arg) since [> is associative
where the form of arg can be described as a grammar.
arg subterm^ [> R
subterm i ::= q | subternn+i [> q
As before, the discovery of an exact generalisation of this rule set lies outside the scope of 
this work. However, this rule set has also been used as an example in [Wat92], where an exact 
generalisation is found.
Finally, we consider adding rules which express more of the functionality of the LOTOS rela­
belling operator (the core set has only two rules: one for s top  and one for exit).
6.4.4 More Rules for the LOTOS R elabelling Operator
Since the addition of the expansion laws requires the addition of rules for some of the usual 
operations over lists and sets, it is possible to add more detailed versions of the LOTOS operators 
which were initially ignored, or only given a few base case rules because of their use of data types. 
The operator hide has its expansion law as mentioned above in section 6.4.1; what about the 
relabelling operator?
Although we can model the relabelling function as a list of pairs, some of the laws in the 
standard for relabelling have rather involved side conditions, e.g. the relabelling must be the 
identity function, or the relabelling must be injective. The identity condition can be easily checked
[ e l ,  e3] 
[d2a, d3] 
[d2a, d3] 
[ d l ,  d3] 
[m l, 19]
[ e l ,  17] 
[e 3 , m3]
[ e l ,  22]
[ e l ,  24]
[ e l ,  25]
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by adding an auxiliary function which first collapses the list, i.e. replaces pairs of the form [a/6 , 6/c] 
by the pair [a/c]. All that is then required is to check no pairs of the form [a/6] appear, where a 
is different from 6 .
It is also possible to check the injectivity condition, but to do so would require so much extra 
work that it seems unlikely to be worth the effort. For example, we would require an auxiliary 
function which checks that the relabelling does not map two different gate names onto the same 
result. At this point we note that in LOTOS we have both gate parameters to processes and the 
relabelling operator, therefore a specifier will typically use gate parameters and ignore relabelling. 
In that case, our effort would be better spent in finding a way to implement gate parameters in 
the rewriting framework, than in adding complex rules for the relabelling operator.
The problem of the complicated side conditions of the laws of the relabelling operator is also 
discussed in chapter 8 .
6.5 Sum m ary
In this chapter we described the process of attempting to find a canonical rule set corresponding 
to the laws of weak bisimulation congruence for LOTOS as given in the LOTOS standard [ISO8 8 ]. 
We were able to find such a rule set for a portion of the LOTOS laws and used this rule set in 
performing simple rewrite proofs. It was clear from these examples that other, more powerful, rules 
were also required, i.e. the expansion laws. Although rules could be expressed implementing the 
expansion laws, these rules cause divergence of the completion procedure, as do a number of other 
desirable rules, such as associativity of |] . This means that the final rule set, which will be used 
in the next chapter, is not complete, and therefore some care has to be exercised in applying the 
rules. We have a semi-decision procedure for weak bisimulation congruence of LOTOS processes, 
i.e. normal forms are not unique. This means that if two terms can be shown to be congruent by 
our rules, then they are congruent in the LOTOS semantics, but if two terms cannot be shown to 
be congruent by our rules, then they may or may not be congruent in the semantics. No special 
techniques to cope with non-confluent rule sets are adopted other than resorting to a hand proof 
if two terms cannot be shown congruent by RRL.
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C hapter 7
Using Term Rewriting for 
LOTOS: Login Case Study
7.1 In troduction
One of the main aims of this work is to investigate the verification requirements of LOTOS, i.e. 
to find out what sort of properties we want to verify, what sort of properties we can verify, and 
how the proofs may be carried out. In order to gain a better understanding of the problems 
of verification we undertake the study of the verification of the small communications problem 
presented in this chapter.
The verification requirement of the example studied is to show that some sort of relationship 
holds between the given specification and implementation, i.e. the implementation satisfies the 
specification. The problem is compounded as the implementation is not derived in any way from 
the specification. In the course of the verification we explore various ways of expressing the 
property to be proved and consider several approaches to the proof. We also try to automate the 
proofs required (by using the rules developed in the previous chapter). The aims of this chapter 
are:
• to investigate the verification requirements of LOTOS via an example,
• that the example chosen should display
— some measure of realism, but also
— simplicity (to allow easier exploration of the verification requirement),
• to obtain a successful proof that the verification requirement is met, and
• to demonstrate the viability of the rules developed in the last chapter as a proof technique.
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The example is presented in section 7.2: an informal overview of the whole system is given, 
followed by formal and informal descriptions of the specification and implementation of the sys­
tem. The formal descriptions are given in Basic LOTOS [IS088]. Section 7.3 is concerned with 
a preliminary discussion of the interpretation of the verification requirement, and possible ap­
proaches to proving that it is satisfied. The formal details of the verification requirement are given 
in section 7.3.2. The process of automating the proofs is as was described in chapter 6 .
Section 7.4 describes how we initially fail to meet the verification requirement. In fact, we 
can show that the implementation does not satisfy the specification. Close examination of the 
proofs that the relation does not hold results in a deeper understanding of the requirement and 
the development of a different approach to the proof. The new approach hinges on adding some 
extra information in a modular way to the specification; this is achieved by adopting the constraint 
oriented style of specification [VSvSB91] and allows the proof to be successfully completed. The 
new approach, the resulting specification, the statement of the verification requirement and its 
proof are presented in section 7.4.3.
We recognise that the example as it stands is simple, so possible extensions to the case study 
are discussed in section 7.5. In section 7.6 we review our experience with LOTOS and RRL, 
making suggestions for improvements. Finally, we give our conclusions and ideas for further work 
arising from this study.
The version of the case study presented here is essentially the same as the one presented at 
TAPSOFT’93 [Kir93], with some elaboration of various points drawn from the technical report 
[Kir92].
7.2 T h e E xam ple
7.2.1 Informal O verview of the System
The example is an abstraction of a real communications problem involving four communicating 
processes at OSI Session level. It was first investigated as a case study for the “Verification 
Techniques for LOTOS” SERC project [VTL93].
There are four communicating entities: A, B, C and D, shown in figure 7.1. In the diagram, a box 
represents an entity, and a O—► represents a message (sent in the direction of the arrow). Each 
message is labelled by mx, where x is a number in {1, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7}. Informal interpretations of the mx 
are given in figure 7.1. Messages of the form px or nx are positive and negative acknowledgements, 
respectively, to the corresponding mx messages. 1
1Note that some messages only require a positive acknowledgment, while others require both positive and 
negative acknowledgments (see figure 7.1) —  this is to do with the nature of the messages which they acknowledge, 
e.g. it does not make any sense to allow C to respond in a negative way to  the message m6 “deallocate” .
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ml pi or n lr m4 p4 or n4.
m3
p3
or
n3
P6
Message interpretation: 
ml — A requests a service of B 
m3 —  B communicates with C 
m4 — B communicates with D 
m5 — D sends a message to B 
m6 —  B deallocates C 
m7 — B deallocates D
Figure 7.1: The Processes and their messages
A requests a service from B; in order to provide that service, B must communicate with C and 
D. B has an internal timer which “times out” if D does not reply to its communication within a 
previously set time limit. B must send deallocation messages to C and D when they are no longer 
required.
The original example [Dic90] was supplied by Jeremy Dick, who worked for RACAL at the 
time. For reasons of security, we were given only the abstract description of the system as above; 
no indication of the real content or meaning of the messages was given. To help illuminate the 
system, we invented a possible interpretation of our own. This provides some intuition as to what 
happens in the system, although it is not an exact match. We view the system as follows: A is 
a user wishing to log-on to a system with a username and a password. C takes a username and 
checks that it is valid. D takes a valid username, acknowledges receipt of the name, and then 
returns the corresponding password. B co-ordinates these activities to ascertain if A is a valid user 
and has supplied the correct password. Since we use Basic LOTOS to model the example, the 
password and username are not in the formal description of the system.
The two descriptions of the system supplied to us are given below: firstly, a group of protocols 
which make up the specification, and secondly a group of processes which make up the imple­
mentation. Note that inconsistencies may be found between the way the specification describes 
something and the way the implementation describes the same thing. This is because the imple­
mentation was not derived from the specification and one of the problems considered here is that 
of trying to reconcile any differences between the two.
Below, the informal introductions to the specification and implementation are followed by their 
formal descriptions, given in Basic LOTOS. Note that in the remainder of this chapter, the term 
processes will be used to refer to the implementation part of the example.
In these descriptions the simplifying assumptions are made that the carrier is faithful and that 
no messages or acknowledgements are lost or corrupted.
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7.2.2 Protocols
Communication in the system is governed by protocols PI, P2 and P3. Each protocol describes the 
interface between just two of the processes in the system, e.g. PI describes the interface between 
A and B, completely ignoring C, D and their associated actions.
PI: A sends ml to B, which must be acknowledged by p i or n l.
P2: B sends m3 to C which must be acknowledged by p3 or n3. Following p3, B may or may not
send m6 to C which must be acknowledged by p6.
P3: B sends m4 to D which must be acknowledged by p4 or n4. After p4, D may or may not send 
m5 to B. m5 must be acknowledged by p5. Also after p4, B may or may not send m7 to D. m7 
is acknowledged by p7. If m7 is received it is no longer possible to send m5.
The LOTOS description of these protocols is as follows:
p r o c e ss  PI := ml; (n l;  e x it  [] p i;  e x it )  en d p ro c
p r o c e ss  P2 := m3; (n3; e x it  [] p3; (e x it  [] m6; p6; e x i t ) )  en d p ro c
p r o c e ss  P3 := e x it  [] m4; ( n4; e x it
[] p4; ( e x it  [] m7; p7; e x it
[] m5; p5; (e x it  [] m7; p7; e x i t ) ) )  e n d p ro c
Note that the alphabets of the LOTOS processes PI, P2 and P3 are disjoint, i.e. the protocols are 
independent of each other.
In a real system the protocols, and also the processes, would probably be described recursively, 
i.e. cycling over the same behaviour forever. This is ignored at the moment, the simpler finite case 
being dealt with first. The problems of dealing with recursive processes in the rewriting paradigm 
are discussed in the next chapter. The initial e x it  branch of P3 is a result of the way the proof 
is carried out; the process names are given here as a convenience, but in the RRL system, the 
conjecture is entered using the full process expressions, therefore the e x it  branch models the case 
in which the P3 protocol is not activated.
7.2.3 Processes
The implementation of the system is achieved by four interacting processes.
A: A sends ml to B. After this message B sends either p i or n l to A, indicating success or failure of 
the transaction respectively.
C: C receives m3 from B to which it replies either p3 or n3. If p3 is sent then C expects an m6 
deallocation message, to which it replies p6.
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D: D receives m4 from B, to which it replies p4, and the transaction continues, or n4, and the 
transaction terminates. After p4, D sends m5 to B, expecting p5 in response, then deallocation 
by m7, to which D replies p7. The transaction may be terminated if D receives m7 before it 
sends m5, i.e. the timer has expired causing B to terminate the transaction.
B: In a successful execution B receives ml from A, allocates C with m3 p3 and D with m4 p4, then 
sets a timer as D must send m5 within some time limit. When m5 arrives the timer is cancelled 
and B replies with p5. C and D are deallocated by m6 p6 and m7 p7 respectively. Finally B 
signals the success of the transaction by sending p i to A.
This sequence of actions may fail in a number of ways: either C or D could refuse to participate 
by returning negative acknowledgments (n3 or n4), or D might not send m5 within the time 
period, in which case the timer “times out” . In these cases B replies n l  to A. Deallocation
of C and D occurs if and only if they originally agreed to participate in the transaction, i.e.
if p3 and p4, respectively, were sent.
The LOTOS descriptions of the processes are as follows:
p ro cess  A := ml; (n l;  e x it  [] p i;  e x it )  en d p ro c
p ro cess  C := m3; (n3; e x it  [] p3; m6; p6; e x it )  en d p ro c
p ro cess  D := e x it  [] m4; ( n4; e x it
[] p4; ( m5; p5; m7; p7; e x it
□  m7; p 7 ; e x i t ) )  en d p ro c
p ro cess  B : =
ml; m3; ( n3; n l;  e x it
□  p3; m4; ( n4; m6; p6; n l;  e x it
[] p4; s e t ;  ( tim eou t; m6; p6; m7; p7; n l;  e x it
[] m5; tc a n c e l;  p5; m6; p6; m7; p7; p i;  e x i t ) ) )
en d p ro c
Note the differences and similarities between the descriptions of the protocols and the processes. 
For example, the description of A is identical to the description of PI, whereas the description of 
C differs slightly from P2 because in C deallocation is compulsory, whereas it is optional in P2. As 
with the protocols, the processes A, C and D are independent of each other; however, here we also 
have the process B which interacts with all other processes.
Now we have the formal descriptions of the specification and the implementation, we try to 
verify that the implementation is correct with respect to the specification.
7.3 V erification  o f  th e  E xam ple
7.3.1 Informal Discussion
The statement to be verified can be expressed as: does the implementation (the processes A,
B, C and D) satisfy the specification (the protocols PI, P2 and P3)? The terms used here are
deliberately vague, allowing exploration of different possible interpretations, discussed informally 
here and more formally in section 7.3.2. Three terms have yet to be defined: “specification” , 
“implementation” and “satisfies” .
In chapter 4 we assumed that the interpretation of the specification and the implementation 
was straightforward; however, consideration of this example shows us that this is not the case. For 
example, the protocols form the specification, but how they should be combined, or indeed if  they 
should be combined, is not mentioned. The same is true of the processes and the implementation.
Suppose the protocols are to be combined to form the specification and the processes combined 
to form the implementation. The statement then becomes:
(A | B | C | D) satisfies (PI | P2 | P3) (7.1)
where the “|” operator denotes “combined with” . Note that each instance of “|” may be replaced 
by a slightly different operator when the statement is made concrete, i.e. the combinator used in 
A | B may be different from that used in C | D, or PI | P2. This is formalised in section 7.3.2.
An alternative approach to expressing the verification requirement exploits the modular way 
in which the system has been defined: each facet of the interaction can be examined separately.
(A | B) satisfies PI (7-2)
(C | B) satisfies P2 (7.3)
(D | B) satisfies P3 (7-4)
As they stand, these equations are not quite correct since the language of the left-hand ex­
pression may not be the same as that of the right-hand expression, e.g. A | B will use events not 
mentioned in PI. Either these events will have to be hidden, or the interpretation of “satisfies” 
must take account of the extra events.
Since equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4) each yield a boolean, the results can be combined using a 
boolean operator. The correctness of the system as a whole is expressed by ((7.2) A (7.3) A (7.4)).
We choose A since we want all facets of the interaction to be satisfied, but we must also be sure
that satisfying all equations separately is the same as satisfying the system as a whole. In this 
case, since PI, P2 and P3 are all concerned with distinct facets of the communication of the system, 
it seems likely that the verification can safely be split into parts. Note that this really depends 
on choosing the right methods of splitting up the system, hiding unimportant events, making 
individual proofs, and recombining the results.
7.3.2 Formalising the Verification Requirem ent
We now give the formal interpretation of “|” , the hiding of events, and “satisfies” in Basic LOTOS.
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The general parallelism operator of LOTOS is used to combine both processes and proto­
cols. Variations of the events in the synchronisation list give subtly different combinations of the 
components of the system as required above.
If we choose the modular approach to the verification requirement proof we must also formalise 
the means by which actions can be ignored in each of the equations (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4). The 
h ide  operator is used to restrict the processes to protocol events only.
There are many different possible interpretations in LOTOS for the “satisfies” relation. The 
various equivalence relations and preorders which can be used with LOTOS were discussed in 
detail in chapters 3 and 4. Here we re-examine these relations with specific reference to the 
current problem.
Given the use of the h ide  operator which converts hidden events into the internal event, an 
equivalence which ignores these internal events is required, therefore strong bisimulation cannot 
be used. At the other extreme we have trace equivalence which is too weak for verification 
purposes as deadlock properties are not preserved, leaving us with the weak bisimulation and 
testing relations. The system under examination will probably have to interact with other systems, 
so it is important that it behaves in the same way in all contexts. This leads us to reject weak 
bisimulation equivalence and testing equivalence, in favour of their congruent counterparts. We 
may also consider using the testing preorder cred. Any of these relations might be taken as our 
interpretation of “satisfies” in the verification requirement.
In the following section, we initially use the strongest relation available to us, weak bisimulation 
congruence, in place of “satisfies” , progressing to weaker relations as necessary. If we start with the 
strongest relation and prove the equation holds for that relation, then all other (weaker) relations 
follow.
The next section contains details of the conjectures we attempted to prove hold, and some 
discussion of why many of those conjectures do not hold.
7.4  V erification  P roofs
Two possible approaches to proving that the implementation of the system satisfies its specification 
have been presented above. One involves splitting the proof into three parts corresponding to the 
three protocols in the specification, while the other deals with the system as a whole. These two 
approaches are explored below.
7.4.1 Sp litting the Conjecture into Three Parts
Since each protocol describes the interface between just two of the processes, the idea of proving 
each interface is correct and deducing from that the correctness of the whole system is very
1 0 0
appealing. The equations to be proved in this section are all of the form:
PI satisfies h id e  [m3,p3,n3,m4,p4,n4,m5,p5,m6,p6,m7,p7] in
(A |[m l,p i,n l] | B) (7.5)
P2 satisfies h id e  [ml, p i, nl,m 4,p4,n4,m 5,p5,m 7,p7] in
(C |[m3,p3,n3,m6,p6]| B) (7.6)
P3 satisfies h id e  [m l,p l,n l,m 3,p3,n3,m 6,p6] in
(D |[m4,p4,n4,m5,p5,m7,p7]| B) (7.7)
where P I, P2, P3 and A, B, C, D are as defined in section 7.2.
The verification requirement is obtained by substituting different relations for “satisfies” in the 
above equations. Correctness of the system as a whole is proven when all three equations can be 
shown to hold for a particular relation. Note that the only parts of the conjectures which change 
from one proof to another is the relation substituted for “satisfies” , and the orientation in the case 
of the cred  refinement relation.
In the following proofs, we use procAB, procCB and procDB to denote the right hand sides of 
equations (7.5), (7.6) and (7.7) respectively. The rule sets newcore, expand and hide are used in 
RRL to attempt to show the conjectures hold for weak bisimulation congruence. We have no rule 
set for testing congruence or the cred relation, therefore these proofs are carried out entirely by 
hand.
Unfortunately, this approach turned out to be unsuccessful. Although some conjectures about 
the relationship between the specification and the implementation can be shown to hold, the results 
are not strong enough to satisfy the correctness requirement. Hand proofs of the negation of the 
conjectures which could not be shown to hold are given below. Examination of these conjectures 
and their proofs may help to illuminate the reasons for the failure of this approach overall.
W eak B isim ula tion  C ongruence Consider:
PI = w b c  procAB (7.8)
P2 = w b c  procCB (7.9)
P3 = w b c  procDB (7.10)
These equations, (7.8), (7.9) and (7.10), cannot be proved to hold using the rule sets in RRL; 
however, we can use the reduced forms of the terms, which are normal forms only with respect 
to our rules, not necessarily unique normal forms, to help us in hand proofs of the negation of 
these conjectures. Remember that as our rule sets are not complete we cannot use RRL to prove 
inequalities. Also note that RRL cannot identify the cause of failure of proofs, it merely returns 
the normal forms of both sides of the conjecture.
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By hand, we can prove the following:
-i (PI =wbc procAB) (7.11)
-> (P2 =wbc procCB) (7-12)
-i (P3 =wbc procDB) (743)
P roof. The key to the proofs of conjectures (741), (7.12) and (7.13) lies in the difference be­
tween weak bisimulation congruence and weak bisimulation equivalence. Informally, the difference 
between weak bisimulation equivalence and weak bisimulation congruence lies in the way in which 
initial internal actions are treated. Let P  denote the left hand side of an equation and Q the 
right hand side, as in definitions 2 and 4 of chapter 3. In both the equivalence and the congru­
ence, every action performed by P  must be matched by an action performed by Q, where extra 
internal actions may be added in the matching process. Similarly, every action performed by Q 
must be matched by an action performed by P. However, for weak bisimulation congruence, an 
initial internal action must be matched by one or more internal actions, while weak bisimulation 
equivalence allows an initial internal action to be matched by zero or more internal actions.
The actions which can be performed by the various components of the system can be more 
easily seen by examining normal forms with respect to =wbc produced by our rewrite rules on 
the terms in equations (7.11), (7.12) and (7.13). These are given in figure 7.2. Note that the 
protocols have not been reduced; they were already in normal form with respect to our rule sets. 
The normal forms in figure 7.2 will be referred to in the proofs in the remainder of this section.
Informally stated, the proof proceeds as follows for each inequation:
E q u a tio n  (7.11) Clause (1) of definition (4) holds; procAB1 can match every action PI7 can 
perform. However, clause (2) fails because (procAB a fte r  ml) can perform an i action to 
get into a situation in which it can perform the action n l and no other, whereas (PI7 a fte r  ml) 
can only match an i action by doing nothing, which leaves it in a state in which either n l 
or p i are possible. Obviously a state in which two distinct actions are possible cannot be 
equivalent to one in which only one action is possible.
E q u a tio n  (7.12) Again clause (1) is satisfied, but clause (2) fails as an initial internal action 
must be matched by one or more internal actions. P27 cannot match the initial internal 
action performed by procCB except by zero actions, and therefore the expressions are not 
weak bisimulation congruent.
E q u a tio n  (7.13) Exactly the same as for equation (7.12).
This ends the proof that the inequations (7.11), (7.12) and (7.13) hold. I
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PI normal form (P l;) is
ml; ( (n l ;  ex it)  [] (p i;  ex i t ) )
P2 normal form (P2') is
m3; ((n3; ex it)  [] (p3; (ex it  [] (m6; p6; e x i t ) ) ) )
P3 norm al form (P3') is 
exit
[] m4; ( n4; exit
□  p4; ( exit
[] m7; p7; exit
[] m5; p5; (ex it  [] m7; p7; e x i t ) ) )
procAB no rm al form  (procAB1) is
ml; ( ( i;  n l;  ex it)  [] (i; p i;  ex i t ) )
procCB no rm al form  (procCB1) is
i; m3; (n3; ex it  [] p3; m6; p6; ex it)
procDB normal form (procDB') is 
i; ( i; exit
[] i; m4; ( n4; exit
[] p4; ( i; m7; p7; exit
[] m5; p5; m7; p7; e x i t ) ) )
Figure 7.2: Normal Forms of the Processes and the Protocols with respect to the Weak Bisimula­
tion Congruence rule sets expand and newcore plus hide.
Since we failed to show the conjectures of the verification requirement hold for weak bisimula­
tion congruence, showing instead that the verification requirement is not met for the specification 
and implementation with respect to weak bisimulation congruence, we move to a weaker relation, 
testing congruence.
T esting  R ela tions Taking equations (7.5), (7.6) and (7.7) as above, we substitute the cred  
relation for “satisfies” and try to show the new equations hold left-to-right and right-to-left (giving 
testing congruence), i.e.
cred laws of the LOTOS standard, which means that the protocols are a deterministic reduction 
of the processes, i.e. the processes may have some nondeterminism not present in the protocols.
PI cred procAB
P2 cred procCB
P3 cred procDB
(7.14)
(7.15)
(7.16)
and vice versa.
Equations (7.14) and (7.15), in the left to right direction, can be shown to hold by applying the
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However, we normally expect the implementation of a system to be less nondeterministic than the 
specification. Neither of these equations can be shown to hold by application of the cred  laws in 
the right-to-left direction; equation (7.16) cannot be shown to hold in either direction.
Proofs of the corresponding inequations are slightly more tricky than the proofs of the weak 
bisimulation congruence inequations. We begin by showing that the equations (7.14), (7.15) and 
(7.16) do not hold in the right-to-left direction for the cred relation, i.e.
-> (procAB cred Pi) (7-17)
-i (procCB cred P2) (7.18)
-n (procDB cred P3) (7-19)
Proof. In definition 9 of chapter 3, the cred relation was characterised by the tests a process
must pass. To prove that two LOTOS processes are not related by cred, a test must be found 
which one must pass but the other need not. In particular, because the orientation of the expression 
is important, a test must be found which the right hand side must pass, but which the left hand 
side may fail. For example, in equation (7.17) a test must be found which PI must pass, but which 
procAB may fail. This is sufficient to prove that the cred  relation does not hold in the given 
direction. If no such test can be found, there may be a context which differentiates the terms, 
since cred  is a congruence relation.
In the following proofs we refer back to the normal forms given for weak bisimulation congruence 
in figure 7.2 and use these in the proofs. This procedure is sound.
T heo rem  1 To make use of the normal forms we need to show, given p =wbc p' and q =wbc q',
-i (p1 cred q') =$>• -i (p cred q)
where p' and q' denote the normal forms with respect to our rule sets relating to weak bisimulation 
congruence of p and q respectively.
P roof. The method of proof is by contradiction. The following statements hold: p =wbc v' and 
q =wbc </, and -> (p' cred  q'), which we will demonstrate for each case in the remainder of this 
section. Now suppose p cred  q. Since (B\ =wbc B2) => (Bi cred  B 2), from [IS088], we may 
deduce pf cred  p and q cred  q', and hence p' cred  q' by transitivity of cred, thus contradicting 
our initial statements. I
Although there are cred laws which can reduce some of the normal forms given further, they 
are not used here as they apply only to the process normal forms and reducing terms on the left 
hand side of the cred  relation when we are trying to show that it doesn’t hold could lead to false 
conclusions (this problem is discussed in more detail in section 8.4).
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Again informally stated, the proofs that equations (7.17), (7.18) and (7.19) hold are as follows:
E q u a tio n  (7.17) (Pi' a fte r  ml) can always pass the test n l, but (procAB1 sifter ml) will some­
times fail that test (because the internal actions can proceed silently and put us into a state 
in which only p i can go ahead).
E q u a tio n  (7.18) There is no test which can differentiate between P2' and p ro c C B however, they 
can be differentiated by the context P Q m8; exit, where m8 is an arbitrarily chosen action 
and P  is a place holder for the system under test. In this context, ((P2' [] m8; exit) a fte r  e) 
can always pass the test m8, whereas (( procCB1 [| m8; exit) a fte r  e) could fail this test. This 
is because the internal action can move procClH [] m8; ex it into a state where only m3 is 
possible.
E q u a tio n  (7.19) To prove this equation we must find a test which P3' must satisfy, but which 
cannot be passed by procDB'. Given the test m5, (P3' a fte r  m4 p4) must always pass this 
test, but (procDB' a fte r  m4 p4) won’t necessarily pass this test (as the internal action may 
be taken, putting procDB? into a state in which it can only perform m7).
This concludes the proofs that equations (7.17), (7.18) and (7.19) hold. I
The final inequation to be proved is to show that (7.16) does not hold, i.e.
-i (P3 cred procDB) (7.20)
P roof. The proof proceeds by demonstrating that there is a test which procDB must satisfy but 
which may not be satisfied by P3. Consider the state (procDB' a fte r  m4 p4 m5 p5 S), call it DB'. 
Although D B' m ust m7, (P3' a fte r  m4 p4 m5 p5 6) may sometimes fail the test m7, therefore P3' 
is not a refinement of procDB?.
This concludes the proof that equation (7.20) holds. I
Equations (7.5), (7.6) and (7.7) do hold for trace equivalence, but as we said earlier, this 
relation is really too weak to be useful in verification.
At this point it appears that trying to prove the verification requirement is satisfied is hopeless. 
However, we strongly believe that the processes are a valid implementation of the system. Since 
we tried weakening our interpretation of satisfies with no success we must conclude that it is the 
approach to the proof which is incorrect. The strategy of splitting the conjecture into three parts 
does not work, or rather, proofs of some parts of the conjecture can be completed, but these 
are not sufficient to satisfy the verification requirement. By examining the normal forms given 
in figure 7.2, it seems that the hiding of events causes the failure of the proofs by spotlighting 
apparently nondeterministic choices in the process normal forms. These choices are not really 
nondeterministic; they are determined by factors in the other processes. For example, procAB'
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makes a nondeterministic choice between replying p i and replying n l. However, we know that 
this choice really depends on the receipt of m5 (which is hidden). This problem affects proofs 
using weak bisimulation congruence or testing congruence. We observe that we are not the only 
ones to encounter this problem; the same phenomenon also causes problems for other authors, e.g. 
[Bai91, BA91].
We now go on to try the other approach to the proof, where the system is considered as a 
whole, thus avoiding the use of hide.
7.4.2 Proving the System  as a W hole
No relationships between the processes all combined and the protocols all combined can be demon­
strated because, although the processes can be combined using parallelism, there is no meaningful 
way in which to combine the protocols.
Two operators are possible candidates for combining the protocols: sequential composition of 
process expressions (the “enable” operator, ) and interleaving (general parallelism synchronising 
on no events, since the protocols have no events in common). Using sequential composition to 
combine the protocols we obtain the following expression:
PI »  P2 »  P3
This is an unsuccessful way of combining the protocols because, for example, the events of PI do 
not all precede the events of P2. Interleaving gives:
PI III P2 III P3
which is similarly unsuccessful as the protocols contain no information about the relative ordering 
of events in different protocols. Interleaving results in a process expression which has a large 
number of traces which make no sense given our informal understanding of the system. For 
example, one trace which results from the above expression is (p4 p3 m4 m3 ml); however, we 
know from the description in section 7.2 that ml should be the first event in the interaction, and 
that events occur in numerical order, i.e. m3 comes before m4, and that messages occur before their 
respective acknowledgements.
Given this way of expressing the protocols we can only prove protocols cred processes, i.e. the 
protocols implement the processes, which is not a true reflection of the verification requirement. 
The reason we cannot show processes cred protocols is that the protocols also specify lots of other 
behaviours which the processes do not. Really our problem is that the specification is too weak; 
there are some details which have been omitted.
The missing information, which is implicit in the implementation, includes details of a timer, 
deallocation and what constitutes success or failure of the transaction. In the specification there
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is no information about any of these things. Our solution is to add the information in the form of 
constraints, giving a successful approach to the problem.
7.4.3 Adding Constraints to the Exam ple
In the constraint oriented style of specification, described in [VSvSB91] and also earlier in sec­
tion 3.5.2 of this thesis, different aspects of the behaviour of the system are described by separate 
processes, the full system description being given by the parallel composition of these subparts. 
The effect is similar to using conjunction in a logical specification; each part must be satisfied 
for the whole to be satisfied. This style of specification is only possible because of the multi-way 
synchronisation of the LOTOS parallel operators.
Using this specification style, we define more LOTOS processes which express aspects of the 
specification not included in the protocols. These include a timer in B to determine how long it 
should wait for D to send the m5 message, compulsory deallocation of C and D, ordering of events 
as mentioned in the informal overview of the system, and conditions dictating success or failure 
of the transaction as a whole. The following constraints are added to the specification:
Timer Constraints
process timer := exit [] s e t ;  ( tcancel;  exit [] timeout; ex it)  endproc
process timer_on := exit [] p4; s e t ;  exit endproc
process timer_off := exit [] s e t ;  ( m5; tcancel;  p5; m7; exit
[] timeout; m7; ex it)  endproc
D ea lloca t ion  Constraints
process dealloc.C := p3; m6; p6; ex it  [] n3; exit endproc
process dealloc_D := exit [] m4; (p4; m7; p7; exit [] n4; ex it)  endproc
Success and Failure  
process system := m5; p i;  exit
[] n3; n l;  exit
[] n4; n l;  exit
[] timeout; n l; exit endproc
Ordering Constraints
process order13 := ml; m3; ( n3; n l;  exit
[] p3; (n l;  exit [] p i;  e x i t ) )  endproc
process order34 := m3; ( n3; nl; exit
□  p3; m4; ( n4; n l;  exit
[] p4; (n l; exit [] p i;  e x i t ) ) )  endproc
process order457 := n3; n l;  exit
□  m4; ( n4; n l;  exit
[] p4; ( m5; p5; m7; p7; p i;  exit
□  timeout; m7; p7; n l;  e x i t ) )  endproc
process order56 := n3; n l;  exit
[] n4; ra6; p6; n l;  exit
[] timeout; m6; p6; n l;  exit
□  m5; p5; m6; p6; p i;  exit endproc
107
process order67 := n3; n l;  exit
□  p3; ( n4; m6; p6; n l;  exit
[] p4; m6; p6; m7; p7; ( n l;  exit
[] p i; e x it ) )  endproc
As with the descriptions of the protocols and the processes, some exit branches are introduced 
to express the notion that a constraint may not be activated.
Given these constraints, the correctness of the system may now be expressed by the following 
equation:
( ( (P I  I [p i ,  n l]I  system) I[ml, p i ,  n l ,  n3]I orderl3)
I [p i ,  n l ,  m3, p3, n3, n4, m5, timeout]I  
( ( ( (P 2  I[p3, n3, m6, p6]I dealloc.C)
I [m3, p3, n3, m6, p6] I (order34 I [p3, n3, p4, n4]I order67))
I [p i ,  n l ,  n3, m4, p4, n4, m7, p7]I
(((P3 I[m4, p4, n4, m7, p7]I deallocJD)
I[m4, p4, n4, m5, p5, m7, p7]I order457)
I[p4, m5, p5, m7, timeout]I
((t im er I [ s e t ]I  timer_on) I [ s e t ,  timeout, tca n ce l]I  tim er_off) ) )
I[m5, p5, m6, p6, timeout]I order56))
— wbc
(((A I[ml, p i ,  n l]I  B) I [m3, p3, n3, m6, p6]| C)
I[m4, p4, n4, m5, p5, m7, p7]I D)
Note that, although the order in which the process expressions are combined does not affect 
the meaning of the process expression as long as the synchronisation lists are adjusted accordingly; 
we find that in practice it is helpful to add the processes which restrict behaviour before adding 
the ones which add behaviour. In the equation above, this means adding as many constraints as 
possible to each protocol before combining it with the other protocols. The reason that this is 
necessary is that, in performing the reductions, our system of rule sets can only deal with one 
parallel statement at a time, which means that the proof has to be built up gradually from small 
units. This is a feature of the way the rules to expand parallel expressions have been implemented 
and was mentioned in section 6.4.1. Adding as much information as early as possible helps to cut 
down the size of the intermediate stages in the proof.
The above equation can be proved to hold by the rule sets. This is an adequate proof of 
correctness since it means not only that the processes have the same observable behaviour as the 
protocols, but also that they behave in the same way in all contexts. The proof requires only 
the expand rules. As the specification and implementation contain no internal actions we may 
also deduce that the above equation holds for strong equivalence as well as for weak bisimulation 
congruence. This is to be expected as the final process expressions are deterministic (and therefore 
all equivalences are the same).
Although we have achieved our aim of proving the verification requirement is satisfied, it is at 
some cost; we had to alter the specification and the new one is much more complex.
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7.5 E xten sion s to  th e  E xam ple
The example as considered so far is very simple; there are a number of ways in which it can be 
made more complex.
• A useful extension would be to add an “abort” message, call it m2. A can abort the service 
at any time by sending m2 to B, which should clean up by deallocating any resources held 
and then replying to A with p2.
In LOTOS it would be simple to add m2 p2 as an abort sequence using the operator [> , 
which allows one process to take control from another. However, in this example the system 
is more complicated, requiring varying sequences of actions between m2 and p2, depending 
on the events which occurred before m2. The original solution could not be easily extended 
to include this new behaviour. This could indicate a fault in the solution to the original 
problem: perhaps it is not modular enough, or it could be that there is no simple, elegant 
way to extend the solution. Certainly it is true to say that some of the constraints used in the 
final description and proof of the example are not perhaps the most obvious descriptions. In 
particular, some constraints contain too much information, in that they are not as modular 
as their names suggest. This information was necessary to be able to combine the LOTOS 
processes in a meaningful way. We do not claim that our solution is in any way optimal; 
further investigation may reveal better solutions which can be easily extended when the 
specification of the problem is altered. Another possibility is that it is the form of this 
particular modification which is causing the problem, see section 7.6.1 for further discussion.
• Data types could be added to the messages, e.g. the login name and password of the informal 
interpretation of the example.
• The most obvious extension would be to introduce recursion.
The first two extensions are not considered further here; the case study with recursion is 
considered in the next chapter.
7.6 R ev iew  o f  th e  T ools U sed
Although some degree of success is achieved in the case study, there are also many problems, not 
all of which arise from the example itself; some are due to either LOTOS or RRL.
7.6.1 Im provem ents to LOTOS
LOTOS is not always suitable to describe the example. A major problem is revealed when attempt­
ing to extend the original problem to include the abort message. The [> operator is unsuitable
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for this purpose because it does not allow the abort sequence to be dependent on the state of 
execution before the abort message. One way round this is to write each abort possibility into the 
LOTOS processes as choice branches, which makes the specification rather cumbersome. What is 
required is an operator which allows the abort sequence to be flexible, perhaps allowing parameters 
to be passed from the interrupted to the interrupting process (there is an extension of this sort 
for sequential composition of processes in full LOTOS).
Another feature which would be useful is an operator to “wrap-up” several actions and make 
them behave as a single action, i.e. like a critical section in a mutual exclusion problem. For 
example, we want to be able to combine two process expressions using interleaving, but to have 
a section in one of the expressions which, once it has begun, has to finish without interleaving 
with the other process until after the last action is completed. This could be achieved by using a 
mutual exclusion algorithm, but a language construct to do this would be more convenient. This 
problem is also identified in [Got87].
7.6.2 Im provem ents to RRL
The following is a list of features which we would find useful in carrying out our proofs.
• The ability to specify which rule to apply next, particularly important when the rule set is 
not complete.
• A list of all the rules used in a reduction. RRL does not supply this information when a 
reduction is carried out.
•  The ability to split rules into groups within the system and to specify which groups of rules 
can be used in a reduction. (We achieve this effect by running simultaneous copies of RRL, 
each with a different rule set. This requires the user to cut and paste equations from one 
system to another, which provides the opportunity to introduce errors.)
•  The ability to reference the last term reduced and to use that reference in the next reduction. 
As our rule sets are not complete, the order in which rules are applied can be very important. 
For the case study proofs this means that subparts of the proof have to be fully expanded 
before they can be added to the rest of the expression. Again we use cut and paste to 
perform this function, increasing the possibility of error.
•  The ability to save rule sets, rather than having to regenerate them every time.
• Although RRL has fairly sophisticated functionality, the user interface is poor, being only a 
list of commands followed by a prompt. A graphical interface would make the system more 
appealing to use.
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Perhaps these features will be available in later versions of the software, but we solve some of the 
problems by adopting a different tool. This is described in the next chapter.
7 .7  Sum m ary and D iscu ssion
After much experimentation, we have successfully shown that the verification requirement of a 
small communications protocol are indeed satisfied. It must be noted that the given specification 
was not sufficient for our purposes and had to have more information added to enable the proofs 
to be carried out. The new information was added in a modular way however, and the text of the 
original specification was unaltered, although it must be admitted that the size and complexity of 
the specification was greatly increased. Possible extensions to the problem, including the intro­
duction of recursion to the LOTOS processes, were provided in section 7.5, but not explored. It 
is hoped that these can also be made in a modular way.
In some ways, the initial failure to meet the verification requirements was perhaps more fruitful 
than the final proof, because we were able to identify problems in the verification process which 
need to be further researched. For example, the effect of h ide  on our proofs, introducing non­
determinism and thus causing failure, and the difficulty of choosing which of the many equivalence 
relations of the process algebra literature to use.
Another way to look at this problem is that perhaps we chose the wrong approach to the veri­
fication. Essentially the protocols constitute a partial specification of the system, which is why we 
had to hide events when splitting the conjecture into three parts. However, using h ide  and equiv­
alence relations we could not prove that the implementation satisfied the specification. We also 
tried using the preorder cred  which captures some aspects of the notion of partial specification, 
but not the ones pertinent to this example because we were unable to show the implementation 
satisfied the specification for cred  either. The failure of cred was due to the fact that cred  only 
captures the notion of reduction with respect to nondeterministic choice, whereas we require the 
reduction of deterministic choice, e.g. we need something which says a; A sat a;A\\ b;B where 
a ^  6 .
A third possible solution would be to express the protocols, the specification, in terms of logic 
and to show the processes provide a model in which that logical formula holds. This possibility is 
explored further in chapter 1 1 .
The main result of our work on this case study is the demonstration that verification, even of 
such a small and simple system, is a difficult process, one which is full of opportunities to take the 
wrong decision and thereby to fail to prove the correctness of the system under investigation. This 
is true even though we restrict our attention to a particular formulation of verification, namely 
equivalence between two processes. In this study we only arrived at a successful conjecture and
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proof because we persevered, having a strong belief that the verification requirement could be 
formulated in this way. In more complex examples it would perhaps be less easy to hold such 
a belief and this prompts several worrying thoughts: how long must we persevere to gain an 
acceptable formulation of the verification requirements and proofs that they are satisfied, how do 
we measure acceptability, and how do we know when to give up. The answers to these questions 
can only be gained through more experience of the verification process.
1 1 2
C hapter 8
Using PAM  to Im plem ent LOTOS 
Relations
In the previous chapter we presented a case study in verifying that a LOTOS specification was 
satisfied by its implementation, also given in LOTOS. There we were more concerned with different 
ways of expressing the verification requirement, so the system was simplified to ease the proof 
process. Specifically, the processes were not recursive. At the time we pointed out that this 
was somewhat unrealistic and that a future exercise should be to introduce recursion to the 
processes and show that the verification requirement was still satisfied. We also encountered 
various problems with the use of RRL as a proof tool. Although when a complete rule set is used 
RRL is very useful and can apply all the rules automatically until a normal form is reached, we wish 
to have more control over the rules applied since our rule sets are not complete. This is something 
which RRL cannot supply. This aspect, together with the recursion problem, encouraged us 
to seek a new proof tool more suited to our purpose. The new tool, PAM [Lin92], which is 
again an equational reasoning tool, is described in this chapter. Having a different tool gives 
a slightly different approach to the proof process, therefore we re-examine our choice of rewrite 
rules, or rather, our choice of the underlying laws. The different possibilities for weak bisimulation 
congruence are explored in section 8.3, with laws for the other equivalences also considered here, 
but not in as great detail. In section 8.4 we consider the problem of axiomatising the cred  preorder 
for input to PAM.
8.1 P roof: T echnique and A u to m a tio n
In this section we consider the problem of extending our rewriting system to recursive LOTOS 
processes; this implies adding recursive rules. Below we discuss several possible approaches to this
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problem, using the simple buffer, Buffer := in; out; Buffer, as an illustrative example.
The obvious (naive) approach adds recursive process definitions directly as recursive rules, i.e.
Buffer — > in; out; Buffer
This is unsatisfactory because the rule set becomes non-terminating; since this rule can always be 
applied, the process of rewriting can never end.
To ensure termination, we could instead add the rule
in; out; Buffer — > Buffer
This rule is no good for investigating the behaviour of the buffer as it folds all the observable 
behaviour away, leaving only the process name itself, making it impossible to say anything about 
the behaviour of the system.
The next possible approach is to somehow control the use of the first rule in the rewriting by 
modelling the recursion as primitive recursion, rather than allowing unbounded recursion. This 
can be done by, for example, adding a counter to indicate the number of times the rule may be 
applied, thus ensuring the rule can only be applied a finite number of times; this approach is 
used in [CN92]. Although this approach may work sufficiently well for small examples, where 
the number of times the recursive equation has to be unfolded is easily calculated, it is probably 
unworkable in practice. However, consideration of this technique gives a clue to the final approach.
The naive approach of adding recursive rules does not work because it is the term rewriting 
system which decides which rule to apply next, and it only stops when no more rules can be 
applied, therefore rewriting with recursive rules is non-terminating. By using primitive recursion 
we try to control the unfolding and application of the recursive rules, but the method of control 
is too restrictive, forcing us to decide in advance how many times the rule can be applied. If 
we cannot automate the decision of when to unfold the expression, then we must give the user 
interactive control over the unfolding of the recursive equations. We must therefore abandon 
traditional rewriting tools (in which virtually no control over the application of rules is given to 
the user), turning instead to a tool which gives the necessary control, preferably without totally 
abandoning equational reasoning as a proof technique. PAM (the Process Algebra Manipulator) 
[Lin92] is such a tool and is described in the next section.
8.2  P A M
PAM [Lin92] is a parameterised rewriting-based proof assistant designed with process algebras in 
mind. Rather than implementing the operators and equivalences of a particular process algebra,
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like tools such as the Concurrency Workbench [CPS89], the philosophy behind the development 
of PAM was to create a general tool which could be used for any process algebra. PAM has 
some built-in transformation steps, relating to common steps in equational proofs which are not 
language specific. An example of one of these built-in steps is the unique fixed-point induction 
technique (ufi); this is of particular interest to us as it allows reasoning about the equality of 
recursively defined processes. Other functions are available which manipulate the presentation of 
the proof in the proof window (zoom, outline) and which perform routine operations (substitution, 
definition, folding/unfolding).
To operate, PAM requires the user to supply a definition of the language to be used, Basic 
LOTOS in our case. Although the description of a number of process algebras, including CCS 
and CSP, is given in the PAM manual, PAM has not, to our knowledge, been used for LOTOS 
before. The language definition contains arities and precedences of the operators of the language 
and axioms which describe the behaviour of those operators. Once set up, PAM can be used to 
carry out equational reasoning style proofs on terms of the language.
An important feature of PAM is that it has a graphical interface. The proof window consists 
of two parts: a control panel and a proof display. The control panel has lots of buttons; one for 
each of the built-in functions, and one for each of the user defined axioms. The proof display 
is essentially the paper on which the conjecture and the subsequent transformations are written. 
To apply an axiom, the user must select a term in the proof side, and then click on a button 
in the control side. Since the language definition gives equations describing the behaviour of the 
operators, the direction of application must be specified by the user every time that equation is 
applied. A switch in the control panel specifies either left-to-right or right-to-left; this direction 
then applies for all equations and substitutions. The user has complete control over the proof 
process; indeed, PAM cannot perform proofs automatically, instead the system is an automated 
pencil and paper; aiding in the book-keeping of proofs.
At the heart of each proof is a conjecture to be proved. This is supplied, together with any 
process definitions required, in a separate file by the user. To help structure the proofs, they are 
divided into sections; so if a subterm of the main conjecture has to be reduced it can be done in 
a new section, the result of that reduction being substituted for the original subterm in the main 
section.
As well as giving the freedom to use equations individually, the current version of PAM (vl.O) 
also gives power in the form of equation groupings. A simple language allows tactics to be built 
which describe common patterns of equation application, thus freeing the user from the tedium of 
applying each equation individually. Tactics are built by single or multiple applications of equa­
tions (the number of applications can be limited). Direction of application can also be specified, 
effectively specifying a rule rather than an equation. A tactic can then be used to specify a rule
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set. If the rule set so defined is confluent and terminating, then application of that tactic to a term 
will produce the (unique) normal form of that term, thus giving us an automatic proof technique. 
PAM cannot determine whether or not a rule set is complete; this must be done using one of the 
traditional rewriting tools such as RRL.
Tactics are problem specific, i.e. the tactic descriptions go into the problem definition files 
rather than the process algebra description file. Useful tactics, developed for use with LOTOS, 
may be found in the PAM problem definition files of appendix D.
Using tactics, PAM can offer flexibility for the experienced user, and a nice interface to an 
automatic proof process for the novice, i.e. the user need not make any hard decisions about the 
order of application of the equations, or the direction of application. This approach can also cut 
down some of the more laborious proofs by automating portions of them. Another useful feature 
for the novice is the command “ask” . Given a term, “ask” will tell the user which equations are 
currently applicable.
A full description of the PAM system may be found in [Lin92]. We now present some of the 
steps in customising PAM for use with LOTOS.
8.2.1 Setting up PAM
Creating a proof in PAM requires two steps: description of the process algebra in the language 
definition file, and description of the particular conjecture to be proved in the problem definition 
file. Below we give details from the actual input files for PAM for LOTOS and weak bisimulation 
congruence to illustrate the method of definition. In these files, comments are prefixed by —.
The first part of the language definition is to declare the types of the language, and the 
operators and their arities. Subtypes can also be declared. PAM has two built in types: boolean 
and set. Infix operators are defined by including _ in the operator declaration as a place holder. 
For any operator, PAM also allows the user to declare priority (a number between 0 and 9999, 
where a higher priority (higher number) means tighter binding), associativity and commutativity, 
and the direction of association (left or right).
The LOTOS definition begins with the following declarations:
signature
type Gate Action Process 
with Gate < Action  
operator  
- [] _
stop
e x it
h ide _ on _ 
i
d e lta
Process Process -> Process 120 AC RIGHT 
Action Process -> Process 200 RIGHT 
-> Process 
-> Process
Gate s e t  Process -> Process 300 
-> Action  
-> Action
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_ | [ _ ] I _ :: Process Gate s e t Process -> Process 150 AC LEFT 
_ I I I _ :: Process Process -> Process 150 AC LEFT
The syntax of the operators is close to the usual LOTOS syntax; departures have only been made 
where clashes with PAM’s inbuilt operators occur, e.g. h ide _ in  _ becomes h ide _ on _ as PAM
uses in  for set membership, and the action sequencing operator ; becomes . (as in CCS).
The next part of the definition file is concerned with the axioms which define the operators 
declared above. Note that, although for weak bisimulation congruence these are really laws with 
respect to the model of labelled transition systems, to PAM they are axioms, as PAM knows 
nothing about the underlying model. In the remainder of the document, we will refer to “PAM 
axioms” in an attempt to make the distinction clear.
Below we give an example of some of the PAM axioms for weak bisimulation congruence, 
to illustrate the style of definition. The makeup of the PAM axioms is more fully discussed in 
section 8.3 and the full PAM input files may be found in appendix D.
axiom
— B1 and B2 AC laws redundant; choice declared  AC above
B3 x [] stop  = x 
B4 x [] x = x
HI hide A on stop  = stop
H2 hide A on (x [] y) = (hide A on x) [] (hide A on y)
H3A hide A on a. x = a. (hide A on x) i f  n o t(a  in  A)
H3B hide A on a. x = i .  (hide A on x) i f  (a in  A)
The above example illustrates the usual form for simple axioms, such as the choice axioms, 
and more complex conditional axioms, such as the hide axioms. The code on the left is the name 
of the axiom; this appears on the button in the command panel, and may also be used in defining 
tactics, see below.
A special law of process algebras is the expansion law. Since the expansion law really denotes 
a infinite family of laws, it cannot be expressed in the same way as the laws above, therefore PAM 
provides a special template. For each language, only the particulars of how synchronisation is 
achieved need be supplied by the user. For LOTOS we must supply information about the style of 
communication, i.e. broadcast, and information about which actions may synchronise, and which 
actions may proceed independently. This information is used by the expansion law to determine 
the possible actions resulting from a parallel expression.
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expansion law
EXP l e t  x = a l .  x l [] . .  . [] an. xn y = b l .  y l [] . . . [] bm. ym then
(x I [A]I y) = stop
i f  (sync_move(x,y) eq n i l )  and (async_move(x,y) eq n i l )
(x I [A] | y) = Sum( [] ,async_m ove(x,y))
i f  sync_move(x,y) eq n i l  
(x I [A] I y) = Sum( [] ,sync_m ove(x,y))
i f  async_move(x,y) eq n i l  
(x I [A] I y) = Sum( [] ,async_m ove(x,y)) [] Sum( [] ,sync_m ove(x,y)) 
otherw ise
with communication fu n ction  
broadcast
sy n c(a , b) = a i f  (a eq b) and n ot(a  eq i )  and ( (a  in  A) or (a eq d e lta ) )  
async(a) = true i f  n o t((a  in  A) or (a eq d e lta ) )
The functions Sum, syncjnove and async_move are built in to PAM.
Some of the laws of LOTOS require information about the language of a process, denoted 
C(P). PAM has this function built in, and calls it Sort; the process of calculating the sort is 
called sort computation. Note that this procedure is only decidable when calculating the syntactic 
sort, i.e. PAM does not carry out any analysis of whether or not an action is ever possible in the 
given environment.
Sort computation may or may not be necessary for a particular example; a flag must be set
in the problem definition file to enable it. The function Sort is defined by the user by a set of
equations, each relating to a particular language construct:
so rt computation  
S o rt(sto p ) = {}
S o r t ( i .  P) = Sort(P)
S o rt(a . P) = a union Sort(P)
Sort(P  [] Q) = Sort(P) union Sort(Q)
Sort(P  I [A]| Q) = Sort(P) union Sort(Q)
S ort(h id e  A on P) = Sort(P) d i f f  A
Note that PAM does not require braces round a in the definition of Sort (a . P).
This completes the description of the form of the language definition file.
Each proof in PAM requires a language definition file, as described above, and also a problem 
definition file. The problem definition file contains the conjecture to be proved, which may be an 
equation or inequation, and any auxiliary process definitions required by the conjecture. This file 
may also contain tactics, see below, and the sort computation flag. Several example of problem 
definition files may be found in appendix D.
Using the defined axioms, tactics may be defined which help to partially automate the proof 
process. For example, below we define a tactic which will repeatedly apply the axioms of h id e until 
no more are applicable, thus pushing the occurrence of hide as far into the process as possible.
ru le  HIDE = *{H1 H2 H3A H3B}
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Here the tactic name is HIDE and the equations it refers to are just the hide axioms defined 
earlier. The braces group the axioms together, indicating that any one of the rules may be applied 
(alternatively, they could have been separated by semi-colons, indicating that they should be tried 
one after the other). The asterisk indicates that the process should be repeated until no more 
rules are applicable (or until the rewrite limit defined in the .pam file, default 20, is reached). We 
could also have specified the direction of application for any of the equations, e.g. Hl> for left to 
right and Hi< for right to left. More examples of tactics may be found in the problem definition 
files in appendix D.
PAM also allows macros to be defined which help make the process definition more readable. 
These are typically used to define sets of events.
Finally, although most of the operators of LOTOS were implemented in PAM easily, the 
relabelling operator continues to cause problems.
8.2.2 Adding the LOTOS R elabelling Operator
In section 6.4.4 we noted that adding rules for the LOTOS relabelling operator is not trivial, 
mainly due to the complex side conditions of some of the relabelling laws of the standard, i.e. 
requiring the relabelling function to be the identity function, or to be injective. In PAM, the 
side conditions of an axiom may only be simple boolean expressions, therefore we cannot even 
express the necessary conditions for the relabelling laws in PAM. However, although the difficulty 
of expressing these laws in RRL led us to reject the relabelling operator, we are reluctant to do 
so this time.
Since PAM does not allow processes to have parameters, one important use of relabelling in 
PAM is to model the effect of gate parameters and their instantiation. In order to have this 
facility we implement a restricted version of relabelling in which only one gate is renamed in one 
application of the operator, e.g. P[a/b]. This form of implementation means that, for individual 
axioms, the side conditions become trivial. However, several relabellings can be applied to one 
process, and there is no way to add conditions which deal with more than one application of an 
operator at a time. This means that it is up to the user to ensure that the function modelled by 
all the relabelling applications is the identity function, or is injective, depending on the axioms 
used. PAM cannot enforce these conditions.
The PAM axioms for relabelling are given in appendix D.2, and examples of the use of rela­
belling to implement gate parameters may be found in the examples in the next chapter; specifi­
cally, the readers and writers problem, section 9.3, and the candy machine, section 9.4.
Having presented the form of the language and problem definition files, we spend the rest of 
this chapter considering the choice of laws/axioms for the language definition file.
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8 .3  P A M  A xiom s for LO TO S E quivalence R ela tion s
In moving from RRL to PAM, power has been gained, in that recursive processes may now be used 
in specifications, and that the user has a lot of control over equation application. Unfortunately, 
a great deal of convenience has also been lost, in that PAM is not automated, and the user 
must direct every equation application. The ability to specify tactics compensates a little for 
this loss by providing partial automation. In addition to these changes, there is one other of 
significance: whereas RRL allows rules to be applied in one direction only, PAM deals with 
equations and allows them to be applied in either direction, therefore we are no longer concerned 
with the completeness of the rules with respect to the laws, except possibly when defining tactics. 
Instead we are concerned with the completeness of the PAM axioms with respect to the underlying 
model of equivalence. We aim for a more complete representation of the LOTOS language and the 
LOTOS relations considered so far, namely: branching bisimulation equivalence, weak bisimulation 
congruence, testing congruence and trace equivalence. We know that, for the latter three relations, 
it is not possible to have a complete and finite axiomatisation, as discussed in section 4.2.2. 
However, we can attempt to find a set of axioms whose form follows some pattern and which are 
simple to apply; a set which is appealing in some sense. Since the aim for completion in chapter 6 
led to the rejection of several rules, and therefore their underlying laws, the decision to forego 
completion allows us to reconsider our choice of laws. Below we consider the laws of a number of 
relations, weak bisimulation congruence in particular, since this is the relation most often used in 
verification proofs.
8.3.1 Laws Given in [BIN92]
In the LOTOS standard it is stated that the laws given for weak bisimulation congruence are not 
complete (with respect to the model) and that other laws could be used to express the relation. 
In [BIN92], laws are given which translate finite Basic LOTOS into finite CCS (i.e. expressions 
involving only choice and sequencing). Once in CCS, there exist complete (with respect to to 
the model, not necessarily confluent and terminating) sets of laws for several of the standard 
relations. The ones given are: observation congruence (weak bisimulation congruence), branching 
bisimulation equivalence, testing congruence and trace equivalence. These laws are given in PAM 
form in appendix D .l. We remark that the laws of branching bisimulation equivalence, when 
added to the laws of strong congruence (the choice laws), form a confluent and terminating set of 
rewrite rules; this was proved in [AB90] for axioms expressed using the left merge operator, but 
we also used RRL to form a complete rule set corresponding to the laws as given in appendix D.l. 
None of the other equivalences described in appendix D.l admit a complete rule set; attempting 
completion with RRL on rule sets corresponding to these laws (using all possible permutations of
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precedences offered by RRL) results in divergence of the completion procedure.
Note that for implementation in PAM these rules have been augmented by three other laws 
which are derived from the LOTOS standard to ease the proof process. For example, the rule 
DELTA which states that ex it is the same as stop . This is added because of the way in which 
the PAM expansion law works (it does not allow ex it as an argument to the parallel operator 
as all processes/process branches must have at least one initial action). The others also state 
specifically the behaviour of parallelism with ex it or s top  as arguments.
The laws of [BIN92] are useful in situations in which a definition of a process must be unfolded, 
pushing occurrences of the higher level operators, such as hide, and [> , further into the 
expression so that the initial portion of the process uses only [| and sequencing. This sort of 
rewriting is required, for example, when trying to identify occurrences of particular events, or 
patterns of behaviour. However, although complete with respect to the model of finite Basic 
LOTOS, these laws do not yield a confluent and terminating rule set, and therefore must not be 
used indiscriminately. In particular, since recursive equations can be continuously unfolded, these 
laws form a nonterminating set of rules. This is not a great problem, as the user is unlikely to 
keep unfolding a recursive definition. The advantages of these laws, that their form follows some 
sort of simple pattern and that they are easy to apply, outweigh this possible disadvantage.
8.3.2 Extra Laws Taken from in [ISO88]
A further disadvantage of the laws of [BIN92], which cannot be discounted, is that these laws are 
geared only towards removing occurrences of the higher level operators to give a more operational 
definition of the system; they cannot manipulate occurrences of these operators in any other 
way. For example, given the expression h ide  A  in  h ide  A  in  P, we would expect to be able to 
reduce it to h ide  A in P, or, if A  H C(P) — 0, P. The laws of [BIN92] cannot perform these 
reductions because they are intended to push occurrences of high-level operators through a process 
expression until an occurrence of exit or stop  is reached, at which point the high-level operator 
can be removed. The laws of [BIN92] are complete only with respect to finite LOTOS, but our 
proofs typically involve infinite processes. The above strategy fails on infinite processes as ex it 
and s to p  are seldom encountered. We found during the course of the experiments detailed in 
chapter 9 that such reductions involving high-level operators are often required, typically to allow 
duplicate states in a process unfolding to be recognised as such. These laws usually take the form 
of those of the LOTOS standard, or slight variants thereof. To this end, we have prepared a 
supplementary set of PAM axioms which follow the standard and which may be added to the set 
from [BIN92] as required.
It is important to remember that the PAM axioms/laws given in appendix D are only guidelines. 
For any particular proof, it is possible that another rule, derived from the inference rules defining
1 2 1
LOTOS, may be required. One of the benefits of using PAM is that several different language 
definition files may be loaded at the same time, so it would be possible to maintain files in which 
different equivalences were described, or in which the same equivalence is described in different 
ways. As long as the syntax of the operators remains constant, problem definitions should be able 
to be used in any setting (unless defined tactics rely on a particular set of axioms). Of course, all 
possible laws/axioms could be included in one file, but this makes the file and the proof window 
somewhat unwieldy.
8 .4  P A M  A x io m s for cred
The above section deals only with expressing axioms for the usual equivalence and congruence 
relations defined over LOTOS. However, it was noted in chapter 2 that equivalence and congruence 
relations are not the only relations of interest when comparing LOTOS specifications. In some 
situations, e.g. if the specifications are partial, i.e. early specifications ignore some aspects of the 
system, while later specifications provide a more full and accurate representation of the system, it 
may be inappropriate to use an equivalence relation to compare specifications. In these cases, where 
we wish to show that the implementation approximates the specification, preorders (sometimes also 
referred to as implementation relations) can be useful. For LOTOS, there are two important related 
preorders: red  and cred. These preorders are based on those first presented in [DH84] and are 
used in the definition of testing equivalence and congruence. Some motivation for these preorders 
may be found in section 3.4.3; the LOTOS definitions of red  and cred  appear in section 3.5.3. 
Other preorders defined there, originally presented in [BSS87], are closely related, differing only 
in minor details.
We have chosen to examine the cred preorder for two reasons: mainly because it appears in 
the standard (although, as mentioned above, the preorders are all substantially the same), but 
also because cred  is the congruent counterpart of red  (and congruence is important if we consider 
that any system will typically be part of a larger system). Figure 8.1 gives the laws from [IS088] 
for cred .
The problem we consider in this section is how a set of PAM axioms corresponding to these 
laws may be formed, allowing us to decide if two processes are related by the cred  preorder (but 
note that cred  is not decidable, therefore the best we can hope for is a semi-decision procedure).
Since cred  is a preorder and therefore reflexive and transitive but not symmetric, the im­
plementation of cred  in PAM cannot be achieved in the same way as the implementation of 
the equivalences as described in the previous section. For example, consider the second law of
1 2 2
1. I- B i  =wbc B 2 => B i  cred B 2
Note: this means that cred  inherits all the laws for weak bisimulation congruence.
2. B  cred  i; B
3. g; (5 i Q B 2) cred  g\Bx  [ g \ B 2
4. g;Bx  cred  g;Bx  Q g , B 2
5. B \  cred  B 2 & B 2 cred  B 3  B \  cred  S 3
6 . B \  cred  S 3  h  B 2 cred  S 3  = > •  (Si Q B 2) cred S 3
Figure 8.1: The cred laws from [ISO8 8 ] 
figure 8.1. Our first attempt at expressing this as a PAM axiom might be:
X  =  i;X
where =  stands for cred. However, the =  relation is PAM in assumed to be an equivalence, 
therefore adding cred  in this way is not sound. Although X  cred  i; X  holds, i; X  c red  X  does 
not.
The obvious way to get round this problem is to axiomatise cred  as a predicate; then the 
equivalence we deal with in PAM will be the equivalence over truth values. For example, the law 
above will be added as:
(X  cred  i; X)  =  true
This approach to adding PAM axioms for cred  is discussed in section 8.4.1. Unfortunately, 
in order to ensure the correctness of the PAM axioms formed using this approach, some strong 
conditions concerning the syntactic form of terms have to be made; these make this approach too 
restrictive in practice.
Given that axiomatising cred  as a predicate is not really practical, we return to the possibility 
of axiomatising cred  as if it were an equivalence in section 8.4.2. Although this is generally 
unsound we can find some restrictions on the axioms which guarantee soundness. The proof 
system generated by this approach is more powerful and flexible than the one in which cred  is 
viewed purely as a predicate. Section 8.4.4 contains the theoretical work required to back up this 
claim. We emphasise here that this rather bizarre approach to axiomatising cred  is necessary 
because we cannot express cred  properly in the equational reasoning framework. At this stage, 
rather than adopting a new framework, we prefer to see how far we can push the equational 
reasoning paradigm.
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8.4.1 A xiom atising cred as a Predicate
As cred  is not an equivalence relation, we cannot treat it in the same way as the other LOTOS 
relations when considering how to add PAM axioms to allow proofs of the conjecture
implementation cred specification
The obvious way to deal with cred is to axiomatise it as a predicate. We now face another 
problem: to our knowledge, no such axiomatisation exists in the literature. Below we present our 
attempt to axiomatise cred as a predicate.
Given that cred  has been declared appropriately in PAM, the first axioms we need are those 
expressing simple cases for which cred holds, i.e. base case axioms. Using the laws in figure 8.1 
as a guide, we arrive at the following:
CBASE2 (A cred i.A ) = tru e
CBASE3 (a .(B I  [] B2) cred a.B l □  a.B2) = tru e
CBASE4 (a .B l cred a .B l [] a.B2) = tru e
These are obviously correct as they are merely particular instantiations of the corresponding 
laws in figure 8.1. We now consider PAM axioms corresponding to the other laws of figure 8.1.
There is no PAM axiom relating to the first cred law of figure 8.1. Assuming the definition 
file for cred  also includes the axioms for weak bisimulation congruence, this law says that we can 
use these axioms to reduce A  and/or B  in the conjecture A  cred  B  =  true and the procedure is 
sound. This is implicit in the operation of PAM which allows subterms to be reduced separately, 
and the result to be substituted back into the main conjecture.
The fifth cred  law of figure 8.1, transitivity of cred, also does not appear because it is impos­
sible to express this in the PAM framework. This law would require being able to work on two 
conjectures at once: A  cred  B = true and B  cred  C =  true, and on being able to combine the 
results. Attempting to express a PAM axiom which would allow this gives:
(A cred  B = true) and (B  cred  C = true) = (A cred  C = true)
but here we end up using the =  operator four times in one axiom, which is not allowed by PAM. The 
effect of this law could be gained by the user decomposing and recombining the desired conjecture 
manually, doing separate proofs for each part of the conjecture, but this is not something we can 
add explicitly as a PAM axiom. We ignore the sixth cred law of figure 8.1 for similar reasons.
In addition to the PAM axioms above, we add the following:
CBASE7 (B cred B) = t ru e
since we must define cred  to be reflexive. This law is implicit in law 1 of figure 8.1.
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Note that none of the base case laws above allow A  cred B = false to be derived, i.e. the 
proof system is at best a semi-decision procedure for cred. This is to be expected as cred is not 
decidable. If ->(A cred B ) then the proof must be completed by hand. Obviously we prefer a 
fully automated procedure; however, this inability to show -i(A cred B ) in PAM can be used to 
our advantage, see section 8.4.2 below.
The next sort of PAM axiom we consider is, given an arbitrary expression A  cred B  =  true,
where A  and B  do not fit any of the base case axioms, how do we reduce the expression until a
base case axiom does apply?
The motivation for the form of these axioms is that the validity of cred depends on the tests 
passed, i.e. (A cred B) implies if B  passes a test, then so does A  (but not vice versa), and 
therefore if -i(A cred B) there will exist at least one test which B  passes but which A  does not. 
The strategy we attempt to express in the PAM axioms is that we can reduce both A  and B  by 
removing process expressions which behave in the same way, i.e. pass the same test, retaining the 
parts of A  and B  which differ (if there are such parts). Eventually we reach an expression to 
which a base case axiom applies, implying {A cred B). If no base case axiom applies then it is 
possible that -i(A cred B), and the proof is continued by hand. We hope that the reductions will 
have made the distinguishing behaviour of A  and B  more obvious and that a hand proof will be 
simplified. The axioms are as follows:
CRED2A i.A  cred i.B  = A cred B
CRED3A a. A [] a.B cred a. A [] a.C = a. (A [] B) cred a. (A [] C)
CRED4A a.A [] a.B cred a.A [] a.C = a . B  cred a.C
These axioms suffer two problems; the first is that they are not sound, the second problem is 
that in the above form the axioms are only applicable to a small number of expressions, i.e. we 
have lost a lot of the power of the original laws. We consider the soundness problem first.
The problem with this approach to formulating PAM axioms for cred is that we cannot guar­
antee that removing a part of the process expression is the same as removing a particular set of 
tests. For example, in CRED4A the idea behind the form of the axiom is that branches with iden­
tical behaviour are removed, leaving behind the branches which may (or may not) have different 
behaviour. In this way, we hope to finally reduce the expression until either it is proved true by 
the base case axioms, or the user can prove by hand that the relationship does not hold. However, 
in CRED4A it is possible that B — A, in which case removing the a.A branch will not remove all 
the tests which a.A satisfies from the expression. This could mean that these tests have been 
removed from one side of the cred predicate, but not the other, i.e. we have artificially created a 
distinguishing test.
To correct this problem we must ensure that removing process behaviour is the same as re­
moving tests. The problem can be formalised as follows: let L\  be the largest set for which
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a.A m u st L\ and let L 2 be the largest set for which a.B m ust L2 . In order to apply CRED4A 
maintaining soundness we must ensure that all tests L\  are removed by removing the expression 
a.A. The simplest way to do this is to insist that L\  fl L 2 =  0. To ensure this condition holds 
we place strong constraints on the syntactic form of the expression A, B  and C: we can insist 
that both sides be normal forms with respect to weak bisimulation congruence (which solves the 
example above), and also that the language of B  be disjoint from the language of A  (thus assuring 
that the set of tests relating to each branch do not overlap). This is stronger than necessary; we 
only require L\ fl L 2 = 0, but this cannot be expressed in PAM. In general, it is also simpler to 
compute the language of a process than the set of tests it passes.
These constraints ensure soundness of the PAM axioms for cred. Leaving aside for a moment 
the fact that they are extremely restrictive, we move on to consider the second problem with our 
formulation of the cred preorder axioms: the loss of the power of the original laws.
Consider the following example: we might want to show
(a.A 0 C cred a.A [] a.B [ 1 ( 7 ) =  true
but the relevant axiom (CRED4A) applies only to expressions with two choice branches, not three. 
Moreover, CRED4A must reduce both sides of the expression, whereas the conjecture above needs 
a PAM axiom which reduces only the right hand side of the cred predicate.
Obviously we can add axioms of the correct form for choice, but then we also have to consider 
the other operators of LOTOS and add axioms for them. Another example of a relation which 
can be proved to hold by the laws of the standard, but which cannot be shown to hold by the 
PAM axioms above is
a.b.B cred a.(b.B Q b.C)
This highlights the problem: the PAM axioms can only be applied to the outermost level of an 
expression.
Normally in this situation we use the PAM functions to reduce the subterms of the expression 
(otherwise we would have had the same problem in axiomatising the equivalence relations), but 
since cred  is axiomatised as a predicate and not as = we have lost this ability. To overcome this 
problem we would have to add an infinite number of axioms, each dealing with different operators 
and different levels of nesting. Clearly this is not possible.
Our inability to express cred as a predicate, without either losing the power of the original 
laws, or having to place strong syntactic conditions on the axioms, indicates that we cannot 
accurately express cred in the equational reasoning framework. On the other hand, our proof 
system is considerably weakened if we ignore preorder relations. This encourages us to try to find 
an alternative formulation of the PAM axioms for cred.
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8.4.2 A xiom atising cred as an Equivalence
Although originally rejected as a means of implementing cred, in this section we explore more 
fully the consequences of axiomatising cred as if it were an equivalence relation.
Some of the problems of the previous attempt to implement axioms for cred in PAM were 
generated because the built in functions of PAM cannot be fully utilised given the form of the 
axioms. In particular, subterms of expressions cannot be reduced independently, with the result 
being substituted back into the original conjecture. This sort of manipulation applies only if the 
relation being considered is modelled by the =  of PAM, i.e. an equivalence relation. In order 
to regain this ability, we consider what happens if cred is axiomatised as an equivalence. The 
axioms are as given in figure 8.2. We also declare cred as a predicate and add the base case 
axioms, CBASE2, CBASE3, CBASE4 and CBASE7, as in the previous section, allowing the derivation 
of true. The PAM input file for these definitions is given in appendix D.3.
CRED 2 A = i.A
CRED3 a. (B [] C) = a.B [] a.C
CRED4 a.C = a.B [] a.C
Figure 8.2: PAM axioms for cred as an equivalence
We know that in general this method of axiomatising cred is not sound, but we can place some 
constraints on the application of the axioms which allow only sound reductions. Unfortunately, 
PAM cannot enforce these restrictions, therefore we rely on the restraint of the user. To help, 
we retain some of the features of the previous axiomatisation in order to remind the user that 
cred is not an equivalence and that care should be taken in the application of these axioms. This 
is why we add the base case axioms, CBASE2, CBASE3, CBASE4 and CBASE7, although they are 
subsumed by the axioms of figure 8.2. We also declare cred as a predicate, even though it is also 
expressed in the axioms by =. This allows us to continue expressing conjectures involving cred as 
A  cred B = true, which serves as a constant reminder in the proof of the true nature of cred.
Note that not all of the original laws are explicitly included in this axiomatisation; the first 
and fifth laws are implied by the properties of =  and PAM’s built-in substitution facility. The 
sixth law of figure 8.1 is again ignored, and for the same reason; we cannot express this law in 
the framework of PAM. Also note that axioms CRED3 and CRED4 hold for a E GU {i}, rather than 
g 6 G as in the original laws. The proofs that this is the case are in section 8.4.3.
Given the axioms of figure 8.2, in which cases is their application sound? Only if they are 
applied right to left to the expression on the right hand side of the cred predicate, i.e. given the 
conjecture A  cred B  =  true, we may only reduce B. The proof of this is given in section 8.4.4, 
where we consider the implications of using the axioms of figure 8.2 as rewrite rules. If A  is reduced
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in A  c red  B = true then the reduction may not be sound.
Like the previous axiomatisation, this axiomatisation is obviously incomplete, as we do not 
provide a way to derive false. We also note that random applications of the axioms may lead to 
being unable to prove relations which hold. For example, CRED3 may be used to throw away the 
“wrong” branch of an expression, i.e. given
a.b.A cred  a.(b.A [] b.C) = true
we can reduce the right hand side of the cred  predicate to a.b.C. However, whereas the original 
expression holds, a.b.A cred  a.b.C =  true does not. In such cases it is an advantage that we 
have no PAM axioms (A c red  B) = false, as otherwise we might not realise our mistake. For this 
example, we should have used the axiom to reduce the right hand side to a.b.A, then CBASE7 could 
be applied to show the conjecture holds.
This new approach is obviously more powerful than that of the previous section; the examples 
which were given there as impossible to derive in that system are straightforward to prove with 
the axioms of figure 8.2. Equally obviously, the axioms of this section are not as powerful as the 
original cred  laws, as they may not be applied to the left hand side of the cred  predicate.
An example of the use of these cred  axioms is included in section 9.2.3. To some extent, the 
rules were designed with this example in mind, and are therefore tailored to make this particular
proof work. Whether or not they can be applied to other examples remains to be seen.
The remaining sections of this chapter provide the theoretical basis for the axiomatisation of 
cred  as in figure 8.2 and the investigation of the soundness of the use of those axioms as rewrite 
rules.
8.4.3 Proving that A xiom s CRED3 and CRED4 hold for i
In axioms CRED3 and CRED4 of figure 8.2 we have used a for actions, thus including i, whereas the 
corresponding laws of the standard use g, implying that they do not hold for i. This is not the 
case and may be an oversight due to the inclusion of the law which allows all occurrences of i to 
be removed. In this section we show that the third and fourth cred  laws do hold for i. These 
proofs were completed by hand.
T heorem  2 The following hold:
i; Bi  cred  I, Bi \\ I, B2 (8.1)
i; (Bi 0 B2) cred  i; Bi  [] i; B2 (8.2)
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The proofs that these laws hold proceed in two stages: first we prove the laws hold for red , and 
then we consider the validity of the relation in all contexts. In the second part of the proofs only 
the context of choice need be considered, as this is the only context which affects the substitution 
property (see for example [Mil89b] or [DH84]).
P roof. In order to show that law (8.1) holds, we must first show that it holds for red , i.e.
Vf .VL.((i; B\  [] i; P 2) a fte r  i) m ust L => ((i; P i) a fte r  t ) m ust L (X)
In other words, in all states, if i; P i (] i; B 2 can pass a test then so must i; B\.
We consider the state sets which result after various traces. The table in figure 8.3 lays out
the sets P  a fte r  t for left and right hand sides of the axiom for each possible case of t. In this 
figure, we use t r (P ) to denote the trace set of P , and, given a trace s, such that s G tr{P), we use 
P'  to denote the set of states reached after s , i.e. {P" \ P  P"}.
trace, t state set of i; P i after t state set of i; P i Q i; P 2 after t
t = € {i; P i, Pi} {i; PiO i; B 2, Bi,  B 2}
t G tr(Bi)  D tr (B2) B[ B[ U B'2
t G tr (Bi) , t  g tr(B2) B[
t £ tr(Bi) , t  G ir (B2) {} P '
t g tr(Bi)  U tr (B2 ) {} {}
Figure 8.3: State sets of law 8.1 after selected traces
The next step is to evaluate the effects of various tests on those state sets.
For each state set we consider four possible tests: the test belongs to the trace set of B\  and 
the trace set of B 2 , the test belongs to trace set of B\  only, the test belongs to the trace set of 
P 2 only, and the test does not belong to the trace set of either P i or B 2 • These results of these 
tests applied to the state sets of figure 8.3 are presented in figures 8.4 to 8.8 in a form similar to 
that of truth tables. In these tables, lhs denotes the process expression i; B\  and rhs denotes the 
process expression i; B 1 [j i; B 2 .
We need not consider L = {}, as then all tests fail, regardless of the state set. We also do 
not have to explicitly consider instantiations of L such that L has more than one element. The 
expression P  m ust {a, b) is equivalent to the expression P  m ust {a} V P  m ust {b}. Since V 
is used to combine the results, it is enough to show that the implication (X) holds for singleton 
sets.
These tables show that for every value of a, and hence all possible L, and for all traces, the 
implication (X) holds, i.e.
i ;Bi  red  i ;P x 0 i; B2
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L =  {a} state set of rhs => state set of lhs
a G tr(Bi)  fl <r(B2) true =£► true
a G ir(B i) A a ^  ir(B 2) false => true
a ^ tr(Bi)  A a G tr(B 2) false => false
a £ tr(Bi)  U tr(B 2) false => false
Figure 8.4: t = e.
£ = {«} state set of rhs =>• state set of lhs
a G ^ (B i)  D tr(B'2) true =$■ true
a G tr(B[) A a ^ tr(B'2) false => true
a £ tr(B[) A a G tr(B2) false => false
a (£ tr(B[) U tr (B2) false =>• false
Figure 8.5: t G tr(Bi)  Pi tr(B 2).
L =  {a} state set of rhs =>• state set of lhs
a G ^  *r (B2) true =>• true
a G A a ^ ^ (B j) true => true
a 0 A a G tr{B2) false => false
a £ tr(B[) U tr (B2) false => false
Figure 8.6: t G tr (B \) , t  £  <r(£?2).
L = {a} state set of rhs => state set of lhs
a G ir{B'i) fl tr (B2) true => true
a G ^(B^) A a £ tr(B2) false => true
a ^ tr(B i) A a G tr (B2) true =£• true
a £ tr(B[) U tr (B2) false => true
Figure 8.7: t ^ tr (B i) , t  G i r ( # 2).
L = {a} state set of rhs => state set of lhs
a G ^(B J) fl t r (B2) true =4>- true
a G tfr(Bi) A a ^  tr (B2) true =$• true
a £ tr(B[) A a G tr (B2) true =J> true
a (fc tr(B[) U t r (B2) true => true
Figure 8.8: t 0 tr(J5i) U <r(B2).
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We must now show that the above statement holds when cred  is substituted for red . This is done 
by considering the expressions i; B\  and i; B\  [] i; B 2 in a choice context, i.e. we need to show
Z  Q i; B\  red  Z  Q i;.Bi Q i , B 2
for some process expression Z.  We only need to consider the state set resulting from t =  e, i.e. the 
case in which the i action might pre-empt the choice; the other state sets are similar to those in 
figure 8.3. After the trace e, the state sets of the left and right hand sides of the above statement 
are:
{Z  0 i; B\, B i )  {Z  0 i ; £ i [ ]  I B 2, B 1, B 2}
Similarly, only one test need be considered, a E tr(Z)  A a £ (tr(Bi  U tr (B 2 ))- In this case, 
both state sets above fail the test and therefore the implication holds.
We therefore conclude that law 8.1 is valid. I
P roof. In order to show that law (8.2) holds, we must show
V/.VL.((i; B\ [| i; B 2) a fte r  t) m ust L =$■ (i; (B\  [] B 2 ) a fte r  t) m u st L (4 )
In other words, in all states, if (i; B\  Q i; B 2) can pass a test then so must (i; (B\  [] £ 2 ))-
As above, we consider the state sets which result after various traces; these are given in 
figure 8.9. The state sets are identical for all traces except t =  e, therefore they will pass the same 
tests and we need only consider tests for state sets of t = c.
trace, t state set of i; (B\  [] B 2 ) after t state set of i; B\  [| i; B 2 after t
t =  € {i; 0 b 2) , b 1 Q b 2} {i; Bi  [] i; B 2 , Bi ,B2}
t E tr(Bi) fl tr (B 2 ) B[ U B'2 B[ U B ’2
t E t r (B i) , t  g tr(B2) B[ B[
t £  t r(B i) , t  E tr{B2) B>2 B'2
t £ tr(Bi) U tr (B 2 ) {} {}
Figure 8.9: State sets of law 8.2 after selected traces
Assume L =  {a}. Consider the possible cases of a and its membership of tr (B \ ) and <r(i?2 ). If 
a belongs to both, then both sides of the law pass the test. If a belongs to one but not the other, 
then i; Bi  [] i; B 2 fails the test, whereas i; (Bi [| B 2 ) passes the test. Finally, if a belongs to the 
trace set of neither branch, then both sides fail the test.
We conclude that the implication (4fc) holds for each test, i.e.
i; {B\ D B2) red  i ; ^  Q i; B 2
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We move on to consider how placing these expressions in a choice context might alter the outcome 
of the tests.
The statement we now need to consider is
Z  D i ; (BiD B2) r e d Z Q  i;B , 0 i;B 2
for some process expression Z. Again only the case t — t need be considered. The state sets are:
{Z  0 i ;(Bi  o b 2) , b 1 0 B2} {Z  0 l , B 1 0 i \ B 2)b u b 2}
Similarly, only one test need be considered, a £ tr (Z ) A a £ (tr (B \ ) U t r (B2)). In this case, 
both state sets above fail the test and therefore the implication holds.
We therefore conclude that law 8.2 is valid. I
We note that for each of these laws, the proof that the law holds in a choice context was not 
really necessary: since each side of the expression is prefixed by i, substituting one for the other 
in a context has no effect, i.e. the tests passed are not changed. We use this realisation to justify 
restricting the analysis of the PAM cred  axioms in the next section to visible actions only; this 
makes the presentation simpler. The results are easily extended to include invisible actions.
8.4.4 W hy cred as an Equivalence can be Dangerous
In this section we analyse the consequences of axiomatising cred  as an equivalence and using the 
PAM axioms given in figure 8.2 as rewrite rules. Axiomatising cred  in this way may lead to 
unsound reductions as PAM assumes the relation is an equivalence, i.e. reflexive, symmetric and 
transitive, but since cred  is a preorder it is only reflexive and transitive.
Consider the conjecture
A  cred  B  =  true
the question we address in this section is: under what circumstances may we use the cred  axioms 
as rewrite rules to reduce the terms A  and/or B  without altering the validity of the conjecture? 
Since the PAM axioms never allow a conjecture to be disproved, we are more concerned with cases 
in which the reductions might turn a false statement into a true one, than in cases in which the 
reduction turns a true statement into a false one. In the latter case, the proof would be finalised 
by hand and we would expect the error to be detected then.
We consider the PAM axioms for cred  as given in figure 8.2; note that only axioms relating 
to the second, third and fourth laws are given. The first law is ignored as this is implicit in 
the way PAM allows the reduction of subterms of a conjecture, assuming the language definition 
file also includes the PAM axioms for weak bisimulation congruence. Using the axioms of weak
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bisimulation congruence to reduce terms of a cred conjecture is correct since weak bisimulation 
congruence is a stronger relation, i.e. makes more distinctions, than cred. The validity of the 
conjecture is unaffected.
Similarly, we ignore the fifth law (transitivity) in our investigation as this is also implicit in 
the operation of PAM. Indeed the need to use this facility was one of the reasons for axiomatising 
cred  as an equivalence. Application of the transitivity law does not change the validity of the 
conjecture. The sixth law, on the other hand, cannot be axiomatised in PAM: given the form of 
the conjecture there is no way to represent it in the PAM framework. If this law is required in 
a proof, the user must reason about the subparts separately and recombine the results manually. 
We analyse each of the other laws as PAM axioms below.
As PAM axioms may be used in either direction, we analyse the consequences of using the 
cred  axioms both left to right and right to left. We note that the left to right direction is less likely 
to be used as this implies taking a deterministic expression and turning it into a nondeterministic 
one. In addition, using axiom CRED4 left to right is forbidden by PAM as the free variables of 
the right hand side of a rule must be included in the free variables of the left hand side of the 
rule. Also, using axiom CRED2 left to right may make the expression behave differently in a choice 
context, since an i action is added. Axiom CRED3 is the only one of the three likely to be used left 
to right.
Recall the definition of red  as given in section 3.5.3.
A  red  B  Vf G A* VL C A.(B  a fte r  t) m ust L =$■ (A a fte r  t ) m ust L
Our motivation for the analysis below is that by reducing either A  or B  the tests passed may be 
changed, thus changing the validity of A  red  B. The analysis below is really on A  red  B, but we 
write A  cred  B  as the context does not affect the validity (as mentioned in the previous section).
For each PAM axiom we consider first how the tests passed differ in the left and right hand 
sides of the axiom; we then consider what that means in terms of increasing or decreasing tests 
passed when used left to right or right to left. After completing this analysis for each of the three 
axioms, we consider how using these axioms in a proof of (A cred  B) =  true might affect the 
validity of the conjecture.
A xiom atising  B  cred  i; B  as B  =  i; B
The only distinction between B  and i ,B  arises after the trace c. B  a fte r  e =  {B},  whereas 
i ,B  a fte r  c =  {i, B , B }  The definition of m ust means that any leading i actions are ignored, 
therefore the set of states on each side is effectively {B},  and the tests passed by each side are the 
same.
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Since the tests are not altered, we conclude that it is safe to use this axiom right to left on either 
A  or B  in (A  cred  B) =  true. As noted above, use of this axiom left to right is not appropriate 
as the introduction of an i action may cause the validity to change in a choice context, i.e. giving 
red  instead of cred.
A xiom atising  g; (Bx Q B2) cred  g \Bx Q g; B2 as g; (Bx [| B 2) =  g;Bx Q g; B2
For this axiom, several instantiations of t need to be examined. The table in figure 8.10 lays out 
the sets P  a fte r  t for left and right hand sides for each possible t. As before, we use P'  to denote 
the state set {P"  | P  —^  P"}.
trace, t state set of <7; (-BiQ B2) after t state set of g\ B x [| <7; B 2 after t
e {91 (Bi 0 B 2)} {g ,Bx 0 9 ,B 2}
9 {Bx\ \B 2} {B i ,B 2}
gs, s E tr(Bi)  fl t r (B2) B[UB'2 B[\JB'2
gs,s  E tr (Bx),s £ tr(B2) B[ B[
gs, s £ tr(Bi ) ,s  E tr{B2) B'2 b '2
gs, s £ tr(Bi)  U tr (B2) {} 0
Figure 8.10: States sets after selected traces in cred  axiom CRED3
The figure shows that the state sets only differ when t =  e or t = g. We examine each case 
separately.
Case: t = e. Consider two possible values for L, either L =  {<7} in which case both sides of the
axiom pass the test, or L = {a}, where a g, in which case both sides fail the test.
Case: t =  g. Let L =  {a}; there are four possible outcomes:
a € t r ( B  1) fl tr (B2) Both sides of the axiom pass this test.
a E tr(Bi),  a £ tr(B2) The right hand side of the axiom fails this test, as passing the test requires 
both states to pass. The left hand side passes the test.
a ^ t r ( B i ) ,  a £ t r ( B 2) As above.
a (fc tr(Bi)  U tr{B2) Both sides of the axiom fail this test.
A xiom  CRED3 rig h t to  left By considering the cases of t and L for CRED3 we see that using 
the axiom right to left may increase the number of tests passed, i.e. by combining B x and B 2 in 
a choice statement the possibility of passing a test is greater because the test is passed if either 
state passes the test, while before applying the axiom passing the test requires both states to pass 
the test.
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A xiom  CRED3 left to  r ig h t Used in this direction, the axiom may decrease the number of tests 
passed. The reasoning is just the reverse of the above.
A xiom atising  g\ Bi  cred  g\ Bi  □ g\B2 as g\Bi  =  g; B x |] g\ B 2
As for the previous axiom, we begin by analysing the states B  a fte r  t, for left and right hand 
sides, and for different values of t. A table of these results is given in figure 8.11.
trace, t state set of g\ B\  after t state set of g\ B\  [| g; B 2 after t
€ {9' ,Bi } {g\B\  0 g ,B 2}
9 {Bi} {B u B 2}
gs, s E tr(Bi)  fl tr(B2) B[ B[ U B2
gs,s  E tr (Bi ) ,s  £ tr(B2) B[ B[
gs, s £ f r ( B i ) , s  E tr (B2) {} b '2
gs, s £ f r ( B i )  U tr (B2) {} {}
Figure 8.11: States sets after selected traces in cred  axiom CRED4
The table shows that the state sets differ for t = e, t = g and some cases of t = gs. We 
examine each case separately.
Case: t = e. Consider two possible values for L, either L =  {g} in which case both sides of the
axiom pass the test, or L =  {a}, where a /  g, in which case both sides of the axiom fail the test.
Case: t = g. Let L = {a}, there are four possible outcomes:
a E tr(Bi) C\ tr(B2) Both sides of the axiom pass this test.
a E tr(Bi),  a £ tr(B2) The left hand side of the axiom passes this test, but the right hand side 
fails the test as B 2 does not pass the test.
a £ tr(Bi),  a E tr (B2) Both sides of the axiom fail the test.
a £ tr(Bi) U tr(B2) Both sides of the axiom fail this test.
Case: t =  gs,s  E tr(B[)  fl tr (B2). The results are similar to the above case analysis for t  = g.
Case: t =  gs,s  E tr(B[), s & For this value of t, the state sets of left and right hand
sides of the axiom are the same, therefore the tests passed are the same.
Case: t = gs,s (fc tr(B[),s  E tr (Bf2). Let L = {a}, there are two cases:
L = {a}, a E tr(B2) Both sides of the axiom pass this test, but note that the left hand side passed 
only because the state set after gs is empty.
L = {a}, a ^  tr (B2) The left hand side passes the test but the right hand side fails.
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Case: t =  gs, s ^  tr(B[) U tr(B'2). Again, the state sets are the same for both sides of the
axiom, therefore the tests passed are the same.
A xiom  CRED4 right to  left By considering the cases of t and L in the above analysis, we see 
that the number of test may be increased, i.e. by throwing away a branch of the choice, we throw 
away all information about the tests which that branch may fail, and assume instead that all of 
those tests are passed.
A xiom  CRED4 left to  right As mentioned above, PAM does not allow use of this axiom left to 
right as a new free variable is introduced on the right hand side of the axiom.
Effect o f  axiom s as reductions
Summarising, use of axioms CRED3 or CRED4 right to left may increase the number of tests passed 
by a behaviour expression, while use of CRED3 left to right may decrease the number of tests passed. 
We now consider how use of these axioms in reductions may affect the validity of a conjecture. 
Assume we are trying to show
A cred B  =  true
and we have, by applying the axioms as rewrite rules, A  — > A! and B  — ► B'. Under what 
circumstances can we substitute A'  for A and B ' for B  in A  cred B = true?
Consider the use of the axioms right to left, which may increase the tests passed, i.e. A ' passes 
more tests than A, and similarly for B'  and B. Since, if ->{A cred B ), there is some test which B  
passes but which A  does not, replacing A  by A! may turn a false statement into a true one, as A'  
may pass the test which previously distinguished A  and B. On the other hand, replacing B  by B'  
might artificially create a distinguishing test, thereby turning a true statement into a false one.
From this analysis we may conclude that using the axioms in figure 8.2 right to left to reduce 
either term in a cred conjecture is not sound; however, while it is totally unacceptable to reduce 
A, as this may allow us to prove a false statement true in PAM, we may consider reducing B. 
Since we know the axioms are not complete and that we therefore cannot always prove a statement 
holds in PAM even though it holds in the model, and also that we can never prove in PAM that 
a conjecture does not hold, using the axioms to reduce B  to B'  is acceptable. The worst thing 
which can happen is that a bad reduction makes us unable to prove a true statement holds in 
PAM in which case we revert to a hand proof employing the technique of finding a distinguishing 
test.
Conversely, if we use the axioms from left to right, possibly decreasing the tests passed, it is 
acceptable to reduce A, but not B, for similar reasons as above.
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In most proofs therefore, we use the cred axioms right to left, and on B only, in the conjecture 
A  cred B = true. Occasionally we may also use the axiom CRED3 left to right on A. These 
restrictions will prevent us from making unsound reductions when using PAM for proofs involving 
the cred preorder.
8.5 Sum m ary
In this chapter we have shown how our proof technique may be transplanted to a different equa­
tional reasoning tool, PAM. This change was necessary to allow us to reason about recursive 
processes. We first considered a number of ways in which rules for recursive processes could be 
added in a normal term rewriting framework, but without success.
We have also considered PAM formulations of the laws/axioms of other equivalences and con­
gruences, and also for the preorder cred. We have shown that, while axiomatising cred as a 
predicate might be sound, we have to place such great restrictions on the rules to ensure sound­
ness that the resulting proof system is considerably weaker than that given by the original laws 
of cred in the LOTOS standard. In order to regain some of that power, we axiomatise cred as 
an equivalence relation; again, some constraints must be placed on the axioms, but the system 
is more powerful than the one resulting from axiomatising cred as a predicate. In order to show 
the possible dangers of axiomatising cred as an equivalence, and also to show which uses of the 
axioms were safe, we analysed each of the axioms in terms of tests passed.
We note that really this is an unsatisfactory situation brought about by the inappropriateness of 
the equational reasoning paradigm as a setting for the cred preorder. One possible view is that we 
should ignore the preorder relations and stick to equivalence and congruence relations; however, 
this is unacceptable as preorders are valuable in expressing the verification requirements of a 
system. We have at least shown a way in which cred can be expressed within equational reasoning 
if necessary, even if it is a rather ugly solution which becomes dangerous if the recommended 
restrictions are ignored.
Having defined our proof system, we must next demonstrate its utility by application to a
range of examples. This is the purpose of chapter 9.
C hapter 9
Further Studies using PAM
In this chapter we present a number of studies in verifying that an implementation of a system 
satisfies a specification of the same system. The purpose of these studies is to perform proofs in 
the system developed in the previous chapter, i.e. PAM in conjunction with the various sets of 
axioms, in order to demonstrate the applicability of the system to real examples.
When developing a proof system of any kind, it is always a worry that the examples carried 
out are somehow tailored, even subconsciously, to the quirks of the system. We have tried to avoid 
this by taking the examples, with one exception, from the papers of other authors. We note that in 
addition to taking the LOTOS or CCS descriptions of the systems, we also used the other authors’ 
interpretation of the verification requirements, typically specification =wbc implementation. The 
only example of our own is a repeat of the Login case study of chapter 7, this time with recursive 
behaviour. This is described in section 9.1.
The other examples presented are: a radiation machine [Tho94], section 9.2, the Readers and 
Writers problem, section 9.3, and the Candy machine, section 9.4, both from [DIN91], and the 
Scheduler [Mil89b, DIN89], section 9.5. The radiation machine is a fair-sized example, which 
introduces the verification technique of property testing and explores the difficulties of proving a 
specification does or does not exhibit a particular behaviour. The other examples are all relatively 
small and straightforward.
9.1 L ogin  C ase S tu dy
With the system as described in the previous chapter, we now have the power necessary to complete 
a proof of correctness of the login case study where the processes and the protocols are described 
using recursion.
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9.1.1 Reform ulating the Exam ple for PAM
T h e  v e r if ic a t io n  req u ire m en t is  a s b efore: to  p ro v e  th a t  th e  implementation sa t is f ie s  th e  specifica­
tion. T h e  n e w  p r o c ess  d e sc r ip t io n s  are o b ta in e d  la r g e ly  b y  e x c h a n g in g  a ll o c cu rr en ce s  o f  ex it b y  
th e  a p p r o p r ia te  (recu rsiv e) p r o c e s s  c a ll . S o m e  m o d if ic a t io n s  are req u ired; th is  is  d e sc r ib e d  b e lo w .  
S in ce  th e  e x a m p le  is  s u b s ta n t ia lly  th e  sa m e  as th e  fin a l, c o n s tr a in t-o r ie n te d , v e rs io n  o f  c h a p te r  7 , 
th e  d e ta i ls  o f  th e  d e sc r ip t io n s  are n o t  g iv e n  here: see  a p p e n d ix  D .4  for  th e  P A M  in p u t  file s .
I t  is  th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  c o n s tr a in t-o r ie n te d  s ty le  o f  s p e c if ic a t io n  to  u se  lo ts  o f  p a r a lle lism ; it  
is  th is  p a r a lle lis m  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  recu rsio n  th a t  c a u se s  u s  so m e  d iff ic u lt ie s  w h en  tr y in g  to  
e x p r e s s  s a t is fa c t io n  u s in g  th e  n e w  v ers io n  o f  th e  L o g in  e x a m p le .  T h e  p r o b le m  is  th a t ,  a s th e  
p r o c e s se s  are n o w  recu rsiv e , a n d  d e fin it io n s  c a n  b e  u n fo ld e d  r e p e a te d ly , e x tr a  o p p o r tu n ity  a r ises  
for  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  a  p a r a lle l  s ta te m e n t  to  p r o d u ce  in d e p e n d e n t  a c t io n s . F or e x a m p le ,  g iv e n  th e
p r o c e s s  d e sc r ip t io n s  A  =  a; 6; ex it a n d  B  =  6; c; exit, th e n  A  | [6] | B  = a; 6; c; exit. H o w ev er ,
i f  w e  r ep la c e  th e  o c cu rr en ce s  o f  ex it b y  A  or B  as a p p ro p r ia te  a n d  m a k e  th e  p r o c esse s  r ecu rsiv e , 
A  | [6] | B  b e c o m es:
(A | [b] | B) =  a; 6; ( c; {A | [6] | B)
0 a-,{b]A I [b] I c; B))
S im ila r  p r o b le m s  a r ise  w ith  th e  lo g in  e x a m p le . C o n sid er  tw o  d e f in it io n s  r e la t in g  t o  th e  t im e r  (in  
th e ir  o r ig in a l f o r m ) :
t i m e r  =  s e t ;  ( t c a n c e l ;  e x i t  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  e x i t )
t im e r _ o n  =  p 4 ;  s e t ;  e x i t
C o m b in in g  th e se  p r o c esse s  in  p a r a lle l , w e  g e t
t i m e r  I [ s e t ]  I t im e r _ o n  = p 4 ;  s e t ;  ( t c a n c e l ;  e x i t  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  e x i t )
N o w  c o n s id e r  th e  recu rsiv e  fo r m s o b ta in e d  b y  r ep la c in g  e x i t  b y  t i m e r  or t im e r j o n :
t i m e r  = s e t ;  ( t c a n c e l ;  t i m e r  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  t i m e r )
t im e r _ o n  = p 4 ;  s e t ;  t im e r _ o n
T h e  r e s u lt  o f  tr y in g  to  c o m b in e  th e  p r o c esse s  t i m e r  a n d  t im e r _ o n  in  p a r a lle l is  a s  fo llo w s , u s in g  
o n ly  u n fo ld in g  a n d  e x p a n s io n :
t i m e r  I [ s e t ]  | t im e r _ o n  
= p 4 ;  s e t ;  ( ( t c a n c e l ;  t i m e r  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  t i m e r )  I [ s e t ] I  t im e r _ o n )
= p 4 ;  s e t ;  ( ( t c a n c e l ;  t i m e r  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  t i m e r )  I [ s e t ] I  ( p 4 ;  s e t ;  t i m e r _ o n ) )
= p 4 ;  s e t ;  ( p 4 ;  ( ( t c a n c e l ;  t i m e r  [ ]  t i m e o u t ;  t i m e r )  I [ s e t ] I  ( s e t ;  t i m e r _ o n ) )
[ ]  t c a n c e l ;  ( t i m e r  I [ s e t ]  I t im e r _ o n )
[ ]  t i m e o u t ;  ( t i m e r  I [ s e t ]  I t im e r _ o n ) )
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A lth o u g h  th e  tr a ce  w e  w a n t a p p ea r s , i .e .  th e  tra ce  p r o d u ce d  b y  th e  o r ig in a l e x p r e s s io n , w e  a lso  
g e t  a  tr a c e  w h ic h  a llo w s  p 4  to  o c cu r  a g a in  b e fo re  e ith e r  t c a n c e l  or tim eout o ccu rs . T h is  p o s s ib le  
tr a c e  d o e s  n o t  m a tc h  w ith  o u r  in tu it io n s  a b o u t  h o w  th e  p r o to c o ls  sh o u ld  b e h a v e . W e  m ig h t  e x p e c t  
s o m e  o th e r  c o n s tr a in t  t o  r e s tr ic t  th is  p o s s ib le  b e h a v io u r , b u t  in  th is  p a r ticu la r  c a se  w e k n o w  th a t  
n o  o th e r  p r o c ess  d e sc r ib e s  th e  r e la t io n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e se  e v e n ts . T o  r e c t ify  th is  s i tu a t io n ,  a  n e w  
timer p r o c e s s  is  d e sc r ib e d  w h ic h  in c o r p o r a te s  a c t iv a t io n  o f  th e  t im e r  a n d  th e  e v e n ts  w h ic h  o ccu r  
a fter  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  t im e r . In  so m e  w a y s  th is  is  a n  u n sa t is fa c to r y  so lu t io n  a s  th e  sp e c if ic a t io n  
is  n o w  le s s  m o d u la r  th a n  i t  w a s  p r e v io u s ly ;  h o w ev er , th ere  s e e m s  t o  b e  n o  o th e r  w a y  a ro u n d  th e  
a b o v e  p r o b le m .
9.1.2 P roof of the Verification Requirem ent
We now present the proof of satisfaction for the Login case study as carried out in PAM on the 
conjecture PROCESSES = PROTOCOLS, where = stands for =wbc-
The only proof techniques required for the proof are the ones built into PAM: the expansion 
law, folding and unfolding of definitions (including recursive definitions), substitution of a subterm 
reduced in an earlier section, and unique fixed-point induction (ufi); none of the axioms defined 
for weak bisimulation congruence are required.
The details of the proof are uninteresting, consisting of expanding each parallel expression to 
end up with an expression using only choice and sequencing in the initial part and calling the 
original process expression recursively. For example,
P2 | [second] I DEALLOCjC
=wbc
m3; (n3;P2 [] p 3;(P 2 [] m 6;p6;P2))
I [second] I m3; (p3;m6;p6;DEALL0C_C [] n3;DEALL0C_C)
— to 6c
m 3;(n 3;(P 2  I[seco n d ]I  DEALLOCjC)
[] p 3 ;((P 2  [] m6;p6;P2) I [second] I m6;p6;DEALL0C_C))
— to 6 c
m 3;(n3;P2>
— to 6c
m 3;(n 3 ;P 2 ’
=wbc
m 3;(n3;P2*
— to 6c
m3; (n 3 ; P2 * [] p 3 ; m6; p 6 ; P2 ’ )
where P2 * is a new name defined to be P2 I [second] I DEALLOCjC. This serves to make the proof 
less cluttered. The other expansions proceed in a similar fashion.
We note that in PROCESSES, A, C and D are all absorbed by B, i.e.
PROCESSES = ((B  I [ f i r s t ] I  A) I[secon d ]I C) I [ t h ir d ] |  D = B
[] p 3 ;((P 2  [] m6;p6;P2) | [second] I m6;p6;DEALLOCJC))
[] p 3 ;((m 3;(n 3;P 2  [] p3; (P 2[]m 6;p 6;P 2)) [] m6;p6;P2) 
I[secon d ]I m6;p6;DEALLOCJC))
[] p3;m 6;p6;(P2 I [second] I DEALLOCjC))
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where
f i r s t = ml, Pi > nl
second = m3, n3, p3, m6, p6
th ird = m4, n4, p4» m5, p5, m7, p7
Having unfolded both PROCESSES and PROTOCOLS we are able to use unique fixed point induction 
via the built-in function ufi to conclude that the conjecture PROCESSES =wbc PROTOCOLS holds, i.e. 
the expressions for PROCESSES and PROTOCOLS are syntactically identical modulo occurrences of 
the process name.
Completion of this example shows that in the new proof system we have achieved the goal 
stated in the discussion of chapter 7 of having more control over the proof process and of being 
able to perform proofs of equivalence of recursive processes.
9.2  A  S im ple R ad ia tion  M achine
In [Tho94], a simple radiation machine, based on the Therac 25, is presented in order to demon­
strate the use of formal specification and verification techniques. The aim of the exercise is to 
prove the safety, or otherwise, of several variants of the machine. The specifications are given in 
Basic LOTOS (later specifications use full LOTOS, but these are ignored at present) and several 
different approaches to verification (trace analysis, property testing and temporal logic) are used 
to reason about the safe and unsafe behaviour of three variants of the machine. In this section, 
the property testing part of the experiment is repeated using the system developed in chapter 8. 
We explore the safety or otherwise of four variants of the Therac machine. Three of these are the 
ones given in [Tho94]; the fourth, called SimpleTherac here, is developed for this experiment to 
provide a simpler example on which to explore techniques for proving the safety of the machine. 
All specifications, unless noted otherwise, are as in [Tho94].
In [Tho94] the original approach to the verification (property testing, automated by the LOLA 
tool [LITE]) was only able to confirm unsafe behaviours of a machine, and could not be used to 
prove a machine safe. The approach relies on building an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) 
representing the process and analysing the transitions of this EFSM. In an unsafe machine, this 
analysis can reveal the “bad” behaviours, usually fairly quickly. However, although LOLA can 
recognise states which it has visited before, the EFSM for one of the safe machines (Theraclb) 
is infinite, and LOLA can continue forever in an attempt to find bad behaviours. This problem 
occurs because of the way in which Therac lb is defined (a problem with the [> operator). In the 
experiments of [Tho94] the tool runs out of memory, therefore although the confidence of the user 
in the correctness of the specification is increased, there is always the possibility that the tool ran 
out of memory just before a bad behaviour was discovered. Here, the strange behaviour of the 
[> is noted, and we are able to re-express Therac lb without [>; the new process is equivalent to
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the original version of Therac lb, and can be shown to be safe. Note however, that, in contrast to 
[Tho94], our proofs are not fully automated. Although PAM can be used to obtained a reduced 
form of the specification, the proof must be finished by hand.
While the main results of our experiment are the successful proofs of the safety or otherwise 
of the four versions of the radiation machine, another result is to “debug” the specifications 
originally given in an unpublished draft of [Tho94]. Our findings have been noted by the author 
and incorporated in the published version.
The basic specification of the radiation machine, Therac 1, is presented in the next section. The 
verification requirement, i.e. how the safety of the machine is measured, follows in section 9.2.2. 
The proof that Theracl is unsafe is given in section 9.2.3 and the following two sections present 
the variations on the basic Therac specification and the proofs of safety (or otherwise, as the case 
may be) of those machines.
9.2.1 LOTOS Specification of the Radiation Machine
The LOTOS specification of the radiation machine is given in figure 9.1. The computer controlled 
radiation machine provides two forms of treatment: electron and xray. The electron treatment is 
produced by firing a low intensity electron beam directly at the patient, while for xray treatment 
the intensity of the beam is higher and the beam is scattered through a shield to produce xrays 
rather than being fired directly at the patient. In the LOTOS processes the setting of the position 
of the shield and the intensity of the beam is modelled by the events Is  (low shield), hs (high 
shield), lb  (low beam) and hb (high beam). The beam and shield are initially both set to low in 
the process STARTUP. The two forms of treatment are reflected by corresponding processes in the 
LOTOS specification. The operator chooses the form of treatment by selecting the event e l  or xr 
and doses the patient by selecting the f i r e  event. The XRAY process sets the beam and shield to 
high (using the auxiliary process SETUP), fires, and then resets the beam and shield to low (again 
using SETUP). The ELECTRON process assumes the shield and beam are set to low, therefore the 
only event this process performs is the f i r e  event. Once a particular form of treatment is selected 
the operator may abort the treatment and return to the initial choice between xray and electron 
treatment. The ability to abort the treatment and begin again is reflected by the use of the special 
LOTOS disable operator, written [>, which was designed specifically for this sort of behaviour.
9.2.2 Expressing the Verification Requirem ents
As stated in [Tho94], the most important verification/safety requirement for the radiation machine 
is that it should not fire when the beam strength is high and the shield is low as this would result 
in a lethal dose of radiation for the patient. A further safety requirement would be to also consider
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specification  Theracl [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it  
behaviour
STARTUP [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l]  
where
process STARTUP [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it :=
SETUP [lb , I s ]  »  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  
endproc
process SETUP [e v l,  ev2] :ex it : =
(e v l;  ex it) I I I (ev2; ex it)  
endproc
process TREATMENT [ f i r e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it := 
xr; XRAY [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]
[] e l ;  ELECTRON [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]
[] ex it  
endproc
process ELECTRON [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it :=
( f ir e ;  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ] )
[> TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
endproc
process XRAY [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it :=
(SETUP [hb, hs] »  ( f ir e ;  SETUP [lb , I s ] )
»  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, x r , e l ] )
[> TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
endproc  
endspec
Figure 9.1: Theracl Specification
the situation in which the beam is low and the shield is high as dangerous, as this results in the 
patient getting insufficient radiation to treat their illness. For simplicity, we consider only the 
former requirement.
In [Tho94] the verification requirement is formalised by specifying the traces which precede a 
lethal dose of radiation as a regular expression:
(not (hb I h s))* ; hb; (not (lb  I hs I f ir e ) )* ;  f i r e
where * denotes zero or more occurrences, I denotes choice, ; sequencing, and not (x I y) 
denotes the choice of all events excluding x and y. The given regular expression says that a bad 
trace is one in which a f i r e  event is preceded by a hb event but not a hs event. The trace will 
always start with ( ( lb ;  I s )  1 (I s ;  lb ) ) ,  representing the initial setting of the beam and shield. 
A minimal example of a bad behaviour is lb ; I s ;  xr; hb; e l ;  f i r e .
143
In [Tho94] the proof technique is based on showing the ability or inability of the Therac 
specification to perform traces of the above form. In other words, we use a bad trace as a test. If 
Therac can pass the test, then we know that the machine is not safe. This technique is generally 
known as Property Testing. This approach is used because it is simpler to give samples of possible 
bad sequences of behaviour than it is to specify all possible good behaviours. Another reason 
for specifying bad behaviour rather than good behaviour is that the good behaviour has already 
been specified once, i.e. in the description of the machine itself. If a mistake was made in that 
specification, it is possible that the same mistake will be repeated when specifying good tests. In 
order to avoid this potential problem, the machine is specified from a different angle the second 
time, namely the bad behaviours.
In general, a proof using the property testing technique proceeds by describing the test (which 
may be a good or a bad sequence of events) as a LOTOS process. The last event in the test is 
the user-defined special event te sto k , which indicates successful completion of the test. The test 
process is then composed in parallel with the process under test, synchronising on all events in 
the test except testo k , i.e. P \ [£(.P)] | TEST, where P  is the system under test. Due to the 
multi-way synchronisation of the LOTOS parallel operator, if the process under test can perform 
the behaviour in the test process, then eventually the te s to k  event will be observed, and we say 
that the process passes the test. Typically, the proof is automated by employing a simulation 
tool to execute the process, although specialised testing tools also exist. The original exercise of 
[Tho94] used the testing tool LOLA, which is part of the LITE toolkit [LITE]. The LOLA tool is 
essentially a simulator, and operates by simulating the process P  | [£(.P)] | TEST  until either the 
te s to k  action is observed, a duplicate state is reached, or the tool runs out of memory.
We may also express property testing in terms of a relation between processes. For our exper­
iment with the radiation machine we use the following basic form:
te sto k ; ex it cred THERACTEST
where
THERACTEST =  h ide theracjevents in
STARTUP I [theracjevents] I lb ; I s ;  (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)
The use of cred expresses the notion that at least one trace of THERACTEST has the behaviour 
we are looking for (although there may be lots of other behaviours). An equivalence relation would 
also take account of these other behaviours and is therefore too strong. The theracjevents must 
be hidden in the combined test process, THERACTEST, to make comparison with te s to k ; ex it 
possible.
The full definition of the TEST process is given in figure 9.2. The TEST process is preceded by 
setting the beam and shield to low (which occurs in the STARTUP process), and when we exit from 
the TEST process the te s to k  action is performed and Therac passes the test. For full generality we 
should give the option to perform Is  before lb, but this would make no difference to the validity of
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process TEST[fire, lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it 
N oth b h s[fire , lb , I s ,  xr, e l]
»  (hb; N o tlb h s[f ir e , hb, I s ,  xr , e l ] )  
»  ( f ir e ;  ex it)
endproc
process N oth b h s[fire , lb ,  I s ,  xr , e l ]  :ex it := 
f i r e ;  Nothbhs [ f ir e ,  lb , I s ,  xr , e l ]
□  lb  
[] Is 
[] xr 
[] e l  
[] ex it  
endproc
N oth b h s[fire , lb ,  I s ,  xr, e l ]  
Nothbhs [ f ir e ,  lb , I s ,  xr , e l]  
Nothbhs [ f ir e ,  lb , I s ,  xr , e l ]  
Nothbhs [ f i r e ,  lb , I s ,  xr , e l ]
process N otlbhs[hb, I s ,  xr, e l ]  :ex it := 
I s ;  Notlbhs [hb, I s ,  xr, e l]
[] hb; Notlbhs [hb, I s ,  xr , e l ]
[] xr; N otlbhs[hb, I s ,  xr , e l ]
[] e l ;  Notlbhs [hb, I s ,  xr, e l ]
[] ex it 
endproc
Figure 9.2: The Unsafe Test Process
the proof and is therefore unnecessary. For all of the Therac examples, the test process describes 
a bad behaviour, therefore if the specification passes the test it means that it is unsafe.
As mentioned in the introduction, use of the LOLA tool for the radiation machine example 
is appropriate in the case that the test is passed (within a small number of unfoldings), but less 
so for the safe machines, which potentially require infinite unfolding. As the power of the tool is 
limited by the number of unfoldings it can perform, and therefore by the physical limitations of 
the machine on which it executes, this can result in inconclusive test results, i.e. the test has not 
been passed, but the unfolding is aborted due to lack of memory. This should not occur in the 
Therac examples, as LOLA can recognise states which have been visited before, e.g. recursive calls 
of a process. Unfortunately, the Therac lb process is more complicated, and LOLA is unable to 
recognise duplicate states and therefore cannot show that the test is rejected, i.e. that the machine 
is safe. We also encounter the same problem, but the close interaction required of the user by PAM 
makes it easier to identify the cause of the problem. The problem and our solution is described in 
section 9.2.5.
In the following sections, proofs of the safety of several variants of the example are attempted 
as follows: in section 9.2.3 the original machine of [Tho94], referred to here as Theracl, is shown 
to be unsafe, in section 9.2.4 our machine SimpleTherac is shown to be safe, and finally, in 
section 9.2.5 two modified versions of machine, also presented in [Tho94], are shown to be unsafe
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and safe respectively. In all cases the main part of the proof is carried out in PAM, with the proofs 
being finished by hand where necessary.
Note that some modifications to the specification are necessary because of limitations of PAM. 
These are merely syntactic rather than semantic and do not affect the proof results. In particular, 
parameter passing is not supported by PAM. The main effect of this is that instead of having a 
parameterised process SETUP as in [Tho94] we have two processes SETUPH and SETUPL which are 
hardwired versions of SETUP [hb, hs] and SETUP [lb , I s ]  respectively. The other processes 
of the specification are also parameterised, but the list of actual parameters matches the list of 
formal parameters, therefore having no effect on the process behaviour.
9.2.3 Proving Theracl is not safe
To show that the machine, as described in figure 9.1, is unsafe, we attempt to prove the following 
conjecture holds using PAM:
(( te s to k ; ex it)  cred THERACTEST) = true (*)
The proof begins by reducing THERACTEST as much as possible by unfolding the definitions of 
the processes, applying various laws preserving weak bisimulation congruence and applying the 
laws which allow the process to be expressed using only the ;, [] and h ide operators. The h ide  
operator could also be removed, but is retained to allow the reduction to be followed more easily. 
Below we give a condensed version of the proof procedure, showing important intermediate stages. 
In performing this unfolding we use the bad trace lb ; Is ;  xr; hb; e l ;  f i r e  to guide us to an 
occurrence of the te s to k  action.
THERACTEST
— uibc
hide theracjevents in
i ; stop
e l;  ELTEST
xr; ( e l ;  ELTEST
[] xr; XRTEST
[] i; hb; ( i ; stop
[] xr; XRTEST'
1—
1 
L
J e l;  ( i; f i r e
[] xr; XRTEST'
[] e l ;  ELTEST'))))
where
ELTEST = ELECTRON | [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)  
XRTEST = XRAY I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)  
ELTEST7 = ELECTRON I [theracjevents] I
(Notlbhs »  f ir e ;  ex it »  te sto k ; ex it)
XRTEST' = XRAY I [theracjevents] I
(Notlbhs »  f ir e ;  ex it »  te sto k ; ex it)
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We stop here because the te s to k  action has appeared in the unfolding.
The reduced form of THERACTEST given above may be further simplified by applying laws which 
push the hide operator further into the expression, turning all hidden events into occurrences of i. 
Once this is done the laws of weak bisimulation and testing congruence can be applied to further 
simplify the expression by removing sequences of internal actions and duplicated branches. Finally 
we obtain
THERACTEST
— t c
i; te s to k ; ex it
[] i; stop
[] i; h ide therac_events in ELTEST
[] i; h ide therac_events in XRTEST
□ i; h id e therac_events in ELTEST7
[] i; h id e therac_events in XRTEST'
By substituting this reduced form of THERACTEST for THERACTEST in (*) the expression which must 
be proved to hold can now be expressed as:
(te sto k ; ex it cred i te sto k ; ex it
□ i stop
□ i h ide therac_events in ELTEST
□ i h ide therac_events in XRTEST
[] i h ide therac_events in ELTEST'
□ i h ide therac_events in XRTEST')
= tru e
which can be shown to hold in PAM by application of the cred axioms, CRED4, CRED2 and CRED7, 
developed in section 8.4.
9.2.4 Proving SimpleTherac is safe
It is relatively easy to prove that the Theracl specification is unsafe since all that is required is 
to show that at least one bad trace is possible. If a particular example of a bad trace, preferably 
the shortest one, is known in advance, the proof is less tedious as there is some notion of where 
the proof is going and what is being aimed for in unfolding definitions and applying axioms. In 
this section we consider the case in which the specification must be proved safe, and therefore no 
such bad trace exists.
By examining the original Theracl we see that it is the ability to interrupt the machine while 
the beam and shield are being set for xray treatment which leads to the firing of the high beam 
with a low shield. As a simple preliminary exercise in proving a specification safe, we look at 
Theracl with the disable sequences omitted, i.e. we remove the ability to abort the treatment. 
This particular modification was not discussed in [Tho94]; the safe modification presented there 
is considered in section 9.2.5.
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specification  SimpleTherac [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it 
behaviour
STARTUP [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l]  
where
process STARTUP [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s , xr, e l ]  :ex it :=
SETUP [ lb , Is ]  »  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  
endproc
process SETUP [e v l,  ev2] :ex it :=
(e v l;  e x it)  III (ev2; ex it)  
endproc
process TREATMENT [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it := 
xr; XRAY [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]
[] e l ;  ELECTRON [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]
[] ex it  
endproc
process ELECTRON [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it := 
f ir e ;  TREATMENT [ f i r e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  
endproc
process XRAY [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it :=
(SETUP [hb, hs] »  ( f ir e ;  SETUP [ lb , I s ] )
»  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ] )
endproc
endspec
Figure 9.3: Simplified Therac Specification
The new SimpleTherac description is as in figure 9.3. The only changes are to the processes 
ELECTRON and XRAY. The test process is as before.
Whereas in the proof of safety of Theracl all that was required was to exhibit an occurrence 
of a bad trace, showing the machine was not safe, here we must show that none of the traces of 
SimpleTherac is a bad trace and that the machine is therefore safe. In the previous section, the 
main part of the proof consists of unfolding the behaviour until a te s to k  action is reached. Here 
there should be no occurrence of te sto k , and, since the processes of SimpleTherac are recursive, 
the unfolding procedure is potentially infinite. The SimpleTherac proof proceeds by unfolding 
the behaviour once or twice as necessary and analysing the behaviour of the initial portion of the 
unfolding and using that analysis to deduce properties of the machine as a whole. In more abstract 
terms, if we start with a process X , we attempt to unfold this process to give an expression which 
involves only X  (and some events), but no other process names, e.g. X  = a \b\c\X . An equation 
of this form tells us that all unfoldings of X  will result in traces of the form (abc)*, allowing us to
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conclude, for example, that no d event will occur.
Consider the initial unfolding of THERACTEST, produced in PAM using the weak bisimulation 
congruence PAM axioms:
THERACTEST
= uibc
hide therac _e vents in
STARTUP I[therac_events]I (lb ; Is ;  TEST) »  te sto k ; ex it
——w be
hide theracjevents in
lb; I s ;  (TREATMENT I [therac_events] I (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )
— wbc
i; (h ide therac_events in
TREATMENT I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )
Two important expressions in the above unfolding are:
hide therac_events in  (TREATMENT I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )  
which we will refer to as TREATTEST, and
TREATMENT I [theracjevents] | (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)
i.e. the above without the h id e  operator, which we will refer to as TREATTEST7.
Instead of trying to find an occurrence of te s to k  in TREATTEST we try to unfold TREATTEST, 
i.e. h ide therac_events in  TREATTEST', to get a process expression in which TREATTEST7 (and no 
others) is referred to again. Unfolding in PAM:
h ide therac_events in  TREATTEST7
— wbc
h ide theracjevents in  
( i ; stop  
[] x r ; hb; stop  
[] e l ;  ( i; stop
[] f i r e ;  TREATTEST7))
By the uniqueness of solutions to equations we can show that this process is equivalent to 
one which does not even have the te s to k  event in its language, allowing us to conclude that this 
version of the machine is safe.
Note that often we do not push the h ide operator through the process expression as this can 
obscure the origins of expression by hiding the identity of events which cause those actions.
For example, the expression above, TREATTEST is weak bisimulation congruent to
i; (h ide therac_events in  TREATTEST [] i; stop )
With the actions hidden, it is harder to see what is happening, but it is obvious that neither 
branch leads to an occurrence of a testo k .
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In this example we are really reasoning about the state of the beam and shield, which could be 
regarded as an underlying state of the process. The actions lb , Is , hb and hs are the operations 
which allow this state to be altered, but we have no way of explicitly examining the current value 
of the state, which is what makes reasoning about it so difficult. In section 10.3.2 a version of the 
machine which makes this state explicit is considered, thus allowing reasoning about the state.
9.2.5 Proving the M odified Theracl is safe
The above version, SimpleTherac, of the machine cannot be used as a serious alternative to the 
original radiation machine as the operator is committed to a course of action as soon as the xray 
or electron button is pressed. This is bad because the operator has no facility for changing the 
dosage: once either of the processes XRAY or ELECTRON has started we must continue to the f i r e  
event and we may not abort the processes. In the original paper [Tho94] a modification is given 
which allows the machine to maintain the ability to abort from a treatment, but which is also safe. 
We now consider this modification here.
The problem in the Theracl specification is that the beam and shield may be set incorrectly 
because of the ability to abort a treatment. Rather than remove the ability to abort the treatment, 
as in SimpleTherac, we look at how the beam and shield are set. The process SETUP allows the 
beam and shield to be set in any order, but the ordering of events could be fixed so that the beam 
is only made high if the shield is already up, and the shield is lowered only after the beam is set to 
low. This adjustment should rectify the problem of firing the high beam when the shield is down.
An alternative solution to this problem would be to introduce a language construct to wrap 
up sequences of events which should be performed as atomic, thus ensuring that the beam and 
shield are set together. The need for such a construct was already mentioned in section 7.6.1. We 
shall only study the former solution to the problem here.
The LOTOS for the modified SETUP process is as in figure 9.4. As before, we modify this for 
PAM to give hardwired versions of the parameterised processes.
process SETUP [e v l,  ev2] :ex it := 
ev l; ev2; ex it  
endproc
Figure 9.4: The New SETUP Process
In addition to the new definition of SETUP there is another important alteration to Theracl. 
For the machine to be safe, the calls to SETUP in XRAY must also be altered (the arguments have 
to be in the right order). The new version of XRAY is as in figure 9.5. The rest of the machine is 
as in figure 9.1.
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process XRAY [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]  :ex it :=
(SETUP [h s, hb] »  ( f ir e ;  SETUP [ lb , I s ] )
»  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ] )
[> TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
endproc
Figure 9.5: The New XRAY Process
If this change to the parameters of SETUP is not made, then the machine can still deliver lethal 
doses of radiation.
We shall refer to the first version (with the parameters in the wrong order) as Therac la  and the 
second version (with the parameters in the correct order) as Therac lb. We prove that Therac la  
is still unsafe, but that Therac lb  is safe. In the draft of [Tho94] this change to the order of the 
parameters was not mentioned, but it was claimed that the new version did not pass the test, i.e. 
was safe. In fact, LOLA ran out of memory before the test could pass or fail, thus the conclusion 
is that confidence in the correctness of the system is increased, even though the system may still 
not be safe.
Theracla
As with the original Theracl proof, we proceed by trying to follow a trace which we know leads 
to te s to k  being performed. The trace is the same as before, as is the final process expression 
obtained (allowing for the modification of XRAY). Our conclusion is that Therac la  is not safe.
Theraclb
Since we believe this process to be safe, we attempt to use the same approach as for the SimpleTherac 
proof of section 9.2.4. We unfold THERACTEST to try to obtain a recursive expression referring only 
to TREATTEST, or TREATTEST' if hide is not pushed through the expression. Although this ap­
proach was successful for the SimpleTherac proof, it is not successful here. Below we give some 
stages in the unfolding of THERACTEST.
THERACTEST
— wbc
h id e  therac_events in
lb ; Is ;  TREATMENT I [therac_events] I lb ; Is ;  (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)
= w b c
h id e  theracjevents in  
lb ; I s ;  TREATTEST'
= wbc
i; h id e  therac_events in  TREATTEST'
— wbc
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i; h ide therac_events in  
lb; Is ;  ( i; stop
[] xr; XRTEST 
□  e l;  ELTEST)
where
XRTEST = XRAY I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te s to k ; ex it)
= i; stop  [] xr; XRTEST [] e l ;  ELTEST 
ELTEST = ELECTRON I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; ex it)
= i; stop  [] xr; XRTEST [] e l ;  ELTEST
[] f ir e ;  ((TREATMENT [> TREATMENT)
I [therac_events] | (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )
In ELTEST, instead of getting TREATTEST7 after a f i r e  event, we get
((TREATMENT [> TREATMENT) I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )
Unfolding this expression results in similar expression to the unfolding of THERACTEST, but with 
extra occurrences of the [> operator in various places. In particular, after f i r e  in the electron 
phase of treatment we get
(((TREATMENT [> TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
I [theracjevents] I (TEST »  te sto k ; e x it ) )
We can deduce from this that each unfolding will have the same effect, giving larger process 
expressions each time, none of which appear to be the same as TREATTEST7. In the original paper 
[Tho94] this is why the tests are inconclusive, because LOLA cannot recognise TREATMENT as the 
same process as TREATMENT [> TREATMENT. What we would like is to have an axiom which allows 
the application of the disable operator to be eliminated, for example P  [> P  =  P , but this 
conjecture does not hold. This can be proved by counter example: let P  =  a; 6; P , then 
P  [> P  =  P  [] a; (P  [| b; P  [> P) which is obviously not the same as P  since a possible trace 
of P  [> P  is (a, a, b) which can never occur as a trace of P .
The situation is not hopeless, as it is possible that the full power of such a general law is not 
required. The problem in the unfolding is that the disable operator, if not activated, gets passed 
on to the next recursion of the process, which is not what we want in the proof. Perhaps the form 
of the above conjecture is incorrect: what we really want to say is, given the following definitions 
and unfoldings:
P  a,b-,P
Pi = PO  a ; ( PD 6; Pi)
P [ >  P =wbc P Q a ; ( P 0  M ^ [ >  P ))
where P  [> P  is generated by the disable expansion law, P  [> P  is a solution for Pi, i.e. if we 
substitute P  [> P  for Pi in the second equation above we get the third equation. In other words,
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by uniqueness of solutions Pi =wbc P  [> P- Although we use a particular example above, what 
we are saying is that the disable expansion law can be used to unfold occurrences of [> , and 
the expression P  [> P  can be replaced by a variable name. This equivalence is taken for granted 
when the disable operator is used.
In PAM we are unable to redefine operators in this way, so instead we rewrite the Therac lb  
specification, replacing occurrences of the disable operator in the ELECTRON and XRAY processes by 
the equivalent expression involving only choice and sequencing; see figures 9.6 and 9.7. These new 
processes are equivalent to the original ELECTRON and XRAY processes by uniqueness of solutions 
to recursive equations.
process ELECTRON [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it :=
TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l]
[] f i r e ;  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  
endproc
Figure 9.6: ELECTRON with no occurrence of [>
p rocess XRAY [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]  :ex it :=
TREATMENT [ f i r e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ]
[] hs; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s , xr , e l ]
[] hb; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
[] f i r e ;  ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
[] lb ; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s, xr , e l ]
[] Is ;  TREATMENT [ f ir e ,  lb ,  hb, I s ,  h s , x r , e l ] ) ) ) )
endproc
Figure 9.7: XRAY with no occurrence of [>
The unfolding of THERACTEST is now as follows:
THERACTEST
=wbc
i; h id e therac_events in  TREATTEST'
— tii 6c
i; h id e th erac.even ts in  
( i ; stop  
[] xr; ( TREATTEST'
[] i; stop )
[] e l ;  ( TREATTEST'
[] f ir e ;  TREATTEST'))
Again, we have produced an expression which refers to itself recursively, so to complete the 
proof of safety we use the uniqueness of solutions to recursive equations theorem to show that the 
above process is equivalent to a process in which the event te s to k  does not occur. We conclude 
that the machine Therac lb is safe.
153
We note that in the original presentation [Tho94], Thomas is unable to prove the safety of this 
machine using LOLA. Although LOLA has the ability to recognise previously explored states, like 
us it cannot identify TREATMENT [> TREATMENT and TREATMENT. Since LOLA is a simulation tool, 
it is not possible to carry out any manipulation of the term TREATMENT [> TREATMENT, which is 
why the original paper does not investigate this problem further. Using PAM, however, we are 
able to manually identify an equivalent expression, without the [> operator, which allows us to 
successfully reason about the safety of the machine.
We also note that if the original experiment with LOLA is repeated with the modified versions 
of ELECTRON and XRAY, as in figures 9.6 and 9.7, LOLA is able to identify loops in the process and 
to state that the unsafe test is rejected, i.e. the machine Therac lb is safe.
9.2.6 Summ ary and Discussion
In this section we have examined four specifications of the radiation machine and proved their 
safety or otherwise. This was largely a repetition of the experiment presented in [Tho94], using a 
modification of the proof technique and a different method of automation. We note that we were 
able to conclude with certainty that Therac lb  was safe, whereas this was not possible in [Tho94]. 
Although the proofs that two of the machines were unsafe were straightforward, the same could 
not be said of the proofs that the other two machines were safe. In the original presentation the 
method was incomplete, in that the proof tool seemed geared towards finding bad behaviours, or 
of proving finite processes safe. In an infinite process the tool ran out of memory and aborted 
before finding a bad behaviour. Here we used additional proof techniques (applied by hand) to 
mathematically prove the safety of two of the machines. The lack of automation is the price which 
has to be paid for a more powerful proof technique.
An example of an additional proof technique required in the radiation machine verification is 
the reference to the underlying state of the beam and shield in the analysis of SimpleTherac. 
Although this state is implicit here, it can be made explicit by the introduction of abstract data 
types modelling the state of the beam and shield. This part of LOTOS has been ignored up till 
now, but is considered in chapter 10. In section 10.3.2 the modified Therac example is analysed 
in the setting of full LOTOS.
Another interesting problem uncovered during this study is the difficulty of reasoning about 
expressions involving the disable operator. In fact, the verification of Therac lb  could not be 
completed until the expression TREATMENT [> TREATMENT had been replaced by an equivalent 
expression involving only sequence and choice.
Our main aim in studying this example was to demonstrate the PAM axioms developed in 
chapter 8. This particular example provides the opportunity to use the cred axioms developed in 
the previous chapter, as well the more commonly used weak bisimulation congruence axioms. Our
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aim has therefore been achieved. In addition, we have also gained more experience of the process 
of verification, and uncovered some more problems in that process.
9.3 R ead ers and W riters
This example is taken from [DIN91]. It is based on the problem of ensuring that a shared re­
source is accessed mutually exclusively by two processes (a reader and a writer). Two LOTOS 
descriptions are given: one which specifies the mutual exclusion property (the specification), and 
one which implements the access of the reader and the writer (the implementation). The ver­
ification requirement is then to prove that the specification is satisfied by the implementation. 
Minor changes have been made to the example from the original presentation in [DIN91]; these 
are detailed in the next section.
9.3.1 The LOTOS Descriptions
The specification of the readers and writers problem is given in figure 9.8. This says that either 
the reader has access to the resource or the writer does, but never both at the same time. If we 
model reading and writing by the actions r and w, then scheduling these activities and ensuring 
mutual exclusion would be trivial (because of the interleaving semantics of LOTOS). Instead, we 
model the beginning and ending of these activities separately, i.e. we have four actions: rb (reader 
begin), wb (writer begin), re (reader end) and we (writer end). This also models the fact that the 
reading and writing activities have some duration.
specification  Readers_And_Writers_Spec [rb, r e , wb, we] :n oex it  
behaviour
Spec [rb, r e ,  wb, we] 
w here
process Spec [rb, r e , wb, we] :n oex it : =
i; rb; re; Spec [rb, r e , wb, we] [] i; wb; we; Spec [rb, r e , wb, we] 
endproc  
endspec
Figure 9.8: The Readers and Writers Specification
A proposed implementation of the specification is given in figure 9.9. The actions of the reader 
and the writer are interleaved. Both processes are forced to synchronise with a semaphore, which 
ensures mutual exclusion. The reader and writer are created by instantiating the general Proc, i.e. 
the reader is the process Proc [p, v, rb, re] and the writer the process Proc [p, v , wb, we]. 
This is different from [DIN91] where the reader and the writer were defined individually. Another
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minor alteration is that the semaphore is more general (using only p and v rather than specific pr 
and vr actions for the reader and pw and vw actions for the writer). The semaphore actions are 
hidden in the implementation.
specification  Readers_And_WritersJEmpl [rb, r e , wb, we] :n oex it  
behaviour
Impl [rb, r e , wb, we] 
w here
process Impl [rb, r e , wb, we] :n oexit : =
h ide p, v in  S [p, v] I[p , v]I (Proc [p, v , rb, re] III Proc [p, v , wb, we]) 
endproc
process S [p, v] : n o ex it : = 
p; v; S [p, v] 
endproc
process Proc [p, v , b, e] : n oex it : = 
p; b; e; v; Proc [p, v , b, e] 
endproc  
endspec
Figure 9.9: The Readers and Writers Implementation
The problem could potentially have more processes accessing the resource, but it is sufficient
to show that the semaphore preserves mutual exclusion for the two process case.
9.3.2 Proving the Verification Requirem ent Holds
The aim of the verification is to show that the implementation of figure 9.9 satisfies the specification 
of figure 9.8, i.e. we have to prove the following conjecture in PAM:
Spec = Impl
where = stands for weak bisimulation congruence. This was the relation used in [DIN91].
Some minor syntactic alterations are made to the LOTOS descriptions of figures 9.8 and 9.9 
in order to conform with PAM syntax, also, gate parameters in the LOTOS description are im­
plemented by relabelling in PAM. See appendix D.6 for the PAM input file.
The above conjecture can be shown by the axioms as described in appendix D.l, the rela­
belling axioms of appendix D.2 and the built-in unique fixpoint induction. As usual, most of the 
proof consists of unfolding process identifiers, expanding parallel statements, and folding process 
identifiers. Tactics are used to push hide and relabelling through a sequence of actions, and the 
PAM axioms of weak bisimulation congruence are used to remove occurrences of the silent action
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i. In the following presentation of the proof we simplify process expressions by removing gate 
parameters. We also combine several simple (tedious) steps, but note the rules used in each step 
at the right hand side.
Impl
= w b c (unfold)
hide p, v in  S I[p , v]I ((Proc [r b /b ]) [r e /e ]  |I |(P r o c  [wb/b]) [w e/e])
= w bc (unfold Proc, REL tactic)
hide p, v in  S |[p , v ] |
(p; rb; re; v; (Proc [rb /b ]) [r e /e ]
I I I  p; wb; we; v; (Proc [wb/b]) [w e/e])
= w bc (unfold S, expansion)
hide p, v in
p; rb; re; v; (S I [p, v]I ((Proc [rb /b ]) [r e /e ]  III (Proc [wb/b]) [w e /e ]))
[] p; wb; we; v; (S I [p, v] I ((Proc [rb /b ]) [r e /e ]  III (Proc [wb/b]) [w e /e ]))
= w bc (fclDE tactic)
i; rb; re; i; (h id e p, v in
(S I[p , v]I ((Proc [r b /b ]) . [r e /e ]  | | |  (Proc [wb/b]) [w e /e ]))
[] i; wb; we; i; (h id e p, v in
(S I [p, v] I ((Proc [rb /b ]) [r e /e ]  III (Proc [wb/b]) [w e /e ]))  
= w b c  fi laws, fold)
i; rb; re; Impl [] i; wb; we; Impl
By application of the built-in uf i  function, PAM is able to conclude Spec = wbc Impl.
Completing this example builds our confidence in the applicability of our proof technique. We 
continue with another example from the same paper.
9.4  A  N o n d eterm in istic  C andy M achine
This problem is also taken from [DIN91] and is again an exercise in proving that two LOTOS 
descriptions of a system are equivalent, i.e. the implementation satisfies the specification. The 
specification gives the observable behaviour of the machine whereas the implementation builds the 
machine from simple components. We feel that the original specification presented was somewhat 
contrived, and therefore ours is slightly different.
9.4.1 The LOTOS Descriptions
The specification of a nondeterministic candy machine is given in figure 9.10. This machine takes 
a ten pence and returns either the message “try again” , a ten pence, or a piece of candy. After 
this it behaves like a candy machine again.
An implementation of the Candy machine is given in figure 9.11. The implementation of the 
machine is the parallel composition of the processes S lo t, Fair and Turn.
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specification  Candy .Spec [inlO p, message, candy, outlOp] : n oex it  
behaviour
Spec [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp] 
w here
process Spec [inlO p, message, candy, outlOp] :n oex it : =
inlOp; ( i; message; Spec [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp] 
□  i; outlOp; Spec [inlO p, message, candy, outlOp] 
[] i; candy; Spec [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp])
endproc
endspec
Figure 9.10: The Candy Machine Specification
specification  CandyJEmpl [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp] :n oex it  
behaviour
Candy [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp] 
w here
process Candy [inlO p, message, candy, outlOp] :n oex it : = 
hide t25p , tlOp in
( (S lo t  [inlO p, message, tlO p, t25p]
I[t25p , tlO p]I Fair [tlO p, t25p , candy, outlOp])
I[inlO p, message, candy, outlOp]I Turn [inlOp, message, candy, outlO p])
endproc
process S lo t [inlO p, message, outlOp, out25p] cnoexit :=
inlOp; ( (i; message; S lo t [inlOp, message, outlOp, out25p])
[] (i; outlOp; S lo t [inlOp, message, outlOp, out25p])
[] (i; out25p; S lo t [inlOp, message, outlOp, out25p]))
endproc
process Fair [inlO p, in25p, candy, outlOp] :n oex it : =
( in25p; candy; Fair [inlOp, in25p, candy, outlOp]
[] inlOp; outlOp; Fair [inlOp, in25p, candy, outlOp]) 
endproc
process Turn [inlO p, message, candy, outlOp] :n oex it : =
inlOp; ( outlOp; Turn [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp]
[] candy; Turn [inlOp, message, candy, outlOp]
[] message; Turn [inlOp, message, candy, outlO p])
endproc
endspec
Figure 9.11: The Candy Machine Implementation
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The processes S lo t and Fair are as given in [DIN91]. The machine S lo t takes ten pence and 
nondeterministically returns either a message, ten pence or twenty-five pence. The machine Fair 
will return a candy if given twenty-five pence, but rejects ten pence. The object of the original 
exercise of [DIN91] was to study the process resulting from the parallel combination of S lo t and 
Fair. The link between the two processes was established by joining the output of S lo t to the 
input of Fair via the new gates t25p and tlOp (through twenty-five pence and through ten pence).
Since there is no restriction on putting ten pence in before the result of the last ten pence is 
known, the specification derived in [DIN91] is rather complex and unintuitive. We have written 
a new, simpler, specification, as given in figure 9.10, and altered the original implementation by 
adding a new constraint in the form of Turn, which forbids putting in another ten pence until the 
result of the previous input is known.
9.4.2 Proving the Verification Requirem ent Holds
The aim of the verification is to show that the implementation of figure 9.11 satisfies the specifi­
cation of figure 9.10, i.e. we have to prove the following conjecture in PAM:
Spec = Candy
where = stands for =wbc-
Some minor syntactic alterations are made to the LOTOS descriptions of figures 9.10 and 9.11 
in order to conform with PAM syntax; see appendix D.7 for the PAM input file. Gate parameters 
in the LOTOS are implemented by means of relabelling in PAM.
The above conjecture can be shown to hold by the axioms as described in appendix D .l, the 
relabelling axioms of appendix D.2 and unique fixpoint induction. The proof below follows the 
format of the Readers and Writers proof of the previous section:
Candy
=wbc (unfold)
h id e tlO p, t25p in  ( ( (S lo t[tlO p /o u tlO p ]) [t25p/out25p]
I [tlO p, t25p]I (F a ir[tlO p /in lO p ]) [t2 5 p /in 2 5 p ])
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)
=wbc (unfold, REL tactic)
hide t l0 p ,t2 5 p  in
inlOp; ( i; message; (S lo t [tlO p/outlO p]) [t25p/out25p]
[] i; tlOp; (S lo t [tlO p/outlO p]) Ct25p/out25p]
[] i; t25p; (S lo t [tlO p /ou t1Op]) [t25p /ou t25p ]))
I[tlO p, t25p]I ( t25p; candy; (Fair [tlO p /in lO p]) [t25p/in25p]
[] tlOp; outlOp; (F air [tlO p /in lO p]) [t2 5 p /in 2 5 p ])
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I inlOp; ( outlOp; Turn [] candy; Turn
[] message; Turn)
=wbc (expansion)
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hide t l0 p ,t2 5 p  in
inlOp; ( i; message; ( ( (S lo t  [tlO p/outlO p]) [t25p/out25p]
I[tlO p, t25p]I (F air [tlO p /in lO p]) [t2 5 p /in 2 5 p ])
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)
□  i; tlOp; outlOp; (((F a ir  [tlO p/in lO p]) [t25p/in25p]
I [tlO p, t25p]I (S lo t [tlO p/outlO p]) [t25p /ou t25p ])
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)
[] i; t25p; candy; (( (F a ir  [tlO p/in lO p]) [t25p/in25p]
I [tlO p, t25p]I (S lo t  [tlO p/outlO p]) Ct25p/out25p])
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn))
= w b c  ("HIDE tactic)
inlOp; ( i; message; (h ide t l0 p ,t2 5 p  in
((S lo t  [tlO p/outlO p]) [t25p/out25p]
I [tlO p, t25p]I (F air [tlO p/in lO p]) [t2 5 p /in 2 5 p ])
I [inlOp, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)))
[] i; i; outlOp; (h ide t l0 p ,t2 5 p  in
((F a ir  [tlO p/in lO p]) [t25p/in25p]
I [tlO p, t2 5 p ]| (S lo t  [tlO p/outlO p]) [t25p /ou t25p ]) 
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)
[] i; i; candy; (h ide t l0 p ,t2 5 p  in
((F a ir  [tlO p/in lO p]) [t25p/in25p]
I[tlO p, t2 5 p ]| (S lo t [tlO p /ou t1Op]) [t25p /ou t25p ]) 
I[inlO p, message, outlOp, candy]I Turn)
=w bc  ( i  la w s ,  f o l d )
inlOp; (i; message; Candy [] i; outlOp; Candy [] i; candy; Candy)
By using the built-in uf i  function PAM is able to conclude Spec =wbc Candy. This was the 
conclusion of [DIN91] on the original version of the candy machine.
9.5  T h e Scheduler
Our final example in this chapter is the well-known Scheduler problem of [Mil89b]. This example 
is often used as a benchmark test for proof systems. The example was also presented in [DIN89], 
which is our main source. In [DIN89] the problem was simplified from the n process case to the 
two process case.
Since the original example was presented in CCS some major changes to the process behaviours 
have been made in recasting the descriptions in Basic LOTOS. These changes relate to the different 
approaches to synchronisation of parallel actions in CCS and LOTOS, and also the use of hiding 
rather than restriction. The example is described in the next section.
9.5.1 The LOTOS D escriptions
Consider two processes, Cl and C2, which each perform some activity. As with the readers and 
writers example, we do not model the actual activities, only the start and end of them. The 
actions a l and b l are the start and stop actions for Cl, with a2 and b2 being the corresponding
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actions for C2. The scheduler must ensure that the start activity actions occur cyclically, i.e. if 
only a actions are observed, the system produces traces of the form (a l a2)*. The end activity 
actions are ignored by the scheduler specification. The LOTOS description of this specification is 
given in figure 9.12.
specification  Sched_Spec [a l ,  a2] :n oex it
behaviour  
Spec [ a l , a2] 
w here
process Spec [a l ,  a2] :n oex it : = 
a l; a2; Spec [a l ,  a2] 
endproc  
en d spec
Figure 9.12: The Scheduler Specification
The implementation of the scheduler, given in LOTOS in figure 9.13, must then ensure that 
this specification is satisfied. This is achieved by using extra actions which model a baton being 
passed back and forth between Cl and C2, where possession of the baton indicates permission to 
start. The b actions (end activity) may occur in any order, in particular, the scheduler must not 
force an ordering on them as it does with the a actions.
Note that the translation from CCS to LOTOS is not trivial. For example, in the CCS 
implementation, the processes Cl and C2 are identical, modulo renaming of events, rather like 
our C l’ and C2. However, these processes need a prompt from another source to start them off, 
since initially both are waiting for their turn; for the “baton” to be passed to them. In the CCS 
description, this prompting is performed by an extra process which performs a g l  action and then 
stops; the process 0 can then be eliminated by using the laws of CCS to rewrite the expression. 
However, in LOTOS, due to the different nature of synchronisation, there is no corresponding law. 
To solve this problem, we have two versions of Cl. Initially Cl can start straight away, but control 
is then passed to C l’ , which must wait for the g l action before it may proceed.
9.5.2 Proving the Verification Requirem ent Holds
The aim of the verification is to show that the implementation of figure 9.13 satisfies the specifi­
cation of figure 9.12, i.e. we have to prove the following conjecture in PAM:
Spec = h ide b l ,  b2 in Sch
where = stands for =wbc-
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sp e c if ic a tio n  Sched-Impl [ a l ,  a2 , b l ,  b2] :n o e x it
b ehaviour
h id e b l ,  b2 in Sch [a l ,  a2, b l,  b2] 
w here
process Sch [a l ,  a2, b l ,  b2] :n oex it : =
h id e g l ,  g2 in  (Cl [ a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g2] I [ g l , g2]I C2 [a2, b2, g l ,  g 2 ]) 
endproc
process Cl [ a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g2] :n oex it : =
a l;  ( (b l;  g2; C l’ [ a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g 2 ]) [] (g2; b l; Cl* [a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g 2 ]) )  
endproc
process C l’ [a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g2] :n oex it : =
g l;  a l;  ( (b l;  g2; C l’ [a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g 2 ]) [] (g2; b l; C l’ [ a l ,  b l ,  g l ,  g 2 ]) )  
endproc
process C2 [a2, b2, g l ,  g2] :n oex it : =
g 2 ; a2; ((b2; g l;  C2 [a2, b2, g l ,  g 2 ]) [] (g l;  b2; C2 [a2, b2, g l ,  g 2 ]) )  
endproc  
en d spec
Figure 9.13: The Scheduler Implementation
Some minor syntactic alterations are made to the above LOTOS descriptions in order to 
conform with PAM syntax. See appendix D.8 for the PAM input file.
In this case the PAM axioms as described in section D .l and unique fixpoint induction are not 
sufficient to complete the proof; two other laws (derived from those in the LOTOS standard and 
given as part of the supplementary set of PAM axioms in appendix D.2) are also required.
h id e  A in h id e A’ in  B = h ide A’ in  h ide A in  B
h id e  A in (Bl I [A’] I B2) = ((h id e  A in B l) I [A*] I (h ide A in  B2))
i f  {} eq (A in te r  A’ )
These allow occurrences of hide to be flipped, and hide to be distributed through parallel
statements (as long as the hidden actions are not required for synchronisation). Again, the proof
follows the format of the Readers and Writers proof.
h id e  b l ,  b2 in  Sch
= w b c  (unfold)
h id e  b l ,  b2 in  h ide g l ,  g2 in  (Cl I [g l ,  g2]I C2)
= w b c  (flip and distribute h id ej
h id e  g l ,  g2 in  ((h id e  b l ,  b2 in Cl) I [ g l ,  g2] I (h ide b l ,  b2 in  C2))
= w b c  (unfold)
h id e  g l ,  g2 in
((h id e  b l ,  b2 in (a l;  ( (b l;  g2; C l’ ) [] (g2; b l; C l* ))))
I [ g l , g2] I (h ide b l ,  b2 in (g2; a2; ((b2; g l;  C2) □  (g l;  b2; C 2 )))))
= wbc ('HIDE tactic)
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hide g l ,  g2 in
( ( a l;  ( ( i;  g2; h ide b l ,  b2 in  C l’ ) [] (g2; i; h ide b l ,  b2 in  C l’ ) ) )
ICgl. g2]l
(g2; a2; ( ( i;  g l;  h ide b l,  b2 in  C2) [] (g l;  i; h id e b l ,  b2 in C 2))))
Iw bc ( i  la w s )
hide g l ,  g2 in
( ( a l;  g2; h ide b l ,  b2 in C l’ ) I [g l ,  g2]I (g2; a2; g l;  h ide b l ,  b2 in  C2)) 
--wbc (expansion)
hide g l ,  g2 in a l;  g2; a2;
((h id e  b l ,  b2 in C l’ ) ICgl, g2] | (g l;  h ide b l ,  b2 in  C2))
=wbc (unfold Cl*)
hide g l ,  g2 in  a l;  g2; a2;
((h id e  b l ,  b2 in (g l;  a l; ( (b l;  g2; C l’ ) [] (g2; b l; C l’ ) ) ) )
ICgl, g2]I (g l;  h ide b l,  b2 in  C2))
=wbc (push hide through g l, expansion, fold)
h ide g l ,  g2 in  a l;  g2; a2; g l;
((h id e  b l ,  b2 in Cl) ICgl, g2] I (h ide b l ,  b2 in C2))
=w bc fHIDE tactic, i laws)
a l;  a2; h id e g l ,  g2 in  ((h id e  b l ,  b2 in  Cl) ICgl, g2] I (h ide b l ,  b2 in  C2)) 
=wbc (reverse 2nd step, fold)
a l;  a2; (h id e b l ,  b2 in Sch)
By using the built-in uf i  function PAM is able to conclude Spec =wbc Impl.
9.6 Sum m ary
In this chapter we have presented five examples of the use of the proof system developed in the 
previous chapter: the login case study, now with recursive processes, one more major example 
(a simple radiation machine) and three minor examples (the readers and writers problem, the 
nondeterministic candy machine, and the scheduler). All examples were drawn from the papers of 
other authors, together with the verification requirement of showing the implementation satisfies 
the specification. The main aim of this chapter was to show that the proof system developed on 
PAM is applicable to other examples; this has been successful. It is worth noting that most of the 
proofs presented here were completed very quickly, also showing that the proof system is easy to 
use, and that this method of proof is practical. Difficulties only occur when new approaches to 
the proof are required, as in the radiation machine example of section 9.2.
With the exception of the radiation machine, no new results were presented here; we merely 
use the examples of others to show that our proof system is applicable more generally. In the 
radiation machine example, we obtained a result (that a particular version of the system was 
safe), where the original presentation failed. Conclusions specific to this example were discussed 
in section 9.2.6.
163
C hapter 10
Full LOTOS
Up to this point, verification of only a subset of the LOTOS language, namely the process algebra 
Basic LOTOS, has been considered; however, full LOTOS incorporates an abstract data type (adt) 
language, also known as ACT ONE [EM85]. The addition of ACT ONE to the language enables 
the specification of guards which may further determine the flow of control within a process, 
and also data values which may be passed between processes. Since, in practical applications of 
LOTOS, specifiers do not restrict themselves only to Basic LOTOS, we must rethink the approach 
to verification presented so far to incorporate specifications including ACT ONE data types.
In the literature, most authors have done as we have: concentrated on verification of Basic 
LOTOS, ignoring data. For example, in the LITE toolset [LITE] the tools which operate over 
full LOTOS are the testing and simulation tools, whereas the verification tools, i.e. those which 
evaluate equivalences between processes and perform model checking, deal only with Basic LOTOS. 
Similarly, there are also tools which deal only with ACT ONE, ignoring the process algebra part 
of LOTOS. Although there is work on the verification of adts, we prefer to concentrate on 
the verification of full LOTOS, i.e. considering how the addition of adts to LOTOS affects the 
verification approach we have adopted up to now. Obviously, since data can affect the flow of 
control within a process and hence its behaviour, ignoring the addition of ACT ONE constructs 
to a specification may have serious implications for any correctness results.
We begin by introducing the data type part of LOTOS, noting that some features of Basic 
LOTOS need to be modified to include data types. To introduce the problems that may arise with 
verification of full LOTOS specifications we give three LOTOS descriptions of the well-known adt 
example, the stack. Each description is written with differing emphasis on the process part and 
the adt part. These descriptions were first presented by Gotzhein in [Got87]. In the original paper 
the author claimed that the descriptions were equivalent, but was unable to prove this. We try 
to prove equivalence using the satisfaction approach to verification, but with limited success. We
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go on to consider approaches by other authors to the problem of verification of full LOTOS. To 
our knowledge there are only a few works in this area: [Led87], [Bri92, BK91] and [Bol92]. We 
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. The latter two approaches seem quite 
promising, and we illustrate their use via application to examples of our own: the stack of the 
early part of the chapter, and the simple radiation machine example of chapter 9 respectively. 
Finally, we conclude that the most suitable approach to verification is a composite one.
10.1 A C T  O N E  and LO TO S
The syntax and semantics of full LOTOS is presented in appendix B. Here we present a brief 
overview of the main features of ACT ONE and alterations to Basic LOTOS which give full 
LOTOS.
10.1.1 ACT ONE Syntax
Abstract data types in LOTOS are specified in an algebraic fashion. A basic specification consists 
of the name of the type, a list of sorts used by the type, declarations of operators over the type, 
and equations specifying the behaviour of those operations. There are no built in types, although 
there is a standard library of commonly used types. One of the standard library types is Boolean. 
A portion of the definition is given in figure 10.1 to illustrate the ACT ONE style of definition. 
The full definition of Boolean also includes the operators =>, i f f , n e , eq and their associated 
equations.
ty p e Boolean is
sorts Bool
opns tru e , f a ls e  : —> Bool
not : Bool —> Bool
_and_, _or_ : Bool, Bool —>
eqns forall x : Bool
ofsort Bool
n o t(tru e) = fa ls e ;
n o t ( fa ls e )  = true;
x and true = x;
x and fa ls e  = fa ls e ;
x or true = true;
x or f a ls e  = x;
en d typ e
Figure 10.1: The Library Type Boolean 
In ACT ONE, complex specifications may be built up from simpler specifications in a hierar-
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chical manner; parameterisation of specifications also aids specification of large systems.
10.1.2 Adding ACT ONE to Basic LOTOS
To incorporate ACT ONE into LOTOS, much more needs to be done than simply providing 
the ability to specify data types; some modification to the existing process algebra, to allow 
manipulation of the data, is also required.
• The actions of Basic LOTOS are enhanced by allowing values to be passed between pro­
cesses at the gates. An action in full LOTOS is a gate plus an event offer, i.e. a value 
passing/receiving construct. There are two types of event offers: variable offering and value 
offering, which can be thought of as input and output. For example,
wire?x:Nat
receives a value x of type Nat at the gate wire, and 
w ir e !1
outputs the value one at the gate wire. There can be more than one value passed at any gate, 
and there are no restrictions on direction (unlike CSP, where it is recommended, although 
not enforced, that channels are unidirectional). For example, in LOTOS the following is also 
an action:
w ire?x:In t !3 ?y:Char
receiving values in x and y, and outputting the value 3, all at the gate wire.
As before, actions synchronise by matching gate names, but now values/variables must also 
be matched. The standard form of value passing is to match a value offering to a variable 
offering, but, in addition, offerings of the same type may synchronise, i.e. value with value 
and variable with variable. This latter form essentially restricts the possible range of the 
value received/sent, bearing in mind that LOTOS has multi-way synchronisation, and that 
wire?x:Nat, for example, is really a shorthand for a set of choices, i.e. wire?0 [] w ire?l 
[] . . . .  The synchronisation mechanism allows the actions of one process to be restricted by 
another (or several others) and is utilised by the constraint-oriented style of specification.
• Processes may be prefixed by guards, e.g.
[x > 0] - >  P
which means P is only performed if x has value greater than zero, i.e. if the guard evaluates 
to true. Typically several such statements are composed using the choice operator, giving
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the effect of the case statement of programming (although the guards may not be mutually 
exclusive, in which case the choice is made nondeterministically).
• A process may produce values on successful termination. Whereas in Basic LOTOS successful 
termination is denoted by the 8 action, in full LOTOS successful termination is denoted by 
J v \ . . .  vn , where v\ . . .  vn is a string of data values.
In Basic LOTOS the functionalities ex it and n oex it are added to processes to indicate 
whether or not they terminate. Given the above modification of successful termination, 
data types can also be added to ex it functionality to indicate the types of values produced 
when the process terminates.
This addition to functionality can be used in an extension of sequential composition of 
processes to pipeline results from one process to another. For example,
P »  accept n:Nat in  Q
Here P will terminate with, for example, 8 5, and Q will use the value of n, instantiated by 
the value 5, in its body. A special value is any which can be used to give a parameter any 
value from the specified type. This is required because in a parallel composition, the exit 
values of a process must match; use of any gives flexibility.
• Data values may be present as parameters to processes, just as gate names may be used as 
parameters in Basic LOTOS.
Note that, according to the full LOTOS syntax, a specification may optionally have data type 
definitions, whereas it must have process definitions. Within these constraints, the balance between 
the two components may be altered, giving, for example, a specification which has no data types 
at all, or a specification which has lots of data types, but only a minimal process providing an 
interface to the data types. The stack descriptions of section 10.2 demonstrate this ability to 
describe the same object in totally different ways while staying within the full LOTOS language.
10.1.3 Full LOTOS Sem antics
Having introduced the syntax of full LOTOS, it is important to discuss how the addition of data 
types to the language affects the semantics. The semantics of an ACT ONE type is a multi­
sorted algebra composed of (one or more) carriers of data elements, and a set of operations (total 
functions) over the carriers. ACT ONE data types are given initial algebra semantics. An algebra 
is initial iff there exists a homomorphism between it and any other algebra which gives the same 
properties for the signature. The formal definition of the ACT ONE syntax and semantics is 
discussed more fully in appendix B.
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The semantics of a full LOTOS process is given by a structured labelled transition system. 
Instead of being labelled by a gate name, a transition is labelled by a gate name and a string of 
values from the ACT ONE algebra. For example, transitions are of the form
where g 6 Gates as before, and w = v\ .. ,vn ,Vi 6 Value. Obviously the interpretation of Value 
will differ from specification to specification, depending on the data types used. No variables are 
included in w, the semantics of full LOTOS ensures that the variables of the specification are 
all instantiated, i.e. only ground terms appear in labelled transition systems and uninstantiated 
terms have no meaning.
Whereas in Basic LOTOS the set Act was composed of gate names and the internal action, now 
actions are of the form gw as above. All definitions of equivalence/congruence/preorder relations 
are modified to use the new type of actions simply by using the new definition of Act. For example, 
for actions to match in a bisimulation relation, the gate names and the data values of the transition 
must match.
Bearing in mind that the semantics of every LOTOS specification is a structured labelled 
transition system, it easy to see now why the data component of the specification is optional while 
the process part is compulsory. Since the equivalences are based on observable behaviour, the 
specifications must have at least some behaviour to observe. Obviously if a specification consists 
of only data types then there will be no transitions; the process part is equivalent to stop. As 
with many other formalisms, this is the result of a design decision by the creators of the language, 
and is not the only way to describe objects.
Now we have discussed how a data type may be used in a LOTOS specification, and how the 
meaning of that specification is given, we can go on to consider the verification of full LOTOS 
specifications.
10.2  T hree V iew s o f  a Stack
Early in the development of LOTOS, [Got87] considered the problems of verification of full LOTOS 
specifications. Four descriptions of the same example, the stack, are presented in [Got87], each with 
a different emphasis on the process algebra or the abstract data type parts of LOTOS. Although 
the descriptions look quite different, the author claims they all represent the same object, and are 
in fact weak bisimulation congruent. No proof is presented to support this conjecture, although 
the author used testing and simulation tools to gain confidence in his claim.
In order to gain intuition about what adjustments to the verification process may be necessary
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when a full LOTOS specification is under consideration, we re-examine three of the four stack 
descriptions of [Got87] with a view to formally proving their equivalence. We have attempted 
to stick as closely as possible to the original descriptions, making only essential changes. Most 
changes were the result of what were assumed to be typographical errors; however, we did also 
remove the error values of the abstract data type as these were not necessary and in fact created 
some problems. The proofs are completed by hand, using a combination of equational reasoning 
and bisimulation techniques.
10.2.1 The ACT ONE Stack
We begin by giving a description of the stack data type in ACT ONE; see figure 10.2. This forms 
the basis for the first LOTOS stack, Stack_l, in the next section, but may also be viewed as the 
conceptual model of behaviour we have in mind when giving the process algebra style descriptions 
of StackJ2 and Stack_3. Note that the description in figure 10.2 does not constitute a LOTOS 
specification itself, as it has no process algebra behaviour.
typ e Element is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  *) en d typ e
ty p e Stack_Type(Data) is Boolean 
form aljsorts Data 
sorts Stack_Type
opns New : —> Stack_Type
Push : Stack_Type x Data —> Stack_Type
Pop : Stack_Type —> Stack_Type
Top : Stack-Type —> Data
Empty : Stack_Type —> Bool
eqns forall s : Stack_Type, d: Element
ofsort Bool 
Empty (New) = true  
Empty (Push ( s ,  d )) = fa ls e  
ofsort Data 
Top (Push ( s ,  d )) = d 
ofsort Stack_Type 
Pop (Push ( s ,  d )) = s
en d typ e
ty p e  Stack_Type (Element) is
Stack_Type (Data) actualizedby Element 
using sortnam e Element for Data
en d typ e
Figure 10.2: Abstract Data Type: Stack
In the ACT ONE stack the usual operations are defined: to p , push, pop and empty. Error 
values are ignored as the process guards provide the means to avoid constructing data values which
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are undefined, such as Top (New).
This specification also demonstrates the parameterisation mechanism used in ACT ONE whereby 
the stack type is described independently of the type of the data elements. These are instantiated 
later. Comments are bracketed by (* and *). Note that our use of comments to indicate por­
tions of the specification which have been omitted is not correct concrete LOTOS, but is rather a 
convenient method of abbreviating the presentation.
In the proof of section 10.2.4 that S tack .l and Stack_2 are equivalent we will find it convenient 
to be able to refer to the bottom part of the stack, i.e. we define a function r e s t  which takes a 
stack and returns the stack obtained by removing the top element.
r e s t  : Stack_Type —> Stack_Type
r e s t  (Push ( s ,  d )) = s
Note that r e s t  (New) is undefined; we will never apply r e s t  to New.
10.2.2 The First LOTOS Stack
The first stack will be described with the emphasis on ACT ONE. The ACT ONE description of 
the stack is as given in figure 10.2. The process part given in figure 10.3 supplies the external 
interface to the abstract data type stack.
specification  Stack_Data_Type_l 
library Boolean end lib
ty p e  Element is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  *) en d typ e
ty p e  Stack_Type (Data) is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  in  fig u re  10.2 *) en d typ e  
ty p e  Stack_Type (Element) is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  in  f ig u re  10.2 *) en d typ e
behaviour
process Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] :n oex it : =
push?x:Element; Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] (Push (New, x ))
[] emptylEmpty (New); Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] (New) 
w here
process Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] ( s :Stack_Type) :n oex it : =
push?x:Element; Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] (Push ( s ,  x ))
□  [not (Empty ( s ) ) ]  —> pop; Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] (Pop ( s ) )
[] [not (Empty ( s ) ) ]  —> toplTop ( s ) ;  Used_Stack_l [push, pop, to p , empty] (s )  
[] empty lEmpty ( s ) ;  Used_Stack_l [push, pop, top , empty] (s )  
endproc  
endproc  
en d spec
Figure 10.3: The First Stack 
This stack is referred to as Version 1 in [Got87].
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10.2.3 The Second LOTOS Stack
Here the data type is coded within the process part, i.e. the stack mechanism is implemented 
by the processes, rather than being described by adt equations. The specification still retains 
approximately the same structure as before, the main differences being the substitution of the ACT 
ONE terms in the process by constants, the change in the parameter to Used_Stack_2 from the 
whole stack to just one element of the stack, the top element, and the use of to connect separate 
cells of the stack, i.e. instances of Used_Stack_2 (x). Note that the process Used_Stack_2 Ox) 
always deals with a stack with something in it, whereas the process Used-StackJL (s )  may also 
have to deal with an empty stack.
specification  Stack_Data_Type_2 
library Boolean end lib
ty p e  Element is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  *) en d typ e  
behaviour
process Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] :n oex it : =
( push?x:Element; Used_Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (x)
[] em pty!true; ex it)
»  Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty]
w here
process Used_Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (x:Elem ent) :ex it : = 
push?y:Element; Used_Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (y)
»  UsedJStack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (x)
[] pop; ex it
[] to p lx ; Used_Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (x)
[] em pty!fa lse; Used_Stack_2 [push, pop, top , empty] (x)
endproc  
endproc  
endspec
Figure 10.4: The Second Stack 
This stack is referred to as Version 3 in [Got87].
10.2.4 Proving Stack One Equivalent to Stack Two
Having described our stacks, how can it be verified that the two specifications, Stack_Data_Type_l 
and Stack_Data_Type_2, denote the same object?
In the previous examples, where we were restricted to Basic LOTOS, such verification was 
achieved by proving that the process expressions of the specifications were related by one of the 
equivalence, congruence or preorder relations. For full LOTOS we have the added complication 
of expressions relating to data. The definitions of the relations in previous chapters are easily 
modified to take account of the shift from gate names to structured actions, as mentioned in
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section 10.1.3. We can therefore still attempt to prove that Stack_l and Stack_2 denote the same 
object by showing that the process expression corresponding to Stack_l is equivalent in some 
sense to the one corresponding to Stack_2, although the proof technique for this is not as well 
researched as that for Basic LOTOS expressions. Here we identify the top level process Stack_l 
with the specification Stack_Data_Type_l by an abuse of notation, and similarly for Stack_2. The 
relation chosen for the comparison is weak bisimulation congruence as this was the relation used 
in [Got87j.
The proof method we use is a combination of equational reasoning and construction of a 
bisimulation relation; this proof method is employed in [Mil89b] for CCS with simple data types. 
We also note that a sketch of an apparently similar style of proof for equivalence of two queue 
specifications described in full LOTOS appears in [Bri88b]. At the time our proof was completed 
we were unaware of this sketch. To our knowledge, no such proof has ever been fully worked out 
for full LOTOS specifications.
The proofs are carried out by hand, partly to gain intuition as to the proof process, and partly 
because no tools currently exist which can prove equivalences between full LOTOS specifications. 
As observed in the introduction, there are several tools which operate over full LOTOS, but these 
are simulators or testers, and our aim is to produce a formal, mathematical proof of correctness. 
It is possible to use a tool to produce a labelled transition system which can then be fed into a 
tool such as the Concurrency Workbench; this technique is used in [EFJ90]. However, this process 
requires intervention by the user to rename the actions to make them acceptable for input to the 
Concurrency Workbench, and on even a small example like the stack, this seems more tedious 
than carrying out the proof by hand in the first place.
The tool used in the last two sections, PAM vl.O, cannot be used for the proofs as PAM only 
deals with basic process algebras. However, a new version called VPAM is under development in 
which processes can have data type parameters, and we hope to use this tool at some point in the 
future. Addition of data types would be straightforward in a term rewriting system framework, 
but we are reluctant to go back to using RRL, as this would mean losing the ability to define 
recursive processes. It might be possible to use the data value parameters of the processes to 
control the rewriting, i.e. primitive recursion, but the stacks in this chapter are unbounded data 
types, therefore the recursion would be unbounded for open terms. For the time being we are 
resigned to carrying out the proof by hand.
Formally, we wish to prove the following theorem holds:
T heorem  3 StackJ. =wbc Stack_2
Proof. Since full LOTOS is rather verbose, the first step in the proof is to simplify the processes 
as much as possible. This is done in two ways: syntactically and semantically. The former includes
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the omission of gate parameters to the processes because the formal and actual parameters of the 
processes are the same in both descriptions, and omission of types of values because these may 
be deduced from the context. Semantic manipulations include application of the laws of weak 
bisimulation congruence to the behaviour expressions, and application of the equations of the
data type to the abstract data type expressions. The descriptions we give below are therefore
LOTOS-like, but do not conform to the concrete syntax of LOTOS.
We identify significant states in the processes S tack J  and Stack_2 and present their simplified 
forms.
S tack J  = push?x; Used_Stack_l (Push (New, x ))
[] empty!true; Used_Stack_l (New)
Stack_2 = ( push?x; UsedJ5tack_2 (x)
[] empty!true; ex it) »  Stack_2 
= w b c  push?x; (Used_Stack_2 (x) »  Stack_2)
[] empty!true; Stack_2
We now do the same for UsedJStack J  and Used_Stack_2.
Used_Stack_l (New) and Used_Stack_l (Push ( s ,  x ) ) are considered as separate cases. There 
is no need to do this for Used_Stack_2 as Used_Stack_2 (New) is not a state of Used_Stack_2; it is 
blocked by the process algebra behaviour. In Used_Stack_l (New) the expression Empty (New) is 
replaced by true, and two of the four choices are removed because their guards evaluate to fa ls e .
Used_StackJ (New) = push?x; Used_Stack_l (Push (New, x ))
[] em pty!true; Used_Stack_l (New)
Used_Stack_l (Push ( s ,  x ))  = push?y; Used_Stack_l (Push (Push ( s ,  x ) , y ))
[] pop; Used_Stack_l (s )
[] top !x; Used_Stack_l (Push ( s ,  x ))
[] em pty!false; Used_Stack_l (Push ( s ,  x ))
Used_Stack_2 (x) = push?y; Used_Stack_2 (y) »  Used_Stack_2 (x)
[] pop; ex it
[] top !x; UsedJStack_2 (x)
[] em pty!false; Used_Stack_2 (x)
It is illuminating to look at the labelled transition systems for these processes, given in fig­
ure 10.5. We can see from these diagrams that S tack J  and StackJ! look very similar, except that 
the state Stack_l is visited only once, at the start of execution, Used_Stack_l being used in its 
place in the remainder of the execution. As a first step towards proving Stack_l =wbc StackJ! we 
show Stack_l =wbc Used_Stack_l (New). The proof proceeds by unique fixed point induction: 
if Used_Stack_l (New) can be substituted for StackJ. in the defining equations of S tack J  with 
no change in the behaviour, then UsedJStack J  (New) is equivalent to S tack J . This is obvious 
from the equations above.
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e m p ty ! t r u e
p u s h ?x
e m p ty !t r u e  
t o p l x
e m p ty !t r u e  j 
t o p ! y
empty  ' . t r u e  | 
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e m p t y ! t r u e
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e m p t y ! t r u e
pop I
pu s h ?x
U s e d _ S t a c k _ l  (Push(New, x ) ) 
p u s h ?y
Used S ta c k  1 
(PusTi (PusTi (New, x) , y)
e m p ty ! t r u e {  
t o p ! x '
pop
e m p ty ! t r u e {  
to p ' . y  r
pop
p u s h ?z
e m p ty !t r u e /  
t o p ! z
U s e d _ S t a c k _ l
(Push  (Push  (P ush  (New, x ) , y ) , z)
S ta c k _ 2
p u s h ?x
U s e d _ S ta c k _ 2  (x) >> S ta c k _ 2  
p u s h ? y
U se d _ S tac k _ 2  (y) >>
(Used S t a c k  2 (x) >> S t a c k  2)
p u s h ?z
U se d _ S ta c k _ 2  (z) >>
(U s ed _ S ta ck _ 2  (y) >>
(Used S t a c k  2 (x) >> S t a c k  2 ) )
Figure 10.5: Stack-1 and Stack_2
The next stage of the proof is to show that Used_Stack_l =wbc Stack_2. We construct a 
relation, 72, which includes pairs of process expressions (which represent states) which we claim 
are equivalent; we must then show that 72. is a weak bisimulation. Using the process expressions 
in figure 10.5 as a guide, we give the first few pairs of 72 below. Note that since »  is associative, 
we have omitted brackets.
72 = {(Used_Stack_l (New), Stack_2),
(UsedJ5tack_l (Push (New, x ) ), Used_Stack_2 (x) »  Stack_2),
(Used_Stack_l (Push (Push (New, x ) , y )) ,
Used_Stack_2 (y) »  Used_Stack_2 (x) »  Stack_2),
(Used_Stack_l (Push (Push (Push (New, x ) , y ) , z ) ) ,
Used_Stack_2 (z) »  Used_Stack_2 (y) »  Used_Stack_2 (x) »  Stack_2),
. . . }
Since the stacks are unbounded 72 will contain an infinite number of pairs, so to express 72 
finitely we have to find a generalisation of the pairs in 72. We define functions which “trans­
late” from states in Stack_l to states in Stack_2, using the adt stack given in figure 10.2 as an 
intermediate step. These functions are merely syntactic manipulations of process expressions.
Given a stack s of Stack-Type, we assume that s is in canonical form, i.e. composed only of 
applications of Push and New (applications of Pop can be removed by the equations of StackJType, 
and Top gives values from Data, rather than Stack-Type). We define /  and g which take s of
Stack-Type and return a process expression, i.e. a member of V, in Stack_l or Stack_2 respec­
tively.
/  : Stack-Type —)■ V g : Stack-Type —» V
/ ( s) =  Used_Stack_l (s )  #(Push ( s ,  d ))=  Used_Stack_2 (d) »  g(s)
<7(New) =  Stack_2
Both functions are bijective with respect to syntactic equality, since both processes take a stack
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s, which is in canonical form, and merely perform syntactic manipulations of the representation of 
that stack to give a process expression. For the function /  this manipulation is trivial, prefixing 
the stack s by Used_Stack_l, therefore each stack s has a unique representation in terms of 
process expressions relating to states in the labelled transition system of StackJ.. The function 
g performs a more complicated manipulation, but it is clear that no elements of the stack s are 
lost or duplicated in the transformation into process expressions, and that each stack s is related 
to precisely one process expression relating to states in the labelled transition system of Stack_2.
Given these definitions, we now define 1Z by:
^  =  { ( / ( s ) .5,(s)) | Vs.s : StackJType}
Having now defined 1Z so that each pair consists of two states which we claim are bisimilar, we 
have to prove that 1Z is a weak bisimulation. We proceed by showing that for any pair in 1Z, the 
definition of weak bisimulation is satisfied (see definition 4 of chapter 3 for the formal definition), 
i.e. for each pair, if one state can perform some transition, then the other state must also be able 
to perform that transition and the pair of states resulting from these transitions is also in 1Z. We 
consider two cases of pairs: s = New and s ^  New.
Case: s  =  New. The pair under consideration is (/(New),</(New)), i.e. (UsedJStackJ (New),
S ta ck J ). From the defining equation of Used .Stack J  (New) two transitions are possible: push?x 
and em pty!true.
1. push?x can also be performed by S tack J . The resultant pair of states is
(U sed-StackJ (Push (New, x ) ) ,  UsedJStack J  (x) »  S ta ck J )
By the definition of /  and g this pair of states can be expressed as (f(s ') ,g (s ')), where 
s' =  Push (New, x ) , which is in 1Z.
2. empty!true can also be performed by S tack J . The resultant pair is
(UsedJStackJ (New), S ta ck J )  
which we know to be in 1Z since this is the pair originally under consideration.
The argument is similar for the second clause of the bisimulation definition.
Case: s ^  New. Here we proceed much as in the first case, except this time we choose an
arbitrary pair from 1Z and therefore an arbitrary underlying stack s. Let s = P u sh(... (Push(New, 
x i ) , . . .  ) , x„) for some n > 1. The pair in 1Z under consideration is ( /(s ) , </(s)), i.e.
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(Used_Stack_l ( s ) ,  Pn) where Pk is defined to be (Used_Stack_2 (x/e) »  Pk-i) for k > 0 and 
S ta ck J  for k = 0.
Four actions are possible:
1. push?y. After push?y the state pair evolves to the result pair
(Used_Stack_l (Push ( s ,  y ) ) ,  Used_StackJ (y) »  Pn)
By using the definition of /  and g and the states of this pair we can see the underlying stack 
is s' = Push(s, y), allowing this pair to be alternatively expressed as ( /(s ') , g{s')), which 
is therefore in 11.
2. pop. To make the calculation of the resultant pair easier, we first partially unfold the
definitions of /  and g in the original state pair giving
(Used_Stack_l (Push ( r e s t ( s ) ,  xn) , Used_StackJ (xn) »  Pn- i )
where r e s t ( s )  is as defined in section 10.2.1. The pair which results after a pop action is
(Used_Stack_l (rest(s)), ex it »  Pn- i )
The right hand element of the pair, ex it »  P ^-i, can be rewritten using the laws of weak
bisimulation congruence to give i; P„_i, giving the pair
(Used_Stack_l (rest(s)), i;P n_i)
Since we know that this is not the pair at the root of the labelled transition system, we can 
use weak bisimulation e q u iva le n c e  laws to remove the occurrence of i, giving
(Used_Stack_l (rest(s )), Pn-i)
which can be expressed as ( / ( r e s t(s )) , g (rest(s))), which is in 1Z.
3. top lx ,,. This transition starts and ends in the same state, so the resultant pair is just the 
same as the original state, i.e.
(Used_Stack_l (s), Pn)
which is in 1Z.
4. em pty!fa lse. As with to p !x n the resultant pair is
(Used_Stack_l (s), P n) 
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which is in 1Z.
Again, the argument is similar for the second clause.
Since the pair in the second case above was chosen arbitrarily, it represents all pairs in 7Z except 
the pair (/(New),0r(New)), which was considered in the first case. The two cases above therefore 
cover all possible forms of pairs in 7Z, and hence 7Z satisfies the definition of weak bisimulation.
Since 1Z is a weak bisimulation, any pair of processes in 7Z are bisimilar. In particular, the pair 
(Used_Stack_l (New), Stack_2) belongs to 7Z, and hence Used_Stack_l (New) &wbe Stack_2. 
Since the first branches of the labelled transition systems involved no internal actions, this relation 
is also a congruence, see the definition of observation congruence (weak bisimulation congruence), 
definition 4, section 3.4.3. I
Having successfully shown that StackJL and Stack_2 are weak bisimulation congruent using a 
combination of equational reasoning and construction of a bisimulation relation, we now consider 
a third description of the stack.
10.2.5 The Third LOTOS Stack
Although described using only process algebra and simple data types, Stack_2 retained some of 
the structure and flavour of Stack_l. In the third stack specification, shown in figure 10.6, the 
adt style is left behind, concentrating on process algebra to give a more operational definition of 
the stack.
Similarly to Stack_2, the process Used_Stack^3 is parameterised on the top element of the 
stack; the rest of the stack is modelled by an auxiliary data structure made up of linked cells, each 
cell containing one element of the stack.
This description is referred to as version 4 in [Got87].
10.2.6 Proving Stack One Equivalent to Stack Three
In Stack_2, each instantiation of Used_Stack_2 only has information about one element of the 
stack; as soon as that element is popped from the top of the stack, the process Used_StackJ2 exits 
and control is taken up by the instantiation of Used_Stack_2 modelling the next element down in 
the stack. In this procedure, it is only because we know how control is passed from one process 
to another via the »  operator that we can deduce that StackJ! behaves as expected.
In Stack_3 we have a similar situation; this time the Used_Stack^3 process behaves like the top 
element of the stack with a pointer to the rest of the stack. Although Used_Stack^3 can perform 
the stack events of push, pop, etc., it is really only an interface to the stack-like structure of linked
instantiations of C ell. After a pop action, Used_Stack_3 obtains the new top value from the C ell
structure.
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sp ecification  Stack_Data_Type J  
library Boolean end lib
ty p e  Element is (* ACT ONE d e f in it io n  *) en d typ e  
b ehaviour
process S ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty] :n oex it : =
(NewJtack [push, empty]
»  accept x:Elem ent, n :In t in
(h id e up_l, up_2, down_l, down_2 in
Used_Stack_3 [push, pop, top , empty, up_i, up_2] (x , n)
|[up_l, up_2] | C ell [up_l, up_2, down_l, down.2] (x , 0 ) ) )
»  S ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty]
w here
p rocess NewJtack [push, empty] :ex it (Element, In t) : = 
push?x: Element; ex it (x , 1)
[] em pty!true; NewJtack [push, empty]
en d proc
p rocess U sed J ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty, up_l, u pJ] (x:Elem ent, n :In t) :ex it : = 
push?y:Element; up_i!x; U sed J ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty, up_l, up_2] (y , n+1) 
[] pop; up_2 ? z :Element;
( [n = 1] —> ex it
[] [n ^ l]  ^  U sed J ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty, up_l, up«2] (z ,  n * l)
[] top !x ; U sed J ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty, up_l, up_2] (x , n)
[] em pty!fa lse; U sed J ta ck J  [push, pop, top , empty, up_l, up_2] (x , n)
en d proc
p rocess C ell [up_l, up_2, down_l, down_2] (x:Elem ent, n :In t) :ex it : = 
h id e down.l', down_2; in  
(up_l?y Element;
( [n >  0] —> down_l! x ; C ell [up_l, up_2, down_l, down_2] (y , n+1)
[] [n = 0] —> ( C ell [up_l, up_2, down_l, down_2] (y , n+1)
|[down_l, down.2] | C ell [down_l, down.2, down.1', down.2'] (x , 0 ) ) )
[] up J  !x;
( [n > 0] —> downJ?z: Element; C ell [up_l, up_2, down.l, down.2] (z ,  n-1)
□  [n = 0] —> e x it ) )
en d proc  
endproc  
en d sp ec
Figure 10.6: The Third Stack
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Consider trying to show Stack-1 = wbc Stack_3 using the same method as in the previous 
section. In the case analysis of possible transitions from an arbitrary state, it is clear that both 
stacks can perform a pop action; it is less clear that Stack^3 then behaves like the rest of the 
stack. Since C e ll actions are hidden, we cannot use weak bisimulation congruence to analyse 
their behaviour; C e ll could reverse the values for all we know, or generate random values. In 
other words, we can never be sure that C e ll returns the right values and in the right order. To 
try to gain understanding of the workings of Stack_3 we take a particular stack and simulate the 
process for the values of that stack.
E quational P ro o f for a P articular Stack
We begin by considering the way Stack_3 behaves with the sequence of actions push! 1 ; p u sh !2 ; 
pop; t o p ? l ; pop; ex it. A test that S ta c k s  really behaves like a stack will be whether or not it 
can synchronise on the t o p ! 1 action. Below we unfold S ta c k s  in parallel with the above sequence 
of actions by hand, in order to gain some confidence in the correctness of the C e ll  processes. We 
begin with the expression
Stack_3 I [s ta c k je v e n ts ]  I p u sh il;  push!2; pop; t o p ! l ;  pop; ex it (*)
and attempt to obtain something of the form
p u s h il;  p u sh !2; pop; t o p ! l ;  pop; Stack_3
In the following unfoldings we know which event we want to occur next, therefore we only 
unfold the appropriate part of the expression. This helps make the unfolding more readable. 
Since all other actions in the choice expression are blocked by our choice of synchronisation list 
this is correct. To further aid readability we abbreviate the set of actions up_l, up_2 by up, 
dow n.l, down_2 by down, u p _ l, up_2 , dow n.l, down_2 by updown, and push, pop, to p , empty 
by sta ck _ ev en ts .
We begin by unfolding some subsidiary expressions required for the unfolding of (*).
L em m a 1 Our first unfolding is to push an occurrence of up_l! 1 through the stack expression. 
h id e  updown in  (u p _ l!l; Used_Stack_3 (2 , 2) I Cup] I C e ll (1 , 0 ))
—iti be
i; h id e  updown in  (Used_Stack_3 (2 , 2) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 1) I [down] I C e ll (1 , 0 ) ) )
We proceed by unfolding and expansion
h id e  updown in  (u p .l! 1; UsedJStack^ (2 , 2) I [up] I C e ll (1 , 0 ))
=wbc (  unfold)
h id e  updown in
(u p .l ! 1; UsedJStack.3 (2 , 2)
I [up]I up_i?y; (C e ll (y , 1) I[down]I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
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=wbc ( expansion)
h id e updown in
up_l! 1; (Used_Stack^3 (2 , 2) I[up]I (C e ll (1 , 1) I[down]I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
=wbc (  f5n)
i; h ide updown in (UsedJStack_3 (2 , 2) I [up] I (C ell (1 , 1) I [down] I C e ll (1 , 0 ) ) )
L em m a 2 Next we unfold the expression which pushes up_2 ?z through the stack expression. 
h id e updown in
((up_2?z; Used_Stack-3 (z , 1)) I [up] I (C ell (1 , 1) | [down] | C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
—wbc
i; h id e updown in (Used_Stack_3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] | e x it ) )
Again we proceed by unfolding and expansion. Note that the second C ell process cannot interact
with UsedJStack.3 as its events were renamed at instantiation. 
h id e updown in
((up_2?z; Used_Stack_3 (z , 1)) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 1) | [down] I C e ll (1 , 0 ) ) )
=wbc (  unfold)
h id e updown in
((up_2?z; Used_Stack_3 (z , 1))
I [up] I (up_2!l; down_2?z; C ell (z , 0) I [down] I C e ll ( i ,  0 ) ) )
=wbc ( expansion, unfold)
h id e  updown in  up_2 ? l;
(Used_Stack^3 (1 , 1)
I [up] I (down_2?z; C ell (z , 0) I [down] | down_2!l; e x it ) )
=wbc (  expansion)
h id e updown in  up_2 ? l;
(UsedJStack^ (1 , 1) I [up] I down_2?l; (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
=wbc (  expansion)
h id e updown in  up_2 ? l;  down_2 ? l;
(Used_StackJ3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) | [down] I e x it ) )
=wbc (  f5a, m l)
i; h id e updown in  (Used_Stack_3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C ell (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
We now proceed with the main proof of (*), i.e.
C onjecture 1 Simulation of the stack with a particular sequence of events.
Stack.3 I [stackjeven ts] | p u sh il; push!2; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it (*)
=wbc
p u sh il;  push 12; pop; to p l l ;  pop; Stack_3
As with the lemmata we proceed mainly by unfolding and expansion.
StackJ3 I [sta ck jev en ts] | p u sh il; push 12; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it 
—wbc (  unfold)
(NewJStack »  accept x , n in
(h id e updown in  UsedJStack^3 (x , n) I [up] I C e ll (x , 0 ) ) )
»  S ta c k s  I [stack_events] | p u sh il; push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it
Let us consider just the initial portion of the right hand side, bearing in mind that this process 
will eventually exit, at which point we need to re-introduce the »  Stack_3 part of the process.
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(New_Stack »  (accept x , n in
(h id e updown in Used_Stack_3 (x , n) I [up] I C ell (x , 0 ) ) )
I [stack jeven ts]I p u sh il; push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it
=wbc (  unfold)
((push?x; ex it (x , 1) [] empty I true; New_Stack)
»  accept x , n in  (h ide updown in  U sed J ta ck J  (x , n) I [up] I C ell (x , 0 ) ) )
I [s ta ck jev en ts] | p u sh il; push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it
=wbc ( expansion)
push 1 1 ;
( (e x it  ( 1 , 1 ) »  accept x , n in
(h id e updown in U sed J ta ck J  (x , n) I [up] I C ell (x , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc (  d2b, m l)
p ush!1 ;
((h id e  updown in  U sed J ta ck J  (1 , 1) I [up] I C ell (1 , 0 ))
I [stack_events] I push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
Since we know that we want the action push 12  to proceed, and that all others are restricted 
by the synchronisation list of the parallel operators, we can unfold this expression further.
push 1 1 ;
( (h id e  updown in push?y; u p_l!l; U sed J ta ck J  (y , 2) I [up] I C ell (1 , 0 ))
I [stackjeven ts] I push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc ( f5b)
p u sh il;  ((push?y; (h id e updown in up_l!l; Used_Stack_3 (y , 2) I [up] I C e ll (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc (  expansion)
p u sh il;  push 12 ;
( (h id e  updown in  (u p _ l!l; Used_Stack_3 (2 , 2) I [up] I C e ll (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
From the result of the first lemma we substitute for the expression 
h ide updown in  (upJLIl; U sed J ta ck J  (2 , 2) I [up] I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) ) ,  giving:
p u sh il;  push 12 ;
(i; h id e updown in (U sed J ta ck J  (2 , 2)
I[up]I (C e ll (1 , 1) I[down]I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc (  expansion, m l)
p u sh il;  push 12 ;
(h id e updown in (U sed J ta ck J  (2 , 2)
I [up]I (C e ll (1 , 1) I[down]I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
—wbc (  unfold)
p u sh il;  push 12 ;
(h id e updown in  ( pop; up_2?z; U sed J ta ck J  (z , 1)
I [up]I (C e ll (1 , 1) I[down]| C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjevents] I pop; to p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc ( expansion)
p u sh il;  push!2 ; pop;
(h id e updown in  ( (upJ2?z; U sed J ta ck J  (z , 1))
I[up]I (C e ll (1 , 1) I[down]I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )
I [stackjevents] I t o p l l ;  pop; ex it)
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Using the second lemma we can substitute the unfolding of h ide updown in  
((up_2?z; Used_Stack_3 (z ,  1)) I [up] I (C ell (1 , 1) I [down] I C ell (1 , 0 ) ) )  into the cur­
rent unfolding
p u sh il; push!2 ; pop;
(i; h id e updown in  (Used_Stack^3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I t o p l l ;  pop; ex it)
=wbc ( expansion, unfold)
p u sh il; push!2 ; pop; i;
(h id e updown in  ( to p l l ;  Used_Stack_3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )  
I [stackjeven ts] I t o p l l ;  pop; ex it)
= w bc (  m l, expansion)
p u sh il; push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;
(h id e updown in (Used_Stack_3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C ell (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I pop; ex it)
Here we see that Used_Stack_3 does indeed have the correct value for the top of the stack, 
since it is able to perform the t o p l l  action. We continue with the unfolding to check that we 
return to the original state.
p u sh il; push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;
(h id e updown in  (Used_Stack^3 (1 , 1) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I pop; ex it)
= w b c ( unfold)
p u sh il;  push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;
(h id e updown in ((pop; up_2?z; ex it) I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] | pop; ex it)
= w bc (  expansion)
p u sh il;  push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
(h id e updown in  ((up_2?z; ex it)  I [up] I (C e ll (1 , 0) I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjevents] I ex it)
= w b c  (  unfold)
p u sh il;  push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
(h id e updown in  ((up_2 ?z; ex it)  I [up] I ((up_2 ! l;  ex it)  I [down] I e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I ex it)
= w bc (  expansion)
p u sh il;  push 12 ; pop; t o p l l ;  pop;
(h id e updown in  up_2 ? i;  (ex it I [up] I (ex it I [down] | e x it ) )
I [stackjeven ts] I e x it)
= w b c  (  c3a, f5a, m l, expansion)
p u sh il;  push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
(h id e updown in  (ex it I [up] I e x it)  I [stack_events] I ex it)
At this point we should remember that a part of the Used_Stack_3 process was stripped away 
for convenience; we put it back now.
p u sh il;  push 12 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
(h ide updown in  ex it »  Stack_3 I [up] I e x it)  I [stackjevents] | ex it  
=wbc (  d2a, f5a, expansion, m l)
p u sh il;  push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
((h id e  updown in  S ta c k s  I [up] I ex it) I [stack_events] I ex it)
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— wbc (
p u sh il; push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop;
((h id e  updown in  S tack J  I [stackjevents] I e x it)  I [stackjevents] I ex it)
= w b C ' (  c %> c 3 a )
p u sh il; push!2 ; pop; to p l l ;  pop; (h ide updown in S ta ck s  I [stackjevents] I e x it)
The occurrence of h id e will eventually be eliminated as at some point in the unfolding we 
get two occurrences of hide, and one can be removed. In the last step above, we can remove 
one occurrence of ex it by manipulation of the parallel operators, but not all. Since S ta ck J  is 
nonterminating, this ex it cannot be removed, as it has no other ex it process with which it may 
synchronise; however, it will not interfere with the actions of S ta ck s . This means that we are in 
fact unable to prove the conjecture (*) holds.
It can be seen that this unfolding is a very tedious process, and that, although we may have 
gained some understanding of the behaviour of C ell and U sed J ta ck J , and hence some extra 
confidence in the correctness of the behaviour, this cannot be taken as a formal proof that Stack_3 
behaves like a stack.
We go on to consider other possible approaches to proving that Stack.3 has the same behaviour 
as Stack_l or Stack_2.
O ther A pproaches to  th e  V erification
An alternative approach to the proof that Stack.3 has the same behaviour as Stack_l or Stack_2 
might be to try to prove something about the C ell structure, for example, that it has the same 
behaviour as Stack_l or Stack_2, and to use that proof to conclude that Stack.3 therefore behaves 
like a stack. Informally, the structure built of C ell processes behaves similarly to a stack, but with 
the bottom element held twice, and the actions renamed. Although we can relate the action up_l 
to push, up_2 is more like a combination of top and pop; there is no C ell action which relates to 
empty. These differences mean that we cannot say anything about C ell in relation to Stack_l, 
since we cannot express that two actions are combined into one. Similarly, we cannot attempt a 
proof of Stack.3 =wbc Stack_l with the occurrence of h ide removed as the C ell actions have no 
counterparts in Stack_l, therefore the equivalence will certainly not hold.
It seems that we cannot perform a proof of behavioural equivalence between two specifications 
to show that Stack.3 has the correct behaviour; are there any other ways of expressing the 
requirement that S ta ck J  behaves like a stack? In section 9.2 we used the notion of property 
testing to express the bad behaviours of the radiation machine, perhaps we can use a similar 
technique to express good behaviours of the stack. We can use the equations of the abstract 
data type stack in figure 10.2, and also some information about which parts of the process model 
empty stacks, to give specifications of properties which the stack may be expected to display. For
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example:
1. A push action followed by a pop action should leave the stack unchanged,
2. A push?x action followed by a top !z  action should satisfy x = z,
3. New_Stack_3 can never perform empty!fa ls e ,  only empty!true,
4. Used_Stack_3 (x , n) can never perform empty!true,
5. New_Stack_3 can never perform top or pop events,
6. Used_Stack_3 (x , n) performs top!x, not to p !z  where x ^  z.
We consider formulating the first property above in more detail. The abstract data type
equation we use as our specification is Pop(Push(s, x ) ) = s; this property can be formulated in
terms of transitions as follows:
. push?x pop , .UsedJStack_3 (z , n) —> P — > UsedJStack^3 (z , n)
Given that so far we have working on equivalence proofs, we would like to be able to express 
this as a relation between processes, e.g.
push?x:Element; pop; Used-Stack.3 (z , n) =  Used_Stack^3 (z , n)
The question is: which relation should be used in place of =? It seems that the above equation 
is too strict if a relation such as weak bisimulation is used as then it says that Used_Stack^3 ( z , n) 
may only perform push then pop actions. What we really want to say is that this is one possible 
course of action, suggesting the use of the cred relation. If we try to prove the conjecture above 
with cred for =  we quickly encounter another problem: Used_Stack_3 does not operate in isola­
tion. In the conjecture there is no mention of the C ell processes. Including C ell processes gives 
an expression of the form:
push?x:Element; pop;
(UsedJStack.3 (z , n) I [. . . ] |  C ell (xn, n) I [. . . ] |  . . .  I [. . . ] |  C e ll ( x l ,  0 ))
cred
(Used_Stack_3 (z , n) I [. . . ] |  C ell (xn, n) I [. . . ] |  . . .  I [. . . ] |  C ell ( x l ,  0 ))
assuming that the synchronisation lists are properly defined.
This formulation of the property has two problems. The first is that the proof will be extremely 
tedious, and the second is that if we have to specify each x i then we are making the proof for 
a particular stack, rather than for an arbitrary stack. On the other hand, if we do not specify 
the x i we must at least specify n and then perform an induction proof over n to show that the 
equivalence holds for all n. Again, this analysis will be tedious. The problem is that really 
that we are attempting to prove something about a process containing uninstantiated variables.
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Technically, such a process has no meaning in the LOTOS semantics, unless the specification is 
parameterised over those variables, although we can think of it as representing a class of processes. 
In the previous proof, of StackJ. =wbc S tack J , we ignored this fact and performed the proof for 
an arbitrary stack. This did not matter as the laws of the allowed us to move the variables 
around appropriately. Here the problem is exaggerated because we cannot rely on the laws of 
weak bisimulation congruence since the actions of C ell are hidden, and we have to rely instead 
on trying to investigate the values of the variables (therefore we must first assign values to those 
variables).
The problems with S tack J  arise because we are using LOTOS both as a specifications language 
and as the meta-language in which we formulate desirable properties. While this was acceptable 
for simple properties, we now encounter properties which require a more powerful meta-language 
incorporating, for example, variables and quantifiers. The LOTOS formalism is more suited to 
describing the construction of a system, than expressing a property of that system at a more ab­
stract level. The property we try to describe above can be easily expressed in terms of transitions: 
if we are at a state s in a labelled transition system we can perform some actions to move to state 
s' , and additionally we might be able to say something about a relationship between s and s', 
such as s =  s'. A more natural formalism to use for this sort of property is a modal or temporal 
logic; the use of such a logic in conjunction with LOTOS is discussed in chapter 11.
10.2.7 Sum m ary and Discussion
We have studied three versions of the stack originally given in [Got87] and tried to prove them 
equivalent in some sense. While we were able to prove that S tack J  =wbc S ta ck J  by using 
a combination of equational reasoning and bisimulation construction, we were unable to prove 
anything about the relationship between S ta ck J  and the other two, mainly because we were 
unable to formulate the conjecture to be proved. The problem of verification of full LOTOS 
requires more study.
Other interesting observations made in [Got87] include some comments about the suitability 
of LOTOS as a tool for specification. Some deficiencies mentioned are: the lack of a mechanism to 
specify groups of events as atomic, i.e. to be performed without interleaving. This was something 
we also encountered in the Login case study of chapter 7. Another possible problem identified by 
Gotzhein is that LOTOS is a constructive language and that this might lead a specifier towards 
a more implementation influenced design than if a more abstract language had been used. The 
author does also praise LOTOS; in particular the ability to make specifications more readable (and 
hence understandable) by modularisation, especially the hierarchical structuring of processes.
Given that the approach to verification which we have been using up till now, i.e. proving 
the implementation satisfies the specification, is not as appropriate for full LOTOS as it was for
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Basic LOTOS, we now consider the approaches of other authors to the problem of verification 
of full LOTOS specifications which do not require the addition of other operators or adoption of 
other formalisms, and which will allow us to remain within the equational reasoning paradigm, 
specifically the proof system developed in chapter 8. These approaches work on the principle that 
if full LOTOS is hard to deal with, then we must somehow separate the data types from the 
process algebra; this includes totally removing the adt part of the specification. We present the 
main ideas in more detail of two approaches, and consider how we might use them in practice. 
Both approaches are illustrated by an example; one the stack of this section, and the other a full 
LOTOS extension of the radiation machine example of chapter 9.
10.3 A  U nified  Fram ew ork
Part of the problem with verifying full LOTOS specifications is the apparent gap between objects 
described using adts and objects described using process algebra. One method of narrowing that 
gap is to create a unified framework for specification and verification by describing both parts of the 
language in the same framework, e.g. in [Ple87] a CCS like language with adts is given a semantics 
in terms of term rewriting systems. Another approach, which will be discussed in chapter 11, is 
to use a more powerful formalism to describe system properties. Yet another alternative, which 
is explored here, is to give the semantics of one part of the language in terms of the other part 
by way of a translation. In the LOTOS literature this has been done in both directions: process 
algebra in ACT ONE and data types as processes.
The semantics of Basic LOTOS in terms of ACT ONE can be found in [Raf92, EBB+86]. 
However, [Raf92] states that it is impossible to have a full and complete axiomatisation of LOTOS 
in a many-sorted equational logic. This is because LOTOS contains operators expressing temporal 
ordering of events and nondeterminism. Therefore, there is never a guaranteed transformation 
from Basic LOTOS to ACT ONE. For our purposes, it is more useful to look at how data types 
can be coded into processes, since we already have techniques for dealing with Basic LOTOS 
processes. There are two main approaches at present to translating data types into processes: 
abstract interpretation and context equations. These are examined below.
10.3.1 A bstract Interpretation and LOTOS
A b stract In terpretation  and LOTOS
The problem with proofs involving full LOTOS is that they are too complicated. On the other 
hand, proofs involving Basic LOTOS are much more straightforward, and a variety of proof tech­
niques and tools for such proofs exist. For some types of analyses, not all of the information in the
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full LOTOS specification will be used; we need to get rid of the information we want to ignore, 
retaining only the information necessary to complete the analysis. Abstract interpretation is a 
well-known technique in partial evaluation of functional programs whereby a large/complex data 
type is replaced in the program by a smaller /simpler data type. This is done in order to allow 
evaluation of properties of the program, such as termination. By throwing away some information, 
analysis of the program behaviour becomes more tractable. The difficult part is retaining enough 
of the right information to make the evaluation meaningful. The same approach can be used to 
translate full LOTOS specifications into Basic LOTOS specifications. This was investigated as 
part of the LOTOSPHERE project, and is reported in chapter 13 of the Catalogue of LOTOS 
Correctness Preserving Transformations [Bol92] produced by the project.
In this section we describe two transformations from full to Basic LOTOS from [Bol92]. In the 
first, all data information is thrown away, leaving only the process skeleton, while in the secorid, 
the data type information is retained by coding it into the process expressions. The correctness 
of these transformations is expressed using modified versions of the simulation and bisimulation 
relations. We give informal descriptions of the transformations and the relations; the full formal 
descriptions may be found in [Bol92], illustrating the transformations by our own examples.
Obviously, transforming a full LOTOS specification into a Basic LOTOS specification in order 
to simplify verification proofs is only justifiable if we can infer properties of the full LOTOS 
specification based on the Basic LOTOS specification. An important question not addressed in 
[Bol92] is: given two full LOTOS descriptions and their Basic LOTOS transformations, if we prove 
something about the relationship between the Basic LOTOS specifications, can we then conclude 
anything about the relationship between the full LOTOS specifications? We consider this question 
in detail, with specific reference to the equivalence/congruence/preorder relations we have used 
so far. Finally, we illustrate the use of one of the transformations by applying it to a full LOTOS 
version of the radiation machine example of chapter 9, and completing a proof of safety of the 
Basic LOTOS transformation of the machine in PAM.
R em ove D ata  T ype Inform ation  C om pletely
The first transformation we consider throws away all the information related to the data type. 
Given any full LOTOS specification, we can always totally remove the data types to give a Basic 
LOTOS specification by syntactically removing the adt part of the specification and any reference 
to adts in the process expressions. In performing this transformation, information about data 
which is important to the flow of control in the process, if there is any such data, will be lost, 
and hence the process behaviour may be altered. For example, given the process P and its Basic 
LOTOS transformation P',
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P = in ? n :In t;  ( [n > 0] - > a; P P' = in ; ( a; P'
n [n = 0] - > b; P D b; P'
[] [n < 0] - > c; P) [] c; P')
consider the consequences of executing P or P' in parallel with the processes Q and R, given below.
Q = b; Q R = (a; R [] b; R [] c; R)
Both q and R can be successfully run in parallel with P', synchronising on a, b and c in both 
cases. However, it is clear that, with the same synchronisation list, while R runs successfully with 
P, q in parallel with P may deadlock, since P may be forced to take either the a or the c action 
because of the value of n, whereas q may only perform b. Even in these very simple processes, the 
data makes a considerable difference. Having said that, this transformation may be of some use 
in reachability analysis. Consider the process S which performs only d actions. Even with all the 
data removed, it is obvious that P I [a , b , c , d] I S will deadlock.
The correctness of this transformation can be expressed in terms of a simulation relation over 
processes. A simulation relation is one half of a bisimulation relation, i.e. only one clause of 
definition 1 of chapter 3 need be satisfied. We write Q simulates P, P < Q, if Q can perform 
all the actions of P  (but P  need not perform all the actions of Q). For this transformation, the 
simulation relation is actually a family of relations, indexed by a coding function on events. The 
coding function throws away all data values, i.e. if gw is a transition label, the coding function 
returns g. The coding function is injective with respect to g, therefore distinctions between gate 
names are preserved. The definitions of these relations may be found in [Bol92].
Using these simulation relations, the correctness of the abstract interpretation which removes 
all the data type information is given by FL < 4, BL, where <f> is the coding function, FL the full 
LOTOS specification and BL the Basic LOTOS specification.
Initially this preorder may seem to be written the wrong way round, but bear in mind that the 
Basic LOTOS translation may be able to perform more actions than the Full LOTOS specification 
can (because some of the restrictions enforced by the data type have been removed). What this 
preorder says is that the Basic LOTOS process can perform all the actions the Full LOTOS process 
can, i.e. it does not refuse any actions allowed by the Full LOTOS process.
As mentioned above, this coding is useful for reachability analyses. It is also useful in cases 
where the data does not affect the flow of control within the process. Unfortunately, there are 
lots of examples of processes in which the data does affect the flow of control. One such is the 
radiation machine example presented in section 10.3.2, where data types are added to indicate 
the level of radiation and the position of the shield. These values are then used to decide whether 
or not it is safe to fire the electron beam. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to use the above 
transformation on this example since the data types carry important information about the flow 
of control of the process.
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The next section presents a transformation which retains the data type information.
R etain  D ata  T ype Inform ation  C om pletely
At the other end of the spectrum, we may take a full LOTOS process and transform it into a 
Basic LOTOS process retaining all the data type information. There are two provisos: either the 
data types involved must be finite, or the target language must provide a means of expressing 
infinite choice over a data range. Although full LOTOS has an operator which gives a choice over 
a possibly infinite range of data, Basic LOTOS has only finite choice, therefore we must ensure 
that the data types we are dealing with are finite.
The basic idea of this transformation is to code the values and variables of the data types into 
the process expressions. For example, a gate with an output variable is replaced by a new gate 
name which incorporates the old gate name and the value represented by the output variable. 
Gates with input variables are replaced by a choice over all the values of the appropriate type; 
again the values are coded into the new gate name. As a concrete example, given a type Three 
which denotes the set {1, 2, 3},
P = in?n:Three; P becomes P = i n . l ;  P
[] i n . 2; P
[] i n . 3; P
This is of course the way in which value passing is implemented in CCS.
In practice, it is not enough for the original data types to merely be finite, ideally each type 
should have only a small number of values, i.e. probably fewer than 10. This requirement is 
not as restrictive as it may seem at first; the types of several specifications in the literature 
satisfy this constraint, for example [Tho94, FLS90, EFJ90, DP91] and the OSI Session layer 
specifications [Sco89, vS89, Aju89] all use enumerated types over a small range (but see below).
In addition to the basic transformation of event offers given above, other expressions involving 
data types must also be evaluated. A record of which values are assigned to which variables 
(the environment) must be carried around to allow the evaluation of guards and instantiation of 
process parameters. This makes this transformation far more complex than the previous one. We 
do not give the transformation details here, but illustrate its use in section 10.3.2 via the radiation 
machine example. A full description of this transformation may be found in [Bol92].
The correctness of the previous transformation was expressed using a simulation preorder in 
conjunction with a coding function; we can use something a little stronger here: a bisimulation 
relation. This time the coding function must be bijective, because the definition of the bisimulation 
relation requires the application of <^-1 to transform Basic LOTOS labels into full LOTOS labels.
The correctness of this transformation is expressed by BL FL where the coding function <j) 
performs the sort of transformations described earlier in this section. The full definition of the
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coding function, and the bisimulation relation may be found in [Bol92].
While this transformation does retain all the data type information, which is good, it may 
also give a huge explosion in the size of the specification. For example, if the processes in the full 
LOTOS specification have data parameters, then each process is transformed into many processes, 
one for each instantiation of the data parameters. Similarly, one variable event offer results in 
several choice branches, one for each possible value of the variable.
A further problem of this transformation is the constraint that all types must be finite; although 
some of the types of a specification may satisfy this constraint, the same specification may also 
include infinite data types (typically the natural numbers or the integers). Several examples 
of such specifications may be found in [vEVD89], including the OSI Session layer specifications 
mentioned above. Many specifications include the integers or naturals as an unlimited source of 
unique identifiers; if the process control relies in any way on comparison of these identifiers, then 
neither of the abstract interpretation techniques described so far can be used.
An alternative transformation is given by choosing some sort of intermediate step between 
throwing away all the data information and retaining all the data information. For example, the 
Integers may be represented by the type {negative, zero, positive}. Another alternative is to retain 
the type of values, but not the values themselves, so at least some sort of type checking can be 
carried out. As with the first transformation, correctness of these transformations is expressed 
using the simulation relation, <</,, as some information is being lost.
Assuming that we can use these transformations on a given specification, it is important to 
know what implications results proved for the Basic LOTOS transformed specification will have 
for the original full LOTOS specification. This question was not considered in [Bol92]; we consider 
it below.
P ro p e rtie s  of th e  S im ulation  R elations
Since the reason for using abstract interpretation is to allow verification to be carried out on the 
simpler Basic LOTOS specifications rather than the full LOTOS specifications, it is important to 
know what implications equivalences, or orderings, proved between Basic LOTOS specifications 
have for the relationships between the full LOTOS specifications they represent. Obviously, any 
relations depend heavily on the coding function used, so we will consider the two main transfor­
mations given above separately.
C oding Function  Throw s Away All D a ta  In fo rm ation  Consider the coding which throws 
away all data type information. Assume we have two full LOTOS specifications, FLi and FL2 . 
From these we can derive two Basic LOTOS specifications, BLi and BL2 , so we have FLi BLi 
and FL2 <* BL2 . Now assume that we can prove something about the relationship between
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BLi and BL2 , say BLi ~  BL2 , i.e. BLi is strongly bisimilar to BL2 . What does this imply for the 
relationship between FLi and FL2? Unfortunately, the answer is that nothing can be implied about 
this relationship. As a counter example, take the case in which the strongest possible relation, and 
hence all other relations, holds between BLi and BL2 : let them be the same process. The processes 
FLi and FL2 are defined as follows, the transformed processes are denoted BLi and BL2 :
FLi = a ? n :In t;  ( [ fa lse ]  —> b; FLi BLi = a; (b; BLi 0  c; BLi)
[ tru e ] —> c; FLi)
FL2 = a ? n :In t;  ( [true ] —> b; FL2 BL2 = a; (b; BL2 □ c; BL2 )
[ fa lse ]  —> c; FL2 )
Obviously FLi BLi and FL2 <4> BL2 , remembering that the BL,- may do more than the FL,-. 
It also plain that FLi bears no relation to FL2 ; they are not even trace equivalent. It is not even 
true to say that FLi cred  FL2 as FL2 a fte r  a m ust b while -1 (FLi a fte r  a m ust b). Throwing 
away all the data type information means that while some general properties, like reachability and 
language as mentioned earlier, are preserved, equations concerning the equivalence or ordering of 
the full LOTOS specifications cannot be inferred from the results proved about the equivalence or 
ordering of the Basic LOTOS processes.
Fortunately, this is not the case for the coding function which retains all information.
C oding Function  R etains A ll D ata  Inform ation Given the transformation which preserves 
the data information of a full LOTOS specification by coding it into the gate name of a Basic 
LOTOS specification, any relation which holds of the two (transformed) Basic LOTOS specifica­
tions can be shown to hold, modulo the composition of the coding functions, for their corresponding 
full LOTOS specifications. The relations weak bisimulation congruence, testing congruence and 
cred can all be defined modulo a coding function in the obvious way.
Below we present results concerning the relations strong bisimulation equivalence, weak bisim­
ulation congruence and cred (and therefore testing congruence). We give only sketches of the 
proofs.
T heorem  4 (FLi BLi A FL2 BL2 A BLi ~  BL2) => FLX ~^3 FL2
Proof. We know that the following relations hold: FLi ~ <j>1 BLi and FL2 BL2 . Notice that 
different coding functions are used here to allow renaming of gates and data elements since we 
expect that FLi and FL2 use different data types. If, in addition, BLi ~  BL2 , then we can deduce 
FLi FL2 , where <j>3 = <j> 1 o 1 and o denotes function composition.
Informally, the proof proceeds by showing that a bisimulation, R (f>a, exists between FLi and 
FL2 , i.e. we show that
Va e  Act f l i  -2+  f l i '  => 3 f l 2. f l 2 ^  f l 2' A ( f l i , f l 2) €
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and vice versa.
If a particular element, a, of Act is chosen, it remains to be proven that a state f  12 exists such 
that f l 2 f l 2; A ( f l^ f l^ )  E R(p3 - The state f l 2 can be found by tracing through the other 
bisimulations:
FLi BLi A f l i  f l i  => 3 b l i .b l i  ^  b i; A (f l i , bl£) 6 
BLi ~  BL2 A b li  b li  => 3 bl'2 .b l2 bl'2 A ( b l i , bl'2) 6 R  
BL2 ~ 02 FL2 A b l2 ^ } bl'2 => 3 fl'2 . f l 2 *a ^ 4 a)) f l'2 A (b l2, f  12) E R<t>2
Since, by definition, a bisimulation equivalence contains all bisimulation relations, we know that 
must contain the relations R, R ^  and Rfa. We also know that we can construct R,pa by the 
transitive closure of these relations, therefore ( f l^ , f l 2) E R<t>3. Note that the coding functions 
<f>i and <f>2 are bijective, as required by the definition of the bisimulation relation.
The proof for the second clause is similar. I
So actually what we get from this chain of relations is a bisimulation modulo variations in the 
names of the data types, i.e. the application of <f>i and <^2. This is important because, according to 
the LOTOS semantics, even if two algebras A  and B  are isomorphic, and we have two processes 
which are identical except that one process uses data values from A  and the other uses data values 
from B , these processes are not bisimilar; however, they will be related by
T heorem  5 (FLi ~ <t>1 BLi A FL2 BL2 A BLi = wbc BL2) =4> FLi = w b c+3 FL2
Proof. The proof is similar to that for strong bisimulation equivalence above, therefore we do 
not present it here. We remark that the only differences occur when considering i actions, but 
that since the coding function is defined to map i to itself, the transition relation =>  behaves as 
expected. The only difficult point might be in requiring congruence, rather than equivalence, but 
the only i transition which affects congruence is one from the root of the Its, and since <f) maps i 
to itself and the Basic LOTOS processes are congruent, there can be no i transitions which affect 
the behaviour of the processes in different contexts. I
T heorem  6 (FLi BLi A FL2 ~^2 BL2 A BLi = tc BL2) => FLi = tc^3 FL2
P roof. We prove this theorem by showing that the result holds for cred, rather than = tc, first 
in one direction and then the other. Below we give the proof for one direction only; the other 
direction is similar. I
T heorem  7 (FLj ~ <p1 BLi A FL2 ~^2 BL2 A BLi cred BL2) => FLi cred^3 FL2
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Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. In addition to the assumptions FLi BLi and 
FL2 BL2, we also assume -i (FLi cred^g FL2), i.e.
3 <3 L.-i(FL2 a fte r  fa(t) m ust fa(L) => FLi a fte r  t m ust L )
We try to derive BLi cred  BL2 , the third assumption of the theorem above.
We know that FL2 must pass a test which FLi does not, so let t and L denote that particular 
trace and test set, modulo the coding functions (there may be other traces and tests, but only one 
representative is required). Since FLi does not pass the test, we know that t 6  <r(FLi), because if 
t £ ir(FLi) then FLi would pass any test. This means that the set FLi a fte r  t must have at least 
one member, call it f l i .  We also know that m ust L).
Since FLi BLi, then BLi may perform the trace <f>i(t), and, moreover, may reach a state, 
call it b li, which is bisimilar to f l i .  As these states are bisimilar, they must be able to perform 
the same actions, in particular, they are both unable to perform the actions in and L
respectively. We therefore have-«(BLi a fte r  <pi(t) m ust <j>i(L)).
We now consider the state FL2, the trace fa(t) and the test set <f>3 (L). We know that FL2 
passes this test. We must now try to determine whether or not BL2 passes the corresponding test.
We have two cases, either fa(t) (fc ir(FL2), or <f>3 (t) £ tr(FL2). In the first case there is no 
f l 2 such that f  12 f l 2, and therefore there can be no b l 2 such that b l 2 b l2, and BL2
passes the test <f>i(L) vacuously. We use <f> 1 here because ^ 3 0  ^ 2 =  fa.
In the second case we can select a specific state f  12 from FL2 a fte r  <j>3 (t) since we know that 
the set is not empty. We can then identify a state b l 2 in BL2 a fte r  <f>i(t) which is bisimilar to f  12, 
and can therefore perform the same actions as f  1 2. In particular, b l2 may perform the actions in 
<f>i(L), and therefore pass the test, i.e. BL2 a fte r  <^ i(Z) m ust <j>\{L).
From the above cases we may deduce that BL2 passes a test which BLi does not, and BLi cred  BL2 
does not hold, contradicting our original assumptions, therefore theorem 7 holds. I
These results allow us to take two full LOTOS specifications, to transform them into Basic 
LOTOS specifications, to prove some relation holds between the Basic LOTOS specifications, and 
to then deduce that a similar relation, modulo the coding function, holds of the full LOTOS 
specifications.
The next section demonstrates the use of the second transformation by applying it to the 
radiation machine example already discussed in chapter 9.
10.3.2 A bstract Interpretation and the Radiation M achine
In section 9.2 the simple radiation machine was introduced, and we concluded there that in order 
to have better control of the shield and beam, or rather, to have better information about the state
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of the shield and beam, data types should be introduced to the specification. This modification 
was originally presented in [Tho94]. We present it here in order to illustrate the full LOTOS to 
Basic LOTOS transformation discussed in the previous section. Having obtained an equivalent 
specification in Basic LOTOS, we attempt to prove the safety of the machine using the proof 
system, PAM together with sets of axioms for weak bisimulation congruence and cred, developed 
in section 9.2.
T he Full LO TOS D escrip tion  o f th e  R ad ia tion  M achine
The full LOTOS specification is presented in figure 10.7, with auxiliary definitions in figures 10.8 
and 10.9. There are several changes from the original presentation in [Tho94].
In [Tho94] the possibility that the electron beam may drift from the correct setting (and need 
recalibration) is modelled by the inclusion of a mid constant in the beam data type which is neither 
high nor low. We have decided to ignore this possibility, remaining with the simpler data type 
including only high and low, since the actual recalibration is not modelled anyway, and inclusion 
of the mid value would merely add to the complexity of the proof (unnecessarily).
One main alteration is made to the behaviour part of the radiation machine specification. In 
[Tho94] the hiding of events is not uniform in the ELECTRON and XRAY processes; this means that 
unfolding some terms gives h ide  l b , Is  in  TREATMENT, while unfolding of other terms gives h ide  
lb , I s ,  hb, h s , xr , e l  in  TREATMENT. These two process expressions cannot be identified by 
PAM as equivalent, and thus the proof becomes impossible. The hiding of events is uniform in 
our processes as this eases the proof process, and make no difference to the eventual behaviour of 
a given process.
T ransla ting  to  Basic LOTOS
We apply the translation as given in [Bol92] to turn the full LOTOS specification into a Basic 
LOTOS specification, preserving the data type information. The main steps are:
• replacing a parameterised process by several new process descriptions; one for each instan­
tiation of the data parameters,
• converting event offers such as f  i r e !Low!Down into gate names f  ire_Low_Down,
• converting S Low Down events to gates d_Low_Down,
• removing choices whose guards evaluate to fa ls e ,
• updating the synchronisation lists of parallel operators to take account of the new events.
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specification  Therac2 
library Boolean end lib
ty p e  SHIELD is (* as in  fig u re  10.8 *) en d typ e  
ty p e  BEAM is (* as in  f ig u re  10.8 *) en d typ e  
ty p e  ERROR is (* as in  f ig u re  10.9 *) en d typ e
behaviour  
STARTUP [ f ir e ]  
w here
process STARTUP [ f i r e ] :ex it (beam, sh ie ld )  :=
h ide lb ,  I s  in  lb ; Is ;  TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (low , down)
endproc
process TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (b:beam, s :s h ie ld ) :ex it (beam, sh ie ld )  :=
(xr; XRAY [ f ir e ]  (b , s ) )
[] ( e l ;  ELECTRON [ f ir e ]  (b, s ) )
[] ex it (b , s) 
endproc
process ELECTRON [ f ir e ]  (b:beam, s :s h ie ld ) :ex it (beam, sh ie ld )  := 
hide lb ,  hb, I s ,  hs in
(FIRE [ f ir e ] ( b ,  s) »  TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (b , s ) )
[] TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (b , s) 
endproc
process XRAY [ f ir e ]  (b:beam, s :s h ie ld ) :ex it (beam, sh ie ld )  := 
hide lb ,  hb, I s ,  hs in
TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (b , s)
[] hb; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (h igh , s)
[] hs; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (h igh , up)
[] (FIRE [ f ir e ]  (h igh , up) »
( TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (h igh , up)
[] lb ; ( TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (low , up)
[] I s ;  TREATMENT [ f ir e ]  (low , d ow n ))))))
endproc
process FIRE [ f ir e ]  (b:beam, s :s h ie ld ) :ex it := 
hide err in
[(b  eq high) and (s  eq down)] —> ERROR [err] (err54)
[] [(b  eq high) and (s  eq up)] —> ZAP [ f ir e ]  (b , s)
□  [(b  eq low) and (s  eq down)] —> ZAP [ f ir e ]  (b , s)
□  [(b  eq low) and (s  eq up)] —> ERROR [err] (err55) 
endproc
process ZAP [ f ir e ]  (brbeam, s :s h ie ld ) :ex it := f i r e lb l s ;  ex it endproc
process ERROR [err] (e:errnum) :ex it := er r le ;  ex it endproc  
en d spec
Figure 10.7: Therac Specification II
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ty p e  SHIELD is Boolean 
sort sh ie ld
opns up, down : -> sh ie ld
_eq_ : s h ie ld , sh ie ld  -> Bool
eqns ofsort Bool
up eq down = fa ls e ;  
up eq up = true; 
down eq down = true; 
down eq up = fa ls e ;  
en d typ e
ty p e  BEAM is Boolean 
sort beam
opns h igh , low : -> beam
_eq_ : beam, beam -> Bool
eqns ofsort Bool
high eq high = true; 
high eq low = fa ls e ;  
low eq high = fa ls e ;  
low eq low = true; 
en d typ e
Figure 10.8: Beam and Shield Data Types
typ e ERROR is Boolean 
sorts errnum
opns err53 , err54 : -> errnum
en d typ e
Figure 10.9: Error Data Type
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The translated specification is given in figures 10.10, 10.11, 10.12 and 10.13. We note that after 
performing the transformation the specification becomes four times longer, corresponding to the 
four permutations of the data parameters.
TREATMENTLowDown =
xr; XRAYLowDown [] e l ;  ELECTRONLowDown [] d_Low_Down; stop  
TREATMENTLowUp
xr; XRAYLowUp [] e l ;  ELECTRONLowUp [] d_Low_Up; stop  
TREATMENTHighDown =
xr; XRAYHighDown [] e l ;  ELECTRONHighDown [] d_High_Down; stop  
TREATMENTHighUp =
xr; XRAYHighUp [] e l ;  ELECTRONHighUp [] d_High_Up; stop
Figure 10.10: Therac Specification II in Basic LOTOS: Treatment
ELECTRONLowDown = h ide lb ,  hb, I s ,  hs in
(FIRELowDown »  TREATMENTLowDown) [] TREATMENTLowDown 
ELECTRONLowUp = h ide lb , hb, I s ,  hs in
(FIRELowUp »  TREATMENTLowUp) [] TREATMENTLowUp 
ELECTRONHighDown = h id e lb ,  hb, I s ,  hs in
(FIREHighDown »  TREATMENTHighDown) [] TREATMENTHighDown 
ELECTRONHighUp = h id e lb ,  hb, I s ,  hs in
(FIREHighUp »  TREATMENTHighUp) [] TREATMENTHighUp
Figure 10.11: Therac Specification II in Basic LOTOS: Electron
FIRELowDown = ZAPLowDown 
FIRELowUp = ERR0R55 
FIREHighDown = ERR0R54 
FIREHighUp = ZAPHighUp
ZAPLowDown
ZAPLowUp
ZAPHighDown
ZAPHighUp
f  ire_Low_Down; ex it  
fire_Low_Up; ex it  
f  ire_High_Down; ex it  
f  ire_High_Up; ex it
ERR0RerrJ54
ERR0RerrJ55
err_54; ex it  
err_55; ex it
Figure 10.12: Therac Specification II in Basic LOTOS: Remainder
P roving th e R ad iation  M achine is Safe
Now that the state of the beam and the shield is explicit, a bad trace is simply expressed as one 
which contains the event f  ire_High_Down. The conjecture to be proved in PAM (if the machine
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XRAYLowDown =
hide lb , hb, I s ,  hs in  
( TREATMENTLowDown 
[] hb; ( TREATMENTHighDown
[] hs; ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] lb ; ( TREATMENTLowUp
□  Is ;  TREATMENTLowDown))))))
XRAYLowUp =
hide lb , hb, I s ,  hs in 
( TREATMENTLowUp 
[] hb; ( TREATMENTHighUp
□  hs; ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
□  lb ; ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] I s ;  TREATMENTLowDown))))))
XRAYHighDown =
h ide lb , hb, I s ,  hs in  
( TREATMENTHighDown 
[] hb; ( TREATMENTHighDown
[] hs; ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] lb ; ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] Is ;  TREATMENTLowDown))))))
XRAYHighUp =
h id e lb , hb, I s ,  hs in  
( TREATMENTHighUp 
[] hb; ( TREATMENTHighUp
□  hs; ( TREATMENTHighUp
□  (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] lb ; ( TREATMENTLowUp
□  Is ;  TREATMENTLowDown))))))
Figure 10.13: Therac Specification II in Basic LOTOS: Xray
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is unsafe) is
(te s to k ; ex it cred h ide events in  UNSAFETESTLowDown) = true
where
UNSAFETESTLowDown = TREATMENTLowDown
| [f ire_High_Down, d_Low_Down, d_Low_Up, d_High_Down, d_High_Up] | 
TEST
TEST = f  ire_High_Down; te sto k ; ex it
events = lb , hb, I s ,  h s , xr, e l ,  err , d_Low_Down, d_Low_Up,
d_High_Down, dJiighJJp, f  ire_Low_Down, fire_Low_Up, 
f  ire_High_Down, fire_High_Up
This test process is slightly different from the original Basic LOTOS test of section 9.2: here 
the STARTUP process is dispensed with, as we can specify that treatment begins with the beam 
low and the shield down by using the process TREATMENTLowDown.
To prove the safety of this machine we use the method of section 9.2.4, i.e. unfold the top level 
process until we get an expression which refers recursively to itself, and check that the bad event 
does not occur in the unfolding. Note that in this example we have a set of mutually recursive 
equations, therefore each one will have to be unfolded and checked for occurrences of the bad 
event. This makes the proof longer, and a little more tedious, than before. Note that we have to 
complete the proof by hand, as we expect that the conjecture above does not hold; we merely use 
PAM to unfold the expression hide events in  UNSAFETEST
In order to allow certain expressions to be reduced and/or unfolded in a different way, the 
following new axioms are added to the usual set.
x I [S o rt(x )] I stop  = stop
h ide A in  h ide A in x = h ide A in x
(x [] y) I Cs] I z = (x I [s] I z) [] (y I [s] I z)
where S ort(x ) calculates the language of the process. These PAM axioms are derived from laws 
in the LOTOS standard and are mentioned in appendix D.2. The need for these axioms was 
discovered in an earlier attempt to perform the proof.
The proof proceeds by unfolding all process expressions of the form TREATMENT&s, where
bs stands for LowDown, LowUp, HighDown or HighUp. In the unfoldings of the proof below,
the following shorthands are used, UNSAFETEST&s for TREATMENT&s I [f  ire_High_Down] I TEST, 
delta_events for {d_Low_Down, d_Low_Up, d_High_Down, d_High_Up}, and, finally, a ll_even ts  
for therac_events union f  ire_events union d elta jeven ts. As in the examples in chapter 9, 
the axioms used to transform the expressions are noted on the right hand side.
h ide a l l  .events in  UNSAFETESTLowDown 
=wbc (unfold)
h id e a l l  .events in  
TREATMENTLowDown
I [d elta jeven ts union f  ire_High_Down] I f  ireJHighJDown; te sto k ; ex it
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= w b c (expansion)
x r ;( UNSAFETESTLowDown
□ i; ( UNSAFETESTHighDown
□ i; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
[] fire_High_Up; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
[] i; ( UNSAFETESTLowUp
[] i;  UNSAFETESTLowDown)))))
[] e l;  ( f  ire_Low_Down; UNSAFETESTLowDown [] UNSAFETESTLowDown)
We also need to unfold each of UNSAFETESTLowUp, UNSAFETESTHighDown and UNSAFETESTHighUp. 
UNSAFETESTLowUp
— wbc
hide hb, h s, lb , I s  in  TREATMENTLowUp
I [d elta jeven ts union f  ire_High-Down] I f  ire_High_Down; te sto k ; ex it
— wbc
xr; ( UNSAFETESTLowUp
□  i; ( fire_High_Up; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
[] i; (UNSAFETESTLowUp [] i; UNSAFETESTLowDown)) 
□ UNSAFETESTHighUp))
[] e l ;  (err_55; UNSAFETESTLowUp [] UNSAFETESTLowUp)
UNSAFETESTHighDown
— wbc
hide hb, h s, lb , I s  in  TREATMENTHighDown
I [delta_events union f  ire_High_Down] I f  ire_High_Down; te sto k ; ex it
— wbc
xr; ( UNSAFETESTHighDown
[] i; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
[] fire_High_Up; (UNSAFETESTHighUp □  i; UNSAFETESTLowDown))))
□  e l;  (e r r ^54; UNSAFETESTHighDown [] UNSAFETESTHighDown)
UNSAFETESTHighUp
— wbc
h id e hb, h s, lb , Is  in  TREATMENTHighUp
I [d elta jeven ts union f  ire_High_Down] I f  ire_High_Down; te sto k ; ex it
— wbc
xr; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
[] f  ire_High_Up; ( UNSAFETESTHighUp
□  i; (UNSAFETESTLowUp [] i; UNSAFETESTLowDown))))
[] e l ;  (fire_High_Up; UNSAFETESTHighUp [] UNSAFETESTHighUp)
By examining these unfoldings it can be seen that none have the capability to perform a 
f  ire_High_Down action, and that the machine must therefore be safe.
Sum m ary and D iscussion
Completion of this example has shown us that, while it may be possible to transform a full LOTOS 
specification into a Basic LOTOS one, the Basic LOTOS specification is so much larger that the
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proof becomes extremely tedious, especially as the proof is not fully automated. In the original 
paper, [Tho94], the LOLA tool was able to simulate the full LOTOS process, and identify duplicate 
states and therefore conclude that the bad test was rejected, i.e. the machine was safe. Certainly 
in this case, the LOLA simulation/testing tool seems more appropriate than our method of proof 
using PAM. On the other hand, PAM has a nice graphical interface and is easy to use, despite the 
process expressions being presented all on one line, with no indentation showing process structure. 
The interface to LOLA is text based, and although indentation is used to aid readability of 
the processes, other features of LOLA such as rather terse on-line help, and lots of confusing 
information produced during the analysis, make LOLA more difficult to use.
We also note here that while performing the transformation some errors in the original descrip­
tion of [Tho94] were found. The FIRE process was incorrect in that it never allowed the high beam 
to be fired, even if the shield was up. This meant that the machine was incapable of delivering an 
xray treatment, and could only perform electron treatments. This error was due to an oversight in 
the specification of the guard conditions of the FIRE process. A further problem is that although 
the mechanism is set up to detect errors (either firing at the wrong level or the beam becoming 
weak), no actions are taken when an error is detected. This means that once an error occurs 
the machine is livelocked: the operator can select a treatment, but the machine refuses to deliver 
that treatment, allowing the operator to select another treatment instead. Obviously the original 
author made a decision to model only certain aspects of the problem, and this was one of the 
features that were ignored.
We now go on to explore a different approach to transforming a full LOTOS specification into 
a Basic LOTOS one.
10.3.3 Using C ontexts
Obviously each of the abstract interpretation approaches of section 10.3.1 has its problems; what 
may be useful is to use a combination of both techniques, preserving information of finite data 
types and throwing away information about infinite data types. This may allow some verification 
to be carried out. There is another problem however: the second transformation may be suitable 
where data types are simple, e.g. the naturals, characters, integers, etc., but what happens when 
more “complex” data types are added, e.g. stacks, queues, i.e. adts with more structure? It quickly 
becomes impossible to deal with gates which are composed of gate names and the entire contents 
of a stack, for example. We may also encounter a similar problem for gates at which many values 
are exchanged, e.g. g!3 ?x !2(n + 1) ?y. A further problem of the second transformation is 
that common data types such as stacks and queues are typically infinite. Obviously, for the first 
transformation these are not problems, as the data is ignored; however, the first transformation 
throws away too much data to be useful in general, which means we have to find a solution to the
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problems of the second transformation.
This section describes a method, presented in [BK91, Bri92], of turning complex data types 
into simple ones. The method is general, as the transformation is derived from the definition 
of the data types. Data types are not completely replaced by processes; the aim is to produce 
processes having a maximum of one data parameter and only simple data types. Below we refer 
only to [BK91]; this is a technical report which contains more detail than the published version of 
the work [Bri92].
The method is presented here as it provides a means of deriving a process algebra oriented 
specification from an adt oriented specification. The two specifications are weak bisimulation con­
gruent (or possibly strong bisimulation equivalent, depending on which derivation rules are used). 
As with the two approaches above, the main reason for using this derivation is that it is typically 
easier to reason about Basic LOTOS specifications than full LOTOS ones. We illustrate the use of 
the method by taking S tack .l of section 10.2.2 and deriving a weak bisimulation congruent pro­
cess algebra stack; the process algebra stack happens to be the Stack_2 of section 10.2.3. Thus the 
derivation also supports our earlier proof, using a different technique, that StackJL =wbc Stack_2. 
In the original paper, four examples of common data types are transformed from ACT ONE speci­
fications into process algebra specifications; the bag, the queue, the stack and the set. The version 
of stack presented in [BK91] is slightly different from our Stack_l, therefore presentation of this 
example is not merely a repeat of the work in [BK91].
We begin by presenting the main ideas and some technical background of the method of [BK91].
T he T echnicalities
The method is based on contexts. A context can be imagined as a LOTOS behaviour expression 
with a number of holes in it. In the definition of weak bisimulation congruence in section 3.4.3 
and in the definition of the cred  relation in section 3.5.3 contexts with only one hole were used to 
express the congruence property, i.e. that congruent processes should behave in the same way in all 
environments. The main theorem of [BK91] is that given an appropriate context equation, where 
the context is the unknown, it is possible to construct a process algebra description of that context 
to perform the function of the data type, thus removing the need for the ACT ONE specification 
of the data type.
A context may be characterised by transductions; in the same way that process states are 
related by transitions, contexts are related by transductions. In general, transductions are written
C -  [a/6] C'
and should be read as “the context C evolves into C'  by producing an a action, which may interact
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with the outside environment, and consuming a 6 action from the process inside” . A transduction 
C — [a/b] —> C'  corresponds to an SOS inference rule of the form
X  — )■ X '  b C[X] C'[X']
Contexts may be composed, written C o D[X], which means C\D\X^.
The main theorem of [BK91] describes a method for constructing a process corresponding 
to a context based on the information contained in the transductions of that context. The only 
transductions considered are those where 6 =  0, which means that no action is produced internally, 
i.e. C  performs a independently, and b = a, which means that the action a is passed through the 
context. The process, pc,  which represents the context C , is built as follows
Pc := 0 {a';pc' | C -  [a/0] ->• C "} Q 0 {^IPc' | C -  [a/a] C"}
and the following equation holds
C[X]~(Pc | [M] | X)[S»]
where SH is a renaming function which turns primed actions back into unprimed actions. The 
actions are primed because, if the context performs an action independently, then the action must 
be temporarily renamed to ensure it does not accidentally synchronise with actions from X.  On 
the other hand, if the context is merely passing an action on from the inner process, it performs 
the action in parallel with the inner process; this has the desired effect because of the multi-way 
synchronisation of LOTOS.
The equation is phrased in terms of strong bisimulation equivalence, but of course the weaker 
relations may be used in place of ~ .
Stack E xam ple
We start with the full LOTOS stack, Stack_l, as given in figure 10.3. In this definition, the 
processes are parameterised by values of type Stack_Type. The aim of the transformation is to 
reduce these stack parameters to simple data types. A suitable context equation for this example 
is
C'x[Used_Stack_l(s)] ~  Used_Stack_l(Push(s, x))
i.e. the context models the last element pushed onto the stack, the top element, ignoring the rest 
of the stack (which is modelled by the process inside the context).
Given this context equation, we define the transductions of the context on which we can then
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use the method of [BK91] to generate the process modelling that context. The process of defining 
the transductions is a weak point of the method, as expressing the most appropriate transductions 
is highly dependent on the skill of the user. It is important to realise that several ways of expressing 
the transductions might be possible, and that not all transductions allow the process corresponding 
to the context to be easily generated.
We define two transductions for the initial case, s = New:
C  — [push?x/0] —>■ Cx o C 
C — [empty! tr u e /0] —>■ C
Since we know that the stack is empty, only the actions push?x and empty! true are possible. We 
also define four transductions for the general case, s /  New:
Cx — [push?y/0] —► Cy o Cx
Cx -[pop/0] -» I
Cx — [top!x/0] ->■ Cx
Cx — [empty!false/0] —Y Cx
where I  denotes the identity context, with transductions I  — [a/a] —> I  for all a. Since the context 
models the top of the stack we know that x is at the top of the stack and that the stack is not 
empty, allowing the top !x  and em pty!false actions.
In all of these transductions none of the actions are generated by the process inside the context 
Cx since this process is just the bottom part of the stack and is unaffected by operations to the 
top of the stack. After top or empty the context remains unchanged and after pop action the 
context behaves like the identity context, i.e. it allows all actions to pass through unchanged since 
after x is popped from the top of the stack there is nothing more to do. Lastly, if a new element 
is pushed onto the stack, the context behaves like the context for the new element composed with 
the old context, i.e. the old context is kept around until it is needed again.
The problem with transforming these equations according to the theorem is that the last 
equation gives composed contexts of arbitrary length, implying that each process has arbitrarily 
complex arguments. To solve this problem in [BK91], a new theorem is introduced which deals 
specifically with contexts of the form C — [a/0] —» C'  and I  — [a/a] —> I. The new theorem, ex­
pressed using =wbc rather than ~ , allows identity contexts to be interpreted as ex it and sequential 
composition to be used in place of parallelism. Applying this theorem gives the following solution 
for Cx [X]:
Cx[ X] : =(  push?y; q(x,y)
[] pop; ex it  
Q top !x; Cx[X]
[] em pty!fa lse; Cx[X]) »  X
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where q(x, y) =  Cy o Cx[X).
Of course the criteria for the transformation have still not been met in that, although only 
simple data types are now used, the process q has two arguments. q(x, y) can be further decom­
posed by further examination of the original transductions for Cx and also of the above process, 
Cx \X\.  Two transitions can be applied to Cx\X\ according to these sources:
Cx [X] P^ I '  Cv oCx[X)
Cx[X] q ( x , y ) »  X
(distributing through [| ). The right hand side states are equivalent by definition since our 
processes are deterministic, i.e.
?(*C) y )  ^  X  = w b c  C y  O C x p f ]
The right hand side of this equation can be transformed by rewriting the composition of contexts, 
and applying associativity of and the definition of Cx[X].
y) ^  x  =WbC
((push?z; q(y,z) [] pop; ex it [] to p ly ; Cy o Cx [X] □  em pty lfa lse ; Cy o Cx[X]) 
»  (push?z; q(x,z)  [] pop; exit [] to p lx ; Cx[X] [] em pty lfalse; Cx [X]))
»  X
Since X  can be an arbitrary process, we can take it to be ex it and use a weak bisimulation 
congruence P  ex it = w bc P  to further transform this expression. This equivalence holds by the 
following argument.
If P  terminates with ex it, then by law (d2a) of the standard the final ex it of P  ex it 
becomes i; exit, which can be further reduced to give ex it (since there must be actions in P  
we can apply law (m l)) , therefore P  ex it reduces to P.  In this case we know that q(x,y) 
will eventually terminate, therefore use of this equivalence is sound. We note that in [BK91] 
the process stop  was (incorrectly) used rather than ex it. By applying the weak bisimulation 
congruence laws to P  s top  we get the actions of P  followed by ex it s top  which is the same 
as stop . Effectively we have turned the final ex it of P  into stop. Obviously the two process do 
not have the same behaviour, i.e. P  s top  =£w bc P- 
So, by taking X  to be ex it we get
?(®> V ) — wbc
( (push?z; q(y,z) [] pop; ex it [] to p ly ; Cy oCx [X] □ em pty lfa lse ; Cy oCx[X])
»  (push?z; q(x, z ) [] pop; ex it [] to p lx ; Cx [X] [] em pty lfa lse ; (7x[X]))
and, prefixing each side by push?y,
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push?y; q(x,y) =wbc 
push?y;
( (push?z; q(y, z) □  pop; ex it [] top ly ; Cy oCx [X] [] em ptylfa lse; Cy oCx [X])
(push?z; q(x,z) [] pop; ex it [] top lx ; Cx[X] [] em ptylfa lse; Cx [X]))
i.e. push?y; q(x, y) is a solution of
X(x)  = xubc
push?y; ((A (y) [] pop; ex it [] top ly ; Cy o Cx[X] [] em ptylfa lse; Cy oCx[X])
»  (X{x)  [] pop; ex it [] top lx ; Cx[X] [] em ptylfa lse; Cx[X]))
By the uniqueness of solutions to recursive process we know that the above expression represents 
only one process, therefore we name it Unit (x).
Unit (x) = w bc
push?y; ((U n it(y ) [] pop; ex it [] top ly; Cy o Cx[X] [] em ptylfa lse; Cy o Cx [X])
»  (U n it(x ) [] pop; ex it [] top lx ; Cx\X\ [] em pty lfa lse; Cx[X]))
One more step gives us the final solution to our transformation. Let Top(x) be the process 
corresponding to Cx [X] given earlier, then from the solution to push?y; q(x, y) given above by the 
process Unit we get the following for Top (x):
Top (x) := ( Unit (x)
[] pop; ex it 
□  to p lx ; Top (x)
[] em pty lfa lse; Top (x ))
remembering that X  =  exit. From this we can then express Unit as
Unit (x) := push?y; Top (y) Top (x)
By the same method as above, we define a process corresponding to C[X],  the context which 
models the empty stack. Since only two transductions are defined for C[X] we only have two 
branches in the process.
C[X] := (push?x; (Cx oC[X\ )
[] empty I true; C[X\) X
As above, we let X  =  ex it, and call C[X\  Stack, giving
Stack = push?x; (Top (x) »  Stack)
□  empty I true; Stack
Note that our derived process, Stack, is weak bisimulation congruent to the original abstract 
data type oriented stack, Stack_i, by definition of the derivation, but also to Stack_2. With some 
manipulation, substituting Unit into Top, reversing the process of distributing »  through [] and 
changing process names, the process Stack above is syntactically identical to the process StackJ2 
of figure 10.4.
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This example shows that it is possible to derive a process algebra specification from an ab­
stract data type; the method also gives us that the two specifications are equivalent, either by 
strong bisimulation equivalence, or weak bisimulation congruence, depending on which theorems 
of [BK91] are used.
10.3.4 R elated Work
In [Led87] a different approach to verifying full LOTOS specifications is taken: the idea is to 
separate the descriptions involving adts from the purely process descriptions. The specification of 
the system as a whole is obtained by composing the adt and process algebra descriptions using 
parallelism. The verification of the system then proceeds on the assumption that the correctness 
of the whole implementation with respect to the specification can be deduced from the correctness 
of the parts. Correctness here is measured by the red  preorder of [BSS87]. This relation, rather 
than weak bisimulation congruence for example, is chosen because of the properties of the trans­
formation used to convert a process dependent on data to one independent of data. In [Led87] a 
rather peculiar transformation from data dependent to data independent processes is used; only 
the guards of the data dependent process are considered, the event offers and process parame­
ters being ignored. This excludes two important sources of information about the possible value 
of a variable; presumably this approach is taken in order to make the transformation simpler. 
The transformation does not preserve the branching structure of the original process as branches 
whose guards are false, and thus are not executed if data information is preserved, are retained. 
The introduction of internal events to model the nondeterminism of choices in which a number 
of guards are true precludes the possibility of using weak bisimulation congruence. Given the 
transformation of section 10.3.1, which behaves more as expected, this approach to the data of a 
full LOTOS specification seems very strange.
Apart from the odd transformation from full LOTOS to Basic LOTOS used, this approach has 
three main problems: firstly, the equivalence of processes involving data has still to be evaluated, 
and it is not made clear whether or not this is possible. Secondly, as demonstrated in chapter 7, it 
is not always possible to deduce anything about the correctness of the whole from the correctness 
of the parts, or rather, it may not be possible to prove anything about the correctness of the parts. 
Thirdly, it seems that the approach only works in the special cases where the two concerns can be 
separated, and therefore relies on the specifier adopting this fairly restrictive approach. In many 
specifications, the data has an important part to play in the flow of control of the process, and is 
intrinsic to the process, therefore it cannot easily be moved to a separate process.
207
10.4  Sum m ary and D iscu ssion
In this chapter the problems of performing verification on full LOTOS specifications have been 
examined and several possible solutions have been explored. We presented a modified version of 
the approach used in chapter 9 and attempted to show (using hand proofs) that an abstract data 
type oriented version of the Stack was equivalent to a process algebra oriented version of the Stack. 
Although successful for Stack_l =wbc Stack_2, we could not show Stack_l =wbc Stack_3.
The proof technique used successfully for Stack_l =wbc Stack_2 seems too complex and the 
proofs too tedious to be carried out reliably (if at all) on other (larger) examples.
A problem we encountered in attempting to prove Stack_l =wbc S tack J  was that LOTOS is 
not a rich enough language to be able to express the properties we wish to show. The next chapter 
proposes the use of logic to specify system properties as a solution to this problem. Meanwhile, in 
this chapter we continued by investigating the possibility of transforming the data information in 
a full LOTOS specification into a process, allowing us to continue using the equational reasoning 
paradigm. Although we can already see that equational reasoning does not provide an ideal setting 
for verification of full LOTOS specifications, it is interesting to see exactly how far we can go before 
the method breaks down completely. The methods investigated rely on first transforming the full 
LOTOS specification into a Basic LOTOS specification, and carrying out any verification on the 
Basic LOTOS specification. We presented the approaches of two other authors to this problem. 
The methods were illustrated by a version of the radiation machine example and the Stack example 
respectively. We also investigated the properties of the transformations produced by one of the 
methods.
It can be seen that each approach on its own does not offer a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of verification of Full LOTOS specifications. In particular, abstract interpretation either 
throws away too much information, or results in an explosion in the size of the specification, 
and the contexts approach relies heavily on the ingenuity of the person doing the transformation 
(although the main data types are covered in [BK91]). However, it may be possible to obtain 
useful results if the different approaches are used together.
For example, a specification of a telephone system is presented in [FLS90]. This specification 
uses three types of data: sets, enumerated types, including booleans, and natural numbers. The 
natural numbers represent the telephone numbers, so we could restrict them to a finite portion of 
the naturals to allow the verification to be carried out. Booleans can be treated like an enumer­
ated type with two values. Two other enumerated types are used: one to denote the state of the 
telephone, Ok or Busy, and the other to denote different phases of the connection process, e.g. dial, 
ring, connect and so on. In the (constraint-oriented) specification the latter are used mainly to 
constrain synchronisations. All enumerated types can be replaced by applying the second trans­
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formation, which will preserve all data. Finally, the sets can be implemented as processes by using 
context equations to derive the appropriate behaviour. Having performed these transformations, 
various properties of the system could be checked, such as it is impossible to call two numbers at 
once, the number dialled is the number connected to, and so on.
This example demonstrates how the approaches to full LOTOS specifications can be used 
together to simplify the specification, hopefully retaining enough information that the results 
proved on the simplified specification can also be applied to the original system.
The next chapter abandons the equational reasoning approach to verification, looking instead 
at the possibility of using temporal or modal logic to describe the requirements of a system.
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C hapter 11
Verification Requirem ents III: 
Temporal and M odal Properties
11.1 In trod u ction
Since chapter 4 we have considered only the approach to verification of comparing two LOTOS 
specifications using equational reasoning. We saw that this approach was beginning to break down 
in the case study of chapter 7, in the attempt to axiomatise the cred  preorder in section 8.4, and 
again when we tackled full LOTOS in chapter 10. More specifically, in the case study we had 
to dramatically alter the form of the specification in order to prove that it was equivalent to the 
implementation; in expressing the cred  preorder in PAM we had to resort to axiomatising cred  
as an equivalence, which is not generally sound; and in the full LOTOS studies we discovered 
that the introduction of data leads to an unacceptable increase in the complexity of the proof 
technique.
A feature common to all these problems is the notion of partial specification. The original 
case study specification, i.e. the protocols, was partial with respect to the system described by 
the implementation, but neither equivalence relations nor the c red  preorder could express this 
relationship; instead we had to strengthen the specification.
Although the cred preorder expresses something of the notion of partial specification, namely 
the reduction of nondeterminism, it was too strong for the case study. In addition, as showed in 
section 8.4.1, we are unable to implement it soundly in the equational reasoning paradigm without 
losing much of the power of the original relation.
As for the problems with full LOTOS, we could alleviate the complexity of proofs involving 
data types by using partial specifications of the properties of the system, thereby simplifying the 
specification and hopefully also the proofs. As can be seen in the above examples, we are unable to
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use process algebra and equivalence relations to express the notion of partial specification directly.
In chapter 2 we indicated that we might sometimes want to use a different formalism to describe 
the requirements of a system; this may also solve the problems of partial specification described 
above. In this chapter we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using logic in that role.
Logic is a non-constructive specification formalism; this means the ordering of events is spec­
ified implicitly, while safety and liveness properties are specified explicitly. We are particularly 
interested in modal and temporal logics, e.g. [HM85, MP92, Koz83]. Some of these logics have 
another useful property, already referred to in section 3.4.3, which is that they provide alternative 
characterisations for the various equivalences on processes. This means that if two processes are 
equivalent, they satisfy the same modal formulae, and if they are not equivalent, there is at least 
one formula satisfied by one process and not the other. If the logic has this property we say that 
it is adequate with respect to the equivalence.
The proof technique usually associated with logic is model checking. Model checking allows 
us to determine whether a given formula holds in the model. In particular, we may use process 
algebra to express that model. Algorithms exist which automate model checking; the user is not 
required to intervene. (Therefore model checking does not depend on the skill of the user for its 
success, unlike the system developed in chapter 8 which is highly reliant on the skills of the user.)
We begin our study of the use of temporal or modal logics with LOTOS by surveying the 
current state of use of temporal logics for LOTOS; only two approaches are known to the author, 
[FGL89, FGR90] and [DFGR92]. Neither of these is suitable for our purposes; the reasons are 
given below. In contrast to this small literature on logic for LOTOS is the large body of work 
on logics for CCS; in particular, for HML (Hennessy-Milner Logic) and its various extensions, 
including modal mu-calculus. A very simple proof technique [SW90] can be used to show that a 
CCS process satisfies a property expressed in one of these logics. Moreover, the logics and proof 
technique do not rely on the syntax of CCS; they are based on labelled transition systems. For 
this reason, we consider the use of the modal mu-calculus with Basic LOTOS.
We present HML and the modal mu-calculus in some detail, together with descriptions and 
examples of the sorts of properties we might use these logics to specify. We continue by illustrating 
the application of logic to two of the problem examples mentioned above, showing how logic can 
solve the problems introduced by partial specifications. Finally, we conjecture that it might be 
possible to extend this logic and proof techinique for use with full LOTOS and give a sketch of 
this together with some examples. We do not pursue the topic here; it is to be the subject of a 
SERC-funded research project, “Temporal Aspects of Verification of LOTOS Specifications” , at 
the University of Glasgow.
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11.2 T em p oral Logics and LO TO S
In [FGL89] a temporal logic for Basic LOTOS is described. The aim of [FGL89] is to give a 
compositional temporal logic semantics for Basic LOTOS, this allows equality of processes and 
satisfiability of formulae to be expressed in terms of temporal logic formulae. In this approach 
each operator of LOTOS corresponds to a logical formula and the meaning of a process is given by 
its characteristic formula, written x(p)-  The ability of a process p to satisfy a particular formula 
<f>, written p |= <f>, can then be expressed as x{p)  The logic defined is expressive with respect
to trace equivalence over processes, which means that p = tr a c e  9 is expressed as q |= x{p)  (o r 
vice versa).
The logic is adequate with respect to trace equivalence, but, as discussed previously, trace 
equivalence is too weak for most verification purposes because liveness properties are not preserved. 
The main problem of this approach, therefore, is that the logic is too weak. Other problems are 
that the proof technique can get very complicated because it involves (possibly nested) fixed points 
and that the i action is not given its special status as an unobservable action.
This work is extended in [FGR90], in which the logic CTL* [CES86] and its relationship to a 
subset of Basic LOTOS, namely action prefix, choice and recursion, is considered. The main result 
of [FGR90] is that while it is possible to give a compositional temporal logic semantics which is 
adequate with respect to strong bisimulation equivalence for this subset of LOTOS, no such logic 
exists for a larger subset of LOTOS. In order to obtain a logic of this strength for Basic LOTOS, 
either the compositionality of the semantics must be abandoned or the logic must be strengthened 
by adding new operators.
The author knows of no other work on the use of a temporal logic with LOTOS (either full 
or Basic LOTOS), although some related work may be found in [DFGR92, LITE]. In [DFGR92] 
a proof technique is described which allows formulae expressed in ACTL (action based CTL) to 
be checked against the model provided by a labelled transition system, expressed in either CCS 
or MEIJE. The underlying model checker is based on CTL and Kripke structures (state based 
transition systems), and the method defines two translations, one from labelled transition systems 
to Kripke structures, and the other from ACTL to CTL. This proof technique is implemented 
for LOTOS in the LITE toolkit [LITE]. Unfortunately, the translations described by [DFGR92] 
only work in one direction; this means that if two processes are not equivalent, the system cannot 
express this information in terms of the labelled transition systems and ACTL. The user must 
learn to work in the world of CTL and Kripke structures or lose the information supplied in the 
case of inequivalence of processes. Such information is one of the advantages of using logic-based 
systems, therefore it seems a shame to lose it.
In direct contrast to the very small literature for logic and LOTOS is the large volume of
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literature concerned with logic and CCS. This proliferation of work on CCS and logic may in fact 
be the reason that this topic has not been pursued specifically in relation to LOTOS.
The most commonly used logic for CCS, HML (Hennessy-Milner Logic), is defined over labelled 
transition systems, therefore there should be no reason why HML cannot be applied to Basic 
LOTOS. Indeed, HML has already been used indirectly for LOTOS in [EFJ90], where the tool 
Caesar is used to provide a labelled transition system which is modified (by changing the event 
names) by hand and then entered into the Concurrency Workbench for model checking. This 
application of HML to LOTOS shows that the only difficulty with using HML for LOTOS lies in 
the lack of a suitable proof technique, or rather proof tool. Obviously it is not acceptable to have 
to modify every example by hand in order to use the Concurrency Workbench.
To show that a formula $  holds for a particular process p we must show p belongs to the set 
of processes satisfying $. One way of doing this is to construct that set and then test for p being 
a member. Obviously this method involves a lot of unnecessary work since p will typically not 
be the only process satisfying <$. Fortunately, other methods for checking a process satisfies a 
formula exist. Safety properties over finite state systems can be checked by reachability analysis, 
but this technique suffers from the state explosion problem. Other methods use proof systems 
built from inference rules which allow the truth of a statement to be deduced from the truth 
of previously proved statements; there are several examples of such systems. Methods which 
make use of the structure of the syntax of the process include [Sti87, AW92]; others, such as 
[SW90, BS90, Lar90a], rely on the structure of the labelled transition system. Obviously this 
latter class of proof techniques is more useful to us since it is independent of CCS syntax.
Not all these proof techniques can be easily automated. Those intended for automation include 
the technique described in [Lar90a], which is automated in TAV [GLZ89], and the tableau method 
of [SW90], a version of which is automated in [CPS89]. These systems are fully automatic, but 
do not support infinite transition systems; however, the tableau method of [SW90] is extended to 
infinite transition systems in [BS90]. This extension is automated in the proof assistant [Bra92],
In the rest of this chapter we consider the use of an extension of HML, the modal mu-calculus, 
for LOTOS.
11.3 In trodu cing  H M L and its V ariants
Modal logics are interpreted over labelled transition systems. In addition to the usual propositional 
logic operators, we also have modalities expressing transitional change. We begin by presenting a 
simple logic, a very slight extension of HML [HM85].
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The syntax of the logic is:
$ ::= tt | Z | -- $  | $1 A $ 2 I [K]$
where K  C Act. In the original HML only single actions are allowed in the modalities.
Operators of this logic are the usual boolean operators (tt, — and A), plus [AT], the modal 
operator “always” , where [A]<1> means that $  holds after every performance of all actions in K.
In addition to the main operators of the language, a number of dual operators can be defined; 
see figure 11.1. The new modal operator {K ) is called “possible” ; ( K) $  means that holds after 
some performance of any action in K.
ff
V $2 
(K)<S>
Figure 11.1: Additional Defined Operators for the Modal Mu-Calculus
The modal operators [A'] and (K)  are analogous to the m u st and m ay testing relations of 
chapter 3. Each operator expresses the necessity or possibility, respectively, of an action being 
performed.
Abbreviations which are useful in formulae are: [—] to denote [Act] and [- K ] to denote 
[Act — K], Similarly, (—) denotes {Act) and (—K ) denotes {Act — K ).
One problem with the above logic is that it cannot express invariants over an infinite compu­
tation. For example, given the process P = a\ P  we can express the property of P  being capable 
of performing an a action by P  (a)tt. However, we cannot express the property that P  is 
always able to perform the action a; the nearest we can get is an infinite formula of the form 
P  |= (a)tt A [a]((a)tt A [a]((a)tt A ...)). To fully express this property we need to extend the 
logic. One method is to introduce infinitary connectives, but these are undesirable if automated 
verification is planned. An alternative solution is to use modal equations to express properties; 
the property above then becomes P  f= Z  =  (a)tt A [a]Z, i.e. Z  says a is possible, and after all 
a transitions, Z  holds. This equation has a number of solutions/fixed points; the smallest being 
the empty set and the largest being the set containing the process P.
The smallest solution to a modal equation is not always the empty set. Another example of 
a modal equation is Z — {b)tt V [a]Z which says either b is possible, or after all a transitions Z  
holds. The smallest solution gives us processes which perform a finite number of a actions followed 
by a b action, while the largest solution can perform an infinite number of a actions and b need 
never occur. This formula is also known as until in some logics because we are expressing the 
property that a holds until b holds.
def
def
= J - t t
A —$ 2)
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As we have seen, the smallest and largest solutions to a modal equation can specify quite 
different properties, therefore in practice we will find it convenient to be able to indicate which 
of the two is required. If we continue to use the equational format to express such properties, 
indicating whether we want the largest or the smallest solution may become cumbersome, especially 
when the formula involves more than one equation. Rather than introduce equations to the 
language, we introduce fixed point operators, one for the least solution to the equation, one for 
the greatest. These two solutions are guaranteed to exist, due to the properties of the operators 
of the logic and Tarski’s theorem.
The resulting logic is called the modal mu-calculus and it was first used in conjunction with 
process algebras in [Lar90b]. Modal mu-calculus can also be described as a propositional branching 
time temporal logic. It will be formally introduced below and used for all the examples following.
11.3.1 The M odal M u-Calculus
The syntax of the modal mu-calculus is the same as that of HML given above, with the addition 
of uZ.<& where Z ranges over propositional variables, and the removal of tt. We define tt  =  vZ.Z.
The new operator, vZ.<&, denotes the greatest fixed point over $  (the maximal solution to the 
equation Z — $). This expression has the syntactic restriction that each free occurrence of Z  in 
$  must lie within the scope of an even number of negations (this constraint allows the application 
of Tarski’s theorem, guaranteeing the existence of least and greatest fixed points).
Just as we defined V to be the dual of A and (K)  to be the dual of [K] we can define a dual 
of u which denotes the least fixed point (minimal solution) of an equation. It is called /*, and is 
defined as follows:
nZ.df =f  ~ ^vZ .^ [Z  := -<Z]
where <b[Z := ->Z] is the formula obtained by substituting -iZ  for each free occurrence of Z  in 
The semantics of the modal operators is given in figure 11.2.
\\Z\\v = V(Z) ( Z S V a r )
I h * | | v  =  P - I W I v
11$] A $ 2 ||v =  ||$ l||v  ^  ll$2 ||v
||[/r]#||v = { P e v - . v k e  k . v p ' . p  - ± + p ' = > p ' s  ||$ ||v}
||(/f>$||v = {P e  V  : 3k € K S P '.P  P ' => P ' e  ||* ||v}
| | i / Z .$ | |v  =  U { £  S  v  ■ £  £  I l* llv [e /Z ]}
U Z M W  =  n { £  £  v  ■ l l* l lv [ e /3 ]  C  £ }
Figure 11.2: Interpretation of Modal Formulae
Formulae of the logic are interpreted over the model (T, V), where T  is a labelled transition 
system and V is a valuation assigning a set of processes to each variable, V{Z) C V  for each Z.  
The valuation may be updated, written V[S/Z\ , to give V', where V' =  V except at Z, where
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V'{Z) =  £. The notation ||$ ||y  is used to denote the set of processes satisfying $ . Usually the T  
is dropped, since it will be obvious from the context.
A process p satisfies a property $ , written p |= $ , if and only if p E ||$ ||v , for some valuation 
V. Modal mu-calculus is adequate with respect to observation/weak bisimulation equivalence.
In the interpretations of figure 11.2, the labelled transition system T  has the transition relation 
— >; the relation = >  may also be used, allowing silent actions to be ignored. The modal operators 
are then written |A | and ((A)), and are defined as follows:
||[ /f]$ ||v  =  {P £ V  : Vi 6 K.VP'.P  =k- P ' => P ' 6 ||$ ||v}
||«/f»® ||v = { p  £ V  : 3* € K 3 P . P  =k- P'  => P ' € ||$ ||v}
The power of the logic is unchanged by this use of =>• instead of — ► , because both [A] and ((A)) 
can be defined in terms of [A'] and (A); however, these forms are often more convenient to use. 
Note that now the modalities may also include [e]| and ((c)), where c is the empty string. These 
formulae indicate the occurrence of a sequence of internal actions.
Above we claimed that it is possible to use the modal mu-calculus in conjunction with Basic 
LOTOS because its definition relies on labelled transition systems rather than process algebra 
syntax. To demonstrate this, we present several examples of the use of mu-calculus for Basic 
LOTOS in the next two sections. We also describe classifications of properties, giving common 
examples from each class.
11.4 C lasses o f  P ro p ertie s
It is useful to be able to classify various properties for two reasons. First, the classifications 
supply templates for formulae which are used frequently in specifications; second, as mentioned in 
chapter 2, the classification can be used as a measure of the completeness of our specification, e.g. 
typically a specification contains representatives of each class. One such classification is known as 
the safety/liveness classification [Lam77]. This classification contains two almost disjoint classes, 
which can be informally described as:
safety  “nothing bad” happens, or invariance, i.e. some property on states holds continuously.
liveness “something good” happens, or response, i.e. requests are eventually dealt with.
The only formula common to both classes is the atomic formula tt. This classification is nice 
because of its simple and intuitive definition.
A different classification, put forward in [MP89], gives a hierarchy of classes distinguished by 
syntactic structure. Each class is also associated with a distinct proof technique. (No such clear
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cut relations exist between the classes of safety and liveness and syntactic structure and/or proof 
technique.) However, the classification of [MP89] does not encompass all expressible properties, 
although the authors claim that all the properties generally required are included.
Below we give a few examples of the sort of properties which may be expressed in the modal 
mu-calculus in order to illustrate what we might expect to be typical usage of the logic with 
respect to LOTOS processes; the presentation reflects the division of properties into the classes 
of safety and liveness, and also the existence of several subclasses. The examples are small, and 
already familiar from earlier chapters. The specific problem examples we drew attention to in the 
introduction to this chapter will be dealt with in the next section.
We begin with safety properties.
11.4.1 Safety Properties
C apacity  This class is the set of properties which say that a process may perform some action, 
i.e. the process is capable of performing the action, although it won’t necessarily perform it. 
Formulae of this subclass contain the operator (K).
For example, given a buffer
B uffer := in ; ou t; B uffer
we may say that once the buffer receives an input, then it is capable of an output. This can be 
expressed using logic.
B uffer |= [in](out)tt 
After all transitions labelled by in, the action out is possible.
N ecessity This class expresses the property that an action not only can occur, but that it must 
occur. For example, once the buffer receives an input, then that item will be output.
Buffer ^  [in]((out)tt A [—out]ff)
After all transitions in, the action out is possible and all other actions are impossible (since ff can 
never be satisfied).
G lobal Invarian ts  The particular formula for a global invariant will depend on the system 
under consideration; however, we can say that in general global invariants are expressed using a 
greatest fixed point. This is because, as a safety property, we want to say that the invariant holds 
forever, i.e. over a (possibly infinite) sequence of actions.
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A particular example of a global invariant is freedom from deadlock. We begin by expressing 
what it means for a process to be deadlocked, i.e. incapable of performing an observable action.
Deadlock [—e]ff
Although deadlock can be good (if viewed as termination), usually we interpret deadlock as un­
successful termination. To say that a process is never deadlocked, it must satisfy:
vZ.-iDeadlock A [—]Z
Yet another global invariant commonly encountered is the property of mutual exclusion.
M u tu a l Exclusion Given two processes and a shared resource, we may wish to ensure that 
only one process at a time may access that resource, i.e. the processes must exclude each other 
from their critical section (the part where they use the resource).
This was described using process algebra in the Readers and Writers example of section 9.3, 
where the mutually exclusive actions were reading and writing (from/to a part of memory). We 
may specify that reading and writing never occur at the same time using logic:
Spec =? i/Z.([rb][wb]ff A [wb][rb]ff A [—\Z)
This formula says that the sequences of actions rb,wb and wb,rb are not permitted at any stage, 
since no process can satisfy the formula ff. Compare this with the process algebra specification of 
section 9.3, where it was necessary to specify the actions which could occur. Using logic allows us 
to specify directly that actions may not occur.
To say that the processes implementing the system, as given in figure 9.9 of section 9.3, satisfy 
this formula, we write Impl |= Spec.
We also want to look at liveness properties.
11.4.2 Liveness Properties
We mentioned above that it is a useful general principle that safety properties are best described 
by maximal solutions because these express properties which hold over infinite computations. On 
the other hand, liveness properties are best described by minimal solutions because these express 
properties which hold over finite computations. (Remember that liveness properties say something 
good eventually happens, i.e. within a finite amount of time.)
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R esponse A response property usually has the form “if some event occurs, then eventually we 
get a response to that event” . Using the buffer example above, a response property might be that 
after an in  action, there will eventually be an out action (although we may first have a finite 
sequence of some other actions):
Buffer [in]//Z.((out)tt V [—]Z)
We would also want to say that this formula is true for every occurrence of in, so we wrap the 
above response formula up in a greatest fixed point, giving:
Buffer \= i/Y.([in]/iZ.((out)tt V [—]Z) A [out]Y)
T erm ination  The most obvious liveness property is that the process eventually terminates. 
This can be expressed by saying the process converges, i.e. may only perform a finite number of 
actions.
Converges d= (iZ.[—]Z
The opposite of this is divergence, i.e. the process is capable of performing silent actions forever.
Diverges *=? uZ.(\)Z
Liveness/L ivelock Freedom  We may also want to express the absence of divergence by saying 
that the process is live.
Live d= [ej((—e))tt
defLiveness =  fiZ.Live A [—]Z
In other words, there may be a finite number of internal actions, but eventually an observable 
action will occur.
Above we have given a very small selection of properties which can be expressed in the modal 
mu-calculus. In the next section we explore further the greater suitability of logic for expressing 
certain system properties by considering how logic can solve the partial specification problems 
mentioned in the introduction.
11.5 U sin g  Logic For P artia l S p ecifica tion s
We began this chapter by describing the problems encountered in the equational reasoning ap­
proach to verification when considering partial specifications. Logic now provides us with a means
219
of expressing a partial specification of system properties, and the |= relation allows us to express 
that an implementation satisfies that specification. We illustrate this by reconsidering the case 
study example of chapter 7 and the radiation machine of section 9.2.
11.5.1 Login Case Study
Consider the first protocol of the case study and our failure to show that equation 7.5 held with any 
interpretation of “satisfies” ; see page 101. The problem we encountered there was the introduction 
of nondeterminism by use of the h ide  operator; the specification used deterministic choice, but 
the implementation (with events hidden) used nondeterministic choice. If we had a way of relating 
the specification and implementation which automatically ignored events in the implementation 
not specified by the specification, we wouldn’t have to use h ide  and this problem wouldn’t arise. 
Using logic allows this; it also allows us to specify this protocol without specifying deterministic 
or nondeterministic choice between p i and n l, something we cannot avoid when using process 
algebra.
The first protocol, PI, is specified as a response property:
[ml]/iZ.((—ml ,p l ,n l)Z  V (p l)tt V (n l)tt)
After all occurrences of ml we have a finite sequence of actions which does not include ml, p i or
nl; but eventually either p i or n l will occur.
This formula really applies to the once-only version of the case study in chapter 7. For the
recursive version, given in section 9.1, we want to be able to say that this formula holds for every 
occurrence of ml. As with the buffer example given in the previous section, we wrap up the 
response property above in a greatest fixed point.
*/Y.(([ral]/i.Z.((— ml ,p l ,n l)Z  V (p l)tt V (nl)tt)) A [—]Y)
To express that the implementation of the system satisfies this property we write:
Processes f= vY.(([mi\nZ.((—ml ,p l ,n l)Z  V (p l)tt V (n l)tt)) A [—]Y)
We anticipate that it should be straightforward to use the tableau method of [SW90] to show that 
this expression holds.
We can express the other protocols similarly, therefore constructing the conjecture and proof 
of correctness in three parts corresponding to the three protocols as we originally thought possible 
in section 7.3. Using process algebra and cred  (or any equivalence relation) this was not possible 
because we had to explicitly hide events of the implementation which the specification did not
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consider. Here logic allows us to say some events occur, without specifying which events occur, or 
even how many of them occur.
We can also express some other properties of the case study which were added as constraints 
to the specification, such as property that the positive response p i hinges on the transmission of 
an m5 event.
[m5]//Z.(((—p i ,n l)Z  V (p l)tt) A (nl)ff)
As above, we can wrap this up in a greatest fixed point to express that the formula holds repeatedly, 
and show that it is satisfied in the model Processes.
The case study example also illustrates the feature of constraint-oriented specification that 
liveness properties are not preserved by parallel composition of processes. When we combined the 
protocols in chapter 7 using parallelism we suddenly were specifying much more than intended; 
the liveness properties had changed. The relationship between constraint-oriented specification 
and safety and liveness was discussed in [Bri89], where he concluded that liveness properties are 
only preserved by composition if the constraints are consistent, i.e. P' $  may only be deduced 
from P (= 4> if the traces of P' are all included in the traces of P.  This was obviously not the 
case with the protocols, and therefore liveness properties were not preserved.
11.5.2 The R adiation M achine
The safety requirement of the radiation machine example of section 9.2 provides an example of 
a global invariant. We note that the term safety is overloaded; we mean specifically that life 
is endangered by faulty operation of the machine; however, this property also happens to be 
expressed as “nothing bad happens” .
We wish to express the requirement that a f  ir e  event can never occur when the shield is low 
and the beam is high. Since we cannot easily say in process algebra that an action cannot occur, 
we must instead specify the converse. We did this in section 9.2 by specifying the general form of 
bad traces of the system, i.e. traces in which the f i r e  event occurs when the beam is high and 
the shield is low. This sort of property can be specified by a process. We can then show using 
the cred  relation that the machine either satisfies or does not satisfy that trace, and is therefore 
unsafe or safe respectively. For an unsafe machine this means showing an expression of the form 
(A cred  B) = true holds; however, in the case of a safe machine we have a problem because this 
requires showing an expression of the form (A cred B) = false holds. As discussed in section 8.4, 
this is not possible in our proof system. Since logic can express that an event cannot occur, we 
solve both of these problems using logic.
The good trace of the radiation machine example can be expressed as follows:
((n o t (hb | h s))* ; hb; (not ( lb  I hs I f i r e ) ) * ;  ( lb  I hs))*
2 2 1
Initially, we can have any actions except hs and hb. As soon as an hb occurs we may then have 
any actions except lb , hs and f ir e .  If either lb  or hs occur, we loop round the expression again. 
Effectively, the danger zone is when an hb event has occurred and before either a lb  or a hs occurs, 
so we block the bad event, f ir e ,  during that period.
We can now express the good trace as a logical formula
good-therac d= uZ.{{—hb, hs)Z V [hb]i/Y.(((—lb , hs, fire )Y  V [lb,hs]Z) A [firejflf))
The fixed point operators in this formula correspond roughly to occurrences of the * in the trace 
formula above.
The safety requirement of the radiation machine is fully expressed by
Therac f= [lb ][is]good-therac
the extra [lb][is] reflecting the initial set up of the machine. This has an equivalent effect to the 
process algebra expression of section 9.2, i.e.
(( te s to k ;  ex it)  cred  THERACTEST) = f a l s e
An extension of the radiation machine example is to add data types; this was done in sec­
tion 10.3.2. The next section considers how we might use the modal mu-calculus with full LOTOS.
11.6 T he M od al M u -C alcu lus and Full LO TO S
Above we have claimed that it is straightforward to use the modal mu-calculus with Basic LOTOS 
because both are based on transition systems. In particular, the same proof techniques can be 
used as long as we choose one which relies only on the transition system, e.g. [SW90], and not 
on the syntactic structure of the process, although these could perhaps be used by applying the 
translation from finite Basic LOTOS to CCS given in [BIN92].
We saw in the chapter on full LOTOS that partial specification could be a way of alleviating 
the complexity introduced by the addition of data types; we now consider extending the modal 
mu-calculus for use with full LOTOS. The following discussion merely speculates on the sort of 
extensions required; this topic is to be taken up as further work.
11.6.1 Extending the M odal M u-Calculus
The first part of the extension is to adapt the definitions of the operators of the modal mu-calculus 
and the rules of the proof system to take account of data values in the transitions; it is just a 
matter of drawing transition labels from the set of structured actions rather than plain gate names.
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This is similar to the way in which the equivalence relations of Basic LOTOS are extended for use 
with full LOTOS; see section 10.1.3.
So, for example, in the semantics of [K ],
\\[I<Mv = {p  e  V  : VAr <E K .'iP '.P  P ' => P' £ ||$ ||v }
the actions in K  can now structured; k = gw, where g is a gate name and w is a list of data 
values. In evaluating formulae we must now consider gate names and data values.
We illustrate the use of the new logic by extending the buffer example given earlier; we can 
now add data to the formulae. The new buffer is described as
Buffer := in?x; o u tlx ; B uffer
and we can express the capability and necessity to output the same data as was input.
Buffer f= */Z.([in?x]/zY.((out!x)tt V [—]Y) A [—]Z)
Buffer \= */Z.([in?x]/iY.(([out!x]tt A [—out!x]ff) V [—]Y) A [—]Z)
The occurrence of ?x is a binding occurrence for x in these formulae, therefore if the labelled 
transition system contains the label in?3 the value 3 will be substituted for x in the remainder of 
the formula. Since the buffer is defined recursively this happens every time the event in?x occurs.
These formulations of the properties of the buffer seem a little clumsy, especially for recursively 
defined processes, in which case we want to look at just one unfolding of the labelled transition 
system and deduce from that and looping in the transition system that the formula holds for all x. 
To express this, the logic needs to be strengthened by quantification-, we want to be able to write
Vx.(Buffer i/Z.([in?x]/<Y.((out!x)tt V [—]Y) A [—]Z))
Introducing quantification seems less straightforward than the introduction of data, and will not 
be discussed further here.
Assuming the logic has been successfully extended along the lines described above, it is useful 
only if we have a corresponding proof technique.
11.6.2 Extending the Proof Technique
We claim it is possible to use the proof technique of [SW90] for the modal mu-calculus in con­
junction with Basic LOTOS processes and to extend it for use with full LOTOS. Below we give 
a sketch of the proof technique and possible extensions.
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The proof technique is a tableau system comprising several inference rules for building the 
tableau based on the operators of the logic, and conditions that allow us to evaluate whether or 
not a tableau is successful. A successful tableau indicates that the formula holds for the given 
labelled transition system.
For example, consider the rule for the [K] modality.
P  hA [# ]$  j p / | vj(f € K  p  _k^ p ly 
P' hA $
where the subscript A stands for a definition list relating variable names to formulae which is used 
to unroll occurrences of fixed point operators.
Given a tableau ending with P  hA [A]$, the top line above, the rule tells us how to build 
the next level in the tableau. In this case we must investigate all possible K  transitions of the 
labelled transition system P, using the next state in the labelled transition system as the model 
in the next line of the tableau. As might be expected, the rule for (K) allows us to choose one 
possible transition from P, and therefore one state P ' , ignoring all the others. This makes tableau 
construction nondeterministic; we have a choice as to how to construct the next row in the tableau. 
The rule for V also gives us a choice.
We do not give full details of the proof system here, referring the reader to [SW90] or the 
introductory [Sti91]. We have successfully carried out preliminary studies using this technique 
to show the validity of some of the formulae of sections 11.4 and 11.5 with respect to LOTOS 
processes.
Now consider using this proof technique for full LOTOS specifications. Given the rule for [K ] 
as presented above we have to work from a labelled transition system in which all data variables 
are instantiated, otherwise we cannot know which transitions are really possible. Computing the 
labelled transition system is time-consuming, and also is not possible if the process is infinite (in 
which case we want to rely on properties of recursive equations, as mentioned above). The tech­
nique of [SW90] has to be modified to support uninstantiated variables in the labelled transition 
systems. The strongest way of doing this would be to carry around details of the environment 
(as in the second transformation from full to Basic LOTOS described in section 10.3.1) so that 
we can work out the exact value attached to a variable. An alternative might be to work from 
the predicates and guards of the process, maintaining a list of conditions which must hold for the 
formula as a whole to hold. For example, rather than having an instantiated variable, we might 
instead have a predicate which tells us that the value of that variable lies within a particular range, 
e.g. n > 0. Again, this topic will be investigated as further work.
We conclude this section with some examples of the way in which we might use an extension 
of the modal mu-calculus with full LOTOS. This gives us some incentive for overcoming the
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problems of proving these properties hold with respect to a structured labelled transition system.
11.6.3 Exam ples
We can express the safety of the radiation machine presented in section 10.3.2 very simply as the 
inability to perform the action fire!high!down:
vZ.{(tire!high!down)ff A [—]Z)
Contrast this with the fairly complicated specification of safety given earlier for the Basic LOTOS 
specification. We believe the proof of the above formula would also compare favourably with the 
complicated proof of section 10.3.2.
Now consider the third stack of section 10.2.5. Although equivalence proofs turned out to be 
impossible for the third stack in section 10.2.6, we can describe some aspects of the behaviour of 
the stack as partial specifications using logic.
For example, New_Stack_3 can only perform em pty!true, and not em pty!fa lse,
New-Stack.3 (empty!true)tt A [emptylfalsejff
and it cannot perform top or pop actions.
New_Stack^3 |= [top!x]ff A [pop]ff
On the other hand, Used_Stack_3 is unable to perform em pty!true.
Used_Stack_3(x,n) \= [empty!true]ff
Bearing in mind that full LOTOS allows data parameters to the processes, we might also want 
to use these in our formulae, e.g.
Used_Stack-3(x, n) \= (toplx)tt A [top!z]ff where x ^  z
Given that x is the value at the top of the stack, top may only produce the value x and no other. 
In this case it is the occurrence of x as a parameter to Used_Stack_3 which binds the value for the 
remainder of the formula.
Looking back at the abstract data type equations of figure 10.2 we might also want to express
225
invariants over the behaviour of the stack, such as
(push?x)(i/Z.(pop)tt A [—]Z)
After a push action it is possible to perform a pop action. Again we might want quantification in 
this formula, to express that the formula holds for all states of Used-Stack_3, e.g.
Vx.Vn.(Used_Stack^3(x, n) \= (push?y)(i/Z.(pop)tt A [—]Z))
The topic of extending the modal mu-calculus for use with full LOTOS is beyond the scope of 
the present work.
11.7  Sum m ary
In this chapter, due to the inadequacy of process algebra and the equational reasoning frame­
work when considering partial specification, we have considered the use of logic as an alternative 
means of specifying a system. Verification of the system can then be expressed by checking the 
LOTOS implementation of the system against the logic specification of the system. We specifically 
considered using the modal mu-calculus for both Basic and full LOTOS.
In order to demonstrate the advantages of using logic we reconsidered the examples which had 
motivated our study of logic, namely the login case study of chapter 7 and the use of cred  in 
the radiation machine of section 9.2. Using logic we showed that it was possible to express the 
correctness of the case study by splitting the conjecture up into three parts, each corresponding 
to a protocol, and we claim that the proof is straightforward. Similarly, it was straightforward to 
specify the good trace of the radiation machine, something which was not possible using process 
algebra.
The modal mu-calculus can be used with no alteration for Basic LOTOS; however, some ex­
tensions must be made when considering full LOTOS. The proof technique must also be extended 
to allow model checking of full LOTOS specifications. We considered some examples illustrating 
the sort of extensions which might be necessary to allow reasoning about models containing data 
types, and also some full LOTOS examples drawn from chapter 10 which illustrate the ease of 
specifying system properties using logic rather than process algebra.
Logic can express properties which were difficult to express using process algebra, and the proof 
technique (model checking) is less reliant on the skills of the user than our equational reasoning 
approach. Nevertheless, this approach is not perfect. The main problem might be that the method 
of describing the properties is a skilled task, more so than describing processes. We are not unduly 
concerned by this, as every approach must have some drawback; the area of logic and LOTOS
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remains a promising one, and will be further researched in the project “Temporal Aspects of 
Verification of LOTOS Specifications” .
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C hapter 12
Conclusions
In this thesis we have introduced the topic of verification of properties of concurrent systems, in 
particular those described using LOTOS, in a manner suitable for those with no prior knowledge 
of the subject. We followed this with a thorough, practically-based investigation of verification of 
properties of LOTOS specifications expressed using comparison of two LOTOS specifications by 
a behavioural relation and equational reasoning.
We developed a partially automated proof technique based on equational reasoning, and used 
this, together with hand proofs where necessary, to study verification via particular examples. This 
allowed us to develop a greater understanding of the verification process and also demonstrated 
the utility of the proof system developed.
The main outcome of our work on equational reasoning and verification of properties of LOTOS 
specifications is that equational reasoning is highly suitable for carrying out equivalence proofs, but 
that the method begins to break down when partial specifications are considered; we are forced to 
write clumsy specifications, and were unable to (soundly) automate the proof process. This implies 
that a different proof paradigm should be adopted when considering ordering of specifications.
We investigated one method of dealing with partial specifications: the use of temporal or modal 
logic for specifications. We do not abandon LOTOS; a LOTOS expression may be used as the 
model in which we evaluate the validity of the logical specification. We made a preliminary study 
of the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, illustrating the use of logic for specification 
by examples drawn from the earlier part of the thesis. We showed how some of the examples for 
which the equational approach had been unsatisfactory are better treated using logic.
228
12.1 D eta iled  List o f  A ch ievem en ts
The achievements of the thesis may be considered in four main groups. We began by introducing 
and surveying the field. This survey gives the necessary background for the main investigation 
of verification of properties of LOTOS specifications; the investigation had both theoretical and 
practical elements. During the practical work we made some contributions to the use of term 
rewriting for automation of process algebra proofs. We concluded by studying the use of logic 
with LOTOS.
Following this grouping, we list these achievements in more detail.
• We began by providing an introduction to verification of concurrent systems, process algebra, 
LOTOS, equational reasoning and logic which may be used as a springboard for other re­
searchers entering the field. This makes the thesis self-contained by providing the background 
necessary for the main investigation of verification of properties of LOTOS specifications.
-  We surveyed the topic of verification of properties of LOTOS specifications. The intro­
ductory work comes in chapter 2, where we discuss possible interpretations of the term 
“verification” , and chapter 4, where one particular approach to verification is described.
-  In chapter 3 we presented aspects of the three process algebras CCS, CSP and Basic 
LOTOS, including equivalence relations and proof techniques. The work is not new, 
but the presentation of the three together in a comparative manner is.
-  We presented those aspects of equational reasoning relevant to our work with LOTOS, 
namely proof by rewriting and Knuth-Bendix completion, in chapter 5.
-  In chapter 11 we presented the logics HML and modal mu-calculus.
-  As part of our survey of verification we also surveyed currently available proof tools 
which might be used with LOTOS. This is mentioned in chapter 4; the survey is given 
in more detail in appendix A.
-  The syntax and semantics of LOTOS is presented in appendix B. We found the pre­
sentation of the same information in the standard [IS088] rather complex and poorly 
organised. Our intention was to provide a clearer presentation for ourselves (and we 
believe this has been achieved); others may also find our presentation easier to follow.
• The bulk of our work was related to the verification of properties of LOTOS specifications 
where the verification requirement is expressed by a behavioural equivalence and the proof 
carried out using equational reasoning.
-  We have surveyed and discussed the topic of verification of properties of LOTOS speci­
fications, including two areas which have been largely ignored in the literature, namely
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verification of properties of full LOTOS specifications and also the use of logic in spec­
ifying the requirements of a system; see chapters 2, 4, 10 and 11.
As part of the study of choices the user is faced with in the verification process we 
identified several possible criteria, given in section 4.2.2, which might help differentiate 
between the various equivalences/preorders.
We have made a thorough investigation of one aspect of the verification topic, namely 
the method of comparing two LOTOS specifications in terms of a behavioural equiv­
alence relation. The theoretical part of the study was carried out first for a portion 
of Basic LOTOS in chapter 4, extended to the complete language of Basic LOTOS, 
including recursion, in chapter 8, and finally extended to full LOTOS in chapter 10.
The above approach to verification of properties of Basic LOTOS specifications has been 
implemented in a term rewriting framework. The initial implementation described in 
chapter 6 deals only with a subset of the language, but the system has evolved to include 
all features of Basic LOTOS. The system finally obtained is described in chapter 8. 
The ease with which it was possible to adapt and develop the system is a consequence of 
choosing the equational reasoning paradigm. This development also required changing 
the underlying equational reasoning tool. Note that the relabelling operator of LOTOS 
is slightly simplified in our implementation.
The utility of the above proof system has been demonstrated via a number of examples, 
presented in chapter 9. We deliberately chose examples which had been presented by 
other authors using different proof systems as a means of avoiding unintentional bias 
towards examples suited to our proof system.
When investigating verification of properties of full LOTOS specifications we consid­
ered the approaches of other authors to the problem in addition to considering how 
the above equational reasoning approach could be modified. In particular we studied 
the transformations from full LOTOS to Basic LOTOS detailed in [Bol92]. We inves­
tigated the properties of these transformations with respect to their use in verification 
of full LOTOS specifications, concluding that the results of verification carried out on 
the transformed specifications can only be extrapolated to the original full LOTOS 
specification for one of the transformations. The other transformation preserves very 
weak properties only. This was not considered in the original presentation of [Bol92]; 
our contribution is detailed in section 10.3.1.
An important part of verification is specification; if the possible approaches to verifi­
cation are borne in mind when specifying a system, the verification may be easier. We 
also contributed to research on specification in LOTOS.
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The LOTOS language was developed for use in specification of communications and 
this is the area in which it is usually applied. We successfully used LOTOS for non­
communications examples in chapter 7 and in chapter 9, showing that the language is 
applicable outside the originally conceived area of application.
We reviewed the language LOTOS in section 7.6. Of special relevance are the obser­
vations that some features of the LOTOS language make verification more difficult, in 
particular the disable operator, discussed in section 9.2.5, and also the hide operator, 
discussed in section 7.4.1.
• During the practical investigation of verification we used equational reasoning and term 
rewriting for automation; this resulted in the following contributions.
-  Early experiments in using a rewriting tool for proofs of equivalence were centered 
around an attempt to find a confluent and terminating set of rewrite rules for the 
LOTOS weak bisimulation congruence relation for a subset of the language; this is 
described in chapter 6. This experiment was successful in that such a rule set was 
developed, but unsuccessful in that the rule set did not have sufficient power for any 
but the simplest proofs.
A complete rule set corresponding to the equivalence of the semantics is impossible 
to obtain because weak bisimulation is undecidable, therefore we also discussed the 
relative merits of different choices of rules and how they might affect the verification 
process, see section 8.3. In particular, we discussed the effects an incomplete set of rules 
might have on the verification process, and how that might necessitate the introduction 
of a strategy in applying the rules, see sections 6.4.2 and 8.3.
— The above completion work had two side effects. The first was the generation of several 
diverging sequences of rules (useful for work detailed in [Wat92]), see section 6.4.3. The 
second was to show that the laws of weak bisimulation congruence given in [IS088] are 
not sound (although this is easily corrected), see section 5.5.2.
-  The complete set of rules developed above was not powerful enough for any but the 
simplest examples, a fact easily ascertained by experiment. Our initial solution was to 
develop a set of rewrite rules which reduce a term according to the expansion law for 
parallelism; see section 6.4.1. (Note that the final implementation does not use these 
rules because this facility is built into PAM).
— Although obtaining a set of rewrite rules for an equivalence relation is just a matter 
of orienting the axioms or laws, the process is not so simple for a preorder relation. 
In section 8.4 we presented two possible rule sets for the c red  preorder, together with 
analysis of the effects of using these rewrite rules in proofs.
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-  Throughout the study various equational reasoning tools were used. The principle of 
equational reasoning is a simple and familiar one, which makes proof in this paradigm 
straightforward. Equational reasoning tools, on the other hand, are hard to use on the 
whole. This is due more to the status of these tools as research tools rather than a 
pieces of software engineered for industry; see particularly our remarks about RRL in 
section 7.6. However, we note that PAM, reviewed in appendix A, is also an equational 
reasoning tool and yet is easy to use. Perhaps its simple graphical interface shows the 
way of the future for such tools.
• As a result of the shortcomings of the proof system developed above, we identified a need 
for an alternative approach to specification and verification. We studied the use of logic 
in specifying the requirements of a system, with a LOTOS specification being used as the 
model in which those requirements are evaluated.
-  In chapter 11 we presented HML and the modal mu-calculus and proposed that, al­
though defined for use with CCS, they could also be used in conjunction with LOTOS 
since both are based on the model of labelled transition systems. We outlined a suit­
able proof technique and gave several examples of the use of the modal mu-calculus 
in expressing properties of Basic LOTOS specifications. In particular we considered 
examples from earlier in the thesis for which the equational approach had been unsuit­
able.
-  The use of the modal mu-calculus for Basic LOTOS seems straightforward, but the 
modification of the logic for use with full LOTOS may be more difficult. We discussed 
possible extensions to the modal mu-calculus and proof system required for use with full 
LOTOS, illustrating those requirements by means of selected examples; see section 11.6.
Our original aims have been only partially met in that we have only thoroughly researched 
one particular approach to verification of LOTOS specifications. Specifically, we have not fully 
considered verification of LOTOS specifications with respect to logical requirements specifications 
(but see further work below). We believe that with respect to verification of equivalence/ordering 
of two LOTOS specifications we have achieved our original goals, including the goal to present the 
work as simply and clearly as possible, making our work easily understood by a newcomer to the 
subject, although this is of course a rather subjective evaluation.
12.2  Further W ork
There are two kinds of work discussed here: work which follows on naturally from the work of the 
thesis, and work which is indirectly related to the main body of the thesis work.
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12.2.1 Work D irectly  R elated to the Thesis
This category contains four main topics: development of the PAM proof system, further case 
studies, further investigation of verification for full LOTOS, in particular methods of automating 
proofs, and use of modal or temporal logic for full LOTOS.
D eveloping th e  PAM  System  There are several ways in which the proof system could be 
further developed. The most obvious one is to add axiomatisations for other relations. This 
could also mean finding a better axiomatisation for the c red  preorder, although really we cannot 
properly express preorders in the equational framework.
We remarked in chapter 10 that a new version of PAM which can handle parameterised pro­
cesses is under development. The addition of parameters to processes, both gate parameters 
and data type parameters, is important if our system is to be used for real LOTOS verification, 
therefore we anticipate modifying our approach to utilise these new features.
A further development, which also depends on development of PAM, is implementation of the 
LOTOS relabelling operator as described in [IS088], rather than the current simplified version.
M ore Exam ples It is clear that we have only attempted fairly small examples in the studies 
of chapters 7 and 9; although we note that our system was easy to use, and, for most of these 
examples, proofs were completed quickly. An important question is: can our method be scaled up 
to deal with larger examples? The easiest way to answer this question is to attempt verification 
proofs involving larger, more complex specifications.
D evelopm ent o f P ro o f Techniques for fu ll LO TOS V erification Although we were able 
to carry out some verification of properties of full LOTOS specifications, these results were not 
satisfactory; the (hand) proofs were complex and tedious. While some of the difficulty lies in 
the lack of automated tools, there has also been very little research on verification techniques 
for full LOTOS. In particular, the method of constructing a bisimulation in the stack proof 
of section 10.2.4 is very tedious; it would be useful to find a better way, which could be easily 
automated, to prove two full LOTOS specifications equivalent.
Developing a M oda l/T em pora l Logic for full LO TO S While the use of the modal mu- 
calculus for Basic LOTOS is perfectly valid, since both are based on labelled transition systems, 
it seems much harder to generalise the modal mu-calculus for use with full LOTOS. As seen in 
chapter 11, the problems lie more in the development of a proof system; we can already formulate 
properties which use data. This work will be continued in the SERC-funded project “Temporal 
Aspects of Verification of LOTOS Specifications” .
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12.2.2 Work Indirectly Related to the Thesis
The remainder of these topics for further work are ones which were encountered during our inves­
tigations but which are somewhat tangential to the main body of the work.
C rite r ia  for Choosing a R ela tion  One of the most difficult parts of verification lies in inter­
preting the verification requirements; a particular aspect of this is choosing which of the many 
equivalence and preorder relations defined for process algebras is most appropriate for a given 
example. In section 4.2.2 we postulated a number of possible criteria which might be used in 
making this choice; these remain to be more thoroughly investigated.
Specification Styles To what extent does the style of specification affect the verification? It 
is clear that some specifications exclude certain methods; see, for example, the third stack and 
equivalence proofs of section 10.2.6. A possible direction for future work lies in determining 
whether such problems can be classified, identified in advance, and avoided.
N ondeterm in ism  In the Login case study example of chapter 7 we originally anticipated that 
the conjecture expressing correctness and hence the proof could be split into three parts due to 
the disjoint nature of the protocols. In attempting the subproofs we discovered that the use of 
the h ide operator led to extra nondeterminism and the proof could not proceed. We could not 
prove anything about the correctness of the parts of the conjecture, and therefore nothing could 
be deduced about the correctness of the system as a whole. However, the technique of divide and 
conquer as a method of simplifying problems is both commonly used and valuable. Since the use 
of h ide causes problems by introducing internal events, the problem may be that we have not as 
yet found the right method of splitting the conjecture up, or of expressing the correctness of the 
parts. As we have seen in chapter 11, one approach to this problem involves the use of logic. If 
we want to remain within process algebra a solution could lie in relativized bisimulation [LM92], 
where bisimulation is measured with respect to an environment which expresses “allowed” actions.
We conclude with a discussion of the possible impact of our work on academics in this field 
and also on the wider LOTOS community.
12.3 P ro sp ects  for th is W ork
The thesis as a whole may be useful to other researchers getting started in the area of verification 
of properties of concurrent systems; we provide an introduction to the main topics of this area, 
a thorough study of the applicability of equational reasoning techniques to such verification, and 
also preliminary investigations of the use of temporal or modal logic for use with LOTOS. It
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is important to point out that the area of verification has been largely ignored by the LOTOS 
community in favour of validation methods such as testing and simulation, therefore few, if any, 
large scale works on verification of properties of LOTOS specifications, such as our own, exist.
Given that LOTOS is an ISO standard and therefore used by industry, particularly the telecom­
munications industry, we must also consider the impact of our work on the wider LOTOS com­
munity, i.e. outside academia.
Through PAM, our system provides an environment in which to reason about Basic LOTOS 
which is easy to use and also to extend (only a knowledge of LOTOS is required; the form of 
the PAM files is straightforward and requires no special coding ability). However, the quality 
and robustness of tools demanded by industrial practitioners is much higher than we have yet 
attained; our tool is still in the early stages of development. We require to carry out further tests, 
particularly on larger examples. In addition, our proof system relies to a large extent on the skill 
of the user in guiding the proof process, which requires a significant investment in terms of time 
both in preliminary study and in the proof process.
As long as tool support for LOTOS continues to be concentrated in the areas of simulation, 
testing and translation, there is little future for verification in the wider LOTOS community. 
Although verification can give us greater confidence in the correctness of our systems, perhaps, 
relative to the amount of work required to gain that confidence, the gain is not as great as can be 
achieved through use of testing and simulation tools which require less effort on the part of the user 
to obtain results. Nevertheless, we hope that our work will help lead to a greater understanding 
of verification and the development of better tools and techniques for verification in the future.
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A p p en d ix  A
A Survey of Proof Tools for 
LOTOS and Related Formalisms
A .l  In trodu ction
This appendix looks at tools which automate the methods discussed in chapters 4 and 11, and 
briefly at tools for LOTOS which perform functions other than verification. Although our main 
investigation is limited to LOTOS, the scope is widened here mainly because there are very few 
tools which can be used for verification of properties of LOTOS specifications. The tools presented 
here which are not specifically for LOTOS were chosen because they are all, or can be, proof tools 
for CCS [Mil89b], one of the languages from which LOTOS is derived. This also implies more 
concern with Basic LOTOS than with full LOTOS. A similar survey covers the process algebra 
verification tools which were developed during the CONCUR project [Mad92].
The tools discussed fall into two main categories: behaviourally based tools, which use the 
semantics of the language to build graphs representing systems and then perform various manip­
ulations on that graph, and algebraic tools, which rely on symbolic manipulation of the terms 
of the language. In the first group we have, for example, the Concurrency Workbench [CPS89], 
TAV [GLZ89] and AUTO [MV89]. The second group includes the Pisa tool [DIN89], further de­
velopment of this tool [Nes92] using HOL [Gor88], and also PAM (Process Algebra Manipulator) 
[Lin92].
Each tool mentioned above is discussed in a separate section; the relative merits of these tools 
are discussed in the final section, which also includes comment on the relation of these tools to 
our work on the verification requirements of LOTOS.
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A .2 B ehavioura lly  B ased  T o o ls /S em a n tic  R eason in g
A .2.1 The Concurrency Workbench
The Concurrency Workbench [CPS89, Mol91] is an automated tool which manipulates and analyses 
concurrent systems, called agents, expressed in Timed CCS (TCCS) [MT90]. One of the aims of 
the CONCUR project was to develop a common format, called FC2, for representing systems, and 
to build front-ends for the existing tools which would allow them to take input from any language. 
The aim of this research was to strengthen tool support in general, by making tools applicable to 
more than just one language. As far as we are aware, this front-end to the CWB has not yet been 
completed.
The CWB supports the following analyses:
• Analysis of behaviours expressed in TCCS, including proof of various relations between two 
agents, and analysis of the state space of the transition systems of those agents. Several 
of the standard equivalences and preorders over concurrent systems are supported, as are 
some of the less well-known relations. At present, relations supported are: strong bisimu­
lation equivalence, observational equivalence and congruence, the preorders associated with 
these relations (i.e. simulation relations), observational equivalence which respects diver­
gence, may, must and testing preorders and equivalences, 2/3 preorder and equivalence, 
branching bisimulation equivalence, and contraction preorder. An important feature of the 
implementation is the ease with which it may be adapted to deal with other relations. This 
is discussed in more detail below.
• Determining whether a given specification satisfies a given modal logic expression by checking 
the model. The logic used is the propositional /i-calculus [Koz83].
• Interactive simulation of the behaviour of an agent.
• Derivation of the missing part of an incomplete specification, given an equivalent specifica­
tion.
• Verification by decomposition, as described in chapter 4.
The power of the Workbench comes from splitting its implementation into three distinct parts: 
interface, which deals with Workbench-User interaction, semantics, which consists of various graph 
transformation procedures, and analysis, which consists of the algorithms for equivalence checking, 
preorder checking and satisfaction of logical propositions. The Workbench proceeds by building 
a graph of the transition system of the agent, and then analysing it. Each node of the graph has 
an information field, whose contents may be varied by applying different manipulations in the
247
semantics layer, which may be used in the equivalence checking procedure. Flexibility is gained 
by using the same equivalence checking algorithm for many different equivalences by varying the 
contents of the information field.
Equivalence checking is carried out by a graph partition algorithm. This works by splitting 
the nodes of the graph into blocks, ending when either the root nodes of the agents are in different 
blocks (in which case the agents are not equivalent) or the relation induced by the partition is a 
bisimulation. The particular algorithm used is derived from that presented in [KS83].
Preorder checking is similar. To check if two graphs are related by a preorder each node of the 
combined graph is annotated by the nodes which are bigger than it in the preorder. The algorithm 
stops when the root node of one is no longer annotated by the root node of the other (they are 
not related), or when the annotations determine a prebisimulation (a bisimulation with special 
clauses to say which nodes of the transition system must be matched).
Checking that an agent satisfies a modal propositions is carried out by a tableau based proce­
dure, documented in [Cle89], which attempts to build a top-down proof of the proposition. Again 
the graph transformation procedures of the semantics layer are utilised to allow different notions 
of satisfaction.
The Workbench is probably the most widely used of the tools considered in this report. See 
[EFP91] for a list of case studies, compiled for the CONCUR project, some of which use the 
Workbench. A few examples of use of the CWB are: verification of communications protocols 
[Par88, BA91], and comparison of the properties of various mutual exclusion algorithms [Wal89].
A .2.2 TAV
The main aim behind the development of TAV (Tools for Automatic Verification) [GLZ89] was to 
respond to a need for a process algebra tool which could not only check equivalence between agents 
and answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (like the CWB), but which could also give a reason for inequivalence, i.e. 
if two agents are not equivalent, then TAV provides a modal formula distinguishing those agents. 
This is possible because the characterisation theorem of [HM85] says that agents are bisimulation 
equivalent exactly when they satisfy the same modal formulae, and vice versa. Therefore, if two 
agents are not equivalent there must be some formulae which one satisfies but the other does not.
Like the CWB, TAV provides checking of strong and weak bisimulation equivalence, various 
state analyses of the transition system of the agents, and checking of modal formulas. The logic 
used is HML [HM85] extended by recursion (both minimum and maximum fixed points). The 
input language of TAV is CCS.
The algorithm used to determine equivalence between two agents in TAV is different from that 
used by the CWB. Given two equivalent agents, TAV uses the method of [Lar86] to construct 
a minimal bisimulation, whereas the partition algorithm of the CWB constructs the maximal
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bisimulation. This difference is analogous to the difference between the original definition of 
observation equivalence, in terms of refining the universal relation, and the definition of observation 
equivalence by bisimulation relations.
Recent work [Cle91] has shown how to refine the partition algorithm to give an explanation for 
bisimulation inequivalence. This is to be added to the CWB, thus removing the main advantage 
TAV has over the CWB. The refined algorithm is claimed to be more efficient than that employed 
by TAV.
A further feature of TAV is the use of modal transition systems [Lar90a]. These allow transi­
tions to be labelled as ‘allowed’ or ‘required’, so making the specification less rigid. TAV provides 
checking and construction of strong and weak refinement relations and equation solving in these 
modal transition systems using the method of [LX90]. This allows the user to check, for example, 
if an implementation satisfies a specification, or to derive an implementation given a specification.
A .2.3 AUTO
AUTO [MV89] is an equivalence checking tool which constructs finite state machines corresponding 
to the input agents, which are finite closed terms of the MEIJE process algebra [AB84]. AUTO 
computes strong, weak and branching bisimulations, reduces the input machines according to 
the axioms of the language (which helps control the state space of the agents) and can simulate 
behaviours of agents. The interface can be textual, through a command language, or window 
based.
MEIJE has been shown to be a universal process algebra [dS85]. Taking advantage of this fact, a 
generalisation of AUTO, MAUTO, has been developed which can be compiled with the structural 
operational semantics of a process algebra to give an equivalence checker for that formalism. 
An instantiation of MAUTO for Basic LOTOS is part of the LITE toolkit (mentioned later in 
appendix A.4). The translation from LOTOS to MEIJE is documented in [DMdS90].
A problem suffered by all of the systems considered so far is that of state explosion, since the 
systems construct graphs of the agents. This also limits their application to finite state processes 
only. We now move on to look at algebraic proof systems.
A .3 A lgeb raica lly  B ased  T o o ls /S y n ta c tic  R eason in g
A .3.1 A R ew riting Strategy
[DIN89] presents an interactive rewriting-based system for proving properties of CCS specifica­
tions; in particular, the system attempts to prove observational equivalence between two CCS 
specifications. This system is different those above in that it has no special internal representation
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for the CCS specification; all manipulation of the terms is symbolic. In this way, the developers 
of the system avoid some of the problems of state explosion. The system also allows a high degree 
of user control and, like TAV, gives meaningful responses to queries.
The power of the system comes from the three ways in which the user may manipulate the 
input:
• Operational semantics of CCS. This section implements the transition rules of CCS. This 
allows simulation of a CCS process.
• Operationally defined equivalences. A term rewriting system corresponding to the chosen 
equivalence relation.
• Axioms for Equivalences. Here the axioms of the equivalence relation can be applied one at 
a time. This process is user controlled.
The implementation is modular and may be extended easily to encompass different verification 
strategies and equivalences. Currently modules dealing with observational equivalence between 
two (possibly recursive) agents have been implemented.
The main problem of this approach is that only some of the defined behavioural equivalences 
defined in the process algebra literature actually have complete term rewriting systems associated 
with them. In particular, the rewriting system associated with observational equivalence causes 
divergence of the completion algorithm. This is a problem because unique normal forms are not 
guaranteed unless the term rewriting system is complete.
To combat this problem, an ad hoc rewriting strategy is used which derives the normal form 
of a term without using the completion algorithm. The strategy is based on the normal forms 
of observational congruence, obs-normal forms, which have been used by Hennessy and Milner 
to prove the completeness of the axiomatisation of observational congruence for a subset of CCS 
(no recursion) [HM85]. The proof of the correctness and completeness of this strategy appears in 
[IN90].
Informally, the divergence of the completion algorithm can be attributed to the interaction 
of the r  laws. The problem is that many proofs will require these laws to be applied first in 
one direction, then in the other (unfolding and folding), but of course rewrite rules can only be 
applied in one direction. The strategy works by applying these unfolding operations until it is 
possible to eliminate all derivatives of the term which are semantically contained in other parts 
of the term. When this is done the term is folded again. In other words, instead of trying to 
create an infinite number of rules to do the right number of unfolds and folds (which is what 
happens in completion), the original rules are applied a sufficient number of times to “simulate” 
the necessary rule. The most difficult part of the implementation of this strategy lies in identifying 
when sufficient unfoldings have been completed.
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From  CCS to  LOTOS
A further development of this work [DIN91] is concerned with adding a translation module to 
the system to allow it to deal with a subcalculus of LOTOS (without value passing or recursion) 
rather than CCS (LOTOS being more widely used in the industrial community). Some of the laws 
from appendix B.2.2 of the LOTOS standard [IS088] are used; a slightly different set from the 
ones we use in RRL in chapter 6.
In [DIN91] two examples are described: the readers and writers problem, and a rather bizarre 
candy/change machine. This is the source of the examples of sections 9.3 and 9.4.
Using HOL
The system described above is implemented in PROLOG. Yet another development of the work 
above [CIN91, Nes92] uses a different system as a base on which to build the CCS tools, namely 
HOL. The use of HOL provides a meta language which will enable the user to define their own 
verification strategies and tactics. The current system supports verification of observational con­
gruence and expansion of parallel terms (using a lazy evaluator of the expansion laws), and also 
satisfaction with respect to the propositional /i-calculus.
A.3.2 PAM
The Process Algebra Manipulator [Lin91, Lin92] differs from the other systems discussed so far 
in that it is a proof assistant, and not designed to be fully automatic, and also in that, like 
MAUTO, it is not tied to a particular process algebra. The main features of PAM are described 
in section 8.2. Not mentioned there is the ability to link to the CWB. Care must be taken that 
the agents supplied to the CWB are in the correct format and also finite state. Examples carried 
out in PAM include the Alternating Bit Protocol in CCS and ACP [BK84], the Scheduler from 
[Mil89b] and the Two Bit Buffer in CCS. Other languages described for PAM are EPL [Hen88], 
CSP [Hoa85], and, of course, LOTOS, as described in chapter 8.
The main advantages of PAM over other systems are its generality, its ability to reason over 
open terms, and its ability to cope with infinite state processes. PAM also has a relatively nice 
mouse-driven graphical interface, with buttons for each rule, rather than the usual text-based 
interface.
This concludes the (brief) survey of verification tools for LOTOS and related process algebras. 
The next section looks at other tools specifically for LOTOS.
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A .4 T ools for LO TO S
One of the products of the LOTOSPHERE project [vSPV92] was the LITE (LOTOS Integrated 
Tool Environment) toolkit [LITE]. LITE provides a set of tools which are built round a common 
representation of LOTOS behaviours. The following functionalities are provided:
• Editing/syntax checking (including a graphical editor for GLOTOS).
• Analysis of cross references and static dependencies.
• Completion of abstract data types.
• Checking for various properties of the abstract data types, e.g. termination, consistency and 
completeness.
• Simulation of LOTOS behaviours by building an extended finite state machine and a sim­
ulation tree obtained by specifying values for the variables in the description. These values 
are obtained by input from the user, or automatically generated by a narrowing tool.
• Compilation of an annotated LOTOS specification into C code. The annotations provide 
information to the compiler about the implementation, e.g. which C object implements a 
LOTOS sort or operation.
• Translations of a LOTOS specification into its labelled transition system, and abstract data 
types into their equivalent rewrite system.
• Testing of behaviours by composition with user-defined test processes. Tests can be accepted 
or rejected, i.e. the process may/must pass the test, or the process will never pass the test.
• Transformation of a LOTOS specification into an equivalent one. Two transformations are 
available: regrouping parallel processes according to a pattern specified by the user and 
preserving strong bisimulation equivalence, and bipartition of functionality, splitting the 
specification with respect to event sets preserving weak bisimulation equivalence.
• Proof of behavioural equivalences and preorders over Basic LOTOS processes (using AUTO 
or by writing the specification in a FC2 format which can be understood by the Concurrency 
Workbench, see section A.2.1).
• Temporal logic model checking (Basic LOTOS only). The logic used is ATCL [CES86].
• Generation of the canonical tester of a Basic LOTOS specification (via Cooper [Ald89]).
All components can be applied to full LOTOS except those flagged as for Basic LOTOS processes 
only. Basic LOTOS is obtained from the full LOTOS specification by forgetting the data types.
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This transformation only preserves reachability properties of the original specification, as discussed 
in section 10.3.1.
Other tools for LOTOS include the University of Ottawa toolkit (interpreter for LOTOS, 
various tools for Graphical LOTOS) and Squiggles (checking of strong, observational and test­
ing equivalences on finite Basic LOTOS processes using Paige and Tarjan’s partition algorithm 
[PT87]).
A .5 Sum m ary and D iscu ssion
Our aim is to investigate the verification of LOTOS specifications, and to do so using tools. 
Although we are really interested in equational reasoning as a proof technique, we should also 
consider other proof techniques which might be suitable and which are already implemented, 
perhaps for CCS, if not for LOTOS. Above we have presented summaries of the abilities of several 
proof tools; in this section we consider how we might use those proof tools.
To summarize the relative advantages and disadvantages of the tools discussed above: the 
most versatile tool in terms of proof facilities seems to be the CWB. The CWB will be even more 
versatile when the front end accepting FC2 is completed, making the CWB independent of input 
language, in which case the CWB can be used for LOTOS. The main drawback of the CWB is 
the problem of state explosion, and its inability to handle infinite state processes. TAV seems 
to be largely superseded by the Workbench, especially if the Workbench is extended to provide 
reasons for inequivalence. The final tool in the behaviourally based category, AUTO, is already 
implemented for LOTOS as part of LITE. However, this tool can only accept Basic LOTOS input.
The Pisa tool of Inverardi and Nesi offers a high degree of interaction and control over the 
proof to the user; however, only observation equivalence over LOTOS processes is evaluated, and 
extensions to the system requires knowledge of Prolog or HOL. One of the benefits of the HOL 
system is that it is built from the very basics of CCS, i.e. the operational semantics, with all the 
axioms of the observation equivalence being derived from that and the definition of bisimulation. 
Also, the tactic language of HOL is very powerful.
As we discovered in the case study of chapter 7, if a rewriting strategy is to be used we require 
a high degree of interaction and control over the development of the proof. PAM offers this, as 
well as flexibility in the input language and the equivalence relation. The price that has to be paid 
is that defining the language and relation takes time (and skill). However, this only has to be done 
once, and we have defined the most commonly used relations. A further benefit of using PAM is 
that it is the only tool, apart from AUTO, which has a more sophisticated interface, making it 
easy to use.
It is clear that none of the tools presented in this appendix have all the features we desire of
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a verification tool for LOTOS. By adopting PAM we have the opportunity to build a system to 
our liking, but without having to do too much implementation work (which, given the number of 
tools available, would be rather a waste of time).
At the moment, our proof system is applicable only to Basic LOTOS specifications, but we 
feel that we have laid the ground work for an extension of the proof system which could provide 
a unified framework for verification of full LOTOS specifications.
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A p p en d ix  B
LOTOS Inference Rules
In this appendix we present the syntax and semantics of full LOTOS. Although these may be 
found in the LOTOS standard [IS088], the presentation there is rather cluttered and unclear. We 
hope our presentation of LOTOS is simpler and easier to understand than that of the standard.
B . l  LO TO S Syntax
The LOTOS syntax is given in the form of a BNF grammar. To make the grammar more readable 
we adopt the convention that reserved words of LOTOS will be shown in bold, other symbols of 
LOTOS will be shown in typewriter style (following the format used for the examples presented 
in the main body of the thesis), while the non-terminals of the BNF are shown in italics. Note 
that in the LOTOS language, no special meaning is attributed to the font in which a character is 
written. Optional parts of a production rule (0 or 1 occurrences) are enclosed by square brackets, 
optionally repeated parts (0 or more occurrences) are enclosed by braces.
The grammar is split into three parts below: first we give the basic elements of the language; 
identifiers, special symbols, etc., second we give the syntax for the process algebra part of the 
language, and finally we give the ACT ONE related syntax.
B .1.1 Basic D efinitions
The syntax of the basic elements such as identifiers is as follows:
letter *= a | b | c | . . .  | z.
digit *= 0 | 1 | . . .  | 9.
normal-character == letter \ digit.
special-character d= # | '/. | & | * | + | -  | . | / | < |  = | > | ® | \ r i ~ | ' C | L
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defreserved-words =  specification | endspec  | b ehav iou r | ty p e  | e n d ty p e  | is
| ac tua lizedby  | using  | lib ra ry  | end lib  | renam edby  
| form al so rts  | fo rm alopns | fo rm aleqns | so rts  | opns 
| ofsort | fo rall | eqns | so rtn am es | opnnam es | for 
| process | en d p ro c  | w here  | s to p  | ex it | n oex it | any 
| i | le t | in  | p a r  | accep t | choice | h ide  | of.
special-symbols d= = | => | : = | »  | [> | I I | I I I | I C | 3 I
I □  I -> I ; 1 , I : | C | 3 | ( | ) | ? | • | - •
defidentifier =  letter [{normal-character | _ } normal-character ].
defspecial-identifier — special-character {special-character)
| digit [{normal-character | _ } normal-character ].
defcomment =  (* “any string of text” *)
The following observations may be helpful in understanding the rest of the LOTOS syntax.
• Since brackets and bar appear both as LOTOS syntax, [3 and I , and as BNF syntax, [ ] and 
|, care must be taken not to confuse them in the following rules. In the syntax rules we have 
tried to distinguish them by using a different typeface. Additionally, it may help to know 
that the LOTOS symbols [3 appears in the production rules for the following non-terminals: 
sum-expression, par-op, choice-expression, guarded-expression, selection-predicate, process- 
instantiation and relabelling, and the I symbol appears only in the rule for par-op. All other 
occurrences of these symbols are therefore BNF syntax.
• The reserved word behav iou r may be substituted by behav io r if desired.
• A special identifier is used for user-defined operators composed of symbols. All *-identifiers 
are identifiers except operation-identifier, which can either be an identifier or a special- 
identifier. No identifier or special identifier is allowed to have the same spelling as a reserved 
word or special symbol.
•  Comments, when included, should be enclosed by (* . . .  *). Comments are not part of 
the formal text of a LOTOS specification. A comment may include text (possibly foreign 
language text) and/or pictures.
• Any *-identifier-list not otherwise defined is a list, separated by commas, of *-identifiers, 
where * stands for different kinds of identifier, e.g. specification, process, gate, value,__
• Association of binary operators is to the right, unless parentheses indicate otherwise. The 
operators C3, » ,  [>, II, III and I [A3 I are all associative, but note that mixed use of the 
different parallel operators is not associative.
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B .1.2  Process Algebra Syntax
The following production rules apply to specifications and to the process algebra part of a speci­
fication. Some reference is made in these rules to the ACT ONE syntax of the next section.
=  sp ec ifica tio n  specification-identifier formal-parameter-list 
data-type-definitions b e h a v io u r  definition-block en d sp ec . 
d= p ro cess  process-identifier formal-parameter-list : = 
definition-block en d p ro c .
def= [\_gate-identifier-lis£]][(identifier-declarations)] :e x it  [(sort-list)]
| [[gate-identifier-lisQ^identifier-declarations)] :n o e x it.
def= identifier-declaration {, identifier-declaration}.
d= value-identifier-list : sort-identifier.
d= sort-identifier {, sort-identifier}.
behaviour-expression [local-definitions].
def= w h ere  local-definition {local-definition}. 
d== data-type-definition \ process-definition.
d= local-definition- expression 
| sum-expression 
| par-expression 
| hiding-expression 
| enable-expression.
local-definition-expression d= le t  identifier-equations in  behaviour-expression.
defidentifier-equations = identifier-equation {, identifier-equation}.
identifier-equation *= identifier-declaration -  value-expression.
sum-expression *= choice sum-domain-expression [] behaviour-expression.
defsum-domain-expression = identifier-declarations \ gate-declarations.
p a r -e x p r e s s io n
def par g a te -d e c la r a t io n s  p a r -o p  b e h a v io u r -e x p re ss io n .
p a r - o p
def 1 1 | 1 1 1 | 1 L g a te - id e n tif ie r - l is t] I.
h id in g -e x p r e s s io n
def hide g a te - id e n t i f ie r - l i s t  in  b e h a v io u r -e x p re ss io n .
e n a b le -e x p re s s io n
def
d isa b le -e x p re s s io n  [e n a b le -o p  e n a b le -e x p re s s io n ].
e n a b le -o p
def
»  [accept id e n ti f ie r -d e c la r a tio n s  in].
d is a b le -e x p r e s s io n def p a r a lle l-e x p r e s s io n  [ [> d isa b le -e x p re s s io n ] .
p a r a l le l - e x p r e s s io n
def
c h o ic e -e x p r e s s io n  [p a r-o p  p a ra lle l-e x p re s s io n ] .
s p e c if ic a tio n
p r o c e s s -d e f in i tio n
f o r m a l - p a r a m e te r - l is t
id e n ti f ie r -d e c la r a tio n s  
id e n ti f ie r -d e c la r a tio n  
s o r t - l i s t  
d e f in it io n -b lo c k  
lo c a l-d e f in it io n s  
lo c a l-d e f in it io n  
b e h a v io u r -e x p re s s io n
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choice-expression 
guarded-expression 
action-prefix-expression
action-denotation
experiment-offer
selection-predicate
atomic-expression
def
def
def
def
guarded-expression [ [] choice-expression],
[premiss] -> guarded-expression \ action-prefix-expression.
action-denotation ; action-prefix-expression 
| atomic-expression. 
gate-identifier
[experiment-offer {experiment-offer)[selection-predicate]]
def
def
def
exit-parameter-list 
exit-parameter 
process-instantiation 
relabelling-expression 
relabelling 
replacements 
value-expression 
simple-expression 
term-expression
value-expression-list 
premiss 
simple-equation 
gate-declarations 
gate-declaration
def
de f
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
def
? identifier-declaration | ! value-expression.
[premiss]. 
stop
| ex it [exit-parameter-list]
| process-instantiation 
| ( behaviour-expression)
| relabelling-expression.
( exit-parameter {, exit-parameter} ). 
value-expression | any sort-identifier.
process-identifier [Lgate-identifier-lisf]][value-expression-list]. 
( behaviour-expression) relabelling.
[ replacements].
gate-name/gate-name [, replacements].
[value-expression operation-identifier] simple-expression. 
term-expression [of sort-identifier].
value-identifier 
| operation-identifier [value-expression-list]
| ( value-expression).
( value-expression {, value-expression}). 
simple-equation | value-expression. 
value-expression = value-expression. 
gate-declaration {, gate-declaration). 
gate-identifier-list in  [gate-identifier-lisQ.
B .1.3  LOTOS D ata Type Syntax
The syntax of this section is only required for full LOTOS.
dtsfdata-type-definitions = {data-type-definition).
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data-type-definition
p-expression
type-union 
p-specification
def
def
def
replacement 
sort-pair-list 
operation-pair-list 
sort-pair 
operation-pair 
sort-list 
operation-list 
operation
def
def  
def  
def  
def  
def  
def  
def
operation-descriptor *=
equation-lists d= 
equation-list d=
equation
premisses
def
def
*= typ e type-identifier is p-expression en d typ e
| library type-identifier {, type-identifier} endlib . 
[type-union] p-specification
| type-identifier actualizedby type-union using replacement 
| type-identifier renam edby replacement, 
type-identifier [, type-union].
[form alsorts sort-list]
[formalopns operation-list]
[formaleqns equation-lists]
[sorts sort-list] [opns operation-list] [eqns equation-lists]. 
[sortnam es sort-pair-list] [opnnam es operation-pair-list]. 
sort-pair [sort-pair-list]. 
operation-pair [operation-pair-list]. 
sort-identifier for sort-identifier. 
operation-identifier for operation-identifier. 
sort-identifier {, sort-identifier}. 
operation {operation}.
operation-descriptor {, operation-descriptor} : 
[sort-list] -> sort-identifier. 
operation-identifier 
| _ operation-identifier _.
[forall identifier-declarations] equation-list {equation-list}. 
ofsort sort-identifier [forall identifier-declarations] 
equation {; equation} [;].
[premisses =>] simple-equation, 
premiss {, premiss}.
Having formalised the syntax of the language, the next section defines the semantics.
B .2  LO TO S Sem antics
The semantics of LOTOS processes is given in two parts:
• structured labelled transition systems, see section B.2.1 for the definition, and the inference 
rules which generate those transition systems, see section B.2.2,
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• equivalence relations over process behaviours/structured labelled transition systems, see sec­
tion B.2.3 onwards for laws, and also sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.3 for motivation and definitions.
Each process is seen as a set of states, with arcs representing transitions connecting those 
states. Each transition is labelled by its action; for Basic LOTOS labels are gate names, while for 
full LOTOS labels are pairs consisting of a gate name and a string of data values.
In order to turn a LOTOS specification into a labelled transition system, the specification is 
first “flattened” . The flattening function essentially ensures that the specification adheres to the 
LOTOS syntax, but also removes all hierarchical structure, ensures uniqueness of variable names, 
and that all names and types used are previously defined. The resulting object is called a c a n o n ic a l  
L O T O S  sp e c if ic a tio n . The inference rules of transition may then be applied to the canonical 
LOTOS specification to give a structured labelled transition system (actually the inference rules 
give a c la s s  of labelled transition systems, each relating to different instantiations of the formal 
parameters of the specification).
In the next section we give the standard definitions relating to labelled transition systems and 
algebras which are required for the definition of the inference rules in section B.2.2.
B.2.1 Algebras and Transition System s
Most of the following definitions relate to algebras and full LOTOS semantics; they can be ignored 
for Basic LOTOS.
• A flattened canonical LOTOS specification, C L S , is given by a pair ( A S , B S ) .  A S  is an 
algebraic specification (S , O P , E ), where (S , O P )  is a signature and E  is a set of conditional 
equations. The semantics of A S  is given by the many sorted algebra Q ( A S )  which is the 
quotient term algebra of A S . B S  is a behaviour specification (P D E F S , p d e fo ) where P D E F S  
is the set of all the process definition in C L S , and pdefo  is the top level process of the speci­
fication. Each element of P D E F S  is a pair (p , B p ) of a process name and the corresponding 
behaviour expression. All sort names and operations in B S  are defined in A S  (the flattening 
function ensures this).
• The algebraic specification generates a derivation system D , which allows us to deduce if two 
terms are congruent, i.e. D  t \  = a s  t i -  The congruence class of a term t , written [t], is 
defined as [t ] — { t '  \ t  = a s  t ' } .
• A m a n y - s o r te d  a lg eb ra  A is a pair ( D ,  O )  where
1. D  is a set of sets, where each set is called a d a ta  c a r r ie r  of A .  Elements of the data 
carrier are called d a ta  va lu es .
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2. O is a set of total functions over the data carriers, D\ x . . .  x Dn —)• D where D, D \ , . . .  Dn 
are data carriers and n > 0.
• A quotient term algebra Q{A) =  (Dq , Oq) where
1. £)q is the set {Q(s) I s £ 5}, where Q(s) = {[<] 11 is a ground term of sort s} for each 
s £ S,
2. Oq is the set of functions {Q(op) \ op £ OP}, where the Q(op) are defined by
Q(op)([*i]> •••>[*«]) =  •••>*«)]•
• A labelled transition system Sys is a 4-tuple (S , Act, T, so) as defined in section 3.4.3, with 
Act -  G U {i}.
• A structured labelled transition system Struc is a 5-tuple (S, Act, A, T, s) where A  =  (D , O) 
is a many-sorted algebra such that (S ,A c t,T ,s ) is a labelled transition system, for
defAct = {i} U {gv | g £ G, v £ ((J D)*}. This is also referred to as a labelled transition system 
over A.
In other words, a structured labelled transition system is just like a labelled transition system, 
except that each label g is decorated by a string of values from D.
We also define the following auxiliary functions to help in the definition of the inference rules:
fg : process-names —>■ (gate-names)*
which yields the formal gate parameter list of a process p 
fv : process-names —> (variables)*
which yields the formal value parameter list of a process p 
so r t: variables —> sort-names
which yields the sort of a value. 
name : transition-label —» G U {1}
given an experiment offer, yields the gate name of the transition, which could be S, or i. 
C : behaviour-expression —> G*
yields the language of a process.
The following notational conventions help us to give the inference rules of transition with less 
clutter:
• B  (B ', B{, . . . )  refer to process behaviours. B, Bi is defined for each rule, but B ', B " , . . .  are 
behaviour-expression instances, unless stated otherwise.
• 9 i 9 1) - .are gate-names.
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• d \ , . . .  are experiment-offer instances, i.e. of the form !x or ?x.
•  x, x i , . . .  are variable instances.
• 1 1 , . . .  are term-expression instances.
• x\ =  t i , . . .  are therefore identifier-equation instances.
• p is a variable over process-names.
• SP  denotes a selection-predicate instance.
•  a ranges over transition labels, Act.
We also use the following notation for substitution: [ti / x i , . . .  , tn/ x n]B meaning the simultaneous 
replacement of the x,- in B  by the appropriate .
These are split into two distinct groups: the axioms of transition, and inference rules of transition. 
The numbering given here coincides with that in the standard [IS088]. Note that one of the rules
sum-expressions while the other applies to par-expressions.
For Basic LOTOS the same axioms and rules apply but assume the data parts of the interactions 
are empty. The rules relating to guards, selection predicates, etc. may be ignored.
The presentation here puts prerequisites of the axiom or inference rule on the left and the
B .2 .2 LOTOS Inference Rules
appears to be repeated (B\ is a simplification of B)\ this is because one inference rule applies to
inference rule or axiom itself in a box on the right. Any conditions on the validity of the rule or 
auxiliary definitions required come below the rule.
Axiom s o f T ransition
(a) B = \\B '
where B' is an action-prefix-expression.
B B'
(bl) B = gd1 . . .d n-B ' 
iff
Vi =  [^]
Vi e Q{si)
t y i , . . . ,  tym are term instances with Vi = \tyi\
if di =  !<t (l < * < 71) and U is a ground term, 
if di = ?x,( 1 < i < n )  with sort(xi) = Si, 
if di = ?yj( 1 < i < n , l < j < m )  
and {2/1 , - . . ,  ym} =  {x,- | d,- =  ?x,-, 1 < i < n}.
where B' is an action-prefix-expression.
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B 9VJ—^ n [ ty i/y i ,. . .tym/y m]B'(b2) B = gdl . . . d n[SP];Bt 
iff
Vi and tyi defined as above, and providing D h SP' where SP1 denotes the ground equation 
obtained by simultaneous replacement in SP of all X{ in SP that also occur contained in a in­
variable offer, i.e. d,- =  ?£,(! < i < n), by a term t E t;,-.
( c l)  B = exi t ( i? i , . . . ,  En) 
iff
Vi = [Ei]
Vi e  Q{si)
if Ei is a ground term (1 < i < n) 
if Ei =  any st (l < i < n)
where E i , . . . ,  En are exit-parameter instances.
(c2) B  =  ex it
Inference R ules o f  T ransition
(a) B =  le t x\ = <1, . . . ,  xn =  tn in  B'
(b l )  B  =  choice g in  \gu . . . , g n ]  0  B' 
for each g{ € { g i , . .  . , g n } -
(b2) B  =  choice x [| B'
iff t is a ground term with [<] € Q(s), where a; is a variable with sort(x) =  s. 
(b3) Bi is a sim plification  o f  B  in norm al form
B  — ► stop
[ ti /x i , .. . , t n/ x n]B' B"
B B "
{B')\gi/g} B"
B B"
[t/x]B‘ - A  B"
Bi B i '
B - ^ B i '
(c l)  B  = p a r  g in  \gu  . . .  ,gn] par-op B'
{B')\gi/g] par-op.. .par-op (.B')\gn/g\ B"
B B"
(c2) Bi is a  sim plification o f B  in  no rm al form
Bi Bi'
B B i '
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(d) B =  h ide  g i , . . . ,g n in  B'
(e) B = Bi accep t x \ , . . . ,  xn in B 2
where t,-,.. , , t n are ground terms with [t 1] =  Vi,
if name (a) (E {<71, . .  •, <7n}
? h ide g i , . . . ,g n in  B ‘ 
if name (a) £ {g i,.. .,gn}
B± -2+ B i’
B  A B i ' ^  accept x i , . . ., xn in B 2
name (a) /  S
^  6vi...v ' B i!
B [h /x i, ■ • • > in /%n\B2
) •
Bi B\
B —■+Si'[> Bi
name (a) ^  S
Bl Sv± J '  Bt'
B Bi
B - ^ B ' 2
(g l)  B = B 1 \\g1 , . . . , g n\ \B 2
Bi -Z+ B^' 
B - ^ B ^
name (a) £ {5 1 , . .  .,g n,S}
B 2 ^ B '2 
B - l+ B i  \ \9 u . . . , g n] \B '2 
name (a) £ {g i,. . .  ,gn,S}
B\ B i ,  B 2 B 2 
5 A 5 / \[ g u ... ,g n] \B '2 
name (a) G {^i , .. .,g n, 6 }
where g i , . . .  ,gn is a (possibly empty) list of gate-name instances.
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(g2) B =  B1|| |B 2
(g3) B =  B1||B 2 
where {gi, --,9n} =  G.
(h) B =  B 1 □ B2
fl A f l '
B r l b i  j „] |B2 - A B '
B - A  B'
P i - ^ B i '
B  -^  B i'
£ 2 ~ ^ B '2
B ^ B ' 2
(j ) B  =  [S B ]-> B '
iff S P  is a ground equation and D h SP. 
( k l )  B  =  stop
(k2) B = p
B' B "
B ~ ^ B n
no inference rules are generated
( [ t l / ^ l , ■ • •, i m / ®m]Pp) > • • • j g n/ hr i ]   ^ B
B ^ B '
iff (p, P p) 6 BS.PDEFS
where /yfo} -  ( /i i , . . . ,  hn), and fv(p) = ( x i , . . . ,x m). 
(k3) B = (.B')
(m ) B = (B ') [flfi/hi,. . . ,5n/h„] 
where
h i , . . . ,  hn are gate-names, 
a = gv i . . . v m ,
a' -  g v i . . .  vm if g £ {hi , . . . ,  hn} 
a! =  giv 1 . . .  vm if g = /i*(l < i < n)
B >  - 1 +  B "
B B"
B' - A  B"
B - ^ ( B " ) \ g 1/ h 1 , . . . , g n/h n]
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These rules and axioms completely define the structured labelled transition system of a canon­
ical LOTOS specification.
The equivalence over labelled transition systems, tree equivalence, is too strong for verification 
purposes, so we usually define other equivalence relations over labelled transition systems which 
allow more identifications. In the following sections we give the laws relating to weak bisimula­
tion congruence and equivalence, testing congruence and equivalence, and the preorders red  and 
c red  as given in [IS088]. The laws given do not completely characterise the relations, and there­
fore some proofs may require additional proof techniques. The definitions of these relations may 
be found in sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.3, assuming the appropriate modification of Act to include 
structured labels. The laws below are the source for the rewrite rules of chapter 6 and the PAM 
axioms of chapter 8.
B .2.3  W eak Bisim ulation Congruence Laws
Appendix B.2.2 to the LOTOS standard [IS088] contains a set of weak bisimulation congruence 
laws. We know these laws are sound with respect to the model, but they are not complete. This 
does not concern us as it is always possible to add specific laws to cover the case we want.
The laws for weak bisimulation congruence, written B =wbc C , are as follows:
a) A ction-prefix  Let g .. P.x : t . . .  be an action-denotation with an experiment offer ?x :t, and 
let z be a value identifier that does not occur in g .. .?x : t . . .  [E\\ B.
1. g .. .lx  : t . . .  [E]; B  =wbc g ...?z : t . . .  [z/x][E\; [z/x]B
2. g .. .?£ : t . . . ;  B =wbc choice x : t \] g . . .  \x ; B
3. g\E ! .. .\En[E\- B =wbc [E] ->  g ^  .. .\En; B
b) Choice
1. B\ Q B2 =wbc B2 D B
2. B\ 0 (B2 0 B3) =wbc ( B i  0 b 2) D b 3
3. B  0 s to p  =wbc B
4. B  \\ B  =wbc B
5. [ E / x ] B  0 (ch o ice  x  : t Q * ) —uube ch o ice  x ■t Q B i f [E ]6 Q ( t )
6. ch o ic e  x  :t \\ B  =wbc B if x  is not free in B
7. ch o ic e  x  : t Q e x i t ( . .. , X, . . .) =wbc e x i t ( . .. , any
c) P a ra lle l If a law holds for all of the parallel operators ‘|’ is used to denote any of them (using
the same instance throughout the law). Let A, A' be lists of gate-identifiers.
1 . B i  | 8 2  = w b c  8 2  | B \
2 .  B i  | ( 8 2  | 8 3 )  = w bc { B i  | B 2 )  | 8 3
3. (a) e x i t ( £ i , ..  . ,E n) | e x it (£ ’( , . . . ,  E'm) = wbc e x i t ( 8 x, . . . ,  En)
if 71 =  m and 
VI < i < n.{[Ei] = [£<] 
or (El = an y  t and sort(8,) =  t )) 
= w bc s to p  otherwise
(b) e x i t ( . ..) | s top  =wbc stop
4 . 8 1  \ [A]\B2 =wbc B 1 \ [A]\B2
5 . B 1 \ [A]\B2 =wbc B x \ [A']\B2
6. Bi | [A] \B 2= wbc Bi || B2
7 . B x | [ 1| B 2 =wbc B x IN B 2
where A! is any list containing the same elements as A 
where A' =  A  fl (£(8x) U £(.8 2 )) 
if (C(Bi) U C(B2)) C A
d) E nab ling  Let 3 >* denote any instance of the enable operator, i.e. or accep t .. .in  .
1. s top  » *  B =wbc s top
2. (a) ex it >  B =wbc i; B
(b) ex i t (£x , . . . ,  £■«) »  accept xi : tn in  B =wbc i; [E i/x i , . . . ,  En/ x n]B
3. (B\ B 2 ) B 3  =wbc Bi ( 8 2  B 3 )
4. B  » *  s top  =wbc B  HI s top  if B =£wbc exi t( . . . )
Note that this side condition has been added here as a result of our experiments, see sec­
tion 5.5.2; it is not in the standard.
e) D isabling
1 .  B x  [ >  ( 8 2  [ >  8 3 )  = Wbc ( 8 x  [ >  8 2 )  [ >  8 3
2. 8  [)> s top  ~wbc B
3. (8 x [ > 8 2) 0 8 2  =wbc 8 x [> 8 2
4. s top  [> 8  =wbc B
5. e x i t ( . ..) [> 8  =wbc e x i t ( . ..) Q 8
f ) H iding
1. h ide  A in  8  =wbc h ide  A' in  8  where A' is any list containing the same elements as A.
2. h ide  A  in  8  =wbc h ide  A' in  8  where A' = A  fl C(B)
3. h ide  A  in  h ide  A' in  8  =wbc h ide A" in  8  where A" =  A  U A!
4. h ide  A in  8  =wbc B  if A  fl C(B) =  0
5. (a) h ide  A  in  a\E\ .. \E n\ B =wbc i; (hide A in  8 ) if a E A
(b) h ide  A  in  g; B  =wbc 9 \ (hide A  in  8 ) if name (#) ^  A
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6. h id e A  in  B \  |] B 2 = w bc (hide A  in  B \ )  |] (hide A  in  B 2)
7. h id e A  in  ( B i  \ [A'] \ B 2) = wbc (hide A  in  B i ) | [A7] | (hide A  in  B 2 ) if A  fl A 1 =  0
8. h id e A  in  ( B i  >■* B 2) = w bc (hide A  in  B i )  » *  (hide A  in  B 2)
9. h id e A  in  { B \  [> B 2 ) = w bc (hide A  in  B \ )  [> (hide A  in  B 2)
10. h id e  A in  [E ] —> B  = w bc [E] —> (hide A  in  B )
g) G u ard in g
1. (a) [L =  R\ —>• B =wbc B
[L = R] ^  B =wbc s top
(b) [BE] —¥ B =wbc [BE =  true] —> B
if L = R  
otherwise
if B E  is a value-expression
h) In s ta n tia tio n
p[a 1 , . . . ,  ctn](£'i) . . . ,  Em) =wbc i \E \/X i, . . . ,  Em/ x m]Bp)[ciif <71, . . . ,  anj  gn]
if p rocess p \g i,. . . ,  gn](% 1 , • • •, xm) : f  Bp endproc  is the format of the corresponding process 
abstraction for the process-identifier p.
j )  Local D efin ition
le t X\ : t-± =  E \ , . . . ,  x n 1 tn — En in B —wbc [E \fx \ , . . . ,  En/ x n]B
k) R elabelling  Let [5] be any instance [ai/gi, . . .  ,an/gn] of the post-fix relabelling operator. 
We associate with [5] the function S  on gate-identifiers defined by
S{gi) =  ai (1  < i < n)
S(g) =  g if g ^  gi{ 1 < i < n)
and S  maps the internal action i to itself.
We extend S  to lists, sets, strings etc. in the obvious way.
1 . stop[5] =wbc s top
2 . e x i t ( . . .)[S] =wbc e x i t ( . ..)
3. (a; 5)[S] =wbc S(a); B[S]
4. (B ! 0 S2)[S] =w6e 5i[5] 0 B 2 [S]
5. (B ! Bi[5] |[5(i4)]|B2[5|
if S  is injective on C{B\) U C(B2) U A
6. (5x > *  B 2 )[S\ =wbc BrfS] > *  B 2 [S\
7. {B1 [> B 2 )[S] = wbc B i [5] [> B 2 [S]
8. (h ide A' in  B)[S] =wbc h ide  A  in  5[5]
if S  is injective on C(B) U A ', and . (^.A7) =wbc A.
9. 5[5j =wbc B
10. =wbc B[S2]
11. ^[5'1][‘S'2] =wbc B[S2 o Si]
if S  is the identity on C(B) 
if Va G C(B).Si(a) =  S 2 (a)
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m ) In te rn a l A ction
1. Gt| 1J B  ~ wbc B
2. B  [] i; B  =wbc i; B
3. a; ( B x Q i; B 2 ) 0 (a; B 2 ) =wbc a; ( B \  Q i; B 2)
4. [ E / x ] B  [j (choice x  : t |] i; B )  =wbc choice x  : t Q i; B  if [.E] E Q(t)
n) E xpansion  T heorem s Let B  = [] {&*; B (  \ i  E I}, C  = 0 {cj jCj I 3 £ «/}
1. B  \ [ A ] \ C  =wbc 0 {bi-, ( B i  | [A] | C) | name (6,) £ A, * E /}
0 0 {cj; (B \ \ A ] \ C j )  I name (cj )  £ j  e <0
[| [] {a; (J3t-| [A] |Cj) | a =  6t- =  Cj, name (a) £  A ,  i  E / ,  j  E J}
if all 6j, Cj are of the form g \ E \ , . . .!E n
2. B [ > C  =wbc C
0 0 {^; ( B i [ >  C ) \ i e i }
3. h ide  A  in  B  =wbc 0 {^ »> h ide  A  in  B i  | name (&,) (fc A ,  i  E 1}
[| \\ {i; h ide  A  in  B i  | name (bi) E A, i  E 1}
if all bi are of the form g \ E \ . .  , \ E n
4. B [ S ]  = wbc 0 { S ( b i Y ,  B [ S ]  I « E /}
B .2 .4  Weak Bisim ulation Equivalence Laws
The following rules may be added to the above rules for weak bisimulation congruence when 
dealing with weak bisimulation equivalence. We denote weak bisimulation equivalence by &wbe.
1. B  £&w be B
2. Let C[] be a LOTOS context of the following forms:
( a )  g - , [ ]
(b) [] | [A] | B ,  or B  \ [A] | []
(c) [] » *  B ,  or B  » *  []
(d) [ ] ( > B
(e) h ide  A in  []
(f) [£] - >  []
(g) IMS]
(h) le t . . .  in  []
then B i  &wbe B 2 => C [ B \ \  C [ B 2],
3. B  ~ wbe C  => a; B  =wbc a] C ,  for all action-denotations a,
4. B  be C  —r* B  rHuihc C
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B .2.5 Testing Congruence Laws
The laws for testing congruence and equivalence are expressed in the pre-orders cred  and red  that 
generate them. B\ red  B 2 can be interpreted as “Bi implements B2\  cred  is the largest subre­
lation of red  that has the substitution property with respect to LOTOS contexts.
1. h Bi =wbc B 2 ==> Bi cred  B 2
Note : this means that cred  inherits all the laws for weak bisimulation congruence.
2. B  cred i; B
3. g\ {Bi 0 B 2) cred  g\B i [] g \B 2
4. g;B  1 cred g;Bi \\g ;B 2
5. Bi cred B 2 &; B 2 c red  B 3 => B\ cred  B3
6. Bi cred B3 & B 2 cred  B 3 => (Bi |] B 2) cred  B3
B .2.6  Testing Equivalence Laws
In addition to the above laws for cred  and testing congruence, we also have the following when 
dealing with red  or testing equivalence.
1. h B\ ube B 2 = >  Bi red  B 2
2. Let C[] be a LOTOS context of the following forms:
(a ) .?;[]
(b) [] | [A] | B, 0 1  B  | [A] | []
(c) [] » *  B, or B  » *  []
(d) [ )[>B
(e) [E] ->  []
(f) [][5]
(g) le t . in  []
then B\ red  B 2 =>■ C[B\] red  C[B2],
3. Bi red  B 2 & B 2 red  B3 =>■ Bi red  B3
4. Bi red  B 3 &; B 2 red  B3 => (B± [] B 2) red  B3
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A p p en d ix  C
RRL Rules
C .l  In trod u ction
In this appendix we give the actual RRL input files that were used for the experiments detailed 
in chapters 6 and 7. Since the presentation of the rules there was LOTOS like, rather than the 
form required by RRL, we begin by giving the mapping between the usual LOTOS syntax and 
the syntax required by RRL. Comments in the RRL input files are preceded by
T he R R L A lgebra
The sorts used in implementing LOTOS are: process, event, gatelist, rlist (relabelling list) and the 
universal type, univ, which is built into RRL. In addition to the algebra definition, we also include 
some subtyping information: all list types are a subtype of list. For the arities of the functions see 
the function declarations in the input files. The way these functions are used to implement the 
corresponding LOTOS ones is given in the next section.
R ep resen ta tion  o f  LOTOS constructs
Operators represented are given in table C.l; only Basic LOTOS has been considered.
RRL requires alphabetic function names rather than operator symbols. We also adopt prefix 
style for function application since RRL does not support mixfix parsing. Note that all variables 
in RRL must start with it, v, w, x, y or z. We try to be consistent in using x , y and z for processes, 
v for lists and u for events.
We now give the RRL input files which were used for the experiments in chapters 6 and 7.
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Operator Name LOTOS RRL
emptylist [] nl
inaction stop stop
termination exit exit
internal action i i
action prefix a; B seq (u, x)
choice Bi D B 2 ch (x, y)
general parallelism B i |[A]| B2 par (x, y, v)
interleaving Bi HI Sa par (x, y, nl)
enabling B\ f?2 en (x, y)
disabling Bi [> B 2 dis (x, y)
hiding hide A in  B hide (v, x)
relabelling B[S\ relabel (x, v)
Table C.l: List of LOTOS expressions and corresponding RRL expressions
C .2 A lgebra
This is the algebra for the LOTOS operators used in the completion experiments, i.e. in conjunction 
with the rule set core.
seq : event, process —>■ process
ch : process, process —> process
par : process, process, gatelist —> process
en : process, process —¥ process
dis : process, process —> process
hide : gatelist, process —> process
relabel : process, rlist —> process
exit : process
stop : process
i : event
nl : list
cons : univ, list -4 list
list < rlist 
list < gatelist
The use of < allows us to define, for example, list, generally, with all supertypes of list inheriting 
the properties and functions of list.
In addition to these declarations, ch is declared to be commutative. Function precedences are 
as described in chapter 6.
C .3 Core R ules
This is the set of rules, referred to as core in chapter 6, derived from the weak bisimulation laws 
of LOTOS which will give a confluent and terminating rule set when run through the completion 
algorithm.
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;; choice is declared as commutative 
ch(x, stop) == x 
ch(x, x) —— x
par (exit, exit, v) == exit 
par (exit, stop, nl) == stop
en(stop, x) == stop
en(exit, x) == seq(i, x)
en(x, en(y, z)) == en(en(x, y), z)
dis(x, stop) — — x 
dis(stop, x) —— x 
ch(dis(x, y), y) == dis(x, y) 
dis (exit, x) == ch (exit, x)
relabel(v, stop) == stop 
relabel(v, exit) == exit
seq(u, seq(i, x)) == seq(u, x) 
ch(x, seq(i, x)) == seq(i, x)
ch (seq (u, ch (x, seq (i, y))), seq (u, y)) == seq (u, ch (x, seq (i, y)))
Other attempts to extend the rule set (sometimes giving a complete set, but mainly giving 
divergent rule sets) use the following rules:
hide (v, en(x,y)) == en(hide(v,x), hide(v,y)) 
hide(v,stop) == stop 
hide(v,exit) == exit
dis(x, dis(y,z)) == dis(dis(x,y),z)
We also added associativity for choice, but this was done by declaring ch to be associative, rather 
than by giving the explicit rule.
For the case study, these rules are not sufficient. The remaining sections detail the new rules 
implemented for the case study proofs. These rules relate mostly to the introduction of the 
expansion laws for parallelism and hide. The resulting rule set is not complete.
We begin with the auxiliary data structures required, sets and lists.
C .4 S ets and L ists
Only a few set and list operations are required by the expansion rules.
{} : set 
s : univ —> set 
-H- : set, set -4 set
x ++ x == x 
x -H- {} = =  x
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The set constructor -H- is declared to be a-c. 
member : univ, list —» bool
member(u, nl) == false 
member(u, cons(u, xs)) — — true
member(u, cons(v, xs)) == member(u, xs) if not(u = v)
;;assume no duplicates 
equal : list f is t  —>■ bool
equal (x cons xs, ys) == equal (xs, delete (x, ys)) if  member (x, ys)
equal (x cons xs, ys) — — false if not (member (x, ys))
equal (nl, nl) == true
delete : univ, list —> list
delete (x, x cons ys) == delete (x, ys)
delete (x, y cons ys) == y cons delete (x, ys) if not (x = y)
delete (x, nl) == nl
C .5  G eneralised  C hoice and P arallelism
To implement the expansion law more easily, two new constructs are introduced: generalised 
choice, i.e. choice over a set of processes, and an auxiliary parallel operator.
Generalised choice notation is used to express the expansion laws. This operator is only a 
shorthand for many occurrences of binary choice and is not a part of the LOTOS syntax. Note that 
since the -H- operator is associative and commutative, we also get associativity and commutativity 
for generalised choice. In the following procset denotes a set of processes.
gch : procset —> process 
set < procset
ch (x, y) == gch (s(x) ++ s(y))
;; if a choice in a set is stop, then we can delete it, law b3. 
gch(s(stop) -H- xs) == gch(xs)
;; we can eliminate nested gch
gch(ys -f+ s(gch(xs))) == gch(xs ++ ys)
;; gch of a single element is just the element 
gch(s(x)) == x
;;gch of an empty list is stop 
gch({}) == stop
The last three rules ensure an uncluttered normal form for gch.
The parallel operator causes considerable problems in the RRL framework, because it is a 
ternary operator between two processes and a list of gate names that acts like an associative
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and commutative binary operator between two processes. In order to alleviate this problem, 
we introduce the auxiliary operator pp, which forms a process pair from two processes. The par 
operator is then redefined to take a process pair and a gate list. By declaring pp to be commutative 
we model the commutativity of par. Unfortunately we cannot do the same for associativity as 
the occurrences of pp are not adjacent, i.e. we have par(pp(par(pp(x, y), v), z), w). However, 
associativity of the parallel operators only applies when both synchronisation lists are the same, 
therefore, we may not actually use associativity very often.
The new definitions are as follows:
par : procpair, gatelist —» process 
pp : process, process —>■ procpair
C .6 C ase S tu d y  C on stan ts
Each constant in the Login case study of chapter 7 must be defined as different from all the others; 
this is achieved by mapping events into the naturals.
m l : event p i : event nl .■ event i :• event
m2  : event P2 : event delta :• event
m3 : event P3 : event n3 .■ event timeout :' event
m4  : event p4 event n4 •■ event tcancel :’ event
m5 : event p5 : event set :• event
m 6  : event p6  : event
m7 : event P7: event
0  : nat 
f  : nat —> nat 
c : nat —>• event
( f (x )  =  f ( y ) )  = =  (x  =  y )
(f(x) = 0)  = ~ false 
(c(x) = c(y)) == (x = y)
i == c(0)
delta == c(f(0))
m l == c(f(f(0 )))
m2  == c(f(f(f(0))))
m3 == c(f(f(f(f(0)))))
m 4  == c(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))
m5 == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(0)))))))
m 6  == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0 ))))))))
m7 == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0)))))))))
p i == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))))))
P 2  == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0)))))))))))
P 3  == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))))))))
P4 == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))))))))) 
p5  == m f ( f ( M f ( f ( f ( f ( f ( f ( f ( f ( o ) ) ) ) ) m m )  
P 6  == C(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(o )m ^^
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p7 = =  c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))))))))))))
n l = =  c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0 ))))))))))))))))) 
nS == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0))))))))))))))))))
n4 == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(mmmmf(f(m)))))))))))))))))) 
set = =  c(f(Ki(s(s(f(mms(f(f(f(f(f(f(i(f(o))))))))))))))))))))
tcancel == c(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(f(0) ) ) )» )))))))))))))))
timeout = =  c m f f m m m H H s a f f m m m s m ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
When added to RRL the following precedences must also be set: timeout > tcancel > set >
m l > m2 > m3 > m4 > m5 > m6 > m7 > p i > p2 > p3 > p4 > p5 > p6 > p7 > i > delta > c
> f > 0
C .7  H id e E xp an sion  R ules
These rules implement the hide expansion law and also describe how h id e  interacts with gch.
These rules are derived from laws n3, f4 and f6.
hide (v, gch(s(x) -H- xs)) == gch (s(hide(v, x)) -H- s(hide(v, gch(xs))))
hide (v, exit(nl)) == exit(nl)
hide (v, seq (u, x)) == seq (u, hide (v, x)) if  not (member (u, v))
hide (v, seq (u, x)) == seq (i, hide (v, x)) if (member (u, v))
C .8 P ara lle l E xp an sion  R ules
The expansion law for parallelism is implemented by the following functions:
expanda : procset, procset, gatelist —> procset 
expandb : procset, procset, gatelist —> procset 
expandc : process, procset, gatelist —> procset
An overview of how these functions operate is given in section 6.4.1. The actual RRL rules are 
given below.
The general form of the expansion rules is: 
par (pp(gch(x),gch(y)), v) == gch(expanda(x,y,v) -H- expanda(y,x,v) -f+ expandb(x,y,v))
We must also define cases for each function for the situation in which one process is a simple
process with either seq, stop or exit at the top level, and the other process has gch at the top level.
par(pp(gch(xs), seq(u,x)), v) == gch (expanda (xs, s(seq(u,x)), v) -f+
expanda(s(seq(u, x)), xs, v) ++ 
expandb(xs, s(seq(u,x)), v)) 
par(pp(gch(xs), exit(vl)), v2 )  == gch (expanda (xs, s(exit(vl)), v2 )  ++
expanda(s(exit(vl)), xs, v2) -H- 
expandb(xs, s(exit(vl)), v2 )) 
par(pp(gch(xs), stop), v) == gch(expanda(xs, s(stop), v) -H-
expanda(s(stop), xs, v) ++ 
expandb (xs, s(stop), v))
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Finally we have to cater for the situation in which both sides of the parallel operator are simple 
processes.
par(pp(seq(ul, xl),seq(u2, x2)), v) —— gch (expanda (s(seq(ul, xl)), s(seq(u2, x2)), v) -H-
expanda (s(seq(u2 , x2 )), s(seq(ul, xl)), v) -f-F
expandb (s(seq(ul, xl)), s(seq(u2 , x2 )), v))
par(pp(seq(u, x), exit(vl)), v2 )  == gch( expanda (s(seq(u, x)), s(exit(vl)), v2 )  ++
expanda (s(exit(vl)), s(seq(u, x)), v2 )  ++-
expandb (s(seq(u, x)), s(exit(vl)), v2 ))
par(pp(seq(u, x), stop), v) == gch( expanda (s(seq(u, x)), s(stop), v) -H-
expanda (s(stop), s(seq(u, x)), v) ++■
expandb (s(seq(u, x)), s(stop), v))
par(pp(exit(vl), exit(vl)), v2 ) == exit(vl) 
par(pp(exit(vl), exit(v2)), v3) == exit(vl) if equal(vl, v2) 
par(pp(exit(vl), exit(v2)), v3) == stop if not (equal(vl, v2)) 
par (pp (exit (vl), stop), v2 )  —— stop 
par(pp(stop, stop), v) == stop
We now define the functions expanda, expandb and expandc.
;;Rules for expanda
expanda (s(seq(u, x)) ++ xs, ys,v) == s(seq (u, par (pp(x, gch (ys)), v))) -f+
expanda (xs, ys, v) if  not(member(u,v)) 
expanda (s(seq(u, x)) ++ xs, ys,v) == expanda(xs,ys,v) if member(u,v)
expanda (s(seq(u, x)), ys, v) == s(seq(u, par(pp(gch(s(x)), gch(ys)), v))) if  not (member (u, v)) 
expanda (s(seq(u, x)), ys, v) == {} if member(u, v)
;; exit must synchronise with exit - it may not proceed on its own
expanda (s(exit(vl))  -H- xs, ys, v2) == expanda (xs, ys, v2)
expanda (s(exit(vl)), ys, v2 ) == {}
;; stop may not synchronise with anything or proceed on its own 
expanda (s(stop) -H- xs, ys, v) == expanda (xs, ys, v)
expanda (s(stop), ys, v) —= {}
expanda({} ,xs,v) == {}
;;Rules for expandb
;; apply expandc to a choice from the first set, together with the second set.
;; apply expandb down the rest of the first set.
expandb (s(x) -f-f xs, ys, v) == expandc(x,ys,v) •++ expandb(xs,ys,v)
expandb (s(x), ys, v) == expandc(x, ys, v)
expandb ({},ys,v) == {}
;;Rules for expandc
expandc (seq(ul,xl), (s(seq(ul,x2)) ++ ys), v) == s(seq(ul, par(pp(xl, x2),v))) -H-
expandc(seq(ul, xl), ys,v) if  member(ul, v) 
expandc (seq(ul,xl), s(seq(ul,x2 ))  ++ ys, v) == {} if  not member(ul, v)
expandc (seq(ul,xl), s(seq(u2 ,x2 ))  ++ ys, v) == expandc (seq(ul,xl), ys,v) if  not (ul = u2 )
expandc(seq(ul, x l), s(seq(ul, x2 )), v) == s(seq(ul, par(pp(xl, x2 ), v))) if  member (ul, v)
expandc(seq(ul, x l), s(seq(ul, x2 )), v) —— {} i f  not (member(ul, v))
expandc(seq(ul, x l), s(seq(u2 , x2 )), v) == {} if  not (ul = u2 )
expandc (seq(ul, x l), s(exit(vl)) -H- ys, v3) —— expandc (seq(ul,xl), ys, v3) 
expandc (seq(ul, xl), s(exit(vl)), v3) == {}
expandc (seq(ul, xl), s(stop) -H- ys, v3) == expandc (seq(ul, xl), ys, v3)
expandc (seq(ul, x l), s(stop), v3) == {}
expandc (exit(vl), s(seq(ul, x l))  -H- ys, v2) == expandc (exit(vl), ys, v2)
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expandc (exit(vl), s(exit(v3)) ++ ys, v2) == s(par(pp(exit(vl), exit(v3)), v2))
expandc (exit(vl), s(stop) -H- ys, v3) == expandc (exit(vl), ys, v3)
expandc (exit (vl), s(seq(u, x)), v2 ) == {}
expandc(exit(vl), s(exit(v2)), v3) == s(par(pp(exit(vl), exit(v2)), v3)) 
expandc (exit(vl), s(stop), v3) — — {} 
expandc (stop, ys, v) == {}
expandc (x, {}, v) == {}
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A p p en d ix  D
PAM  Input Files
This appendix contains the PAM input files used for the examples in chapter 9. Comments in the 
input files are preceded by —. Note that in some cases, only a portion of the input file is given, 
this is to avoid excessive repetition; the accompanying text details the parts omitted.
D . l  M ain  LO TO S “A x io m s”
This is the input file usually used in conjunction with LOTOS. The main operators are declared 
here, together with the PAM axioms, derived from the laws given in [BIN92], which allow the 
derived operators to be converted into choice and sequencing. Also included are the so-called 
“r-laws” for weak bisimulation congruence, branching bisimulation, testing congruence and trace 
equivalence.
— B asic LOTOS
— Axioms fo r  rew ritin g  LOTOS terms based on BIN:92 
signature
type Gate Action Process 
w ith Gate < Action  
operator  
i
d e lta  
stop  
e x it
- [] - 
_ »  _
- [> - 
hide _ on _
_ If  - ] |  -
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Acxion 
-> Action  
-> Process 
-> Process
Action Process -> Process 150 RIGHT 
Process Process -> Process 130 AC LEFT
Process Process -> Process 120 LEFT
Process Process -> Process 120 LEFT
Gate s e t  Process -> Process 30 RIGHT
Process Gate s e t  Process -> Process 100 AC LEFT 
Process Process -> Process 100 AC LEFT
axiom
— CHI and CH2 AC axioms, covered by operator d ec lara tion  
CH3 x [] stop  = x
CH4 x [] x = x
— th ese  f i r s t  th ree are covered by the expansion law i f  DELTA
— i s  used , but i t  may be more convenient to  use th ese  forms.
Pi e x it  I I I e x i t  = e x it
P2 e x it  I [s ]I  e x it  = e x it
P3 e x it  I [s ]I  stop  = stop
P4 x I I I y = x I [{}] I y
P5 stop  I [s ]I  stop  = stop
HI h ide A on stop  = stop
H2 hide A on (x [] y) = (h ide A on x) [] (h ide A on y)
H3A hide A on a .x  = a .(h id e  A on x) i f  n o t(a  in  A)
H3B hide A on a .x  = i .( h id e  A on x) i f  (a  in  A)
El stop  »  x = stop
E2 (x [] y) »  z = (x » z) [] (y »  z)
E3A a.x »  y = a. (x »  y) i f not (a eq
E3B a.x »  y = i . y i f (a eq
D1 stop  [> X  = X
D2 (x [] y) [> z = (x [> z) □ (y [> z)
D3A a.x [> y = y □  a.(x [> y) i f not (a eq
D3B a.x [> y = a.x [] y i f (a eq
DELTA e x it  = d e lta .s to p
— add th ese  fo r  observation  congruence 
0BS1 a . i . x  = a .x
0BS2 x [] i . x  = i . x
0BS3 a. (x [] i . y )  [] a .y  = a .(x  □  i .y )
— add th ese  fo r  branching b isim u lation  congruence 
BB1 a . i . x  = a .x
BB2  a . ( i . (x [] y) H  x) = a .(x  [] y)
— add th ese  fo r  t e s t in g  congruence 
TESTl i . (x [] y) n  i . y  = i . y  □  x 
TEST2 a. ( i . x  [] i . y )  = a .x  [] a .y
TEST3 i . ( a . x  [] a .y  [] z ) = a .x  [] i . ( a . y  [] z)
— add th ese  fo r  tra ce  congruence 
TR1 i . x  = x
TR2 a .(x  [] y) = a .x  [] a .y
expansion law 
EXP 
then
l e t X  = a l .x l
i—
i 
i __i [] an.xn y = b l . ■yi [] .
(x 1 [A] 1 y) = stop i f  (sync_move(x ,y) eq n i l )
(x 1 CA] | y) = Sum( [] , async jnove (x , y ))
(x 1 CAD 1 y) = Sum( [] , sync jnove ( x ,y ) )
[] bm. ym
i f  syncjnove(x,y) eq n i l  
i f  async_move(x,y) eq n i l
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(x I [A] I y) = Sum([] , asyncjnove(x,y))  [] Sum( [] , syn cju ove(x ,y )) otherw ise
w ith communication fu n ction  
broadcast
syn c(a , b) = a i f  (a eq b) and n ot(a  eq i )  and ( (a  in  A) or (a eq d e lta ) )  
async(a) = true i f  n o t((a  in  A) or (a eq d e lta ) )
so r t computation  
S o rt(sto p ) = {}
S o r t( i.P )  = Sort(P)
S o rt(a .P ) = {a} union Sort(P)
Sort(P  [] Q) = Sort(P) union Sort(Q)
Sort(P  III Q) = Sort(P) union Sort(Q)
Sort(P  I [A]| Q) = Sort(P) union Sort(Q)
S ort(h id e A on P) = Sort(P) d i f f  A
end
D .2  E xtra  LO TO S “A x io m s”
Occasionally the above laws are not enough to complete a proof, c.f. the scheduler example in 
section 9.5. Below is a selection of the PAM axioms, derived from the laws of the LOTOS standard 
[IS088], which may be useful for particular proofs; these axioms should be used in conjunction 
with the declarations and axioms of the previous section, therefore this section cannot be used on 
its own as a PAM input file. Also included in this selection is the declaration for the relabelling 
operator, and the associated laws.
Each group of axioms/laws is denoted by the labels used in the standard, prefixed by an S, 
otherwise some confusion with the axioms of the previous section may arise. We discuss each law 
individually, noting ones which are either not Basic LOTOS, in which case they are ignored, or 
which already occur in the previous set of PAM axioms.
— PAM axioms fo r  rew ritin g  B asic LOTOS terms based on the laws of
— th e  LOTOS standard.
— R e la b e llin g  i s  added to  the usual d e f in it io n s  and d ec la ra tio n s .
_ [ _ / _ ]  : : Process Gate Gate -> Process 300 — r e la b e llin g
— Axioms
— F ir s t ,  axioms which are a s tr a ig h t tr a n s la tio n  of the laws in  the LOTOS standard.
— a (a c t io n -p r e f ix )
— not B asic LOTOS.
— b (ch o ice )
— laws 1 and 2 covered by standard d eclara tion : choice AC.
— laws 3 and 4 covered by standard laws CH3 and CH4.
— stop  as a zero and choice idempotent.
— laws 5 - 7  not B asic LOTOS.
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— c (p a ra lle lism )
— laws 1 and 2 covered by standard laws: p a ra lle lism  AC.
— law 3a covered by standard laws PI and P2.
— law 3b covered by standard law P3.
— law 4 unnecessary as gate s e t s  are used rather than gate l i s t s .
— law 6  unnecessary as f u l l  synchronisation  i s  not used.
— law 7 covered by P4.
SC5 x I [s ]I  y = x I [ t ]I  y i f  t  eq (s in te r  (S ort(x ) union S o r t(y )) )
— d (enable)
— law 1 covered by standard law E l.
— law 3 not B asic LOTOS.
SD2 e x i t  »  x = i . x
SD4 (x »  y) »  z = x »  (y »  z)
SD5 x »  stop  = x I I I stop  i f  not (x eq e x i t )
— the s id e  con d ition  must be added as otherw ise th is  law leads  
to  a co n tra d ic tio n , see se c tio n  5 .5 .2 .
— e (d isa b le )
— law 4 covered by standard law Dl.
SE1 x [> (y [> z) = (x [> y) [> z
SE2 x [> stop  = x
SE3 (x [> y) [] y = x [> y
SE5 e x i t  [> x = e x it  [] x
— th is  axiom i s  covered by the laws D2 and D3B, but th is  form i s  more convenient.
— f  (h id in g)
— law 1 unnecessary as s e t s  are used rather than l i s t s .
— laws 5a, 5b and 6  covered by axioms H3A, H3B and H2.
— law 10 not B asic LOTOS.
SF2 h ide A on x = hide (A in te r  S o r t(x )) on x
SF3 h ide A on hide A’ on x = hide (A union A’ ) on x
SF4 hide A on x = x i f  ({}  eq (A in te r  S o r t(x )) )
— standard law HI i s  an instance of t h is .
SF7 hide A on (x I [s]I  y) = (h ide A on x) I [s]I  (h ide A on y)
i f  ({}  eq (A in te r  s ) )
SF8  h ide A on (x »  y) = (hide A on x) »  (hide A on y)
SF9 hide A on (x [> y) = (hide A on x) [> (h ide A on y)
— g (guards)
— not B asic LOTOS.
— h ( in s ta n t ia t io n )
— Since parameters are ignored, th is  i s  implemented by the PAM
— unfold  fu n ctio n .
“  J
— not B asic LOTOS.
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— k (r e la b e llin g )
— Note th at th ese  are s im p lif ie d  as r e la b e llin g  cannot be implemented
— as a fu n ctio n  in  PAM, instead  we use a p a ir of gate names.
— laws 10 and 11 are redundant under th is  implementation of
— r e la b e l l in g .
SKI stop  [a/b ] = stop
SK2 e x it  [a /b ] = e x it
SK3A (c .x ) [a /b ]  = c . ( x [ a /b ] ) i f
SK3B (b .x ) [a /b ]  = a .(x [a /b ] )
SK4 (x [] y) [a/b] = x [a/b] [] y [a /b ]
SK5 (x 1 [s ]I  y )[a /b ]  = x [a /b ] 1[ ( ( s  d i f f  {a}) union { b } ) ] 1 y [a /b ]
 not (c eq b)
— i f  more than one r e la b e ll in g  p a ir i s  p resen t, the user must ensure
— th a t the r e la b e ll in g  fu n ction  as a whole i s  in je c t iv e .
SK6  (x »  y) [a /b ] = x [a /b ] »  y [a /b ]
SK7 (x [> y )[a /b ]  = x [a /b ] [> y [a /b ]
SK8  (h ide A on x )[a /b ]  = hide ((A d i f f  {a}) union {b}) on x [a /b ]
— as w ith SK5, the r e la b e ll in g  fu n ction  as a whole must be in j e c t iv e .
SK9 x [a /a ] = x
SK11 x [a /b ] [c /d ] = x [c /d ] [a/b]
— m (in te r n a l a c tio n )
— laws 1 - 3  covered by the axioms 0BS1, 0BS2 and 0BS3.
— laws 4 not B asic LOTOS.
— n (expansion laws)
— law 1 implemented by PAM expansion law
— law 2 implemented by group of standard axioms D.
— law 3 implemented by group of standard axioms H.
— law 4 implemented by group of laws above SKI -  SK4.
— Some other axioms, a lso  derived from the laws of the LOTOS standard,
— which were added fo r  p a r ticu la r  p roofs.
H4 hide A on hide A on x = hide A on x
H5 hide A on hide A* on x = hide A* on hide A on x
ST x I [S o r t(x )]I  stop  = stop
NEWEXP (x [] y) I [s] | z = (x I [s] I z ) [] (y I [s] I z)
— t h i s  i s  added because th e PAM expansion law in s i s t s  on a l l  p rocesses
— being unfolded before expansion can take p la ce , but sometimes we don’t
— want every branch of a process to  be expanded.
D .3  “A x io m s” for th e  LO TO S cred P reorder
In some relations, rather than viewing the implementation as equivalent to the specification, we 
wish to show that the implementation approximates the behaviour of the specification. This can 
be modelled by the use of the cred  preorder. As described in section 8.4.2, cred  is implemented 
as a predicate, but axiomatised in the style of an equivalence. No restraints are placed on the 
application of cred  axioms by PAM; it is up to the user to apply the rules in the manner advised
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in section 8.4.2. As with the axioms of the previous section, the following axioms are designed to 
be added to the axioms and declarations of appendix D.l; they cannot be used as a PAM input 
file on their own. These PAM axioms were used in the Theracl proof, section 9.2.3.
— in  a d d ition  to  the usual d ec la ra tio n s:
_ cred _ : : Process Process -> Bool 20
— the cred axioms
— fo r  th ese  ru le s  we assume the conjecture i s  of the form (A cred B) = true
— base cases
CBASE2 A cred i.A  = true
CBASE3 a. (Bi [] B2) cred a .B l [] a.B2 = true
CBASE4 a .B l cred a .B l [] a.B2 = true
CBASE7 B cred B = true
— cred ru le s  which can be applied  as axioms,
— but only to  B in  (A cred B) = true
— and only r ig h t to  l e f t .
CRED2 A = i.A
CRED3 a. (B [] C) = a.B [] a.C
CRED4 a.C = a.B [] a.C
— axiom CRED1 comes by a llow ing terms to  be reduced by OBS r u le s .
— axiom CRED5, t r a n s i t iv i t y ,  i s  im p lic it .
— axiom CRED6  a llow ing implementations to  be combined
— cannot be implemented in  th is  s e t t in g .
D .4  T h e Login C ase S tu dy
— Login Case Study (recu rsiv e  version ) —
— P rotoco ls  d escr ib in g  in te r fa c e s  between e n t i t i e s ,  g iv in g  the s p e c if ic a t io n .
— P rocesses d ecrib in g  e n t i t i e s ,  g iv in g  the implementation.
— C onstrain ts d escr ib in g  some extra  inform ation e s s e n t ia l  to  the s p e c if ic a t io n .
con jectu re
PROCESSES = PROTOCOLS 
where
PROCESSES = ( (B I [ f i r s t ] I  A) I[second]I C) I [ th ir d ] | D
A = m l.( (n l.A )  [] (p i.A ))
B = m l.m 3.( ( n 3 .n l .B)
[] (p3.m 4.( (n4.m 6.p6.n l.B )
[] ( p 4 .s e t . (  (tim eout.m 6.p6.m 7.p7.nl.B )
[] (m5. tc a n c e l . p5.m6. p6.m7. p7. p i . B) ) ) ) ))
C = m 3.(n3.C [] p3.m6.p6.C)
D = m4.(n4.D [] p4.(m 5.p5.m 7.p7.D [] m7.p7.D))
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— p ro to co ls
PI = ml. (n l .P l  [] p i.P I )
P2 = m3. (n3.P2 [] p3.(P 2 [] m6.p6.P2))
P3 = m4.(n4.P3 [] p4.(P3 □  m7.p7.P3 [] m5.p5.(P3 [] m 7.p7.P3)))
— co n stra in ts
TIMER = p 4 .s e t . (m5.tcancel.TIMER [] timeout.TIMER)
DEALLOC.C = m3. (p 3 . m6 . p6 .DEALLOC_C [] n3 .DEALLOCjC)
DEALLOC-D = m4. (p 4 .m7.p7.DEALLOCJ) [] n4.DEALL0C_D)
SYSTEM = ml. (m 5 .p l.SYSTEM [] n 3 .n l .SYSTEM [] n 4 .n l .SYSTEM [] t im e o u t .n l. SYSTEM)
0RDERT1 = tcancel.pi.0RDERT1
0RDER3467 = m3.( p3.m 4.( p4.m6.m7. p7. 0RDER3467
[] n4. m6 . 0RDER3467)
[] n3 . 0RDER3467)
ORDER13467 = m l.m 3.( n 3 .n l . 0RDER13467
[] p3.m 4.( n4.m6.p6.nl.0RDER13467
[] p4.m 6.p6.m 7.p7.( n l . 0RDER13467
□  p i . 0RDER13467)))
0RDER4567 = m4.( p 4 .(  m6.p6.m7. p7. 0RDER4567
[] m5. p5.m6. p6.m7.p7. 0RDER4567)
[] n4 . m6 . p6 . 0RDER4567 )
0RDER1345 = m l.m 3.( n 3 .n l .ORDER1345
[] p3.m 4.( n 4 .n l .ORDER1345
[] p 4 .(m 5 .p l.0RDER1345 
0RDER167 = m l. ( m6 .p6 . (  m 7.p7.( nl.0RDER167 [] pl.0RDER167)
□  n l . 0RDER167)
[] n l . 0RDER167)
0RDER134 = m l.m 3.( p3.m 4.(n 4 .n l .0RDER134 □  p4.(nl.0RDER134 [] p i . 0RDER134))
[] n 3 .n l .0RDER134)
ORDERTIME = n4.m6.ORDERTIME [] p 4 .s e t . (  tcancel.p 5 .m 6 . ORDERTIME
[] timeout.m 6 .ORDERTIME)
PROTOCOLS = ( ( ( ( ( ( P 2  I[second ]| DEALL0C.C) I [{m3, n3, p3, m6 }]I  0RDER3467)
I[{m4, n4, p4, m6 , p6 , m7, p7}JI
( (P3 I [{m4, p4, n4, m7, p7}]I DEALL0C_D) I[th ird ]I  0RDER4567))
I [{m3, n3, p3, m4, n4, p4, m6 , p6 , m7, p7}]I 0RDER13467)
I[{m l, n l ,  p i ,  m3, n3, p3, m4, n4, p4, m5}]I
( ( ( (P I  I [ f i r s t ] I  SYSTEM) I[{m l, n l ,  p i ,  n3, n4, m5}]| 0RDER1345)
I[{m5, p4, tim eout}]I TIMER) I [{ p i ,  tca n c e l} ]I  0RDERT1))
I[{m4, n4, p4, m5, p5, m6 , p6 , m7, p7}]I 0RDER4567)
I [{p4, n4, s e t ,  tc a n c e l, tim eout, p5, m6 }]I ORDERTIME
macro
f i r s t  = 
second 
th i r d  =
end
• {ml, p i ,  nl}
= {m3, n3, p3, m6, p6}
; {m4, n4, p4, m5, p5, m7, p7}
D .5  T h e S im ple R ad ia tion  M achine
Several variants of the radiation machine example were presented in section 9.2; the input files for 
the first variant, Theracl, is given in its entirety here, as is the input file for Therac2. For all the
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other variants, only the Therac part of the definition is given; the complete input file is formed 
by taking the conjecture, test process, macros and rules from Theracl. For all of the radiation 
machine examples, the alphabet is: lb  — low beam, hb — high beam, Is  — low shield, hs — 
high shield, e l  — electron beam treatment, xr — xray beam treatment, and f i r e  — fire!
D .5.1 T heracl
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— Theracl
con jectu re
te s t o k .e x i t  = hide theracjevents on UNSAFETEST 
where
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine 
Theracl = STARTUP
STARTUP = SETUPL »  TREATMENT
SETUPL = ( lb .e x i t )  I I I ( I s .e x i t )
SETUPH = (h b .e x it )  I |I  (h s .e x i t )
TREATMENT = x r . XRAY [] el.ELECTRON [] e x it
ELECTRON = ( f i r e . TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
XRAY = (SETUPH »  ( f i r e . SETUPL) »  TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
— d e f in it io n  o f the t e s t  p rocesses
UNSAFETEST = STARTUP I [theracjevents] I ((lb .Is.T E ST ) »  t e s to k .e x i t )
TEST = Nothbhs »  (hb.N otlbhs) »  ( f i r e .e x i t )
Nothbhs = fire .N othb h s
□  lb.Nothbhs 
[] Is.N othbhs 
[] xr.Nothbhs 
[] el.N othbhs 
[] e x it
Notlbhs = ls .N o tlb h s
[] hb.Notlbhs 
[] xr.N otlbhs  
[] e l.N o tlb h s  
[] e x it
macro
therac_events = { lb , hb, I s ,  h s , f i r e ,  xr , e l}
ru le  DIS = +DELTA 
ru le  EN = *DELTA 
ru le  HIDE = *DELTA
*{D2 D3A D3B}; *{DELTA<} 
*{E2 E3A E3B}; *{DELTA<} 
*{H1 H2 H3A H3B}; *{DELTA<}
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ru le  INT = +DELTA; *P4; *EXP; *P5; DELTA< 
end
D .5.2  Sim ple Therac
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— s im p lif ie d  v ersio n  in  which the in terru p ts are t o t a l ly  removed.
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine 
Theracl = STARTUP
STARTUP = SETUPL »  TREATMENT
SETUPL = ( lb .e x i t )  III ( I s .e x i t )
SETUPH = (h b .e x it )  III (h s .e x i t )
TREATMENT = x r . XRAY [] el.ELECTRON [] e x it
ELECTRON = f i r e . TREATMENT
— o ld  v ersio n  ELECTRON = (fire.TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT 
XRAY = (SETUPH »  ( f i r e . SETUPL) »  TREATMENT)
— old  version  XRAY = (SETUPH »  ( f i r e . SETUPL) »  TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
— d e f in it io n  of the t e s t  p rocesses as in  sec tio n  D .5 .1 .
D .5 .3  M odified T heracl —  Version A
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— Theracl w ith new version  of SETUP without in ter le a v in g .
— SETUPH has events in  order hb, hs; th erefore  Theracla i s  unsafe.
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine 
Theracl = STARTUP
STARTUP = SETUPL »  TREATMENT
SETUPL = l b . I s . e x i t  
SETUPH = h b .h s .e x it
TREATMENT = x r . XRAY □  el.ELECTRON [] e x it
ELECTRON = (fire.TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
XRAY = (SETUPH »  (fire.SETUPL) »  TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
— d e f in it io n  o f th e t e s t  processes as in  sec tio n  D .5 .1 .
D .5 .4  M odified T heracl —  Version B
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— Theracl w ith new version  of SETUP without in ter le a v in g .
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— SETUPH has events in  order h s, hb; th erefore Theraclb i s  sa fe .
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine 
Theracl = STARTUP
STARTUP = SETUPL »  TREATMENT
SETUPL = l b . I s . e x i t  
SETUPH = h s .h b .e x it
TREATMENT = x r . XRAY [] el.ELECTRON [] e x it
ELECTRON = (fire.TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
XRAY = (SETUPH »  ( f i r e . SETUPL) »  TREATMENT) [> TREATMENT
— d e f in it io n  o f the t e s t  p rocesses as in  sec tio n  D .5 .1 .
D .5.5  T h eracld
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— a lte r a t io n s  from Theracl: new version  of SETUP with no in ter le a v in g ,
— ch oice and sequencing su b stitu ted  fo r  d isa b le .
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine 
Theracl = STARTUP
STARTUP = SETUPL »  TREATMENT
SETUPL = l b . I s . e x i t  
SETUPH = h s .h b .e x it
TREATMENT = x r . XRAY [] el.ELECTRON [] e x it  
ELECTRON = f i r e . TREATMENT [] TREATMENT
XRAY = TREATMENT
[] h s . (  TREATMENT
□  h b .( TREATMENT
[] f i r e . ( TREATMENT
[] I s . (TREATMENT [] l b .TREATMENT) ) ) )
— d e f in it io n  of the t e s t  p rocesses as in  sec tio n  D .5 .1 .
D .5.6  Therac2
— Therac-25 case study, due to  M. Thomas.
— This i s  th e tr a n sla ted  version  o f therac2 ( i . e .  p lus data typ es)
— Note th at because of the use of . in stead  of ; here, the tr a n s la t io n
— i s  s l ig h t ly  d if fe r e n t  from that in  sec tio n  1 0 .3 .2 .
— Gates and values are represented  g_u_v_w rather than g .u .v .w .
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conjecture
te s t o k .e x i t  =
hide (therac_events union f ir e .e v e n ts  union d elta_events) on UNSAFETEST 
where
— d e f in it io n  o f the therac machine
TREATMENTLowDown = x r . XRAYLowDown [] e l . ELECTRONLowDown [] d_LowJDown.stop 
TREATMENTLowUp = xr.XRAYLowUp [] e l . ELECTRONLowUp [] d_Low_Up.stop 
TREATMENTHighDown = x r . XRAYHighDown [] e l . ELECTRONHighDown [] d_High_Down.stop 
TREATMENTHighUp = x r . XRAYHighUp [] e l . ELECTRDNHighUp [] d_High_Up. stop
— e lec tro n  treatm ents
ELECTRONLowDown = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs) on
(FIRELowDown »  TREATMENTLowDown) [] TREATMENTLowDown 
ELECTRONLowUp = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on
(FIRELowUp »  TREATMENTLowUp) [] TREATMENTLowUp 
ELECTRONHighDown = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on
(FIREHighDown »  TREATMENTHighDown) [] TREATMENTHighUp 
ELECTRONHighUp = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on
(FIREHighUp »  TREATMENTHighDown) [] TREATMENTHighDown
— xray treatm ents
XRAYLowDown = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on
( TREATMENTLowDown 
[] h b .( TREATMENTHighDown
[] h s . (  TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] l b . ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] Is.TREATMENTLowDown) ) ) ) ) )
XRAYLowUp = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on
( TREATMENTLowUp
□  h b .( TREATMENTHighUp
[] h s . (  TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] l b . ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] Is.TREATMENTLowDown) ) ) ) ) )
XRAYHighDown = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on 
( TREATMENTHighDown
□  h b .( TREATMENTHighDown
[] h s . (  TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] l b . ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] Is.TREATMENTLowDown) ) ) ) ) )
XRAYHighUp = hide { lb , hb, I s ,  hs} on 
( TREATMENTHighUp 
[] h b .( TREATMENTHighUp
[] h s . (  TREATMENTHighUp
[] (FIREHighUp »  ( TREATMENTHighUp
[] l b . ( TREATMENTLowUp
[] Is.TREATMENTLowDown) ) ) ) ) )
FIRELowDown = ZAPLowDown
FIRELowUp = ERR0R55
FIREHighDown = ERR0R54
FIREHighUp = ZAPHighUp
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ZAPLowDown = f  ire_Low_Down. e x it
ZAPLowUp = f  ire_Low_Up.exit
ZAPHighDown = f  ire_High_Down.exit
ZAPHighUp = f  ire_High_Up.exit
ERR0R54 = err_ 5 4 .ex it  
ERR0R55 = err _55. e x it
— d e f in it io n  o f the t e s t  p rocesses
UNSAFETEST = TREATMENTLowDown I [{ f  ire_High_Down} union d elta jeven ts] I OVERDOSE
OVERDOSE = f  ire_High_Down. te s to k . e x it  
macro
fire_ ev en ts  = {fire_Low_Down, fire_Low_Up, f  ireJIighJDown, fire_High_Up}
theracjevents = { lb , hb, I s ,  h s, xr, e l ,  err}
delta_events = {dJLowJDown, d_Low_Up, d_High_Down, dJiighJJp}
need so r t computation 
end
D .6  T h e R ead ers and W riters E xam ple
— Readers and W riters Problem, due to  De N ico la , Inverardi and N esi.
— Gate parameters implemented by r e la b e ll in g .
— alphabet
— rb , re denote reader begin , reader end
— wb, we denote w riter  begin , w riter end
— p, v denote semaphore s ig n a ls
con jectu re
Spec = Impl 
where
— s p e c if ic a t io n
Spec = i .r b .r e .S p e c  [] i.w b.w e.Spec
— implementation
Impl = hide {p ,v }  on S I [{p , v } ] | (Proc [rb/b] [r e /e ]  | | |  Proc [wb/b] [w e/e])
S = p .v .S
Proc = p .b .e .v .P r o c
end
D .7  T h e C andy M achine E xam ple
— Candy Machine Problem, due to  De N ico la , Inverardi and N esi.
— Gate parameters modelled by r e la b e llin g .
— alphabet
— inlOp denotes input ten  pence
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— in25p denotes input tw en ty -fiv e  pence
— outlOp denotes output lOp
— out25p denotes output 25p
— tlOp denotes through lOp
— t25p denotes through 25p
— candy denotes output candy
— message denotes a p iece  of paper saying "try again"
conjecture
Spec = Candy 
where
— s p e c if ic a t io n
Spec = in lO p .(i.m essage .S p ec [] i.ou tlO p.Spec [] i . candy.Spec)
— Candy machine
Candy = hide {t25p , tlOp} on
( ( ( S lo t  [tlOp /  outlOp] [t25p /  out25p]) |[{ t2 5 p , tlO p}]I 
(F air [tlOp /  inlOp] [t25p /  in 25p ])) I [candy.events] I Turn)
S lo t = in lO p .(( i .m e ssa g e .S lo t)  [] ( i .o u t lO p .S lo t)  [] ( i .o u t2 5 p .S lo t ) )  
Fair = (in 25p .can d y .F air) [] ( inlO p. outlO p.Fair)
— Turn i s  an ad d ition  from the o r ig in a l.  I t  allow s a more natural
— s p e c if ic a t io n .
Turn = inlO p.(outlO p.Turn [] candy.Turn [] message.Turn) 
macro
candy ^ events = {inlO p, outlOp, message, candy}
end
D .8  T h e Scheduler E xam ple
— Scheduler Problem, due to  M ilner, and De N ico la , Inverardi and N esi.
— T ranslated from CCS.
— The implementation i s  a ltered  to  g iv e  two version s of Cl,
— one which can s ta r t ,  and one which has to  wait fo r  the g l a c tio n .
— The o r ig in a l had a f ir in g  process which sta r ted  Cl, but th is
— implementation i s  inappropriate fo r  LOTOS because of the
— m ulti way syn ch ron isation .
— alphabet
— a l ,  a2 denote the ‘ ‘s t a r t ’ * a ctio n s of C l, C2
— b l ,  b2 denote the ‘ ‘stop*' a c tio n s of Cl, C2
— g l ,  g2 synchronise the implementation Cl, C2
con jectu re
Spec = h ide { b l,  b2} on Sch 
where
— s p e c if ic a t io n  
Spec = a i.a 2 .S p ec
— implementation
Sch = hide { g l ,  g2} on (Cl I [ { g l ,  g2}]I C2)
Cl = a l . ( ( b l .g 2 .C l ’ ) [] ( g 2 .b l .C l’ ))
C l’ = g l . a l . ( ( b l .g 2 .C l’ ) [] (g 2 . b l . C l’ ))
C2 = g 2 .a 2 .( (b 2 .g l.C 2 )  □  (g l.b 2 .C 2 ))
end
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